IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA	Not Restricted	
AT MELBOURNE
Common Law Division
major torts list
S ECI 2021 04104

VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD	Plaintiff	
		
v		
		
ROONA NIDA	Defendant	

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JUDGE:	Gorton J	
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne	
DATE OF HEARING:	17 March 2023	
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	31 March 2023	
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Victorian Legal Services Board v Nida (No 2)	
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2023] VSC 154	

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CONTEMPT OF COURT – Civil contempt – Penalty and final orders – Indemnity costs – Fixing of costs - Whether necessary or appropriate to impose additional penalty - Whether an application for contempt can be brought or an order for costs made against a bankrupt – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Summary dismissal of defendant’s summons – Whether claim of contempt may be brought by summons in a proceeding when the alleged contempt is not in relation to the proceeding or the alleged contemnors are not parties to the proceeding – Whether application for contempt has no realistic prospect of success – Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 Order 75.06.

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APPEARANCES:
	Counsel	Solicitors	
For the Plaintiff	Mr S Ginsbourg	Corrs Chambers Westgarth	
			
For the Defendant	Self-represented	Not applicable	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A.  The scope of these reasons	2
B.  Background	2
C.  Application of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)	5
D.	The orders to be made consequential upon my finding of contempt	6
E.  The application summarily to dismiss Ms Nida’s summons	10
E.1  Does the summons raise issues that fall to be determined in this proceeding?	12
E.2  Is Ms Nida’s application otherwise scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or without merit?	14
E.2.1  The material before me	14
E.2.2  The merits of Ms Nida’s complaints	19
E.2.2.1 The Board	20
E.2.2.2  Ms Cecere	21
E.2.2.3  Constable Dan Wolf	22
E.2.2.4  The Office of Public Prosecutions and the bail application	22
E.2.2.5  Corrs Chambers Westgarth	22
E.2.2.6 An unlawful conspiracy more generally	22
F.  Disposition	23

HIS HONOUR:
A.  The scope of these reasons
1	These reasons concern the orders that should be made following my earlier finding that Ms Roona Nida, the defendant, acted in contempt of court, and the Victorian Legal Services Board’s (‘the Board’) application that a summons filed by Ms Nida be summarily dismissed.
B.  Background
2	Ms Nida is legally qualified.  The Victorian Bar Association (‘Victorian Bar’) refused to renew Ms Nida’s practising certificate.  Ms Nida commenced proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) seeking merits review of the Victorian Bar’s decision.  That proceeding remains on foot.  On 5 November 2021, the Board commenced this proceeding by which it sought an order restraining Ms Nida from engaging in legal practice.  On 19 November 2021, this Court made an order essentially in the form sought by the Board.  On 13 May 2022, the Board applied by summons for a declaration that Ms Nida was in contempt of court as a result of breaching that order.  The summons was amended on 17 August 2022.  
3	One of Ms Nida’s arguments in opposition to the finding that she was in contempt was that the order precluding her from engaging in legal practice was obtained as a result of a conspiracy against her that included the Board and those that acted for it.  I did not make findings on those allegations, because, as my reasons make clear, I concluded that, even if that were so, the order had to be complied with.
4	On 30 November 2022, Ms Nida filed a summons (dated 28 November 2022) returnable on 1 December 2022.  Her summons, although at times expressed in an unclear way, is directed, as I understand it, at obtaining orders that various persons have engaged in criminal contempt of court.  The summons also seeks an order that the Attorney-General be joined to the proceeding as a necessary party, and that the application be tried with a jury.  The summons has 15 ‘particulars’ that I set out in Part E below.  On 1 December 2022, the return date of the summons, Ms Nida also applied for a stay of the contempt application against her as she indicated that she sought to have her application and the Board’s application heard together.  I did not accede to that request.  I dismissed her application for a stay, and adjourned her summons to a date to be fixed after the determination of the Board’s contempt application.
5	On 5 December 2022, Ms Nida commenced proceeding no. S ECI 2022 04984 in this Court by filing an originating motion.  That proceeding names as defendants the Board, the Victorian Bar, the State of Victoria, Madison Branson Lawyers, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Legoll Lawyers, BKA Practice Co Pty Ltd, which is the company name of the law firm Belleli King & Associates, and John Searle, a barrister.  In that proceeding, Ms Nida seeks:
(a)	an order restraining the Board and the Victorian Bar from representing, doing or stating anything express or implied about her personal and/or professional legal matters that are yet to be determined before independent courts and tribunals;
(b)	an order requiring the Board, the Victorian Bar and the State of Victoria to commence without further delay an investigation of the complaint filed by Ms Nida against Belleli King & Associates (whose misconduct, Ms Nida contends, was responsible for her bankruptcy proceedings);
(c)	an order directing the Board and the Victorian Bar to commence a determination of an application filed by her for a change of her legal practising certificate;
(d)	a declaration that the Board, the Victorian Bar and the State of Victoria breached her human rights under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 and the Equal Opportunity Act 1995; and
(e)	an order that the Board, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Legoll Lawyers, Belleli King & Associates and John Searle are in criminal contempt of court for falsely swearing affidavits, making false and misleading submissions, and attempting to pervert the course of justice.
6	On 7 February 2023, after hearing evidence and argument, I determined that Ms Nida was in breach of the order made on 19 November 2021 and that she was guilty of civil, but not criminal, contempts and published reasons for that decision.  I listed the penalty hearing for Friday 3 March 2023.
7	The Board applied by summons filed 24 February 2023 for an order that Ms Nida’s summons be dismissed as an abuse of process or because it is ‘scandalous, frivolous or vexatious’, or alternatively for summary judgment on the grounds that it has an insufficient prospect of success to allow it to proceed.  That summons was made returnable on 3 March 2023.
8	On 2 March 2023, Ms Nida circulated an affidavit in support of her summons.  The affidavit says that it was affirmed on 17 August 2022, but the affirmation clause is dated 1 March 2023.  It was witnessed by a pharmacist and has not been filed.  On 3 March 2023 at 6:51am, Ms Nida circulated a proposed amended summons, another copy of the affidavit, and the exhibits to the affidavit.  The exhibits totalled 1,252 pages (although there was considerable duplication of documents).  On the morning of 3 March 2023, Ambulance Victoria left a message with my chambers to the effect that it was with Ms Nida and that she would not be able to attend Court that morning.  Ms Nida did not appear in Court when the matter was called on.  In the circumstances, I adjourned the further hearing of the matter to a date to be fixed. The matter was relisted for 17 March 2023.  Ms Nida appeared on that day.  I heard submissions on penalty and on the Board’s application to strike out Ms Nida’s summons.  Ms Nida explained that the date of 17 August 2022 on her affidavit was a mistake and that the affidavit had been affirmed on 1 March 2023.  She asserted that an affidavit could be witnessed by a pharmacist.  I do not consider that to be the case.  However, in the circumstances, and with the consent of the Board, I treated the affidavit as if it had been validly affirmed and filed.
9	It also emerged on 17 March 2023 that Ms Nida is currently a bankrupt, and has been so since a sequestration order was made in December 2020, albeit that she is challenging the processes that lead to the appointment of a trustee in the Federal or High Courts.  I gave the parties leave to file a further submission, if they wished to do so, limited to the implications of Ms Nida’s bankruptcy on either application before me.  
C.  Application of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
10	As discussed above, it seems that Ms Nida has been bankrupt for some time, probably since December 2020.  The Board submitted that the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) does not prevent it from pursuing its application or the Court from making a costs order against Ms Nida.  Ms Nida did not submit to the contrary.  I accept the Board’s submission.  Because of this conclusion, the precise date on which she was made bankrupt does not matter for present purposes.  
11	Section 58(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 vests, upon bankruptcy, certain property in the trustee of bankruptcy.  Section 58(3) then precludes a creditor from commencing a proceeding or taking a fresh step in a proceeding ‘in respect of a provable debt’ without leave of the Court:  
58  Vesting of property upon bankruptcy – general rule
…
(3) 	Except as provided by this Act, after a debtor has become a bankrupt, it is not competent for a creditor:
(a) to enforce any remedy against the person or the property of the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt; or
(b) 	except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court thinks fit, to commence any legal proceeding in respect of a provable debt or take any fresh step in such a proceeding.
12	A ‘provable debt’ is defined in s 82 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 as follows:
82  Debts provable in bankruptcy
(1) Subject to this Division, all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which a bankrupt was subject at the date of the bankruptcy, or to which he or she may become subject before his or her discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy, are provable in his or her bankruptcy.
…
(3)	Penalties or fines imposed by a court in respect of an offence against a law, whether a law of the Commonwealth or not, are not provable in bankruptcy.
13	It may well be that a party may not bring or continue a proceeding for contempt against a bankrupt if the contempt alleged is a breach of an order that the person pay a sum of money or transfer property.  In those circumstances, the obligation contained in the order may be a ‘provable debt’, and the contempt proceeding may be a proceeding ‘in respect of’ that debt.  That is not the case here.  The order that Ms Nida breached did not involve the payment of money or the transfer of any assets.  Accordingly, the Board’s application for a finding that Ms Nida was in contempt was not a step in a proceeding brought by a ‘creditor’ in respect of a ‘provable debt’ and so may be maintained notwithstanding her bankruptcy.   This result accords with common sense; it would be an odd result if the Court were unable to hold a person in contempt for failing to comply with an order that they behave or not behave in a certain way, as was the case with the order under consideration here, because that person has become bankrupt.
D.	The orders to be made consequential upon my finding of contempt
14	The principles applicable to sentencing in criminal proceedings apply, with necessary modification, to the question as to what orders should be made following a finding of contempt.
15	Ms Nida previously practised as a lawyer for many years.  I am satisfied that she was a citizen in good standing.  It is not suggested that she has been guilty of prior acts of contempt of court.
16	Ms Nida did not put any material before me relating to her financial position.  In light of her status as an undischarged bankrupt, I proceed on the basis that she has little or no money available to her.
17	Ms Nida put before me correspondence indicating that she has been subjected to family conflict and other stresses including ‘coercive control’ and ‘financial abuse’ that have caused her emotional distress, depression and anxiety.  I acknowledge that her interactions with the Victorian Bar and the Board, and the issues with her family, have caused her considerable stress and that she was under that stress when she engaged in the conduct that I have found was in contempt of court.  I have also formed the view that Ms Nida’s judgment is affected by a sense of anger and persecution.  
18	Ms Nida continues to contend that she acted appropriately and that the Board acted inappropriately in bringing and prosecuting the application for an order that she was in contempt.   She has shown little remorse or insight.  There is a need that any order made operate as a specific deterrent to her acting again in the way that I have found constituted a contempt.  However, balancing that, I take account of the fact that her conduct was limited to assisting her children with their legal affairs in circumstances where she felt there was a pressing need to do so.  She engaged in the conduct she did out of a desire to help her children and she did not seek to continue a legal practice offering services to the public generally, as she previously had.  Consistently with this, Ms Nida has always acted respectfully towards me and to this Court’s processes and she respects the law and the role of the courts.  She was not deliberately defying the Court’s authority, but allowed herself to believe that what she was doing was acceptable because she was acting for her children.  This somewhat increases the likelihood that the declaration that by so doing she was nonetheless in contempt of court and the making of any order will result in a change in her behaviour and reduces the need for punishment.  Although Ms Nida still needs to be deterred from engaging in legal practice including by offering legal services to her family members, I am satisfied that the risk of Ms Nida engaging in general legal practice outside her family without a practising certificate is small.     
19	The Board seeks an order that Ms Nida pay its costs on an indemnity and ‘gross sum’ basis.  It does not otherwise seek the imposition of a fine.  It filed affidavits in which it deposed as to its actual costs of the proceeding. The amount it seeks is $151,357.78.  That figure reflects:
(a)	$145,667.78  for work already invoiced;
(b)	$5,690.00, being its estimate of further fees that will be incurred.
20	Ms Nida submitted that the process through which she had been put, the public nature of that process, and the stress it has caused, are punishment enough, and reason to exercise my discretion not to order any costs against her.  She also pointed out that the Board had failed to establish that she had been in contempt of court when she appeared before the County Court of Victoria in the confiscation proceeding, and also failed in its argument that Ms Nida was guilty of criminal contempt of court, and that these were additional reasons for which costs, or costs in the amount sought, should not be ordered against her.  Other than noting that the amount sought was large, she did not dispute that the amounts sought were payable by the Board to its lawyers.
21	A party found guilty of a contempt of court will ordinarily be ordered to pay costs on an indemnity basis.  Subject to the qualifications below, there is no reason to depart from that practice in this case.  The costs are high, but that is, in large part, because Ms Nida fought the case tenaciously and at times inefficiently.  The Board should not be disadvantaged because of the manner in which Ms Nida defended the claims.  I consider it appropriate that I make an order that Ms Nida pay the Board’s costs, subject to the qualifications below, on an indemnity basis.  I am also satisfied that it is appropriate that I quantify the costs payable.  Not only will the figure chosen inform the general sentencing discretion, but to do otherwise would likely subject the parties to a lengthy, complicated and expensive taxation.
22	There are four reasons, however, for reducing the amount sought by the Board.  The first is that part of the costs claimed relate to Ms Nida’s summons, rather than to the prosecution of the contempt application.  The non-common costs of Ms Nida’s summons should be considered separately.  Recognising this possibility, the Board filed an affidavit in which it identified that, of the costs invoiced to date, $6,778.60 related only to Ms Nida’s summons.  The second is that part of the amounts claimed are estimates only.  I do not consider it appropriate to fix indemnity costs based on estimates.  The third is that the Board failed to establish that Ms Nida was in contempt of court in her dealings with the County Court.  Some allowance should be made for the non-common costs that were incurred by reason of those allegations being pursued.  Had those allegations not been made, then it is likely that less time would have been spent preparing for the hearing and in the running of the hearing, although there was considerable overlap in the issues that arose. The fourth is that the Board failed to establish that Ms Nida was guilty of criminal contempt.  I consider, though, that the allegation that she was guilty of a criminal contempt did not add much to the costs that would have been incurred even if the only allegation pursued was that she was guilty of a civil contempt.
23	Taking all these matters together, I consider it appropriate to order that Ms Nida pay the Board’s costs of the contempt application fixed in the sum of $110,000.
24	The fact that Ms Nida will be ordered to pay costs of this amount is a matter to be considered when deciding whether there should also be a fine.  The Board did not seek that I impose a fine in the event that I were to order and to fix costs on an indemnity basis.  In my view, and notwithstanding that I have fixed the costs at a figure lower than that which the Board sought, I consider that to be a sensible and realistic approach.  I am satisfied that the impact of the process itself, the public nature of my reasons and declaration, and the costs order will operate as a specific and general deterrent and vindication of the Court’s authority, and will otherwise satisfy the sentencing principles.  I will make no further orders on the contempt application.
25	Finally, I note that Ms Nida’s bankruptcy does not prevent the Court from making an order that she pay the Board’s costs.  An order that she pay costs creates a liability in her but not a provable debt because an order that she pay costs is not a debt or liability ‘to which [she] was subject at the date of the bankruptcy, or … by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of bankruptcy’.  
E.  The application summarily to dismiss Ms Nida’s summons
26	Ms Nida’s summons sets out 15  ‘particulars’.  They are as follows (the particulars start with paragraph number 2):

The Plaintiff:
2. On 17 March 2022, 23 March 2022, 12 May 2022, filed affidavits in connection with Summons in the Supreme Court Proceeding No. S ECI 2021 04104, falsely swearing that it cannot recall information when had the knowledge of the falsity of statement presented before the Honorable Court. (Corrs Chambers Westgarth lawyers for VLSB). 
3. Issued the above-mentioned Court Proceeding number with the wrongful intention to punish the Defendant and to cause prejudice to her pending VCAT Proceeding No Z83/2021, regarding a merit review and wrongfully relied on the ground of public interest to falsely justify the conduct before the Honourable Court. 
4. During the month of December 2021, consistently refused to comply with multiple directions of the VCAT, and ultimately induced the VCAT into striking out the Defendant’s VCAT Proceeding No. J83/2021 regarding her application for merit review that she had filed and served on 17 November 2021. (MICHELLE HARPER and DANIELAH LACONO of VLSB). 
5. Despite being served on 17 November 2021, with the subject application, the supporting affidavit and written submissions, vigorously refused to file a response within the required time frame, refusing to comply with multiple VCAT’S requests and directions in asking the Plaintiff to file an appropriate response and written submissions so that the VCAT can list the Defendant’s application for a merit review for a mention, and that the VCAT could appropriately hear the Plaintiff’s submissions on reasons for objections to the Defendant’s merit review application in the mention hearing day. (DANIELAH LACONO of VLSB). 
6. Refused to comply with the VCAT’s multiple directions by stating that it had no obligations to file a response, and on 10 December 2021, the VCAT strike out the Defendant’s merit review application before being heard in the first mention.  (DANIELAH LACONO of VLSB). 
7. Provided false and misleading statements in the affidavit dated 27 May 2022, in connection with the VCAT review application in the proceeding number No Z83/2021. (DANIELAH LACONO of VLSB). 
8. On 17 March 2022, 23 March 2022, the without a proper base issued an application in connection with seeking leave to join the Defendant’s son Mr. Maiwand Fazal’s Court Proceeding Number Cl-21-04843 (Confiscation Proceeding) which was listed for hearing in the Melbourne County Court on 22 and 24 March 2022. (Corrs Chambers Westgarth lawyers for VLSB). 
9. Filed false evidence in support of the above-mentioned application with the intention to obtain wrong court orders, and to defame the Defendant before the court in her son’s proceeding, despite receiving the Defendant’s undertaking by way of email in which she confirmed that she was not going to join her son’s court proceeding. 
10. Knowingly concealed the relevant information from the Honourable Court and evidence in the supporting affidavit sworn and filed in connection with application for seeking leave with the intention to obtain wrong Court Orders in granting leave to intervene in the subject proceeding. (Corrs Chambers Westgarth lawyers for VLSB). 
11. The intervention in the mentioned proceeding was unlawful and was ill intended. It was conspired to gather false evidence in support of issuing improperly the next Supreme Court proceeding against the Defendant to wrongfully justify the criminal prosecution of the Defendant on alleged contempt, with the intention to prejudice the Defendant’s pending delayed VCAT application for merit review and to wrongfully punish and prolong the final hearing of her application to March 2023. 
12. On 15 March 2022, made false and misleading submissions in the above-mentioned proceeding number in the County Court Melbourne (Confiscation Proceeding) before the Court when was asked by Honourable Judge Dyer regarding the date on which was first instructed by Mr. Fazal in connection with client’s matter. (Lawyer/ Witness- Simon Tsapepas). 
13. On 12 May 2022, provided contradicting, false and misleading information in the affidavit filed in connection with the contempt proceeding number S ECI 2021 04104. ((Lawyer/ Witness- Simon Tsapepas). 
14. On 3 June 2022, made false and misleading submissions in the County Court Melbourne proceeding number CR-22-00272 – FAZAL. (OPP). 
15. On 19 August 2022, provided false and misleading submissions in the Magistrate’s Court Melbourne proceedings number: Z01542472, Z01542475, Z01542476, Z01542610 (Interpleader Summons Proceeding) in support of an application for adjournment made on behalf of client Mr. Fazal. (Lawyer/ Witness Mr. Tsapepas, Lawyer/ Witness Sapna Khan and Lawyer/Witness Isabella Cecere). 
16. On 21 and 22 November 2022, provided false and misleading evidence in the Supreme Court proceeding number S ECI 2021 04104 listed before Honourable Judge Gorton. (Lawyer/ Witness Mr. Tsapepas, Lawyer/ Witness Sapna Khan and Lawyer/Witness Isabella Cecere)
E.1  Does the summons raise issues that fall to be determined in this proceeding?
27	Rule 75.06 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 provides as follows:
75.06 Procedure 
(1) Application for punishment for the contempt shall be by summons or originating motion in accordance with this Rule. 
(2) Where the contempt is committed by a party in relation to a proceeding in the Court, the application shall be made by summons in the proceeding. 
(3) Where paragraph (2) does not apply, the application shall be made by originating motion which— 
(a) shall be entitled "The Queen v." the respondent, "on the application of" the applicant; and 
(b) shall require the respondent to attend before a Judge of the Court. 
(4) The summons or originating motion shall specify the contempt with which the respondent is charged. 
28	The power to apply for punishment for contempt by summons filed in a proceeding is limited to alleged contempts committed ‘in relation to’ that proceeding.  For the most part, the applications that Ms Nida seeks to make by her summons deal with matters and conduct surrounding a VCAT proceeding or in the County Court rather than this proceeding.  Those claims are not alleged contempts committed by a party ‘in relation to’ this proceeding and so may not be made by summons filed in this proceeding.  To the extent that the summons seeks to do so, it is an abuse of process.  This is sufficient reason to strike out Ms Nida’s summons to the extent that it relies on particulars 3 to 12, 14 and 15.
29	Ms Nida in oral argument accepted that her allegation against the Board was that it was in contempt of VCAT, and she submitted that this Court has the power to deal with contempts committed against VCAT.  Even assuming that this Court has the power to hear a claim that persons have acted in contempt of VCAT, a point on which I make no finding, that does not overcome the fact that any such claim could not be made by summons in this proceeding because it would not be a contempt ‘in relation to a proceeding in the Court’.
30	Particulars 2, 13 and 16 do refer to alleged conduct in relation to this proceeding.  Particular 2 contends that Corrs Chambers Westgarth swore false affidavits and filed them in this proceeding.  Particular 13 contends that Mr Simon Tsapepas swore and filed a false affidavit in this proceeding.  Particular 16 contends that Mr Tsapepas, Ms Sapna Khan and Ms Isabelle Cecere provided false evidence before me.  
31	A distinction must be drawn between perjury, which applies in the case of false evidence and is not punishable summarily, and contempt.  But I accept, for present purposes, that the line between the two is unclear and that it is at least arguable that deliberately swearing a false affidavit or deliberately giving false evidence with the intention of misleading the Court may amount to a contempt of court and be pursued summarily. 
32	However, the ability to apply for punishment for contempt by summons within a proceeding is also limited to an application in relation to a ‘party’.  Ms Nida submitted that the word ‘party’ should be read to include witnesses and advocates.  I disagree.  I read the reference in r 75.06(2) to a ‘party’ as a reference to one of the parties to the litigation, and not as extending to witnesses or the lawyers who represent parties.  For this reason, Ms Nida’s summons is also an abuse of process to the extent that it relies on particulars 2, 13 and 16.
33	It follows from this that Ms Nida’s applications, if they are to be made, must be made by filing an originating motion rather than by summons filed in this proceeding, and the summons filed in this proceeding should be dismissed. 
34	As noted above, Ms Nida has already commenced a proceeding by originating motion in which allegations similar to those made before me have been made.  That proceeding is not presently before me.  It may be that Ms Nida’s summons in this proceeding is also an abuse of process (or vexatious) because it duplicates allegations made in another proceeding.  However, I do not need to, and do not, decide that.
E.2  Is Ms Nida’s application otherwise scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or without merit?
35	I will also consider whether Ms Nida’s affidavit should, in any event, be summarily dismissed for other reasons.
E.2.1  The material before me
36	Ms Nida’s affidavit contained both evidence and submissions.  Her material, and the material otherwise before me, establishes the following:
(a)	Belleli King & Associates performed work for Ms Nida, or for a company associated with her.  They sued for fees and obtained default judgments against her.   Ms Nida made a complaint to the Board about the conduct of Belleli King & Associates.  According to Ms Nida, the Board refused to investigate this complaint.  The judgment debts against her in favour of this firm were the basis of bankruptcy notices and then a creditors’ petition.  A bankruptcy notice based on a default judgment was served on her in or about June 2017.  That judgment was set aside, but another default judgment was entered, and then a second bankruptcy notice was served.  A creditors’ petition was filed.   There are ongoing bankruptcy proceedings against her that are presently before the Federal Court.  Ms Nida informed me that a sequestration order has been made, and that she is applying for special leave to appeal to the High Court.  
(b)	Ms Nida claims to have lodged an application with the Board on 18 November 2019 regarding a change to her practising certificate to allow her to practice as a solicitor rather than as a barrister.  Her exhibits included an email that was consistent with such an application being made at that time.  But although the email said that an application was attached, the attachment was not included in the exhibit and may, or may not, have been attached to the email as sent.  In March 2021, the Board said that it had no record of that application and asked her to resend the relevant material.  She did so.  Ms Nida contends that the Board was slow in its responses.  
(c)	On 29 April 2021, the Board recommended to the Victorian Bar that it investigate Ms Nida on the basis that she had not disclosed bankruptcy proceedings brought against her.  The Victorian Bar sent her a ‘show cause letter’.  Ms Nida says that she had disclosed the bankruptcy proceedings and that this letter was sent without reasonable basis or justification.  She believes, it seems, that the show cause letter was sent to her because the authorities were unhappy that she had acted, pro bono, for persons bringing certain claims.  Ms Nida also asked the Victorian Bar to investigate the complaint against Belelli King & Associates, but it failed to do so.  She contends that both the Board and the Victorian Bar treated her unfairly.
(d)	On 19 August 2021, the Victorian Bar decided not to renew Ms Nida’s practising certificate.  On 17 November 2021, Ms Nida commenced a proceeding in VCAT for a review of that decision.  On 17 November 2021, VCAT struck out that application.  Ms Nida contends that this was because the Board had provided ‘false information, with the intention to cause confusions in the mind of the Registrar’.  
(e)	In September 2021, Ms Nida communicated her concerns to the Attorney-General’s office.
(f)	In late October and early November 2021, Michelle Harper from the Board emailed Ms Nida about a complaint made against her in 2016 (which had already been resolved).  
(g)	On 5 November 2021, the Board commenced this proceeding in which it sought an order restraining Ms Nida from engaging in legal practice.  On 3 November 2021, Ms Harper sent a letter to Ms Nida relating to statutory powers that it proposed to exercise.
(h)	On 19 November 2021, O’Meara J made the order that restrained Ms Nida from engaging in legal practice.  
(i)	On an unspecified date, VCAT reinstated Ms Nida’s application before it.  The proceeding at VCAT then suffered from various delays, for which Ms Nida blames the Board.  She contends that the Board misled VCAT.
(j)	In March 2022, Ms Nida engaged in conduct relating to a County Court proceeding that concerned her son Hamad Fazal  The role she played is considered in detail in my reasons for judgment.  I did not conclude that Ms Nida acted in contempt of court by her involvement in that proceeding.  Prior to that hearing, the Board had put Ms Nida ‘on notice’ not to join that proceeding.  It also communicated to the County Court and ‘falsely alleged’ that she intended to appear at that proceeding as the legal practitioner for her son.  Ms Nida contends that Ms Cecere of Corrs Chambers Westgarth ‘manipulated’ the evidence relating to that matter and that the Board provided ‘false evidence in multiple affidavits’ in support of its ‘unlawful intervention’.    
(k)	Also in March 2022, Ms Nida engaged in conduct relating to a Magistrates’ Court interpleader proceeding.  Again, the role she played is considered in detail in my reasons for judgment. I concluded that Ms Nida did act in contempt of court by her involvement in that proceeding.
(l)	On 31 March 2022, Ms Nida asked the Board to review its decision regarding her practising certificate or for its consent to stay the operation of O’Meara J’s order pending final determination of the issue as to whether or not her certificate should have been renewed.  The Board responded contending that Ms Nida had breached the order by her involvement in the County Court directions hearing.  As noted, and after a hearing, I later concluded that Ms Nida did not breach the order by that involvement.  
(m)	On 19 April 2022, the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, who also acted for the Board, wrote to Ms Nida in relation to a matter where she had assisted someone in a claim against Victoria Police, and indicated that it might apply to have the proceeding struck out.  
(n)	On 3 May 2022, Constable Dan Wolf swore an affidavit that was filed in this proceeding.  Constable Dan Wolf was the informant in the confiscation and interpleader proceedings referred to in my earlier reasons for judgment that involved Ms Nida’s sons.  Among other things, Constable Dan Wolf exhibited a 2 March 2022 email from Ms Nida to him in which she stated that she was ‘still assisting in the subject matter’.  Ms Nida contends, as I understand it, that the use of that phrase establishes that her involvement was as a mother not as a lawyer.  
(o)	On 13 May 2022, the Board filed its summons seeking an order that Ms Nida be found guilty of contempt as a result of her conduct at various times in March 2022.  On 12 May 2022, Ms Cecere affirmed an affidavit.  Ms Cecere gave evidence at the hearing on 21 November 2022 and was cross-examined by Ms Nida.  In relation to that affidavit:
(i)	Ms Nida contends that Ms Cecere said that the Board had not received a response to a communication, when Ms Nida said that she had responded.  
(ii)	Ms Nida contends that the affidavit concealed relevant information to justify the ‘unlawful conduct perpetrated against’ her including the issue of the summons for contempt ‘without proper basis’ and ‘for unlawful purpose’.  
(iii)	Ms Nida contends that Ms Cecere’s statement that she had had discussions with ‘the OPP, the VLSB and Mr Simon Tsapepas solicitor on behalf of Mr Maiwand Fazal’ was ‘clear evidence’ that she was ‘a victim of conspiracy’, and that the Board was in ‘serious breach of overarching obligations’ because it acknowledged that Maiwand Fazal had engaged a solicitor, and so, I understand it is contended, it could not be the case that Ms Nida was engaging in legal practice to the extent that she was assisting Maiwand.    
(iv)	Ms Nida contends that Ms Cecere attempted to mislead the Court by exhibiting emails Ms Nida circulated on 21 March 2022 and 23 March 2022; that Ms Cecere ‘decided to conceal relevant information with the intention to wrongfully justify the brutal unlawful conduct’ against her.
(v)	Ms Nida also contends that Ms Cecere intended to mislead the Court for an improper purpose when she deposed that: ‘Notwithstanding the above, I on behalf of the VLSB attended the directions hearing on 24 March 2022.  While Ms Nida did not attend, I informed Judicial Registrar  Wilson that to the extent Ms Nida attempts to appear, she is unable to do so’.  There is no realistic prospect that that conclusion could be drawn.
(p)	On 27 May 2022, Danielah Lacono of the Board swore an affidavit in the VCAT proceeding.  That affidavit summarises complaints made about Ms Nida that Ms Nida says are baseless.  Ms Nida contends that the Board and the Victorian Bar acted improperly in relation to those complaints and in the VCAT proceeding.
(q)	On 3 June 2022, the OPP told the County Court, in the context of her son’s bail application, that Ms Nida’s surety should be assessed in a context where the Victorian Bar had ‘refused to renew her practising certification’, that ‘her integrity is being questioned’, and that she had engaged in breaching court orders.  
(r)	On 15 August 2022, Corrs Chambers Westgarth sent a letter to Ms Nida demanding her undertaking not to assist her son in the upcoming proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court.  Ms Nida contends that this was done because Corrs Chambers Westgarth were acting for the finance companies and that they thought their prospects of succeeding would be harmed if Ms Nida assisted her son.
(s)	The Board’s contempt application was listed for hearing on 18 August 2022.  Ms Nida sought an adjournment.  She said she needed an extension of time to prepare her defence, and also provided ‘a medical certificate’.  The Board did not agree to an adjournment.  Ms Nida contends that the Board’s wish to have the matter heard on that day reflected its ‘demands for running the trial in absolute disregards of everything else’ including the material that, she said, established that she was dealing with ‘extreme crisis’.  She contends that this was being done to ‘punish’ her.  There was a mention on 17 August 2022 before me at which Ms Nida formally applied for an adjournment of the 18 August 2022 hearing.  She assured me that she would engage solicitors within three weeks.  I adjourned the hearing.  She did engage solicitors, but they later withdrew.
(t)	An interpleader proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court involving Ms Nida’s son was listed to be heard on 19 August 2022.  Finance companies claimed interests in cars that were in her son’s name.  The Board sought her undertaking that she would not, in Ms Nida’s words, ‘assist’ her son in that proceeding.  Ms Nida perceived that her son was in need of assistance, because he was in rehabilitation and could not afford legal fees.  She observed that the same legal firm that acted for the Board, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, also acted for the finance companies.
E.2.2  The merits of Ms Nida’s complaints
37	On the material before me, there is no realistic prospect that Ms Nida can establish the matters she seeks to do so in her summons.  I set out below my observations on the various allegations made by Ms Nida based on both her summons and her affidavit.
E.2.2.1 The Board
38	The Board has been involved in both seeking the order that restrained Ms Nida from engaging in legal practice, and in enforcing that order.    The Board was attempting to prevent Ms Nida from engaging in conduct that it thought was unlawful, Ms Nida was vigorously disputing that her conduct was unlawful, and there were occasions where the Board did not accept assertions made by her or accede to her requests.  It is, perhaps, understandable that Ms Nida might think that the Board was acting with a view to making her life difficult, because that has been a result of its action.  But the allegations the Board made have in large part been established, and those that were not established were well arguable and properly presented.   
39	Notwithstanding the lack of clarity in the summons itself, it became apparent that Ms Nida contended that the Board was in contempt of VCAT.  I asked Ms Nida to identify the order made by VCAT with which, she contended, the Board failed to comply.  She confirmed that she did not contend that the Board had breached an order.  Rather, she referred to correspondence in which VCAT had invited, or sought, certain documents or information from the Board, and contended that the Board had delayed providing the information that was sought and then, months later, provided it without there being any proper reason for the delay.  She submitted that its conduct justified an inference that the Board had an improper motive.  In my view, the material to which Ms Nida drew my attention could not justify a finding that the Board had acted in contempt of VCAT.  Even if it could be inferred that the Board was responsible for unwarranted delays, as to which I make no finding, and had improper motives, an inference that I do not consider could be drawn from the material that Ms Nida took me to, that could not, in the absence of a breach of an order, or perhaps some overt sign of disrespect, amount to a contempt.
40	There is no reason for which Ms Nida, as a trained lawyer, should object to the County Court of Victoria being informed of the order made by O’Meara J.  Notwithstanding that I did not conclude that Ms Nida’s involvement in her son’s case in the County Court of Victoria was in contempt of court, the matter was not straightforward and the contention by the Board that she had or would be in contempt was able properly to be made.  There is no realistic prospect that its making of that contention or its refusal to agree to a stay of O’Meara J’s order justify the drawing of a conclusion that it was acting with an improper motive or was involved in an unlawful conspiracy to harm Ms Nida.
41	More generally, on the material before me, there is no realistic prospect that the Board’s conduct could justify a conclusion that it was involved in an unlawful conspiracy to harm Ms Nida.
E.2.2.2  Ms Cecere 
42	I consider any omission by Ms Cecere to refer to a communication, if there were one, to be an inconsequential mistake.  I reject Ms Nida’s characterisation that Ms Cecere’s affidavit concealed relevant information in order to justify unlawful conduct including the issue of the summons without proper basis and for an improper purpose.  The emails that Ms Cecere exhibited are simple emails in which Ms Nida informed the Court and others that she would not be joining the hearings.  The paragraphs of the affidavit that Ms Nida refers to simply identify and exhibit the emails without any comment.  There is no issue that the emails were sent and that the copies exhibited were true, unaltered copies.  Ms Nida had the opportunity to produce whatever other correspondence she wished if she thought the emails had to be seen in some broader context.  There is nothing exceptional or unusual about Ms Cecere’s affidavit.  
43	Ms Nida contends, as I understand it, that some of the correspondence that suggested that she was potentially in breach of O’Meara J’s order were ‘without any basis and with unlawful intention to punish and cause [her] further hardships and trauma and to wrongfully justify the issuing’ of the summons.  I found that Ms Nida was in contempt, and it cannot be said that the Board’s summons was filed without a proper basis or for an unlawful purpose or that the bringing of the contempt application was in any way unwarranted.  
44	Having heard Ms Cecere give evidence, and considered the issues between the parties, I consider that there is no realistic prospect that it could be established that she acted dishonestly or for an improper motive.
E.2.2.3  Constable Dan Wolf 
45	If Ms Nida is contending that it was improper for anyone to suggest that she was not acting only as a mother, then I consider that contention is without any prospect of success.  If there is a complaint about Constable Dan Wolf’s affidavit, there is nothing in it because it essentially merely exhibited correspondence.
E.2.2.4  The Office of Public Prosecutions and the bail application 
46	The observations made by the Office of Public Prosecutions (‘OPP’) were correct (although the breach of orders was then only an allegation, I have since concluded that she had, by that time, in fact breached the order in some respects).  There was nothing improper in the OPP bringing these matters to the Court’s attention.  Ms Nida was able to contend to the contrary.  There is no realistic prospect that this could justify a conclusion that the OPP was involved in an unlawful conspiracy to harm Ms Nida.
E.2.2.5  Corrs Chambers Westgarth 
47	Corrs Chambers Westgarth is a large law firm.  It is, perhaps, unfortunate that it was acting both for the Board in its dispute with Ms Nida and for the finance companies in their dispute with Ms Nida’s son.  In both capacities, Corrs Chambers Westgarth was acting contrary to Ms Nida’s interests.  But on the material placed before me, there is no realistic prospect that this fact, or its conduct, could justify a conclusion that Corrs Chambers Westgarth was involved in an unlawful conspiracy to harm Ms Nida.
E.2.2.6 An unlawful conspiracy more generally
48	Ms Nida contended, in the proceeding before me, that Ms Khan, Mr Tsapepas and, I infer, Ms Cecere, were engaged in a conspiracy to cause her harm, and that Mr Tsapepas and Ms Khan had given false evidence.  I rejected those contentions.  On the material before me, there is no realistic prospect that a claim that those persons were in contempt of court in the way they gave their evidence before me could succeed, or that they were involved in an unlawful conspiracy to harm Ms Nida.
49	Accordingly, had I not decided that Ms Nida’s summons should be struck out as an abuse of process because it raised issues that should not be litigated in this proceeding, I would, on the material presently before me, have summarily dismissed the summons in any event on the basis that it has no realistic prospect of success.
F.  Disposition
50	I will declare that Ms Nida was in contempt of Court by breaching orders made by the Honourable Justice O’Meara on 19 November 2021, by doing the following whilst she did not hold an Australian practising certificate:
(a)	Between 2 and 4 March 2022, and by her email communications and appearances in court, engaging in legal practice, and implying that she was entitled to engage in legal practice, in connection with an interpleader summons proceeding in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court; and 
(b)	On various dates between 2 and 15 March, representing an entitlement to engage in legal practice by identifying herself as a barrister at the Victorian Bar in her email communications.
51	I will order that Ms Nida pay the Board’s costs of its summons filed 13 May 2022 fixed in the sum of $110,000.
52	I will order Ms Nida’s summons dated 28 November 2022 filed in this proceeding on 30 November 2022 be dismissed and that Ms Nida pay the Board’s non-common costs of that summons to be taxed in default of agreement.