QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:	Saxer v Hume [2022] QCATA 25	
PARTIES:	sarah saxer	

(applicant/appellant)	

	v	
	troy hume
amy schneillinger	

(respondents)	

APPLICATION NO/S:	APL363-20	
ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:	MCD 1/20 Nanango	
MATTER TYPE:	Appeals	
DELIVERED ON:	2 March 2022	
HEARING DATE:	On the papers	
HEARD AT:	Brisbane	
DECISION OF:	Judicial Member D J McGill SC	
ORDERS:	Leave to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal on 9 November 2020 refused.  	
CATCHWORDS:	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – jurisdiction – minor civil dispute – no jurisdiction for specific performance of contract or for declaration 
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 11, s 13(2), s 52(2), Schedule 3  
Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219 Gerhardt v Hanlon [2011] QCATA 356
Hashfield v Gold Coast City Council [2020] QCATA 36  
Kellogg v Board of Trustees the Ipswich Girls’ Grammar School [2011] QCATA 210 
Right v Burrett [2020] QCATA 71
	
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:	
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)	

REASONS FOR DECISION
[1]	This is an application for leave to appeal from the decision of a Member of the Tribunal who, on 9 November 2020, dismissed the appellant’s application on the ground that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide it.  The application for leave to appeal was filed on 1 December 2020, and the appellant on 19 March 2021 filed a statutory declaration repeating the grounds set out in the application.  The respondents have not filed any submissions, despite an extension of time to do so.  
[2]	Because this matter was a minor civil dispute, leave is required to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal.  As a general proposition, when leave to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal is required, it will be granted only where there is a reasonable argument that the decision was attended by error and an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by that error, or where the appeal raises a question of general importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal would be to the public advantage. In deciding whether grounds for leave to appeal have been shown, it is relevant to consider that the proceeding was a minor civil dispute, and the obligation on the Tribunal was to make orders it considered to be fair and equitable to the parties to the proceeding in order to resolve the dispute: the QCAT Act s 13(1).  The Tribunal was also required to comply with the QCAT Act s 28 and s 29.  
Background
[3]	The material filed by the appellant indicates that her claim is that in 2019 there was an agreement between her and the respondents under which she would sell a horse to the respondents for $2,500 and the respondents would sell her a horse for $4,000, with the balance of $1,500 to be paid by the appellant into the respondents’ bank account.  Each of the horses has been delivered to the relevant purchaser, but the respondents have refused to provide bank details to enable the balance to be paid, and, when the appellant sent a bank cheque for the amount, the respondents sent her a video of its being burned.  Importantly, the respondents have failed to provide the documents necessary to enable the registration of the horse they sold to be transferred into the name of the appellant, although the relevant documents for the other horse were provided to the respondents.  
[4]	The respondents have claimed that the horse sold to them is infertile, a claim the appellant refutes.  During the hearing, when the male respondent appeared by telephone, he claimed to have something from the Local Court at Liverpool, New South Wales, in relation to the recovery of possession of the horse delivered to the appellant.  No such document has been provided to the Tribunal, and I doubt if an order to return the horse has been made by a Local Court, because, apart from the fact that property in the horses had passed on or before delivery, so far as I can see that Court has no jurisdiction to set aside contracts on any grounds.  
[5]	In her original application, the appellant sought:
(a)	Either an order for the respondents to provide a signed transfer of [the horse’s] registration from them to me; or  
(b)	An order acknowledging that I am the legal owner of [the horse] to allow the Paint Horse Association of Australia to proceed with the transfer of registration of the horse into my name.  
Decision of the Member
[6]	The Member held that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to grant this relief.  The situation was the same as in the decision of the Appeal Tribunal in Right v Burrett [2020] QCATA 71, supported by the decision in Hashfield v Gold Coast City Council [2020] QCATA 36.  The former case also involved the sale of a horse and an attempt by the purchaser to obtain a signed transfer form from the vendors, and the Member said that it was not distinguishable, and showed that the proceeding was not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  Accordingly the application was dismissed.  
 Grounds of Appeal
[7]	The appellant relied on three grounds of appeal in the application for leave to appeal, as follows:
(a)	The Member erred at law in discussing the application.  -  This does not identify a ground of appeal, even if one reads “deciding” for “discussing”.  I have read the transcript and did not detect any error of law on the part of the Member.  
(b)	The Member did not take into account all of the evidence which shows that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter.  -  Whether or not the Tribunal had jurisdiction did not turn on the content of the evidence before the Tribunal, but on the relief sought by the appellant, quoted above.  I shall return to this point.  
(c)	The Member failed to provide any, or any sufficient, reasons for dismissing the application.  
[8]	As to the third point, it is true that the reasons of the Member were quite brief, about as long as the paraphrase set out above.  The function of reasons is to explain the decision actually made, and if the decision turns on a short point, it may be possible to explain it quite succinctly.  This matter was decided on a point of jurisdiction, which will often require very little in the way of explanation.  A claim by way of a minor civil dispute for an amount of money in excess of the prescribed amount can be dismissed for reasons which can be adequately expressed in one sentence.  
[9]	In the present case, part of the explanation for the brevity of the reasons was that the Member adopted the reasoning in the decision of the Appeal Tribunal in Right (above).  That decision set out in considerable detail why the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with a claim which was factually indistinguishable from the first part of the claim by the appellant.  In a sense, the reasoning in Right was incorporated by reference into the decision in the present case.  Such a process is common enough, and does not involve any error of law.  
[10]	As the Member identified, in substance the appellant was seeking specific performance of the contract between the parties, to require the respondents to carry out the last of their obligations under it.  This is a form of equitable relief, and the Tribunal has no general equitable jurisdiction.  The orders which may be made in a minor civil dispute are set out in the QCAT Act s 13(2), and are subject to the limitations in s 13(3); they do not include an order that the respondents do an act of the nature of providing a signed transfer of equine registration.  They also do not include making a declaration, which is another form of equitable relief, and in substance what was sought in the alternative by the appellant.  
[11]	The tribunal has, under the QCAT Act s 11, jurisdiction to decide a minor civil dispute.  This term is defined in schedule 3 to the QCAT Act by reference, relevantly, to what is claimed by the applicant.  Whether the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is invoked is determined, relevantly, by what relief is claimed by the applicant.  If the applicant claims relief not within that covered by the definition of a minor civil dispute, it is not a minor civil dispute as defined, so the Tribunal is not given jurisdiction to decide it by the QCAT Act.  That was the situation here, so the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has not been enlivened, and the Tribunal could not decide the matter.  In those circumstances, the strength of the evidence relied on by the appellant to support her claim cannot assist, and is really irrelevant.  
[12]	I respectfully agree with the analysis set out in the reasons for the decision in Right v Burrett (above).  I consider that, in view of the relief claimed by the appellant, that analysis was correctly applied by the Member, and agree with the conclusion that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in this matter.  Subject to one matter, I agree that the application was correctly dismissed by the Member.  
[13]	The QCAT Act s 52(2) provides that, if the Tribunal considers it does not have jurisdiction to hear all matters in a proceeding, the Tribunal may, by order, transfer the matter or matters for which it does not have jurisdiction to (relevantly) a court of competent jurisdiction.  The District Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of property, so long as the value of the property does not exceed the monetary limit.  If that Court has jurisdiction under s 68, one of its powers is to make a declaration for the purpose of exercising that jurisdiction.  
[14]	Under s 52(6) the Tribunal can act under s 52(2) on application by a party, or on its own initiative.  Accordingly it would have been open to the Member, assuming that he was a legally qualified Member, to have transferred the proceeding to the District Court instead of dismissing it.  It would however have been necessary for the Member to raise that possibility with the parties first, and to consider any submissions they made about the matter, in order to accord natural justice.  That was not done, and the appellant has not raised a failure to consider a transfer to the District Court, so it is not appropriate for me to consider it further.  It would still be open to her to start a proceeding in the District Court, should she wish to do so.  
[15]	In the circumstances, the appropriate course for me is to refuse leave to appeal.