QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:	Oliver & Anor v Waterfront Management Pty Ltd [2021] QCATA 147	
PARTIES:	DANIEL FREDERICK OLIVER & ROSWITHA MARIA OLIVER	
	(applicants)	
	v	
	waterfront management pty ltd	
	(respondent)	
APPLICATION NO:	APL368-20	
MATTER TYPE:	Residential tenancy matters	
DELIVERED ON: 	2 December 2021	
HEARING DATE:	On the papers	
HEARD AT:	Brisbane	
DECISION OF:	Dr J R Forbes	
ORDERS:	The application for leave to appeal is dismissed
.	
CATCHWORDS:	APPEAL – APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL – residential tenancy matter – liability to pay water rates - 

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)  s 32, 143
Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) Form 18a
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Drew v Bundaberg Regional Council [2012] QPELR 350; [2011] QCA 359
Felton and Anor v Raine and Horne Real Estate [2011] QCATA 330
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
International Professional Services v Tritone Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] QCATA 332
QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd  [2009] 1 Qd R 41
Robinson v Corr [2011] QCATA 302
Sali v SPC Limited (1993) 67 ALJR 841
	
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:	This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)	

REASONS FOR DECISION
[1]	The burning question is whether the appellants (`the Olivers’) owe the lessor of a home unit at Biggera Waters, Gold Coast, (`the premises’) an amount of $141.95 (including costs) for water charges allegedly incurred by the Olivers while they occupied those premises. 
[2]	On 9 September 2018 the Olivers leased the premises from a person described as `Dong c/- Waterfront Management’ for the period 29 September 2018 to 28 September 2020. However, the tenancy was terminated by mutual agreement in July 2000.
[3]	It appears that the person identified in the lease as simply `Dong’ is a Chinese national more formally known as Quiju Dong. For present purposes, Dong’s duly authorised agent is the respondent Waterfront Management Pty Ltd (`the agent’).
[4]	According to a standard term of the lease, the lessor’s nominated agent may sue or be sued on behalf of the lessor, in the agent’s own name. (This is the short answer to Mr Oliver’s contentions to the contrary.)
[5]	Other pertinent provisions of the lease appear in Part 1 Cl 12.2, and in Part 2 Cl 17 (water charges). The first of these provisions reads: `Is the tenant to pay for water supplied to the premises? See clause 17’. And the answer given is `Yes’.
[6]	These proceedings were commenced by the agent on 16 July 2020. A counterclaim was signed by the Olivers on 3 August 2020, but was not pursued at the hearing. Nor is it reagitated in the application for leave.
[7]	The claims in dispute are itemised in the agent’s invoices to the Olivers dated 11 May 2020 and 8 June 2020 respectively. It appears from material tendered by the agent that the appellants paid several earlier and somewhat higher charges for water usage without contention.
[8]	Nevertheless, the Olivers now contend that there is no acceptable evidence to support the two water usage claims in issue. Amid some confused and confusing submissions it does not seem to be suggested that the amounts claimed have been falsified or inflated; indeed, on the contrary, the rates charged correspond exactly with the current rate set by the local authority. There is no profit-taking.
[9]	The Olivers contend that the criminal standard of proof applies. That is, of course, a fundamental error. According to the civil standard, the learned Adjudicator was clearly entitled to find, as he did, that the agent correctly and reliably calculated the amounts in issue, by reference to information supplied by the local authority. There is no evidence, as distinct from bald assertions, to the contrary. The Adjudicator accepted the agent’s evidence as to the method of calculation, including water usage in the final, incomplete period of occupation. As judge of fact that was a decision that he was well entitled to take, and, as the High Court emphasises, it is not open to me, on an application for leave to appeal, to re-try a primary decision reasonably and properly made. Questions of fact and credit are essentially matters for the trial judge, not for `second guessing’ by an appeals court.
[10]	A party seeking leave to appeal must demonstrate a legally appellable error in the primary decision. That is something that the present appellants have signally failed to do. It is not nearly enough for an applicant to express disappointment, or to entertain a subjective feeling that justice has not been done. Indeed, the very requirement to obtain leave to appeal is to preclude attempts to retry cases on the merits. 
[11]	Obscurely the first appellant asserted that, in some unexplained manner, the agent’s calculations were made unlawfully and in breach of unspecified legislation governing Gold Coast Council water meters, but several commendably patient attempts by the Adjudicator to discover a basis for this contention elicited nothing more informative than: `It doesn’t matter about the Act.  I will be using another section of the law that I have at home.’ 
[12]	This application for leave to appeal a judgment for $141.95 is a baseless, if not frivolous use of the Tribunal’s resources, while more meritorious causes await a hearing. No arguable ground for a successful appeal has been shown. Accordingly the application must be dismissed.
ORDER
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.