IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA	Not Restricted	
AT MELBOURNE
Criminal Division
S ECR 2020 0096

IN THE MATTER of the Bail Act 1977		
		
and		
		
IN THE MATTER of an Application for Bail by DR		

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JUDGE:	TINNEY J	
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne	
DATE OF HEARING:	13 May 2020	
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	13 May 2020	
DATE OF REASONS	20 May 2020	
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Re DR 	
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2020] VSC 282	

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CRIMINAL LAW – Bail Home invasion, aggravated home invasion and other offences – 17 year old child offender – Criminal history with appearances for violence - Applicant on Youth Justice Supervised Bail and subject to youth supervision order at time of offending – Breach of curfew – Youth Justice still supportive – Family support and stable accommodation – Period on remand not likely to exceed sentence – COVID-19 considerations - Exceptional circumstances not established – Unacceptable risk in any event – Bail refused – Bail Act 1977 ss 1B, 3AAA, 3B, 4AA, 4A, 4D, 4E.

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APPEARANCES:
	Counsel	Solicitors	
For the Applicant	Mr J Portelli	James Dowsley & Associates	
			
For the Respondent 	Ms D Caruso	Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions 	

HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
1	The applicant, a child aged 17, applied for bail in respect of a number of serious charges he faces, including home invasion and aggravated home invasion, arising from a spree of offending on 7 and 8 September 2019.  
2	The parties agreed that bail was required to be refused unless the applicant could demonstrate that exceptional circumstances existed that justified his release on bail. This was because aggravated home invasion is a Schedule 1 offence.
3	Having heard the application, I determined that the applicant had failed to discharge the onus resting upon him of establishing exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, I was of the view that even had the applicant succeeded in discharging the above onus, I would have concluded that the respondent had proved that the risk posed by the applicant of reoffending or endangering the community if released on bail would be unacceptable. 
4	I therefore refused the application for bail. I indicated at the time that I would publish my detailed reasons for the decision at a future time. These are those reasons.   
Procedural history
5	The applicant has been in custody since being remanded on 8 September 2019. The next listed date is a mention on 21 May 2020. 
6	The applicant has been refused bail on two occasions in the Children’s Court on 14 October 2019 and 30 April 2020. Bail was refused on the first occasion on the basis that the applicant had failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances and in addition because there was an unacceptable risk that he would commit an offence while on bail or endanger the safety or welfare of any person. On the second occasion, it was found that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances, but bail was refused on the basis of an unacceptable risk. 
Background to offending the subject of bail application
7	The applicant was released on a youth supervision order on 21 March 2019, on charges of unlicensed driving, theft of a motor vehicle and affray. 
8	The applicant was charged by Informant Cahir on 8 May 2019, with robbery (three charges) and theft (two charges) arising from offences allegedly committed in retail stores in Prahran and Malvern on 4 May 2019. Youth Justice Supervised Bail was granted in respect of these charges in the Children’s Court on 24 May 2019. Amongst the conditions of bail was a curfew condition requiring the applicant to be at his place of residence overnight. 
The alleged offendin+
Primary matter – Informant Powell
9	The informant Powell offending allegedly occurred over three incidents on 7 and 8 September 2019. 
10	On 7 September 2019, at around 5:20 pm, the applicant, two known co-accused AJ and MA, and another unidentified male allegedly attended the Big W store at the Market Place shopping centre in Sunshine. They were approached by a member of the security staff and asked to leave the store. They became abusive and while the staff member was endeavouring to telephone the police, his mobile phone was hit from his hand and the males commenced to punch him to the face. He fell to the ground and lay in the foetal position while the four males kicked and punched him repeatedly. The attack was captured on CCTV. The security guard received facial injuries requiring examination at hospital.
11	The next morning on 8 September 2019 at about 6:15 am, a male opened his front door at a residential address in Duncan Street, Flemington after the doorbell was rung. He observed a male of African appearance standing there. The male complainant closed and locked the door when he saw two other males of African appearance standing near the rear of his Mercedes Benz. 
12	After this, it is alleged the applicant and co-accused broke the door lock by striking it with an object and entered the house. One of them chased the male complainant around the house, repeatedly threatening to kill his son. The male complainant cowered in the face of the frightening pursuit and said to his pursuer, ‘Just take what you want’. The attacker grabbed hold of the male complainant and started to drag him along. The man struggled and was able to break free. 
13	While the pursuit and attack upon the male complainant continued, the other two offenders allegedly approached the female complainant in the lounge room. She begged the men to leave the house. The male complainant came to her assistance and the two of them were eventually able to run from the house screaming for help. A neighbour called 000. While in the neighbour’s doorway, the male complainant saw his Toyota Aurion being driven away. When the complainants returned to their house they confirmed other items had been stolen including the number plates from their Mercedes Benz vehicle. 
14	Later that morning at about 6:45 am, the applicant, AJ and MA, having allegedly driven to the secondary location in the stolen Aurion and another vehicle, arrived in the vicinity of an address in Malibu Grove, Keilor lodge, about a 20 minute drive away from the Flemington address.  MA was armed with an imitation submachinegun. The three offenders were captured on CCTV footage forcing their way into the rear of the property. In the house, a male was asleep on the couch. He was awoken by the sound of voices in the house. After seeing AJ wearing a balaclava, he ran and locked himself in his father’s bedroom, observing the applicant and MA on his way. They followed him and tried to break down the door using a tomahawk  that they had found at the address, saying ‘we’re going to kill you’. MA was later seen on CCTV footage throwing the tomahawk over the side fence.
15	The applicant and co-accused stole one set of car keys and demanded the keys to other vehicles at the address. At this time, the brother of the complainant arrived home armed with a wood splitter and found the three offenders still inside the house. He chased them out of the house. 
16	CCTV largely captured the rest of the incident, which occurred outside the house. 
17	The applicant and MA got into the complainant’s Holden Commodore and tried to steal it, with the applicant in the driver’s seat. The two male complainants tried to get them out of the vehicle, eventually shattering the driver’s window with the wood splitter. They tried to remove the keys from the ignition. 
18	Whilst this was occurring, AJ got into the stolen Toyota Aurion and started driving. One of the male complainants tried to stop him from driving away by standing in the middle of the street. Either the applicant or MA shouted ‘hit him, hit him’, at which point AJ drove at speed towards the male throwing him over the bonnet and causing the windscreen to smash. At this point, he parked the car and the applicant got into the driver’s seat of the stolen Toyota. Once the co-accused were also in the vehicle, the applicant intentionally struck one of the complainant’s vehicles and drove from the scene. 
19	Around 7:08 am, one of the male complainants called emergency services, as did a neighbour who observed the incident. Police who were attending in response saw the stolen Toyota Aurion travelling at a fast speed along Sunshine Avenue in Keilor and notified other police units in the area. 
20	Shortly before 8:00 am, police observed the stolen Toyota Aurion parked outside an address in Kensei Street, Kurunjang. Police attempted to intercept the vehicle and a pursuit took place, during which the Aurion was driven erratically through the residential streets of Melton and reached an estimated speed of 180 km/h. While the driver of the vehicle attempted to drive off-road, the vehicle crashed into some wooden bollards. The applicant and co-accused got out and tried to evade police on foot but were arrested shortly afterwards. They were wearing the same clothes as depicted on the CCTV footage from the Keilor Lodge incident and they all participated in no comment interviews with the police. 
21	Around the Keilor Lodge crime scene, police located a Mercedes which had been stolen from Lara on 5 September 2019, as well as the imitation firearm that was left behind in the house. Other items stolen from the Flemington address were also located in a search around Keilor.
Personal circumstances
22	The applicant is now 17 years old but was 16 at the time of the alleged offending. He was born in a refugee camp in Kenya of South Sudanese origins. His father was killed in military service before the applicant’s birth. The family, comprising the applicant, his two older siblings and his mother,  were accepted as refugees into Australia and moved here in 2007, initially settling in Wagga Wagga, then later living in Moe before finally moving to the Wyndham area of Melbourne. The applicant is supported by his mother and two older siblings who, as attested to by his older sister who gave evidence before me,  are motivated to help him lead a prosocial lifestyle and do not have any history with the criminal justice system. 
23	The applicant has been on the Youth Justice Supervised Bail program four times in the past. Youth Justice found that he was not suitable for this program before a previous bail application in this matter on 14 October 2019. Since then, on 23 April 2020, a favourable report from Ms Emma Hinton recommended him for the Youth Justice Intensive Bail Service program. The assessment report dated 23 April 2020 was exhibited to the affidavit in support. In addition, Ms Hinton filed a progress report on 11 May 2020. 
24	Ms Hinton gave evidence during the application before me in which she confirmed that she had known the applicant for a month and found him to be a polite and engaging young person. She informed the Court of the differences between intensive bail and the arrangements which had been in place in the past, indicating what supports would be available to him were he to be released on bail. The applicant had never been the beneficiary of Youth Justice Intensive Bail for which Ms Hinton confirmed her favourable assessment. 
25	The applicant has a complex trauma history as set out in the reports of Ms Hinton and a psychiatric report of Dr Lester Walton which were all exhibited to the affidavit in support.  He was diagnosed in the past with post-traumatic stress disorder and shows symptoms of anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder and paranoia. In preparation for his possible release on bail, he was referred to a private psychologist, Mr Michael Bilyk, on 20 April 2020 for counselling. Since then, he has engaged with Mr Bilyk on two occasions.
26	The applicant suffers from social anxiety and reports struggling to make new friendships.
Criminal record
27	The applicant has a criminal history which commenced when he was still 14 years of age. He was dealt with for carrying a controlled weapon in 2017. On 1 May 2018, he received a without conviction adjournment for 12 months for charges of theft of a motor car, theft (4 charges), committing an indictable offence whist on bail, and two charges of armed robbery. On 23 March 2019, he was placed on a youth supervision order as set out in paragraph 7 of this decision. 
The law
28	Section 1B of the Bail Act 1977 (‘the Act’) sets out the guiding principles of the legislation, which include maximising community safety, and taking account of the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty. Section 4 of the Act makes plain the fact that there is generally to be a presumption in favour of the granting of bail. In a number of situations set out in the Act, however, that presumption is displaced by the requirement that the applicant establish the existence of either exceptional circumstances or a compelling reason that would justify a grant of bail. 
29	Section 4AA(1) dictates that the exceptional circumstances test applies in this case. Pursuant to s 4A(1A) of the Act, the Court must refuse bail unless ‘satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail’.
30	The applicant bears the burden of satisfying the Court as to the existence of exceptional circumstances. In considering whether exceptional circumstances exist, the Court is required to take into account the surrounding circumstances as outlined in the non-exhaustive list of matters in s 3AAA of the Act.
31	If satisfied of the existence of exceptional circumstances, the Court is required to move to step 2 of the bail process, the unacceptable risk test.  Section 4E(1) of the Act requires the Court to refuse bail if satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that, if released on bail, the applicant would:
i. endanger the safety or welfare of any person; or
ii. commit an offence while on bail; or
iii. interfere with a witness or otherwise obstruct the course of justice in any matter; or
iv. fail to surrender into custody in accordance with the conditions of bail.
32	The respondent bears the burden of proof in respect of the unacceptable risk test. In considering the test, again, the Court is required to take into account the surrounding circumstances pursuant to s 3AAA. The Court is also required to consider whether there are any conditions of bail that may be imposed to mitigate the risk so that it is not an unacceptable one.
33	In this case, because the applicant is a child, s 3B(1) has application. This provision provides that in such a case, the Court must take into account a number of considerations, including the need to consider all other options before remanding the child in custody, the need to strengthen and preserve the relationship between the child and his family, the desirability of allowing the living arrangement of the child to continue without interruption, the desirability of allowing the education of the child to continue without interruption, and the likely sentence should the child be found guilty. Section 3B(2) provides that in making a determination under the Act, the Court may take into account any recommendation contained in a report provided by a bail support service. 
Exceptional circumstances
34	The meaning of exceptional circumstances has been considered in a number of decisions of this Court.  Kaye J (as he then was) in DPP v Muhaidat stated the relevant principles as follows:
Effectively, the applicant has to establish circumstances right out of the ordinary. They have to be exceptional to the ordinary circumstances which would otherwise entitle the applicant to bail.
35	In the context of an application for a bail by a child, Forrest J in Re JO noted: 
Whilst the burden of demonstrating ‘exceptional circumstances’ is, as I have said, a stringent one, the age of the applicant weighs heavily in his favour. Children are rightly afforded a special status by the Act and any assessment of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the case of a child must be viewed through the prism of s 3B(1). In the case of an adult, a combination of circumstances may fall short of constituting exceptional circumstances, while the same combination when considered in the case of a child may achieve a wholly different outcome. The suite of considerations enumerated in s 3B(1) make the evaluation of any determination under this Act, including the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, a different exercise in the case of a child.
36	This passage has been  cited with approval in a number of the decisions of this Court. 
Outstanding matters
37	As well as the other matters to which I have referred which are outstanding, the applicant faces charges in relation to a serious incident which took place at Parkville Youth Justice Precinct (PYJP) on 7 April 2020, in which a number of staff members were attacked. Other incidents in which it is alleged staff members were attacked by the applicant during various periods in custody occurred on 10 August 2018, 27 December 2018 and 13 May 2019. These three matters resulted in the applicant being found guilty of assaulting a youth justice worker, recklessly causing injury and assault by kicking respectively. 
The applicant’s contentions
38	The applicant, as indicated in the affidavit in support of bail and supplemented by the submissions of Mr Portelli, relied on the following matters in combination to prove the existence of exceptional circumstances that justify the grant of bail: 
(a)	His young age. The applicant is now 17 years old and was only 16 at the time of the alleged offending. Mr Portelli drew my attention to the considerations in s 3B of the Act. 
(b)	The strength of the prosecution case. Mr Portelli submitted that there was no admissible evidence of identification of the offenders in respect of the Flemington home invasion. The case on the Flemington offending was not an overwhelming one. As for the Keilor Lodge aggravated home invasion, identity would not be in issue, but there was an arguable dispute about whether all of the elements of aggravated home invasion could be proved against the applicant, albeit that he has indicated a willingness to plead guilty to home invasion simpliciter. On the charges of home invasion and aggravated home invasion, Mr Portelli did not characterise the cases as weak, but rather, as not overwhelming. As for the charge of reckless conduct endangering life, the applicant was not the driver at the time the pedestrian was struck and it may not be able to be established that he offered any encouragement to the driver to do what he did. 
(c)	Length of time already spent on remand. In total, the applicant has spent over 478 days on remand. This includes spending 217 days on remand as a 15 year old for charges that were ultimately withdrawn in full, which will be called upon as Renzella time. The remaining 248 days is the actual time he has been in custody during this period of remand. 
(d)	Limited criminal history. The criminal history of the applicant is not extensive. He has only received without-conviction dispositions and has never been sentenced to detention in a youth justice centre.
(e)	Likely delay before finalisation of the matter. Contested hearings are not currently being heard in the Children’s Court. If the matter remains as a contested hearing, which is likely, it will not be heard until the end of 2020.
(f)	Likely sentence should the applicant be found guilty. Mr Portelli did not submit that the Court should conclude that the period of time the applicant would spend on remand would exceed any sentence likely to be ordered to be served, but did submit that it would be open to a sentencing court to pass a sentence that would not involve any further period of detention. 
(g)	COVID-19 considerations. Mr Portelli relied on the fact that the current conditions of remand in the youth justice centre are onerous, and will remain so for a time at least. Personal visits are no longer allowed, there have been partial lockdowns, and whilst educational and other programs continue, they have been somewhat affected. Also there is the issue of the anxiety brought about by the risk of the virus finding its way into the centre. 
(h)	The availability of family support and suitable accommodation. If granted bail, the applicant would reside with his mother and older siblings in the family home. His sister gave evidence indicating that she would advise the authorities should the applicant breach any of his bail conditions. The family support which the applicant has can be seen as being a protective factor. 
(i)	Availability of education. If granted bail, the applicant would be able to return to finish his Victorian Certificate of Applied Learning at the secondary college he previously attended. He would be supported in that by the Head of Senior School. The school would support the applicant to learn online, due to the restrictions related to COVID-19. The applicant’s sister has confirmed he would have access to the technology at home to complete this. 
(j)	Availability of intensive bail supervision by Youth Justice. While the applicant has been on Youth Justice Supervised Bail four times in the past, this would be his first opportunity to have the benefit of Youth Justice Intensive Bail support. A very detailed assessment report dated 23 April 2020 and progress report dated 11 May 2020 were exhibited to the affidavit in support of bail. 
(k)	Positive engagement while in custody. The applicant provided copies of two favourable letters from Parkville College regarding his participation exhibited to the affidavit in support. Youth Justice noted that since their assessment report on 23 April 2020, the applicant’s compliance and engagement had remained good. This and other matters were relied on by Mr Portelli in support of the contention that the consequences of his actions have ‘really started to sink in’.
(l)	Access to counselling in the community. The applicant has been referred to a private psychologist for counselling and if granted bail, Youth Justice will schedule fortnightly appointments for him to attend.
(m)	The informant Powell matters will be dealt with in the summary jurisdiction. An application for summary jurisdiction pursuant to s 356(6) of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 was granted on 30 April 2020 at the Melbourne Children’s Court. The matters will therefore be heard and determined in the Children’s Court. 
(n)	The applicant is not a flight risk.
(o)	The availability of strict conditions of bail.
The respondent’s contentions
39	The respondent opposed bail on the basis that the applicant had not demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances that justified the grant of bail and if released on bail, the applicant would pose an unacceptable risk of endangering the safety of any person and committing an offence while on bail. The affidavit in opposition to bail was supplemented by the submissions of Ms Caruso.  
40	In response to the applicant’s contentions, the respondent submitted: 
(a)	The age of the applicant. Whilst the importance of the young age of the applicant was acknowledged, he was 16 ½ years old at the time of the offending, with some criminal history, and not an immature 14 year old. 
(b)	Limited criminal history. It was acknowledged that the applicant does not have a substantial criminal history but it was pointed out that such history as he does have is violent in nature. He was under a youth supervision order for affray and other offences and also on bail for repeated robberies at the time of the alleged main offending, and the subsequent incident in the youth justice centre in April 2020 is also concerning. 
(c)	Strength of the prosecution case. It was submitted that the prosecution cases on the home invasion and aggravated home invasion are strong. 
(d)	The applicant was subject to bail and a youth supervision order at the time of the offending. His offending constituted a fundamental breach of bail, as did his defiance of the curfew. In addition, he has a history of failing to abide by bail. 
(e)	Length of time on remand. The applicant has spent only 248 days on remand in relation to the informant Powell matter. It is acknowledged that the applicant was on remand from 9 August 2018 to 13 March 2019 for charges that were ultimately withdrawn, but this will be relevant for the sentencing magistrate, and indeed, there is every reason to believe that it would already have been taken into account by courts dealing with the applicant since that time. 
(f)	Availability of suitable accommodation and family support. The applicant was staying with his mother and siblings at the same address at the time of the current offending and earlier offending. He was on bail requiring him to reside at that address with his family and comply with a curfew at the time of the offending, but this was not sufficient to control him. Nothing has changed. 
(g)	Availability of Youth Justice Intensive Bail support. The applicant was on Youth Justice supervised bail at the time of the present offending, and this support was not sufficient to control him. There is no reason to think the support likely to be available in future would make any difference. 
(h)	Positive engagement in custody. During his time on remand the applicant has been charged with serious offences against custody staff. He is a young man who says all of the right things to all of the right people, but his behaviour continues to be problematic. 
(i)	Mental health issues. There is no evidence that the applicant is suffering in this regard due to his custodial situation. He is receiving appropriate support. 
(j)	Issues related to COVID-19. It was acknowledged by Ms Caruso that the cessation of in-person visits was a significant matter. It was noted, however,  that education, entertainment and case management are still occurring in custody and contact can be facilitated over Skype. It was accepted, however,  that this is no substitute for personal contact. It was also acknowledged that COVID-19 has contributed to delays in having matters finalised.
(k)	Time on remand and likely sentence. Ms Caruso submitted that the time the applicant will spend on remand if bail is refused will be less than the sentence he is likely to receive should he be found guilty. These are serious violent offences committed in company by a young person with a history of committing serious violent offences in company. 
(l)	Fact that summary jurisdiction has been granted. This was a matter which will serve to reduce the delay in disposition of the matter. 
41	Ms Caruso submitted that even if I was satisfied of the existence of exceptional circumstances, the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of endangering the safety or welfare of any person or committing an offence while on bail for reasons which she spelt out. There was simply no way the risk could be adequately controlled even by the most stringent of conditions. 
Analysis
42	A logical starting point in considering the surrounding circumstances when determining whether exceptional circumstances have been shown to exist is the seriousness of the offending. In this case, the applicant faces a charge of a serious home invasion in Flemington during which it is alleged that, in company with two other males, he broke into a home at 6.15 am by breaking the door lock, and then terrorised the occupants of the home, including by chasing one of them through the house threatening to kill his son, before the justifiably frightened male and female complainants were able to escape. A vehicle was stolen from these premises, and was then used in the subsequent aggravated home invasion in Keilor Lodge. 
43	That crime occurred about half-an-hour later. The applicant and the two co-accused, one of them carrying a realistic-looking imitation sub-machine gun, entered the premises, and again, terrified an occupant who fled for his life, locking himself in a room. The offenders then engaged in the frightening action of trying to break down the door to the room with a tomahawk, only to be stopped in their tracks by the return home of the brother of the occupant of the house. The extravagant violence of the offenders was met with a forthright response from the occupants of the home, as evidenced by the CCTV footage from the front of the property. The overall picture was of three young offenders engaging in a crime which had a real potential to end up in tragedy. 
44	These crimes were of a very high degree of seriousness, and allegedly carried out by the applicant in breach of the conditions of bail to which he was subject, and in particular, a curfew designed to control his movements and conduct. He was also subject to a youth supervision order for offences including affray. Those matters are of particular note when the circumstances, as set out in s 3AAA of the Act, were contemplated. 
45	As far as could be assessed at the time of the application, the prosecution case on the two home invasions could not be considered to be anything less than strong. 
46	The applicant’s criminal history, whilst not lengthy, is already concerning, with a flavour of violence with which the current alleged offending sits quite comfortably. So, too, does the conduct of the applicant in custody fit in with the overall picture of a defiant young person who unfortunately, at this time, has shown a worrying predisposition for violence, especially in the company of others. 
47	The applicant is fortunate to have the support of his family, including his sister who gave impressive evidence before me, but the recent past has shown that in spite of the support he has, and the potentially stable home that comes with it, the applicant has consistently refused to control his behaviour. 
48	In respect of the support offered by Youth Justice, it speaks well of that organisation and of Ms Hinton that in spite of his many failures thus far, the applicant would still be considered appropriate for the supervision of Youth Justice. Realistically, however, it is difficult to see the prospects of the applicant abiding by the strictures of bail and the requirements of intensive supervision as being anything better than slim. 
49	I was informed that the victims of the Flemington home invasion are terrified at the prospect of the offenders being released on bail, and that the victims of the Keilor Lodge crime would also prefer that it did not occur. I take those matters into account pursuant to s 3AAA(1)(j) of the Act. 
50	I took into account the period of time already spent on remand by the applicant, and the fact that due to delays brought about by COVID-19, the overall period on remand should the applicant not be bailed will be quite significant. I also paid regard to the onerous nature of custody at the present time due to the implications of the pandemic. 
51	It is, of course, no small thing for any person, let alone a child, to be held on remand for a significant period of time pending the hearing of charges. This is especially the case now during these difficult times. 
52	An important consideration in this case, however, is that significant though that period on remand would be, it would not equate to the likely sentence to be received by the applicant in the event he is found guilty, such is the seriousness of the alleged offending. 
53	The authorities make it clear that in the case of a child, the consideration of every aspect of bail needs to occur through the prism of s 3B(1) of the Act. In making the determination on the question of whether or not the applicant had established exceptional circumstances, I bore that principle strongly in mind. 
54	Having carefully considered all of the surrounding circumstances, I was not satisfied that the applicant had discharged the onus resting upon him of proving that exceptional circumstances existed which would justify the grant of bail. 
55	For completeness, I also indicated at the time of my decision that even had I been satisfied of the existence of exceptional circumstances, I would have concluded that the respondent had proved that the risk posed by the applicant of reoffending or endangering the community would be unacceptable. 
56	On that score, I noted that in recent years, unfortunately, the applicant has shown himself to be a violent person who is quite prepared to expose innocent members of the community to the risk of serious injury. While on supervised bail with a curfew condition and subject to a youth supervision order, he is alleged to have breached the curfew and engaged in violence which represented substantial and frightening invasions of the homes of two families, accompanied by actual violence and by threats. 
57	I was moved to the sad conclusion that at this time in his life, at least, the applicant represents a substantial danger to the community, and that not even the most stringent conditions of bail could give the Court any confidence that he would not again breach bail and carry out serious crimes of violence. 
Conclusion
58	For the above reasons, it was necessary for this application for bail to be refused.