PATENTS ACT 1990

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

Re:  Patent Application no. 73657/87 in the name of PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED, and a request by McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED for the Commissioner to order the production of documents.

BACKGROUND

Application no. 73657/87 was lodged as a provisional application (no. PH6019) on 21 May 1986, and completed on 20 May 1987. Examination was requested on 16 December 1988, and an examination report issued on 9 March 1989.

The first continuation fee payable under section 47D(1) [Patents Act 1952] was due on 20 May 1989. Pursuant to section 47D(2), the applicant had a right to an extension of the time to pay that fee, expiring on 20 November 1989. The fee was not paid by that later date, and consequently the application lapsed. Lapsing was advertised in the Official Journal of 11 January 1990.

On 19 December 1989 the applicant lodged an application for restoration, pursuant to the provisions of section 47E [Patents Act 1952], with a supporting declaration filed on 2 January 1990. Following a letter from the Commissioner requiring further explanation, a second supporting declaration was filed on 23 January 1990. The declarations were executed by Robert Coghill, a Director of Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd. The text of the two declarations is as follows:

Declaration dated 27 December 1989

1.	I am a director of Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd, the applicant for the above application. I am responsible for instructing our Attorneys, Shelston Waters of 55 Clarence Street, Sydney in relation to maintenance of this application.

2.	On or about the 20th February, 1989 I was advised by Shelston Waters that the maintenance fee was due in respect of this application. As our company was experiencing management and cash flow problems at the time I decided to defer payment and it was my understanding that the fee could be paid late with fine.

3.	On or about the 20th May, 1989 I was again advised by Shelston Waters that the application had lapsed but could be reinstated by payment of the required fee and a fine. I again deferred instructing Shelston Waters believing that the application could be reinstated by payment of the appropriate fine.

4.	On the 30th November, 1989 I telephoned Shelston Waters to ask what was required in terms of late payment of the maintenance fee. I was advised that the application had lapsed irrevocably as the period in which a fine could be paid had expired on the 20th November, 1989. I immediately instructed Shelston Waters to apply for restoration of this application.

5.	It was always my company's intention to maintain this application in force and the lapsing resulted from my misunderstanding of the provisions relating to late payment of the maintenance fee.

Declaration dated 22 January 1990

1.	I am the declarant in respect of the declaration of the 27th December, 1989 filed in support of this application for restoration.

2.	I have read the Commissioner's letter of the 15th January 1990 and understand that further explanation of the circumstance leading to the lapsing of application 73,657/87 is required.

3.	At the time of lapsing of this application, myself and other directors of the applicant company were under considerable pressure to sort out the affairs of the company following a management reorganisation. Accordingly I was deferring all matters which in my view did not require my urgent attention.

4.	It was always my view and understanding of the procedure involved in maintenance of this patent application that the renewal fees could be paid late with the appropriate fine. I failed to understand the patent application would lapse irrevocably if the fee was not paid within six months of the due date. How I arrived at this view, I am unsure, however, given that I am a layman in respect of patent procedures and was under great pressure at the time, I now believe that I did not fully understand the advice provided by my Attorney and/or did not spend sufficient time in attempting to understand the requirements in relation to maintenance of this application.

5.	I again state that it was always my intention to maintain this application in force and that the lapsing was unintentional and resulted from my failure to fully understand the procedure required in maintaining this application. This lack of understanding, in hindsight, resulted from my paying minimal attention to the matter due to pressures of other business.

The application for restoration was advertised in the Official Journal of 22 February 1990. Subsequently, McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED (hereafter referred to as the opponents) filed notice of opposition to the restoration on 21 May 1990. Since that time evidence in support, and evidence in answer, has been filed in respect of that opposition.

Subsequent to the serving of the evidence in answer, the opponent requested the Commissioner to order the production of certain documents. In response to a request by the Commissioner, the opponent provided a draft order, and served a copy on the applicant. The substance of the draft orders are as follows:

Draft Orders

Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd shall within thirty (30) days of the date of this order deliver to the Commissioner two copies, both certified by an officer of Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd as a true copy of the original, of each of the following documents:-

1.	the advice received by Mr. Robert Coghill on or about 20 February 1989 from Shelston Waters;

2.	the advice received by Robert Coghill on or about 20 May 1989 from Shelston Waters;

3.	all correspondence between Paracel holdings Pty Ltd and Shelston Waters relating to the payment of the continuation fee due in respect of patent application 73657/87 on 20 May 1989;

4.	diary notes prepared by Shelston Waters as a result of Mr. Coghill's telephone call of 30 November 1989; and

5.	the letter of Shelston Waters to Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd reporting the payment of the continuation fee and the filing of an application for restoration in respect of the present application.

The applicant objected to the draft order, and the matter was heard in Sydney on 14 October 1991. Mr. Peter Heathcote of Shelston Waters appeared for the applicant, and Ms. Sophie Goddard, instructed by Mr. Crispen Marsh of F.B. Rice & Co, appeared for the opponent.
Although the original request for production was made before the commencement of the Patents Act 1990, and the matter of the restoration is proceeding under the relevant provisions of the Patents Act 1952 (by reason of Regulation 23.8 under the Patents Act 1990), this matter for the production of documents must be determined under the provisions of section 210(c) of the Patents Act 1990, by reason of section 235 of that Act.

ISSUES

Two issues of substance require determination in this matter.

Firstly, the applicant claims privilege (pursuant to section 200(2)) in all the documents sought by the order.

Secondly, the applicant contends that items 3 and 4 of the draft order are tantamount to an order for discovery; as the Commissioner does not have the power to order discovery, it follows that an order containing item 3 or 4 would be unlawful.

I note that there is little precedent regarding the Commissioner ordering the production of documents; there have been only two requests for production of documents before the Office which proceeded to hearing:

i.	Joyce v. Stronach (1939) 9 AOJP 1470; and 

ii.	In the Matter of Applications 455463 and 457498 for Patents by Unilever and Opposition thereto by Colgate-Palmolive (decision not published, issued 31 March, 1982).

Both requests were refused. 

PRIVILEGE

Section 200(2) of the Patents Act 1990 provides as follows:

 (2) A communication between a patent attorney and his or her client, and any record or document made for the purposes of such a communication, are privileged  to the same extent as a communication between a solicitor and his or her client.

This provision is the same as section 134(1A) of the Patents Act 1952, except for the additional portion which is underlined. At the hearing the parties agreed that the matter of privilege in this action fell to be determined under the Patents Act 1990.

The applicant stated that they claimed privilege in all the documents referred to in the order; however they waived privilege in the documents referred to in items 1 and 2 of the draft order. At the hearing the attorney for the applicant further stated that although the applicant did not object to the production of items 1 and 2, they would not produce those documents until an order for production was issued.

The opponent followed two lines of argument to suggest that the documents listed in the draft order were not subject to privilege. Firstly, they suggested that privilege extended only to those documents which contain specific legal advice, and referred to Grant v Downs (1976) CLR 674. They further suggested that they do not know whether the documents listed in the draft order contain advice or not; that they should be produced to the Commissioner for him to determine whether or not they contain legal advice, and thus whether they are privileged.

I am not pursuaded by this argument. In the majority judgement in Grant v Downs it was stated:

All that we have said so far indicates that unless the law confines legal professional privilege to those documents which are brought into existence for the sole purpose of submission to legal advisers for advice or for use in legal proceedings the privilege will travel beyond the underlying rationale to which it is intended to give expression and will confer an advantage and immunity on a corporation which is not enjoyed by the ordinary individual. It is not right that the privilege can attach to documents which, quite apart from the purpose of submission to a solicitor, would have been brought into existence for other purposes in any event, and then without attracting any attendant privilege. It is true that the requirement that documents be brought into existence in anticipation of litigation diminishes to some extent the risk that documents brought into existence for non-privilaged purposes will attract the privilege but it certainly does not eliminate that risk. For this, and the reasons we have expressed earlier we consider the sole purpose test should now be adopted as the criterion of legal professional privilege.

It seems to me that all the documents referred to in the draft order are documents which (of their very nature) were brought into existence solely as part of the communication regarding the prosecution of the patent application, between the applicant and his attorney; there is nothing before me to suggest that any of those documents came into existence for some other purpose (either exclusively, or additionally). I am therefore of the opinion that (subject to any waiver of privilege) all the documents referred to in the draft order are subject to privilege.

The second line of argument put forward by the opponent was that although the applicant had not expressly waived privilege in the documents referred to in items 3 to 5, they had in fact waived privilege in those documents by implication. In support of this argument I was referred to Attorney General for the Northern Territory v Maurice and others (1986) 161 CLR 475.

In the judgement of Mason J and Brennan J in this case, the following was stated:

The limiting effect of legal professional privilege on the availability of evidence otherwise relevant is confined, inter alia, by the doctrine of waiver. A litigant can of course waive his privilege directly through intentionally disclosing protected material. He can also loose his protection through a waiver by implication. An implied waiver occurs when, by reason of some conduct on the privilege holder's part, it becomes unfair to maintain the privilege. The holder of the privilege should not be able to abuse it by using it to create an inaccurate perception of the protected communication. Professor Wigmore explains:

"[W]hen his conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not. He cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder." (Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1961), vol. 8, para. 2327, p 636.)

In order to ensure that the opposing litigant is not misled by an inaccurate perception of the disclosed communication, fairness will usually require that waiver as to one part of a protected communication should result in waiver as to the rest of the communication on that subject-matter:....

Hence, the implied waiver inquiry is at the bottom focussed on the fairness of imputing such a waiver. 

In my view this principle is apposite to the present circumstances. In this regard I note the following with reference to the above declarations:

i.	Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration dated 27 December 1989 refer to two specific advices by the attorney, Shelston Waters.

ii.	Paragraph 5 of the declaration dated 27 December 1989 states that the lapsing 'resulted from my misunderstanding of the provisions relating to late payment of the maintenance fee'.

iii.	Paragraph 4 of the declaration dated 22 January 1990 states 'I failed to understand the patent application would lapse irrevocably if the fee was not paid within six months of the due date. .... I now believe that I did not fully understand the advice provided by my Attorney and/or did not spend sufficient time in attempting to understand the requirements in relation to maintenance of this application." (My underlining.)

iv.	Paragraph 5 of the declaration dated 22 January 1990 states 'the lapsing was unintentional and resulted from my failure to fully understand the procedure required in maintaining this application. This lack of understanding, in hindsight, resulted from my paying minimal attention to the matter due to pressures of other business'.

The substance of the declarant's justification for restoration is thus two-fold - that is, he alleges that he failed to pay the continuation fee in time because:

i.	he did not understand the requirements or provisions for maintaining the application, and 

ii.	he did not understand the advice provided by his attorney. 

It seems to me that the second  line of justification clearly and properly raises the question - "what was the advice that the declarant received from his patent attorney?"

Applying the principles from Attorney General for the Northern Territory v Maurice and others (supra), I come to the conclusion that fairness in this case requires that privilege in respect of correspondence regarding the payment of the continuation fee for the anniversary of 20 May 1989, is waived by implication.

However I am of the view that the implied waver does not cover any and all correspondence regarding the payment of the continuation fee. The declarations refer to the level of understanding or knowledge of the declarant leading to the continuation fee not being paid. Clearly, the declarations relate to the applicant's understanding or knowledge at or before the date of lapsing; his understanding or knowledge after that date seems, in the present circumstances, to be irrelevant. I also note that a communication after the date of lapsing could not have affected the applicant's understanding or knowledge before that date, nor resulted in the timely payment of the fee. It follows, in my view, that any correspondence after 20 Nov. 1989 is not relied upon by the applicant to support the restoration, and thus any such correspondence is not subject to an implied waiver of privilege.

Also, I consider that the implied waiver only covers correspondence from the patent attorney to the applicant. The declarant has avered that he did not fully understand the advice of his attorney; there is no suggestion that the attorney has not understood the correspondence of the applicant, or that the applicant is otherwise relying on correspondence to his attorney to justify the restoration. Only correspondence from the attorney to the applicant is relied upon to justify the restoration, and thus only this correspondence is subject to implied waiver of privilege.

In summary, I conclude that:

i.	documents referred to in items 1 and 2 of the draft order are subject to an express waiver of privilege; and

ii.	documents referred to in item 3 of the draft order which relate to correspondence on or before 20 Nov. 1989 from Shelston Waters to the applicant, are subject to an implied waiver of privilege.

iii.	documents referred to in item 3 of the draft order which relate to correspondence after 20 November 1989, or to correspondence from the applicant to Shelston Waters on or before that date, are subject to privilege; and

iv.	documents referred to in items 4 and 5 of the draft order, being explicitly (item 4) or implicitly (item 5) communications made after 20 Nov. 1989, are subject to privilege.

Since I cannot order the production of documents that are the subject of privilege, any order for production of documents that I issue must be restricted to those documents covered by paras (i) and (ii) above.

..../9

PRODUCTION

As I noted earlier, at the hearing the attorney for the applicant stated that their client waved privilege in respect of items 1 and 2 of the draft order, and did not otherwise have an objection to an order for the production of those documents. It therefore remains for me to decide whether I can order production of documents in the terms used in item 3 of the draft order (in so far as it relates to communications from Shelston Waters to the applicant on or before 20 Nov. 1989).

At the hearing, I noted that prior to the serving of the draft orders there had been some correspondence between the opponent and the Commissioner relating to the difference between an order for discovery and an order for production. I noted that the applicant was likely unaware of that correspondence, and invited comments on the issue. Subsequent to the hearing the applicant requested leave to file further argument; the opponent had no objection subject to the right to reply. Accordingly subsequent to the hearing submissions on this issue were received from both parties.

The applicant has argued that item 3 is tantamount to an order for discovery, on the following basis:

"Discovery is a general power to enable a party to obtain a list of documents relating to a matter. Documents discoverable under such a power have been defined in Wellcome Foundation ltd v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd  29 ALR 261 at 264. ... In contrast to discovery, "production" relates to the power to order specific documents referred to in the list of documents previously "discovered" ... Production requires the document to be known to exist and be specifically identified whereas "discovery" is a process of "discovering" what relevant documents are available for production.

...The opponent has no idea what documents are available and is merely seeking general discovery of any correspondence relating to the matter. We submit that the opponent is conducting a "fishing expedition" which was eloquently defined by Owen J in Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Son Pty Ltd [1955] 72 WN (NSW) 250 at 254; '.. a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out whether there are any or not".

The opponent argues that the orders they requested do not amount to an order for discovery. They refer inter alia to the decisions  of Lucas industries Ltd v Hewitt 18 ALR 555, Waind v Hill and National Employer's Mutual and General Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 372, and Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564

The distinction between production and discovery is succinctly elicited from The Oxford Companion to Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980, which provides the following :

Production. In England the High Court has power to order a party to produce any documents relating to the matter in issue, or to produce any documents for the inspection of another party.

Discovery. The process by which parties to a civil cause in England may, within limits, obtain information of the existence and contents of all documents relevant to the matters in dispute between them. The object is to elicit documents before the trial so as to eliminate surprise at the trial and promote fair disposal of the case. ....

The applicant's submission in part states that production relates to the power to order specific documents referred to in the list of documents previously discovered. I do not accept this element of the submission. The Commissioner has no power under the Patents Act 1990 to order discovery, but he has power to order production of documents; hence an order for production cannot be predicated on discovery.

The issue of substance however is the degree of particularity that is required in an order for production. That is, is it necessary to specifically identify each document with great precision, or is some degree of generality permissable?

The material set out in the Practice and Procedure of the High Court and Federal Court of Australia, Butterworths, 1978, at paragraphs 8939.9 and 8939.10 sheds some light on the issue. These paragraphs read as follows:

[8939.9] The need for specificity and particularity in subpoenas to produce documents: The classic statement on the requirement of a subpoena to produce documents being in terms which are specific and clear was made in Small v Commissioner of Railways (1938) SR (NSW) 564 by Jordan CJ at 573 : "A writ of subpoena duces tecum may be addressed to a stranger to the cause or to a party. If it be addressed to a stranger, it must specify with reasonable particularity the documents which are required to be produced. A subpoena duces tecum ought not to be issued to such a person requiring him to search for and produce all such documents as he may have in his possession or power relating to a particular subject matter. It is not legitimate to use a subpoena for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain what would be in effect discovery of documents against a person who, being a stranger, is not liable to make discovery. A stranger to the cause ought not to be required to go to trouble and perhaps to expense in ransacking his records and endeavouring to form a judgement as to whether any of his papers throw light on a dispute which is to be litigated upon issues of which he is presumable ignorant: ....

"Where the subpoena is addressed to a party, it is still necessary that it should state with reasonable particularity the documents which are to be produced: A-G v Wilson (1839) 9 Sim 526 at 529; Earl of Powis v Negus [1923] 1 Ch 186 at 190. It is true that a party, unlike a stranger, can be required to give discovery; but it is not legitimate to use a writ of subpoena duces tecum as a substitute for an application for discovery of documents, or as an alternative to an application for further and better discovery. ..."

[8939.10] "relating to" and "referred to": The expression "relating to" and "referred to" were discussed by Waddell J in Spencer Motors Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921 at 929 where his honour said, after citing the famous passage by Jordan CJ in Small's case, "It is, of course, important not to read the passage cited as forbidding the use of expressions such as 'relating to'. Taken as a whole, the passage indicates that what is objectionable is placing on the person to whom a subpoena is addressed the same kind of burden as is placed on a party required to give discovery of documents. Broadly speaking, that burden is to go through the documents in his possession or power and list each document which relates to the matters in question in the proceeding in the sense that 'it contains information which may - not which must- either diectly or indirecly enable the part reqiuring the discovery either to asvance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary, or which may fairly lead to a train of enquiry which may have either of these two consequences' ..

"Use of expressions such as 'relating to' need not result in there being any oppression or abuse of process. It all depends on the context in which the expresson is used. For instance, it could hardly be said to be objectionable to produce all 'invoices' relating to sales of a particular item to the defendant on a particular day. The use of theword 'invoices' would restrict the potential width of the expression 'relating to'. Similarly, in American warehousing Ltd v Doe [1967] 1 Lloyds Rep 222, the Court of Appeal held that a requirement to produce the 'contract slips' and 'quote slips' relating to each  of a number of insurances was not objectionable. ...

I get further guidance from the decision of Lucas Industries Ltd v Hewitt (1978) 18 ALR 555 where it was held, inter alia that:

-	while the documents required in a subpoena duces tecum must be specified with reasonable particularity, a degree of generality in the description of the documents might according to the circumstances be compatible with reasonableness. A description such as "the hospitable records relating to treatment of Mr. X between January and July 1977" was said to be acceptable; although the description places upon the hospital the burden of searching for the records, such a burden was considered reasonable having regard to modern business practices (see pg 570);

-	It is relevant that the respondents do not put any evidence before the court that they did not know what documents were required by the subpoena or that the search for them would be unduly onerous;

-	Classes of documents provided the description of the class is sufficiently clear, may be required to be produced on subpoena duces tecum. What is sufficiently clear in relation to any class must be determined by reference to all the circumstances concerning the demand for production.

In the present case, 

-	the order for production is to be served on a party to the action, and not a stranger; indeed, the order is to be served on the party initiating the action (through its request for restoration);

-	in my view, item 3 of the draft order identifies the documents sought with sufficient particularity that the applicant has no doubt which documents in his possession or power the order is referring to; the degree of generality used is not unreasonable in the circumstances. 

In coming to this view I particularly have regard to the normal role of a patent attorney in advising clients of the need to pay continuation fees, and in maintaining systems to monitor the payment or otherwise of those fees; and

-	at no stage has the applicant indicated that he does not know what documents are required by item 3.

As a result, I consider item 3 (in so far as it relates to communications from Shelston Waters to the applicant, before 20 Nov. 1989) constitutes a proper identification of documents for production. I do not consider that an order for production containing item 3 would be tantamount to an order for discovery, nor a fishing expedition, as submitted by the applicant.

THE ORDER FOR PRODUCTION - OTHER ISSUES

At the hearing I expressed some concern with the wording used in the draft order. I am of the view that the wording used in the draft order (ignoring items 4 and 5) is deficient for the following reasons:

1.	Items 1 and 2 do not specifically relate the advice to that referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration of 27 December 1988, and

2.	Item 3 is not circumscribed by either a start or an end date. With regard to an end date, I found above that item 3 should be restricted to correspondence on or before 20 November 1989. In respect of the start date, the opponent filed on 17 October 1991 a revised draft order which excluded from item 3 correspondence before 20 February 1989. This date seems in the circumstances to be reasonable, and I have therefore adopted it.

3.	To give force to the order, it should include a reference to the provisions of section 181 of the Patents Act 1990.

I also noted that to give full force to the order, section 181 implicitly required the person requesting production to offer to meet the reasonable expenses of the applicant in providing to the Commissioner copies of the documents, and that no such offer had been made. On 17 October 1991, the opponent filed such an offer.

Attached to this decision is the order for production.

COSTS

In actions before the Commissioner, costs normally follow the event.

In this case I have found that the opponent is entitled in part to the order for production of documents that they sought. On the other hand, I have found that the applicant was properly entitled to claim privilege in some of the documents sought to be produced.

As both parties were partly successful in the action, I make no award of costs.

(David Herald)
Assistant Commissioner of Patents

PATENTS ACT 1990

ORDER OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

In the matter of Australian Patent Application No. 73657/87 in the name of PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LTD

and

In the matter of an application under section 47E(2) of the Patents Act 1952 for restoration

and

In the matter of an opposition thereto by McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED

To :	PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LTD
	C/- Shelston Waters
	55 Clarence Street
	SYDNEY    NSW  2000

Whereas the Commissioner of Patents has received a request from  McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED to order PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LTD to produce certain documents, and

the Commissioner of Patents considers it appropriate to order PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LTD to produce certain of those documents so that they may be received in evidence in the above matter by the Commissioner, and

McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED has requested the Commissioner supply them with a copy of the documents so produced, and

the Commissioner considers it desirable that the documents be produced in time to enable them to be considered by the Commissioner, and by McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED, before the hearing of the opposition to the application for restoration, and

Whereas McILWRAITH McEACHERN OPERATIONS LIMITED has undertaken to meet the reasonable expenses of PARACEL HOLDING PTY LTD in providing to the Commissioner of Patents copies of documents in response to this order, and

Whereas section 181 of the Patents Act 1990 provides that a person who:
(a)	is required by the Commissioner to produce a document or article; and
(b)	has been offered payment of reasonable expenses;
must not, without lawful excuse, fail to produce it,

The COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS orders that:

PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LTD shall within thirty (30) days of the date of this order deliver to the Commissioner of Patents two copies, both certified by an officer of PARACEL HOLDINGS PTY LTD or its patent attorneys as a true copy of the original, of each of the following documents:-

1.	the advice received by Mr. Robert Coghill on or about 20 February 1989 from Shelston Waters, as referred to in paragraph 2 of the declaration by Coghill dated 27 December 1989.

2.	the advice received by Mr. Robert Coghill on or about 20 May 1989 from Shelston Waters, as referred to in paragraph 3 of the declaration by Coghill dated 27 December 1989.

3.	all correspondence from Shelston Waters to Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd between 20 February 1989 and 20 November 1989 concerning the payment of the continuation fee due in respect of patent application no. 73657/87 on 20 May 1989.

DATED this Thirteenth day of December 1991

THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

By his Delegate
DAVID HERALD
Assistant Commissioner Of Patents

OFFICIAL NOTICE

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

Application	:	No. 73657/87 in the name of Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd

Title	:	Recompression Chamber

Action	:	Request for the Commissioner to order, under Section 210(c), the production of certain documents. Consideration of privelage under section 200(2).

Decision	:	Issued             .  All documents  sought were subject to privelage. Privelage expressly waived for certain documents, and implicitly waived for others. The order for production sought is not tantamount to an order for discovery. Order for production of certain documents issued.