FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WZAVX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR	[2015] FCCA 2578	

Catchwords: 
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Class XA) visa – whether applicant at risk of harm due to atheist beliefs – whether the applicant was a credible witness – whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error in making adverse findings of credit – bias – whether Tribunal took into account all relevant factors – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.	

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(aa), 91R(3), 430, 476, 477.	

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
SZFDE v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189 Mellick v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 1134	

Applicant:	WZAVX	

First Respondent:	Minister for Immigration & Border Protection	

Second Respondent:	Administrative Appeals Tribunal	

File Number:	PEG 54 of 2015	

Judgment of:	Judge Street	

Hearing date:	16 September 2015	

Date of Last Submission:	16 September 2015	

Delivered at:	Perth	

Delivered on:	16 September 2015	

REPRESENTATION
The applicant appeared in person via video link	

Counsel for the Respondents:	Mr R S French	

Solicitors for the Respondents:	Australian Government Solicitor	

ORDERS
(1)	The name of the Second Respondent be amended to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the filing of any further document in this regard is dispensed with. 
(2)	The 35 day period within which to make an application under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be extended up to and including 16 September 2015. 
(3)	The application be dismissed. 
(4)	The Applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $6825. 

(1)	
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT 
OF AUSTRALIA 
AT Perth	
PEG 54 of 2015
WZAVX	
Applicant

And

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection	
First Respondent
Administrative Appeals Tribunal	
Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1.	This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in respect of a decision of the Tribunal made on 12 January 2015 affirming a decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection (class XA) visa.  The application is one in respect of which an extension of time is required under s.477.  Counsel on behalf of the first respondent accepted that there was an adequate explanation advanced by the applicant but maintained that the issue of whether there was a sufficiently arguable ground of jurisdictional error was a reason why an extension of time should not be granted under s.477. The grounds are sufficiently arguable to warrant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice.
2.	The application identifies four grounds:
	1. The Tribunal was in error because it had made the decision in denial of procedural fairness and denial of natural justice to me.
	2. The Tribunal had constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction.
	Tribunals and other government decision makers must make decisions based on the evidence put before them, and to make a decision based on no evidence is a legal error.
	At Paragraph 66 of page 13 of 25 of RRT decision, the Tribunal Member stated that “while the Tribunal accepts that the applicant no longer attends mosque, the Tribunal does not accept that he is a genuine atheist…mosque.) The Tribunal’s finding was that I am not an atheist is based on no evidence.
	3. The Tribunal had failed to take into account relevant materials and considerations.
	4. Misapplication of the Section 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958
3.	In addition to those four grounds the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application identified additional grounds as to the applicant’s submissions.  The additional grounds are as follows:
	5. The Tribunal failed to set out the reasons for the decision. 
	6. The Tribunal failed to refer to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based on. 
	7. The Tribunal failed to make relevant enquiries into critical facts the existence of which was easily ascertained under Migration Act 1958. 
	8. The Tribunal made erroneous findings, reached mistaken conclusions on material questions of fact in breach of Section 430 of the Migration Act 1958. 
	9. The Tribunal failed to engage and invoke Australia's International Obligation under the International Covenant for Civil and Political right (ICCPR) and its second option protocol aiming at the abolition of the Death Penalty and the Covenant against torture. 
	…
	11. The Tribunal’s decision is irrational, illogical, or so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could make it.
4.	Paragraph 10 was the same as the applicant had raised as ground 4 in the application.
5.	The applicant arrived in Australia on a student visa on 8 July 2004, which was due to expire on 31 January 2006 but which was cancelled on 19 January 2006. After cancellation of the student visa, the applicant was granted a bridging visa which expired on 31 January 2006.  The applicant thereafter remained unlawfully in Australia until located on 16 March 2014 when he was placed in immigration detention, following which he lodged an application for protection on 26 March 2014.  The applicant was found to be a citizen of Bangladesh and his claims were assessed against that country.
6.	The applicant claimed fears of being persecuted because of his political opinion and his religious beliefs, by reason of which he said he would be targeted and killed.  The applicant also raised claims of fear of persecution due to his blogs and being an atheist.  The applicant also raised a claim relating to a new law in Bangladesh that he claimed would be used to persecute bloggers.  In his submissions provided to the Tribunal the applicant provided a further statement dated 26 August 2014 and relevantly said in relation to the new law:
	I fear the government can arrest me and detain me for a trial under this new law, as I have criticised religion, religious laws, Quran and religious figures many times in my writings and blogs and Facebook. 
7.	 In response to the first respondent’s submissions and in support of the application the applicant from the Bar table identified in the court book references to his blogs and his picture in relation to certain posts.  
8.	This is a case where the Tribunal did not accept the credibility of the applicant and relevantly found:
	30. Having considered the applicant's evidence, the Tribunal has formed the view that the applicant is not a witness of truth and considers that the very basis of the applicant's claims to be implausible. …
9.	The applicant contended that the adverse findings of credit were made on observations and not inconsistencies with his evidence.  That is not consistent with the clear reference to inconsistencies raised in the following sentence:
	30. …The Tribunal found the witness to be clearly an intelligent, quick-witted man who is able to explain away inconsistencies put to him.
10.	It is clear that the Tribunal took into account the inconsistencies in relation to the applicant’s evidence as well as the other matters identified in para.30 in coming to the finding that the applicant’s overall testimony was unconvincing.  The applicant did provide reasons why he has rehearsed his evidence, given its importance to him, and sought to rely upon a psychologist’s report in relation to his mental health.  It is clear that the Tribunal took into account that expert report at para.27 and the point being made by the Tribunal in the second sentence, which was criticised by the applicant, was that it was a matter for the Tribunal to determine the credibility of the applicant.
11.	It was for reasons of want of a finding of credibility in relation to the applicant’s evidence that the delegate had rejected the application.  I do not accept that there is any irrational or inconsistent reasoning in relation to the Tribunal taking into account the psychologist’s report.  The Tribunal noted that it found:
	…The applicant appearing to be expansive and eloquent, addressing a range of general issues while lacking specific detail in his own active participation.
12.	It was a finding that was open to the Tribunal, on the material before the Tribunal, and it is clear from the presentation by the applicant in this Court, that he is a highly intelligent, eloquent and clever person.  However, it was matter for the Tribunal to determine the applicant’s credit and relevantly, in that regard, the Tribunal said:
	30. …The Tribunal considers the applicant’s oral and written evidence regarding the reasons why he left Bangladesh, his claims to be an atheist, and his subsequent blogging activities not believable.  After considering all his evidence individually, cumulatively and in its entirety, the Tribunal did not find the applicant credible.
13.	That adverse finding cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification and notwithstanding the applicant’s disagreement with the finding by the Tribunal it was an adverse finding it was open on the material before the Tribunal.  In relation to the applicant being an atheist, relevantly the Tribunal said:
	64. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant's claim that his uncle will harm him because he is an atheist. The applicant's evidence is that he decided in his late teens that he no longer believed, stopping his attendance at mosque and asking questions about Islam. He claims he was hassled by family members because of his non-attendance. He claims he was called kafir for asking questions and stopping his practise of Islam. The Tribunal does not accept that being called names and hassled for not attending mosque or stopping the practice of Islam amounts to serious harm or significant harm as defined in the Act. The applicant indicates that he remained living in his home area for several more years before moving to Dhaka where he claimed to have only gone out to collect the money sent by his family and to go to and from his tutoring jobs, indicating that be did not attend mosque while in Dhaka either. The applicant's evidence was that he was close to his maternal grandparents and family because he lived with them for several years when he was younger. He indicates that his family were aware that he no longer went to mosque and the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant's uncle was unaware that he was not attending mosque on a regular basis when he resided in Bangladesh based on the claims made by the applicant as to the closeness of his maternal family.
	…
		66. While the Tribunal accepts that the applicant no longer attends mosque, the Tribunal does not accept that he is a genuine atheist or that he will face serious harm on his return to  Bangladesh because he is an atheist and no longer attends mosque. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant's claims that his family were calling him every day, telling him to stay away from western culture and to ask if he was attending mosque because his evidence is that he had ceased going to mosque while living in Bangladesh in his home area where his family were located indicating that they would already be aware that he was not attending mosque on a regular basis. 'The applicant had already been living away from his family for four years prior to his departure for Australia, was not attending mosque or practising his religion and had not experienced any harm. For the reasons as discussed earlier, the Tribunal does not find the applicant a credible witness and does not accept that he told his maternal uncle in 2004 that he was an atheist and does not accept that his brother had to flee because of threats from Islamic extremists because the Tribunal does not accept that his brother was ever threatened by Islamic extremists. The Tribunal does not accept that his uncle will harm him on his return to Bangladesh because he is an atheist as his uncle has not sought to harm him in the past for not practising Islam or attending mosque and the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant is a genuine atheist. The Tribunal does not accept that his uncle has ever threatened to harm him as it does not accept that he told his uncle be was an atheist. The Tribunal does not accept that he will be unable to return to his family as they have continued to support him despite his non-attendance at mosque and failure to practise Islam.
	67. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant will face harm from any family member or any person or extremist group if he returns to Bangladesh because be is an atheist or no longer attends mosque or will be considered to be a Muslim male apostate as he no longer practises Islam or because he no longer believes in being a Muslim and has left Islam.
14.	The applicant sought to maintain that there was no rational foundation for the adverse finding in relation to him being a genuine atheist and that he had given evidence about ceasing to attend a mosque.  The adverse findings of credit were a rational and logical basis for the adverse finding by the Tribunal and it is not a matter for this Court to make fresh findings of fact.  This Court does not have jurisdiction to evaluate afresh the applicant’s credit or make fresh findings of fact.  
15.	It is also clear that the Tribunal addressed the changes to the laws in Bangladesh that the applicant raised in respect of a fear that he would be arrested, as identified in paras.80 and 93.
16.	The applicant, before this Court, advanced that the new law was a specific identified provision which he accepted had not been identified before the Tribunal.  The applicant went further and contended that the specific provision was a discriminatory law that should have been addressed by the Tribunal in terms of his fears of persecution.  I do not accept that the issue of the specific provision as part of the law of Bangladesh being a discriminatory law was raised before the Tribunal or was sufficiently apparent from the material before the Tribunal as to be a claim or integer that the Tribunal should have addressed.
17.	The applicant raised a potential inconsistency between paras.85 and 91 in the reasoning of the Tribunal.  The applicant contended that at one point the Tribunal had accepted, in para.91, that he published blogs and that, in para.85, it was suggested the contrary finding had been made.  The Tribunal’s reasons are not to be read with a keen eye for error and are to be read as a whole.  It is apparent, from looking at the whole of para.85, that the Tribunal was addressing the extent of the blogging activities by the applicant in its last sentence.  In paragraph 85 there is a reference to the applicant’s activity in online blogging organisations which is a reference to the claim by the applicant as to the role he had undertaken as an administrator in relation to blogging activities. Paragraph 85 is as follows:
	85. The Tribunal found the applicant an intelligent and articulate person, able to provide considerable general information on the Shabagh movement and the blogging movement. Apart from his claims of specific involvement, limited evidence was provided to support his claims. The Tribunal has had regard to the letter he provided as well as copies of his articles and on-line activities, but did not find that these demonstrate or support the applicant’s claims to have been heavily involved. The Tribunal found the limited evidence was provided to support his claimed on-line blogging activities despite the applicant claiming to be heavily involved. The Tribunal finds that the applicant has exaggerated his role to enhance his application for protection. The Tribunal does not accept as credible the applicant’s claims to have been actively involved in blogging or in any on-line blogging organisations or with the Youth Peace and Democracy organisation.
18.	The adverse finding by the Tribunal in 85 was open on the material before the Tribunal and I accept the submission of the first respondent that it is not inconsistent with the reasoning addressing the publication of articles on a blog identified in para.91.  The findings in paras.85 and 91 cannot be said to be irrational and illogical so as to give rise to any jurisdictional error. It is clear from attachment A to the Tribunal’s reasons it was expressly incorporated in para.4 that the Tribunal correctly identified the relevant law and, in particular, the role of s.91R in relation to the refugee criterion and separately identified the criterion for complementary protection.
19.	Whilst there is a reference in para.91 to the purpose of the applicant in engaging in blogging activities, that purpose was relevant to the reasoning as found as follows:
93. The Tribunal has considered the applicant's claims that following changes to the laws in Bangladesh he will be arrested if he returns as he has spoken out through his blogging criticising the actions of the Bangladesh government and religion, supporting the Sahbag movement, demanding war crime justice and this will cause him to be identified to others who wish to harm him. The applicant provided articles and photographs of high profile persons associated with Youth Peace and Democracy in Bangladesh being assaulted as evidence that would also happen to him. The Tribunal does not accept on the evidence provided that the applicant would firstly be identified as the writer and participant in these groups as he has undertaken all his on-line activities, including his Facebook page under the name Tonoy Emroz. Secondly the Tribunal finds that any activity has been limited and he has not achieved the high profile of those he submitted had been targeted by the police. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has any interest in his blogging or on-line activities for any other purpose than strengthening his claims to be a refugee and does not accept that he will continue these activities should he return to Bangladesh. The Tribunal therefore does not accept that he will be harmed for these reasons if he returns to Bangladesh. 
	94. The Tribunal has considered whether the applicant would face a real risk of significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his return to Bangladesh if he is identified as an atheist. The Tribunal has considered whether the applicant would face a real risk of significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his return to Bangladesh if he is identified as a blogger or because of his membership of various blogging groups or his on-line activities. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal has not accepted that the applicant will suffer harm for reasons that he is an atheist or that he is opposed to the Bangladesh Government through his blogging activities or membership of various on-line groups or because he no longer attends mosque or practices Islam. 
	95. In summary, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant is a credible witness and rejects his claims to fear harm as a result of his political involvement, his on-line blogging activities and membership of various on-line groups such as Youth Peace and Democracy and because he claims to be an atheist and joined various on-line atheist groups. 
	96. Having considered the applicant's circumstances individually and cumulatively, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal finds there are no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Bangladesh, that there is a real risk he will suffer significant harm. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the applicant meets the alternative provisions in s.36(2)(aa).
20.	This is not a case where the Court has impermissibly taken into account an irrelevant consideration, being s.91R, in its evaluation of the complementary protection criterion.  The applicant sought to rely upon more recent material subsequent to the decision of the Tribunal, identifying grounds upon which the applicant maintained that he would be killed if he went back to Bangladesh and he identified alleged examples of a blogger being tracked down and killed 15 days after arriving, in front of his wife.  This was not material that was before the Tribunal and, as I have indicated, this Court is not sitting as a court de novo assessing the applicant’s views but has a limited jurisdiction that is focused upon issues of jurisdictional error or a denial of procedural fairness that constitutes a jurisdictional error.
21.	The applicant also identified that there were other blogging website activities that he had engaged in that he had not raised before the Tribunal because he could not get access to those websites whilst in detention.  This is not a matter that can give rise to any jurisdictional error and it is clear that the Tribunal gave careful attention to the applicant’s blogs as identified in para.19 as follows:
	…The applicant provided copies of his blogs in support of his claims. The delegate refers to some of the blogs being exactly the same as blogs appearing on other websites yet the applicant has made no claim to blog on any other website. The applicant claims to have commenced his blogging about 2012. 
22.	In relation to ground 1 it is clear that the applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 30 July 2014, consistent with the statutory regime, and did attend that hearing, at which he was represented by his registered migration agent. The applicant had a genuine hearing. Ground 1 is a generalised allegation of a denial of procedural fairness and a denial of natural justice.  The generalised allegations do not make out any sufficiently arguable jurisdictional error.
23.	The applicant provided detailed written submissions in relation to the fear raised in respect of political and imputed political opinion and, in substance, disagreed with the adverse findings made by the Tribunal.  That disagreement did not identify any jurisdictional error or any denial of procedural fairness or denial of natural justice.  The applicant also took issue with the Tribunal’s adverse finding in respect of the applicant’s religion and being an atheist.  To the extent that it is suggested the Tribunal did not set out reasons for the adverse findings, I reject that submission.
24.	To the extent that it is suggested that the Tribunal did not refer to evidence or other material on which the findings were based, it is clear that the findings were based on the assessment of credit by the applicant and that those adverse findings were available.  To the extent that it is suggested that the finding in this regard was one which lacked a logical foundation, for the reasons I have given, the adverse finding was open in light of the Tribunal’s assessment of credit.
25.	The applicant maintained that the Tribunal was biased and had used trickery to ground the decision.  The applicant conveyed that he intended no offence to the Tribunal by raising the allegation of bias.  The Court explained to the applicant it was a perfectly proper allegation for the applicant to raise, however, an allegation of bias must be clearly made and strictly proved.  The applicant referred to the adverse finding in para.64. 
26.	An adverse finding is not a basis upon which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits.  The allegation of bias is not made out.  I reject the submission of trickery.  It is clear that the Tribunal was taking into account the material provided by the applicant and it was entitled to do so in its assessment of the applicant’s credit.  The applicant contended that the Tribunal had ignored relevant country information which was available to the Tribunal and which was more current in relation to the difficulties the applicant was likely to face in respect of his fears in Bangladesh.  
27.	In this regard, the applicant contended that the Tribunal had based its decision on country information in 2011.  It is clear, however, from the Tribunal’s reasons that it did take into account country information post 2011 as identified in footnote 2.  This is not a case where it can be said that the Tribunal ignored material current country information that was available to the Tribunal.  No error is made out in relation to the country information to which the Tribunal had regard and I reject the submission that the Tribunal ignored relevant country information.
28.	The applicant contended that it was the duty of the Tribunal to research what the applicant contends before this Court were discriminatory laws in Bangladesh.  The reasons I have given, no such discriminatory law issue was raised before the Tribunal, nor was it one that was sufficiently identified that it should have been addressed by the Tribunal.  I accept the first respondent’s submission that the Tribunal was under no duty to make inquiries regarding matters raised by the applicant was it not obliged to make out the applicant’s case for him.  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) HCA 1 at 20:  Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-170.  I repeat in this regard the proposition of a discriminatory law was not raised by the applicant.
29.	No denial of procedural fairness or denial of natural justice is made out in relation to the adverse findings in respect to the applicant’s religion and the applicant’s claim as to being an atheist.  The applicant maintained that he had suffered events that constituted torture, threats or humiliation.  The applicant identified in this Court the evidence to which he had referred in respect of those events.  I accept the first respondent’s submission that the Tribunal accepted the applicant may have been assaulted in December 2001 but found this assault was because of generalised violence occurring in Bangladesh at the time and not indicative of persecution.  See para.57.
30.	The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had been tortured and his claims to persecution in that regard were rejected.  That adverse finding was open on the material before the Tribunal.  The Tribunal did not deny the applicant procedural fairness or deny the applicant natural justice in relation to the adverse findings in respect of torture.  In relation to the applicant’s blogging and online activities, it is clear that the Tribunal carefully addressed those matters.  I do not accept the applicant’s contention that the Tribunal failed to understand the features of Facebook or reach mistaken conclusions or asked itself a wrong question in relation to the applicant’s blogging, so far as having an impact on credibility findings.
31.	I do not accept that the Tribunal did not take into account the evidence advanced by the applicant.  I do not accept that the Tribunal ignored the photographs and name of the applicant on the articles and I do not accept that the Tribunal ignored the evidence of the applicant in relation to the blog specified by the application.  I do not accept that the Tribunal’s adverse conclusion in relation to the applicant’s blogging and the extent of that blogging was not open on the material before the Tribunal. I do not accept that the Tribunal made contradictory findings in relation to the blogging by the applicant
32.	I do not accept that there are any identified relevant considerations to which the Tribunal failed to have regard in relation to the adverse findings on blogging.  In relation to the applicant’s claim for protection as a refugee, I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to consider any relevant matter in applying s.91R(3). I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to take into account the applicant’s alleged claims of fear because of his criticism of Islam and advocating secularism.  There was no denial of procedural fairness or denial of natural justice relating to the Tribunal’s adverse findings in relation to the applicant’s blogging and online activities.
33.	In relation to the applicant’s credibility, I do not accept that the adverse findings were based on unfairness, erroneous assumptions or a lack of partiality.  For the reasons I have given, the adverse findings were open and the adverse findings are not a basis upon which any allegation of bias can be made out.  I do not accept that the Tribunal made erroneous or mistaken conclusions or lacked an understanding of the evidence in the making of the adverse findings, or did not take into account the applicant’s evidence.  I do not accept that the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question in relation to the applicant’s evidence and the adverse finding, for the reasons I have identified, in respect of the applicant’s credibility was open.
34.	The adverse findings of the Tribunal in relation to the applicant’s credibility are not ones that give rise to any denial of procedural fairness or a denial of natural justice in relation to the applicant.  In relation to s.91R(3), I do not accept that the Tribunal asked itself the wrong questions and I have not accepted that the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s evidence.  I reject the submission that the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s evidence in relation to the involvement of the applicant in the blogging and his role or in determining his profile for the reasons I have given.  The issue of a discriminatory law was not raised before the Tribunal and was not one which the Tribunal should have addressed on the material before the Tribunal.
35.	It is clear that the Tribunal did address the applicant’s fears in respect of the persecution of atheists and secular bloggers.  I do not accept that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness or denied the applicant natural justice in the adverse finding in relation to s.91R.  To the extent that the applicant sought to identify a want of tendering of material by the migration agent, that is not a basis upon which any jurisdictional error can be made out, see SZFDE v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189 at [53] and Mellick v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 1134 at [23].  Ground 1 of the application accordingly is not made out.
36.	In relation to ground 2, the adverse finding in relation to the applicant’s religion and alleged state of being an atheist is not one in respect of which there was any constructive failure of Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction.  This was an area which was open to the Tribunal to make adverse findings.  Ground 2 fails to make out any jurisdictional error.  In relation to ground 3, the generalised assertion of the failure to take into account relevant matters, is not capable of making out a jurisdictional error, for the reasons I have given.  There was no jurisdictional error of the kind identified in para.3. 
37.	In relation to ground 4, it is clear that the Tribunal properly identified the relevant law in relation to s.91R and there is nothing to identify any misapplication of s.91R(3) by the Tribunal.  Relevantly the Tribunal held:
	86. The Tribunal discussed with the applicant the provisions of s91R(3) and was told that he did blogging because he was interested in politics and it had nothing to do with a protection visa application. It was submitted that the applicant had joined these groups prior to his application for protection being lodged or contemplated and therefore s91(R)(3) does not apply. The applicant told the Tribunal that he joined these online groups in 2012 because of his continuing interest in Bangladesh politics and because he is an atheist and opposes the Islamic groups. He told the Tribunal that be joined in 2012 after looking at another group at the end of 2011. For the reasons as discussed earlier, the Tribunal has not accepted the applicant' s claims to have maintained an interest in Bangladesh politics and does not accept his claim that it was his interest that caused him to seek out on-line groups and become involved in blogging as well as participate in the on-line group Youth Peace and Democracy. The applicant told the Tribunal that from about 2005 he had discussed with his former flatmate and friends about applying for protection but they told him he had left it too late. The applicant had been unlawful in Australia since January 2006 and was aware of the possibility that he may at some stage be detained or that he may have to resolve his visa status. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant's sole purpose in starting blogging activities as well as joining on-line atheist groups was to support an application for protection. As the Tribunal has determined that the applicant's sole purpose in blogging and joining on-line atheist and political groups was to strengthen his refugee claims, the Tribunal must disregard this conduct when considering his well-founded fear of persecution on this basis.  
	87. After considering the available evidence, the Tribunal finds that there is not a real chance the applicant would be harmed by the government and/or the authorities and/or any political party and/or anyone associated with any political party and/or any member of his family and or any extremist political or religions group now or in in the reasonably foreseeable future if be returns to Bangladesh for any Convention ground.  
88. The Tribunal has considered all the applicant's the claims individually, cumulatively and in entirety and finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason if he returns to Bangladesh now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 
38.	No jurisdictional error is made out in relation to ground 4.  In relation to the other grounds raised by the applicant, the assertion that the Tribunal failed to set out the reasons for the decision in ground 5 does not make out any jurisdictional error. For the reasons I have given, it is clear that the adverse findings by the Tribunal were open and there was no failure by the Tribunal to provide reasons for its adverse findings.
39.	In relation to ground 6, the generalised assertion of a failure to refer to evidence and material upon which the findings were based, fails to make out any jurisdictional error.  For the reasons I have earlier identified, nothing in the applicant’s submissions identifies any adverse finding that was not open on the material before the Tribunal.  In relation to ground 7, the generalised assertion of a requirement to make inquiries into critical facts is misconceived and does not identify any jurisdictional error.  In relation to ground 8, there was no breach of the Tribunal’s duty under s.430 and the adverse findings were open and no jurisdictional error of the kind identified in ground 8 is made out.
40.	Ground 9 fails to identify any jurisdictional error and is in substance an attempt to agitate the merits of the matter, which was within the domain of the Tribunal.  In relation to ground 11, the adverse findings by the Tribunal cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification.  Ground 11 does not make out any jurisdictional error.  The application is dismissed.  
I certify that the preceding forty (40) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Associate:  

Date: 23 September 2015