VICTORIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
planning and environment LIST	vcat reference No. P977/2024
Permit Application no. P4/2024	
CATCHWORDS	
Section 61(4) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic); interpretation of restrictive covenant; whether proposal would result in a breach of a restrictive covenant.	

Applicant	TLC Melbourne Pty Ltd	
Responsible Authority	Banyule City Council	
Respondents	Chris James	
	Philippa Griffith	
	SaveIvanhoeEast.org.au Incorporated	
	Sylvia Kappadais	
	Gary Marshall & Elizabeth Marshall	
SUBJECT LAND	321 Lower Heidelberg Road & 1 Maltravers Road
IVANHOE EAST  VIC  3079	
HEARING TYPE	Preliminary Hearing	
DATE OF HEARING	17 & 18 March 2025	
DATE OF ORDER	2 July 2025
	
CITATION	TLC Melbourne Pty Ltd v Banyule CC [2025] VCAT 582	
Determination on question of law
Question:
Would the grant of a permit for the use and development proposed within planning permit application P4/2024 authorise anything which would result in a breach of the following registered restrictive covenants, such that the responsible authority must refuse to grant the permit unless a permit has been issued, or a decision made to grant a permit, to allow the removal or variation of the covenant, by reason of s 61(4) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic):
•	1101302;
•	1127466;
•	1350689;
•	1394247;
•	1408211;
•	1532483?
Answer:
No.

S P Djohan
Senior Member	

Appearances
For TLC Melbourne Pty Ltd	Barnaby Chessell SC with Emma Peppler of Counsel instructed by Rigby Cooke.	
For Banyule City Council	David Vorchiemer with Nick Sissons of Russell Kennedy Lawyers.	
For SaveIvanhoeEast.org.au	Daniel Robinson of Counsel instructed by Jackson Lane Lawyers.	
For Chris James	In person.	
For Philippa Griffith	In person.	
For Gary Marshall & Elizabeth Marshall	Gary Marshall.	
Sylvia Kappadais	No appearance.	

Reasons
Background
1	On or about 15 July 2024, Banyule City Council (‘responsible authority’) refused planning permit application P4/2024 (‘permit application’).
2	The permit application sought permission under the Banyule Planning Scheme (‘planning scheme’) for use and development of land situated at 321 Lower Heidelberg Road and 1 Maltravers Road, Ivanhoe East, Victoria (‘subject land’) for:
Use and development of the land for a child care centre, medical centre, restricted recreation facility (gym, pool and wellness centre), food and drink premises (café) and place of assembly (gallery); removal of vegetation under the Vegetation Protection Overlay; removal and creation of easements; display of internally illuminated business identification signage; and alteration of access to a Transport Zone (Schedule 2).
3	On 6 September 2024, TLC Melbourne Pty Ltd (‘applicant’) commenced this proceeding by filing with the Tribunal an application for review under s 77 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) (‘PE Act’) seeking a review of the responsible authority’s decision to refuse the permit application.
4	The respondents are all original objectors to the permit application that have elected to become parties to this proceeding.
5	The subject land comprises of 7 separate registered titles and the applicant is the registered owner of all the 7 titles.
6	Each title comprising the subject land is burdened by a registered restrictive covenant and the question I am required to answer is, in essence, whether the grant of a permit to use and develop the subject land as described in the permit application would authorise anything that would result in a breach of any of the registered restrictive covenants burdening the subject land.
7	For the reasons that follow, I have determined that a grant of a permit to use and develop the subject land as described in permit application would not authorise anything that would result in a breach of any of the registered covenants burdening the subject land.
8	My reasons are set out in the following parts:
•	Part A sets out in further detail relevant key background facts.
•	Part B sets out the relevant legislative provisions.
•	Part C sets out the key legal principles applicable to my task.
•	Part D sets out a summary of the submissions of the parties.
•	Part E contains my determination.
Part A – Key background facts
9	The subject land is comprised of the following registered titles:
•	For 1 Maltravers Road:
o	Volume 96773 Folio 432; and
o	Volume 08210 Folio 095.
•	For 321 Lower Heidelberg Road:
o	Volume 4772 Folio 268;
o	Volume 6312 Folio 391;
o	Volume 9503 Folio 493
o	Volume 8210 Folio 094; and
o	Volume 6524 Folio 742.
10	All the above registered titles were derived from lodged plan LP8311 and the original parcels of land that now comprise the subject land are lots 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52 on LP8311. Each of these lots were in turn burdened by registered restrictive covenants (‘Covenants’) as shown in the table below.
Original lots on LP8311	Registered Covenant	Date of Covenant	
46	1101301	28 April 1923	
47	1127466	3 August 1923	
48	1394247	20 November 1928	
49	1394247	20 November 1928	
50	1532483	7 March 1933	
51	1350689	20 December 1927	
52	1408211	28 March 1928	
11	There is no debate between the parties that the specific restrictions contained in each of the covenants that requires my consideration for determination of the question before me is encapsulated in the following words that are common to all the Covenants (save for the name of each transferee and corresponding gender pronouns):
…will not erect or cause to be erected more than one dwelling house (with the usual outbuildings) on any of the said land hereby transferred any such house to have a roof of slate or tiles or any other material approved of by James Athelstan King his heirs executors administrators and transferees ad to cost not less than Five hundred pounds exclusive of out-building and that he the said …his heirs executors administrators and transferees will not carry on or cause to be carried on upon the said land hereby transferred any quarrying or brick making operations nor remove any sand or gravel therefrom except for the purpose of building thereon nor carry on nor cause to be carried on any fellmongery, butchering, poultry farming or other offensive operations or manufacturing thereon.
12	Examination of the Covenants shows that the land benefited in each case as being land remaining in the Certificate of Title for land registered as Volume 3198 Folio 63578 (‘Parent Parcel’). The subject land is located in the north-eastern corner of the Parent Parcel as shown below on the extract of sheet 1 of LP8311.

13	Part of the land known as 1 Maltravers Road (being lots 51 and 50) has been developed by a single dwelling.
14	Part of the land known as 321 Lower Heidelberg Road has been developed for church purposes as follows:
•	A church building has been constructed across Lots 47 and 48 facing King Street;
•	A church building has also been constructed across Lots 48 and 49 facing Lower Heidelberg Road;
•	A hall has been constructed across Lots 48 and 49;
•	A residence for use by church staff (otherwise referred to as a parsonage) has been constructed on Lot 46;
•	Tennis courts across Lots 47 and 48;
•	At grade car parking on Lot 52.
15	Although the date of development is not material to my determination, the parties generally agree that the above-described development has occurred over a period between 1941 to 1961. It is also generally accepted since the applicant became the owner of the subject land in 2017 and 2018 there has been no active use of the subject land.
16	The proposal the subject of the decision under review is detailed in the permit application plans, however those plans do not require detailed examination for the purposes of my determination. It is sufficient to note that the proposal is a mixed-use development that includes a child care centre, a medical centre, a place of assembly, a restricted recreation facility, and a cafe. Accordingly, the proposal involves redevelopment for something other than a single dwelling on each of the relevant lots affected by the Covenants.
part b – relevant legislative provisions
17	Section 61(4) of the PE Act requires:
(4)	If the grant of a permit would authorise anything which would result in a breach of a registered restrictive covenant, the responsible authority must refuse to grant the permit unless a permit has been issued, or a decision made to grant a permit, to allow the removal or variation of the covenant.
18	When determining a review application, the Tribunal must also refuse to grant a permit where to do so would authorise anything which would result in a breach of a registered restrictive covenant.
19	Section 61(4) of the PE Act:
a	is not concerned with the enforceability of a registered restrictive covenant; and
b	is not concerned with the obsolescence or prior breach of a registered restrictive covenant.
20	The term ‘registered restrictive covenant’ is defined in s 3 of the PE Act to mean ‘a restriction within the meaning of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic). 
21	Section of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic) defines ‘restriction’ to mean:
a restrictive covenant or a restriction which can be registered, or recorded in the Register under the Transfer of Land Act 1958;
22	For completeness, the Covenants are all registered restrictive covenants for the purposes of s 61(4) of the PE Act. Therefore, in determining the review application, the Tribunal must refuse to grant a permit if to do so would authorise anything which would result in a breach of the Covenants.
Part c – key legal principles
23	I was referred to various authorities of the Supreme Court of Victoria by the parties relied upon as setting out the principles by which covenants should be interpreted. As is often the case in submissions, there is no real disagreement between the parties as to the relevant principles to be applied but rather the dispute lies in the construction to be adopted.
24	The following two recent decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal (‘CoA’) have a direct bearing on my task:
a	Jeshing Property Management Pty Ltd & Bao v Yang & Ors [2023] VSCA 185 (‘Jeshing’); and
b	Sumervale Pty Ltd & Anor v Viva Energy Refining Pty Ltd. [2024] VSCA 140 (‘Sumervale’).
25	In Jeshing, the CoA confirmed what had previously been corrected stated below and in other decisions that:
…the principles to be applied in construing restrictive covenants are the same as ‘established principles’ as apply to the construction of contracts, except the rules of evidence as to the admissibility as to extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances are constrained by the decisions in Westfield and Deguisa. This is evidence from the judgement of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales in Pheonix and the judgment of this Court in Barport Pty Ltd v Baum. On this basis, the principes stated by the High Court in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd with such adaptions as are necessary to reflect the decisions in Westfield and Deguisa, should apply to the construction of the Covenants, as follows:
•	(1) The meaning of the phrase at issue is to be determined objectively, by reference to its text, context (the entire text of the Covenants as well as any registered instrument or statutory provision referred to in the text of the Covenants) and purpose.
•	(2) In determining the meaning of the relevant terms of the Covenants, it is necessary to ask what a reasonable person in the position of Mrs Buckley and Mr McDonald would have understood those terms to mean. That enquiry requires consideration of the language used by the parties in the Covenants, the circumstances addressed by the Covenants and the commercial purpose or objects of the Covenants.
•	(3) A construction of the relevant words in the Covenants which accords with commercial sense and commercial convenience should be preferred over one which does not.
(footnotes omitted)
26	In Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 528 (‘Westfield’), the High Court unanimously affirmed that the dealings recorded on the certificate of title, together with the information appearing on that folio of the Register Book, provide a purchaser taking his or her title to land from the registered proprietor with the information necessary to comprehend the extent or state of the registered title to the land in question. Information that was extraneous to the certificate of title was immaterial to the infeasibility of the purchaser’s title.
27	In Deguisa v Lynn [2020] HCA 39 (‘Deguisa’), the High Court stated that the reasons in Westfield supported the proposition that unless reference to an interest is endorsed on the certificate of title or incorporated by reference in a registered instrument notified on the certificate of title, that interest has not been notified on the certificate of title.
28	In Deguisa, the High Court noted:
… the Torrens system is characterised by the guarantee of the State that the title which it produces to a person seeking to take an interest in a parcel of land is an accurate and comprehensive statement of the state of the title to that land, as to both the title of the registered owner and the interests of others in that land. With the benefit of that guarantee, a person dealing with a registered proprietor of land need look no further than the registered title and the interests notified on it in order to ensure that his or her dealing does not miscarry.
	(footnotes omitted)
29	In Jeshing, the CoA rejected that in interpreting a restrictive covenant reference was permitted to a network of similarly worded covenants contained in other transfers from a parent title.
30	In Sumervale, the CoA confirmed the approach in Jeshing.
31	In confirming when construing a covenant regard may be given to the purpose of the covenant, the CoA in Summervale stated:
It will be generally possible to discern from the text of a restrictive covenant its purpose and intent. That is, it will be apparent from the text how the covenant affects the burdened land and the reason why it was imposed will also usually also be obvious. Commonly, a restrictive covenant was imposed as an incipient form of planning control to regulate future development with an aim to preserve the use, character or amenity of the benefitted land and its surrounds.
...
… The search for purpose or intent is subject to the limiting principle, which derives from the indefeasibility of registered instruments, that the title is an ‘accurate and comprehensive statement of the state of the title to that land, as to both the title of the registered owner and the interests of others in that land’ and a person dealing with the registered proprietor is entitled to rely on the title and interests notified on it without recourse to other extrinsic material.
…
… Purpose in this sense is objectively determined and fixed. The purpose of the covenant does not change over time with changes in land use or other variables but, as with a contract or deed, represents the objectively ascertained intent of the parties on the making of the covenant.
…
… Purpose is not subjective, and can only be discerned by reference to the text of the covenant having regard to the title and other instruments referred to in the title.
		(internal footnotes omitted)
32	As the meaning of particular words in a covenant are dependent on their context (including the purpose or object of the restriction in a covenant) cases that consider similar words provide no more than persuasive authority as to the meaning of words in a different document. Further decisions upon an expression in one instrument are of very dubious utility in relation to another.
part d – Summary of submissions of the parties
33	It is fair to observe that the responsible authority and the other respondent parties all contend that the proposed use and development would result in a breach of the Covenants. To avoid repetition, I set out below a summary of the common submissions made by the responsible authority and the respondents.
Responsible authority and respondents
34	The responsible authority and all respondents submitted that the wording of the Covenants:
a	is intended to restrict the type of building that can be developed on each of the respective lots to that of one dwelling house (together with the usual outbuildings);
b	prevents the use of roof materials other than tile and slate and ensure that the dwellings constructed are of quality materials;
c	prevent commercial quarrying or brickmaking or remove or sand or gravel other than for the construction of a dwelling house (and usual outbuildings); and 
d	prevent the use of the subject land for certain specified offensive uses.
35	The responsible authority and the respondents also submitted that the proposed use and development of the subject land would breach the Covenants because- 
a	The proposed development is a built form other than a single dwelling house; and
b	The proposed built form does not have a tiled or slated roof.
36	One of the respondents submitted that the proposed use and development would be an ‘offensive operation’ because it would constitute a ‘for-profit’ use of the subject land and therefore offend the Covenants.
37	The responsible authority also submitted that the proposed use and development may also breach the restriction in the Covenants on the removal of sand or gravel from the subject land because the exemption to the restriction could only relate to the excavations of a building that was a dwelling house. Given that the proposed development was not a dwelling house the proposal would result in a breach of this restriction in the Covenants.
38	The responsible authority and some of the respondents relied on the decision of Cavanagh J in Prowse v Johnstone [2012] VSC 4 (‘Prowse’) as a leading authority that has direct bearing on how the Covenants should be construed in this matter. 
39	No party submitted that I was bound by the decision in Prowse, however a submission was made on behalf of SaveIvanhoeEast Inc. that while I was not bound by the decision in Prowse, I was bound to apply to the line of reasoning employed by Cavanagh J in that decision. I had considerable difficulty in understanding the belated submission made orally at the hearing, nevertheless I have considered the reasons in Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commission of State Revenue [2005] VSC 136 (‘Roy Morgan’) relied upon as authority for that proposition. 
40	I consider both Prowse and Roy Morgan further below.
Applicant
41	The applicant’s overall contention is that when each of the Covenants is read as a whole and having regard to their text, context and purpose, none of the Covenants would be breached by the proposed use and development of the subject land.
42	The applicant submitted that each of the Covenants prohibits, for each respective lot:
a	The erection of more than one dwelling house (with the usual outbuildings;
b	The erection of a dwelling house which does not have a roof of slate or tiles (or other approved material);
c	The erection of a dwelling house which costs less than £500 exclusive of buildings;
d	The carrying of quarrying or brickmaking operations or removal of sand or gravel except for the purpose of building on the lot; and 
e	The carrying on of any fellmongery, butchery, poultry farming or other offensive operations or manufactures.
43	The applicant submitted that:
a	The text of the Covenants supports its construction of the Covenants because there is no aspect of the proposal that is expressly prohibited by the terms of the Covenants. 
b	In order to conclude that the proposal would breach the terms of the Covenants, it would be necessary to material redraft the terms of the Covenants by reading into the Covenants express words that limit the use of the subject land only to use for one single dwelling house.
c	The purpose of the Covenants was likely directed toward the achievement of an estate of high quality and amenity but not necessarily exclusively residential.
d	The Covenants were clearly intended to ensure that where dwelling houses were to be constructed, they were to be expensive and have high quality roofing and advanced complimentary objectives by precluding a number of potentially offensive or amenity impacting uses, together with restricting the number of dwelling houses on each respective lot.
e	If the intention of the parties to the Covenants was to preclude all other forms of development other than dwelling houses within the estate, then they could have expressly specified this restriction. The Tribunal should not retrospectively rewrite the Covenants in a fundamental way as would be required to achieve the construction contended for by the respondent parties.
44	The applicant distinguished the facts and circumstances in Prowse from those presently before the Tribunal as follows:
a	The Covenants do not prohibit ‘trade and business’.
b	As the form of development is not residential, the present case is not one in which it can be said that the proposal would contravene a clear purpose to establish a residential estate.
c	A clear and deliberate choice was made by the drafters of the Covenants to exclude only certain types of uses on the subject land.
45	The applicant submitted that the Supreme Court decision in Grant v Preece [2012] VSC 55 (‘Grant’) is relevant as it concerned another parcel of land within the same parent parcel area and was burdened with a covenant in terms relevantly the same as the Covenants. In its reasons, the Court stated:
72	I do not consider the development of the East Ivanhoe Shopping Village and attached car park, the church precinct, or the kindergarten to be relevant for the purposes of determining whether the single dwelling restrictions imposed by the covenant is obsolete. The covenant does not require that a lot be development for housing; it requires that if a lot is developed for housing, only one dwelling can be constructed on that lot. In my view, the shopping village, church precinct and kindergarten service the largely residential neighbourhood; they do not define its character.
Part e – tribunal’s determination
46	My review of the text and context of the Covenants leads me to the following conclusions.
47	There is no ambiguity in the text of the Covenants. 
48	There is no express restriction on the use of the subject land exclusively for residential use. 
49	This is so because none of the Covenants contain any words of limitation, prohibition or restriction that leads to the conclusion that the only permissible use of the relevant lots making up the subject land is for residential use only. 
50	The limitation on the number of dwelling houses on each lot is a limitation as to number and does not either expressly or impliedly limit use of the lots to a particular purpose. Something more than a limitation in number would be required to achieve a restriction in use.
51	The restriction that ‘any such house’ is to have a roof of tile or slate or any other approved material only applies to where the form of building to be erected is a dwelling house.
52	It is not a proper approach to characterise all covenants that contain a ‘one dwelling house’ restriction or ‘a single dwelling house’ restriction as having a single common purpose. To draw this conclusion as a matter of course is to elevate the single dwelling house restriction as defining the purpose of a covenant irrespective of the words used in the covenant and any other restrictions that may be contained in the covenant.
53	When considered in the context of the whole of the terms of each Covenant, there is no warrant or justification to imply words of limitation that would restrict the use of each lot making up the subject land to a residential use only. 
54	This is because on an objective reading of the Covenants the drafters of the Covenants have clearly identified those uses that are not to be carried out ‘on the said land’ specifically being fellmongery, butchery, poultry farming or other offensive operations or manufactures. Those uses specifically prohibited from being carried out do not include any of the proposed uses involved in the proposal.
55	It is of some significance that the specified restriction as to uses is imposed on the use of the ‘said land’ and not on the built form to be erected on the land. This indicates that the drafters of the Covenants considered the restriction on the use of the relevant land to be separate from any restriction on built form.
56	The reference to ‘other offensive operations’ is to be interpreted as being limited to those uses or operations of a similar nature to ‘fellmongery, butchery and poultry farming’. The commercial mixed use proposed for the subject land is not an offensive operation or manufacture as there are no manufacturing processes that are intended as part of the proposal and none of the proposed uses can objectively be considered to be offensive.
57	Interpretation of the actual words used in the Covenants does not involve speculation as to the intention of the drafters. Similarly, limitations on the underlying purpose of a covenant assumes that the purpose or object of the covenant is discoverable from the words of the covenant used in the context of the whole of the covenant. 
58	It is not for the Tribunal to construct its own idea about what is a desirable purpose, imply it into the words used in the Covenant and to then characterise it as the purpose of the Covenants. 
59	It is not for this Tribunal to now consider that a desirable purpose of the Covenants was not only to restrict the specified uses referred to in the Covenants but all other possible uses other than residential uses carried out in single dwelling houses where the unambiguous words used in the Covenants do not so require.
60	The likely purposes of the Covenants were twofold:
a	To ensure that certain specified uses were not carried out on each lot; and
b	To ensure any development of each lot for housing was restricted to one dwelling house that had a slate or tiled roof (or otherwise approved material) and met the minimum cost of building stipulated.
61	In both Prowse and Grant, the nature of the proceedings before the Supreme Court was an application under s 84(1) of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) to modify a restrictive covenant. In both cases, before considering whether the requested modification would not substantially injure the persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction, the Supreme Court embarked on the exercise of construing the relevant covenant before it.
62	As noted above, the relevant covenant in Grant was essentially in the same terms as the Covenants under consideration here. In Prowse, the restrictive covenant was expressed in the following terms:
AND the said William Durham Leslie doth hereby for himself his executors and administrators covenant with the said Jane Langmore and Arthur Charles Langmore Registered Proprietor for the time being of the untransferred part of the land in the said Certificate of Title their executors and administrators or transferees will not at any time or times hereafter quarry on the said land or cart or carry away any stone or gravel soil or sand therefrom or make any excavations therein except such as may be necessary for laying the foundation of any building on the said land AND FURTHER that he or they will note erect more than one house on each of the said Lots and that any house so erected shall be of stone or brick and stone with roof of slates or tiles on the main portion thereof at a cost of not less than six hundred pounds each exclusive of stables and outbuildings and that such building shall not be used for any trade or business AND FURTHER that the said William Durham Leslie will not subdivide either of the said Lots into smaller allotments nor reduce the frontage thereof to a smaller frontage than appears on the said Plan of Subdivision AND the said William Durham Leslie hereby requests that the above covenants may appear as an encumbrance on the Certificate of Title to be issued in respect the land hereby transferred and run with the land.
63	It is immediately apparent to me that the restrictions in the relevant covenant in Prowse are different to those under consideration here. Amongst other differences, the Prowse covenant specifically excludes the use of any dwelling house erected for any trade or business. There is no such restriction in the Covenants. The Covenants prohibit the use of the ‘said land’, that is the land comprising each relevant lot, from certain specified uses. The differences between the Prowse covenant and the Covenants underpins the common position of the each of the parties at the hearing that the Tribunal is not bound by the decision in Prowse when determining whether the proposal would result in a breach of the Covenants. My task is not to construe the Prowse covenant (that has already been done by Cavanagh J) but to construe the Covenants and I have done so and given my reasons for my determination.
64	Finally, I reject the submission on behalf of SaveEastIvanhoe Inc. that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roy Morgan is relevant to my determination. 
65	Roy Morgan involved consideration of an application under s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) against the decision of another division of the Tribunal in respect to the validity of a claim by the Commissioner of State Revenue that Roy Morgan was liable to the Commissioner under the Pay-Roll Tax Act 1971 (Vic) in respect of persons engaged by Roy Morgan as ‘interviewers’. 
66	Before the Tribunal’s determination the subject of the leave application, an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal involving the same parties had been given in which Roy Morgan was unsuccessful in its challenge that it was not liable to the Commissioner under the Pay-Roll Tax Act 1971 (Vic) for persons engaged by it as ‘interviewers’. 
67	The Supreme Court in Roy Morgan found that apart from involving different periods of time, the two proceedings (the one before the Court of Appeal and the one before the Tribunal) bear ‘on the surface if not upon proper analysis, every indication of being relevantly indistinguishable’.  In this context, the following statements were made by the Supreme Court in Roy Morgan: 
12	… The law is simple. The decision of the Court of Appeal is not one that (to adopt the Tribunal’s words) “it would seem, cannot be ignored”. It is one by which the Tribunal is absolutely bound. Indeed, it is necessary to recognise that it is not only the decision that binds; it is both the decision and the reasoning behind the decision…
68	The proposition by SaveEastIvanhoe Inc. founded in the above statement is that while the Tribunal may not be bound by the decision in Prowse, it is bound by the reasoning used by the Supreme Court to come to its determination. In circumstances where, unlike in Roy Morgan, it cannot be said that the terms of the Prowse covenant and the Covenants are ‘relevantly indistinguisable’, that proposition simply is wrong and I reject it.
69	In conclusion, the grant of a permit for the use and development proposed in the permit application would not result in a breach of the Covenants.

S P Djohan
Senior Member