IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE	
CIV-2024-485-538
[2025] NZHC 1434	

BETWEEN	CHANTELLE BAKER
Plaintiff	
AND	STUFF LIMITED
First Defendant

KATE HANNAH
Second Defendant	

Hearing:	21 May 2025	
Appearances:	M Hague and K Wang for Plaintiff
D Nilsson for First and Second Defendant	
Judgment:	4 June 2025	

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SKELTON

Introduction

[1]	This matter involves applications by the first and second defendants against the plaintiff for security for costs.

[2]	The plaintiff, Chantelle Baker, has sued the defendants for defamation.

[3]	The first defendant, Stuff Limited, produced and released a documentary in August 2022. The  documentary  investigates  the  spread  of  misinformation  in New Zealand in relation to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social and political effects, including as expressed during and after the protest at Parliament in February and early March 2022.

BAKER v STUFF LIMITED [2025] NZHC 1434 [4 June 2025]

[4]	The second defendant, Kate Hannah, is the founder and former director of “The Disinformation Project”, an unincorporated research organisation  established in 2020 to study the effects of misinformation. Ms Hannah was interviewed for the documentary and features in it.

[5]	Ms Baker is discussed in the documentary as one of the actors responsible for the spread of misinformation in New Zealand, including during the protest at Parliament. Stuff also published an article in conjunction with the documentary, and it explains the approach that Stuff adopted in producing the documentary, but does not identify Ms Baker by name.

[6]	Ms Baker alleges that Stuff and Ms Hannah made defamatory statements in the documentary (the first cause of action) and the article (the second cause of action). In her amended statement of claim, Ms Baker identifies eleven statements which she alleges are defamatory. She alleges ten statements were made by Stuff and one by Ms Hannah. Mr Hague, for Ms Baker, submits that, in summary, the defendants said Ms Baker was part of a group of people and organisations who were key drivers in New Zealand of false information and dangerous conspiracy.

[7]	Ms Baker seeks damages, including interest on any damages, and costs from Stuff under both causes of action. In relation to the first cause of action, Ms Baker seeks a declaration that the statements made by Ms Hannah are defamatory and that she is liable to the plaintiff in defamation. Ms Baker seeks compensatory damages of
$30,000, interest on any damages and costs against Ms Hannah.

[8]	Both defendants defend the claims. Following the filing of an amended statement of claim and amended statements of defence, the defendants raised concerns about Ms Baker’s ability to meet any adverse costs award based on public statements made by her. The parties were unable to reach agreement on the issue of security for costs. Both defendants have now applied for security for costs in an amount to be determined by the Court. They also seek costs on the applications.

[9]	Ms Baker opposes both applications for security for costs.

Legal principles – security for costs

[10]	Rule 5.45(1) - (3) of the High Court Rules 2016 provides:

5.45	Order for security of costs

(1)	Subclause (2) applies if a Judge is satisfied, on the application of a defendant,—

(a)	that a plaintiff—

(i)	is resident out of New Zealand; or

(ii)	is a corporation incorporated outside New Zealand; or

(iii)	is a subsidiary (within the meaning of section 5 of the Companies Act 1993) of a corporation incorporated outside New Zealand; or

(b)	that there is reason to believe that a plaintiff will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if the plaintiff is unsuccessful in the plaintiff’s proceeding.

(2)	A Judge may, if the Judge thinks it is just in all the circumstances, order the giving of security for costs.

(3)	An order under subclause (2)—

(a)	requires the plaintiff or plaintiffs against whom the order is made to give security for costs as directed for a sum that the Judge considers sufficient—

(i)	by paying that sum into court; or

(ii)	by giving, to the satisfaction of the Judge or the Registrar, security for that sum; and

(b)	may stay the proceeding until the sum is paid or the security given.

[11]	Applications for security for costs are to be approached in three stages:1

(a)	the first question is whether the threshold test in r 5.45(1) is met, or in other words, whether the applicant can establish that the rule applies;

1	Busch v Zion Wildlife Gardens Ltd (in rec and liq) [2012] NZHC 17 as cited in Jindal v Kamal [2023] NZHC 2820  at  [9]  and  Jessica  Gorman  and  others  McGechan  on  Procedure  (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR5.45.01]–[HR5.45.04], [HR5.45.07], [HR5.45.09] and [HR5.45.11].

(b)	if the threshold is met, then the second question is whether it is just in all the circumstances to make an order for security for costs;2 and

(c)	if the Court so concludes, then the third question is the nature of the order that should be made.

[12]	Determining the amount of security justified in the particular case requires the exercise of discretion rather than a strict mathematical approach.3 It does not necessarily need to be fixed by reference to likely costs awards but rather what the Court thinks fit in all the circumstances.4 The circumstances to be taken into account include the following:5

(a)	amount or nature of the relief claimed;

(b)	nature of the proceeding, including the complexity and novelty of the issues;

(c)	estimated duration of the trial; and

(d)	probable costs payable if the plaintiff is unsuccessful and/or the defendant’s estimated actual costs.

[13]	A global award of security rather than individual orders may be more appropriate in a case involving multiple defendants as it allows the Court greater flexibility if and when required to allocate the funds to successful defendants.6

2	Balancing  the   interests   of   plaintiff   and   defendant   is   the   overriding   consideration:   see Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine [2012] NZHC 2288, [2013] NZAR 1017 at [24].
3	Sharp v Pillay [2017] NZHC 647.
4	McLachlan v MEL Network Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 747 (CA) at [13] and [27].
5	This summary was adopted by the Court of Appeal in McNaughton v Miller [2022] NZCA 273 at [17].
6	Walker v Forbes [2017] NZHC 1212 at [91].

The threshold question under r 5.45(1)

[14]	Ms Baker’s affidavit evidence states her current address as being on the   Gold Coast, Australia. In  his  oral  submissions,  Mr  Hague  acknowledged  that  Ms Baker resides overseas and that the threshold test under r 5.45(1)(a) is met.7

[15]	Mr  Hague  maintains  that,  even  though  the  threshold  test  is  met  under  r 5.45(1)(a), I should still consider the issue of the ability of Ms Baker to pay any adverse cost award in exercising my discretion. I am not satisfied that, where the threshold test is met under r 5.45(1)(a), I am necessarily required to consider whether Ms Baker is or is not in a position to pay the defendants’ costs if she is unsuccessful in her claim as part of the exercise of my discretion.8 However, I will consider this issue in addressing the discretionary factors below.

Whether an order for security for costs would be just in the circumstances

[16]	The following approach is applicable when considering whether an order for security for costs should be made against an overseas plaintiff:9

(a)	there is no inflexible principle that such a plaintiff with no assets within the jurisdiction should normally be ordered to give security;

(b)	the Court’s discretion is to be exercised by taking into account all the circumstances of the case and arriving at a conclusion which will do justice between the parties; and

(c)	the ease, convenience, and cost of enforcing a costs judgment in the plaintiff's country of residence is a primary consideration.

[17]	Otherwise, the principles applicable to applications for security by a plaintiff resident overseas are those generally applicable when the threshold test is met under

7	See Reihana v Rakiura Titi Committee [2014] NZHC 3166 at [8]; Morrell v World Solar Ltd [2018] NZHC 518 at [8]; Keezz Ltd v Waikato District Health Board [2020] NZHC 2330 at [29]– [31]; and McGechan on Procedure, above n 1, at [HR5.45.06].
8	See Keezz Ltd v Waikato District Health Board, above n 7, at [30].
9	Aquaculture Corporation v McFarlane Laboratories (1984) Ltd (1987) 1 PRNZ 467 at 470.

r 5.45(1)(b). Relevant considerations for and against the making of an order for security for costs are identified in Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine.10 These include, in the context of this proceeding:

(a)	the apparent merits of Ms Baker’s claim;

(b)	whether Ms Baker has access to third party funding;

(c)	whether the denial of security would be oppressive to the defendants; and

(d)	whether ordering security deprives the plaintiff of the ability to advance her claim.

[18]	I now turn to consider relevant factors in this case.

Apparent merits of the claim

[19]	It is well recognised that there is a limit to the inquiry that can be made into the merits, particularly at an early stage of the proceeding.11 In a more complex proceeding, any assessment of the merits will be no more than an impression.12

[20]	This proceeding is at an early stage. The defendants have filed amended statements of defence in response  to  Ms  Baker’s  amended  statement  of  claim. Ms Baker has also filed a reply to Stuff’s amended statement of defence. The defendants indicate they will file further particulars following discovery and in advance of trial. The defendants seek to have the application for security for costs determined before any further significant procedural steps are taken.

[21]	I have reviewed the pleadings filed to date. Stuff admits that the documentary and article include the relevant statements but deny that the statements bear the meanings alleged by Ms Baker and that they were defamatory of Ms Baker.

10	Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine [2012] NZHC 2288, [2013] NZAR 1017 at [22]–[24].
11	McNaughton v Miller, above n 5, at [19] citing Meates v Taylor (1992) 5 PRNZ 524 (CA) at 528 and Lee v Lee [2019] NZCA 345 at [73].
12	McLachlan v MEL Network Ltd, above n 4, at [21].

Ms Hannah admits that she made the relevant statement in the documentary but denies that the statement bears the meanings alleged by Ms Baker and that it was defamatory of Ms Baker. Both defendants plead affirmative defences including, for example, truth, honest opinion and responsible communication of matters in the public interest.

[22]	The defendants submit that Ms Baker’s claims are weak and stand by the accuracy of the reporting. They submit that their truth and honest opinion defences (the second and third affirmative defences) are supported by detailed particulars of matters that they say are correct and which justify the statements in the documentary, both about Ms Baker and the other persons and organisations mentioned. They say that many of the particulars relate to matters that should not be controversial, including those which are supported by documentary evidence, much of which is included in the documentary itself.

[23]	The detailed particulars supporting the defence of truth (and reasons for alleged bad reputation) are set out in schedules to the defendants’ amended statements of defence which record the pleaded imputations and the facts and circumstances relied on by the defendants in support of the allegation that the statements are true. Ms Baker has replied to these particulars in a schedule but most of her replies simply plead that she has insufficient knowledge of, and therefore denies, the particulars.

[24]	The defendants submit that, to the extent any aspect of the reporting is actionable and not fully addressed by truth or honest opinion defences, there is a strong public interest defence available. The defendants say that they took reasonable steps to verify all allegations made and ensured that Ms Baker’s perspective was fairly represented by reference to several of her public statements.   Stuff accepts that     Ms Baker was not approached for comment, but says it relied on expert views on appropriate reporting on disseminators of mis- and disinformation. Stuff says that it explained its editorial choices in the article to ensure that viewers had all information needed to form their own views on the reporting. Ms Baker admits that conceptually the matters raised in the documentary, including the spread of misinformation in New Zealand, are in the public interest but denies that the matters are relevant to her.

[25]	Ms Baker’s overall position is that there is a clear case for the defendants to answer, and it is in the interests of justice not to depart from the principle of access to the courts, especially as this proceeding involves an individual who says she has been defamed by a professional researcher and mainstream media entity.

[26]	Overall, while acknowledging the case is at an early stage, my assessment is that Ms Baker will face difficulties establishing her claims against the defendants. As mentioned, the defendants have denied that the relevant statements bear the meanings alleged by Ms Baker and that they are defamatory. The defendants have also raised a number of affirmative defences, including truth and honest opinion, supported by detailed particulars. Ms Baker has put the defendants to proof on the particulars supporting the defence of truth but has not at this stage replied substantively. It is a complete defence to defamation if the defendants can establish that the imputations relied on by Ms Baker were true or not materially different from the truth.13

[27]	While I cannot say at this early stage that Ms Baker’s claim is entirely without merit, there is a reasonable likelihood that costs may ultimately be ordered against her. I assess the apparent merits of the claim as a factor weighing in favour of an order for security for costs.

Third party funding

[28]	It is accepted by Stuff that there is no commercial third-party litigation funder involved in this case. Therefore, this is not a case which necessarily requires the Court to ensure that the defendants are protected by security tending towards “relatively full security”.14

[29]	However, the defendants contend that Ms Baker is relying on non-party funding and this, together with the fact she has not provided any evidence of her personal financial position, provides good reason to believe that Ms Baker will be unable to meet an adverse costs order. The defendants say that after this proceeding was filed Ms Baker made a number of statements on her social media channels, and

13	Defamation Act 1992, s 8.
14	Houghton v Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [106] and [129].

in interviews with digital content creators, suggesting she was reliant on non-party funding to progress her claims.

[30]	For example, there is evidence in the affidavit of Charlotte Foster, Senior Legal Counsel at Stuff, that on 26  September  2024,  Ms  Baker  was  interviewed  by  Sean Plunket on his online channel “The Platform”. The evidence is that, during that interview, Ms Baker referred to her previous case against NZME15 which she “decided to settle … because then it would allow me to take the second suit” and “…I settled that one so I can chase a much bigger fish which to me is [Stuff’s documentary].” The evidence is that Ms Baker noted that this proceeding was “far more expensive…to bring” than her previous claim against NZME, because she was putting “the entire documentary” in issue. She continued:

…[Centrist]16 are really helpful with funding lawsuits for a number of different people, and so they are bringing, they are helping to bring this lawsuit through, because they believe that what Stuff news did, uhm, was incredibly wrong…

[31]	Ms Foster’s affidavit also refers to another interview Ms Baker gave  on        3 October 2024 to Australian digital content creator Avi Yemini. The evidence is that Ms Baker said:

…I’m also in partnership with Centrist New Zealand, which is another independent news organisation who do a lot more written work. And they are the ones that have been helping to bring these lawsuits because it is a big financial investment. And as we all know, the last few years have been taxing for a lot.

[32]	The evidence is that in the same interview Ms Baker indicated that she was also relying on having a legal team “who is relatively affordable as far as legal teams go”.

[33]	Ms Foster’s affidavit includes an  exhibit  of  an  article  by  Centrist  dated 30 September 2024. The article states that “Centrist backed a defamation lawsuit for Chantelle Baker” against NZME.   Under the heading “A battle won, but the war

15	Publisher of the New Zealand Herald.
16	An online news platform.

continues”, the article states that “Centrist remains committed to supporting other defamation cases including Julian Batchelor’s lawsuit against TVNZ…” and:

Additionally, Chantelle Baker is pursing more legal action, this time regarding her portrayal in Fire and Fury, a documentary produced by Stuff and funded by NZ on Air.

We believe both Batchelor and Baker deserve the right to express their views without being defamed, regardless of whether we agree with their positions.

[34]	The defendants also say that they have arranged for searches of the land register in New Zealand for evidence of any real property owned by Ms Baker, but no property has been identified.

[35]	In her affidavit evidence, Ms Baker denies the defendants’ assessment of her ability to pay costs. She states that she has “no arrangement with [her] supporters that allows them to control [her] claim” and she will “continue with legal proceedings even if they decide to stop supporting [her]”. She does not identify her “supporters”. She states that she “previously worked in a sponsorship capacity with Centrist … for nearly a year, during which time they supported [her] activities” but “[t]hat agreement has since  ended”.     She  acknowledges  the  statements  made  in  the  interview  on      3 October 2024 referred to above at [31] and states that “[a]t the time, I had been engaged in sponsorship work with the Centrist for nearly a year, and the Centrist provided support that contributed to my ability to pursue legal action”. She reiterates that “[t]his sponsorship arrangement has since concluded”. Ms Baker also refers to statements made in the 3 October 2024 interview about the settlement with NZME. She states that “the settlement allowed me to finish one claim and remove the financial burden of potentially pursuing two lawsuits at the same time”.

[36]	Mr Hague submits that there is no indication in the evidence put forward by the defendants of the plaintiff being unable to meet past debts, and the evidence is limited to past statements made by the plaintiff where she has shown gratitude for those who have supported her. Mr Hague submits that the plaintiff is not required to give detailed evidence about her financial and asset position in response to the defendants’ applications, and this should not be interpreted as a concession that she is unable to pay costs.

[37]	The defendants do not need to prove that Ms Baker will, in fact, be unable to pay their costs if unsuccessful. What is contemplated by the test is that there is some evidential basis, which may be evidence of surrounding circumstances rather than direct evidence, from which it may be reasonably inferred that Ms Baker will be unable to pay costs.17 While a plaintiff opposing an application for security is not required to disclose their financial position, and the Court will give due weight to a plaintiff’s sworn assertion that he or she will be able to pay costs, this is not decisive.18 An adverse inference may be made where the defendant has put a plaintiff’s inability to pay sufficiently in issue to require more than a bald assertion of ability to pay.19

[38]	I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidential basis for me to reasonably infer that Ms Baker will be unable to pay an adverse costs award. The evidence suggests that Ms Baker settled her previous claim against NZME to remove the “financial burden” of pursuing two proceedings at the same time. Ms Baker is reliant on having a legal team that is “relatively affordable” and on receiving financial assistance from her “supporters”, whoever they may be, even though she says there is no arrangement with those supporters that allows them to control the claim, and the “sponsorship arrangement” with Centrist has ended.20 Ms Baker baldly denies the defendants’ assessment of her ability to pay costs and states that she will continue legal proceedings even if her supporters stop supporting her. But she has not put any evidence before the Court as to her personal financial position and assets to substantiate these statements and provide the Court with some assurance as to her ability to pay an adverse costs award.

[39]	Ms Baker’s apparent reliance on third party financial support, together with the absence of any evidence from her as to her financial position, is a factor that weighs in favour of an order for security.21

17 Concorde Enterprises Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd No 2 [1977] 1 NZLR 516 (SC) at 519;  Cook v Thomson [2022] NZHC 3373 at [17]; and McGechan on Procedure, above n 1, at [HR5.45.02].
18 Arnold v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd [2017] NZHC 1757 at [9]; Keezz Ltd v Waikato District Health Board, above n 7, at [40] citing New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board v Maheatataka Cool Pack Ltd (1993) 7 PRNZ 209 at 212.
19	Arnold v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd, above n 18, at [9].
20	See Gold Star Invest Ltd v V [2021] NZHC 334 at [15]–[16].
21	Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine, above n 10, at [22(d)].

Oppression of defendants

[40]	Mr Nilsson on behalf of both defendants, submits that, while the defendants’ defences are strong, they will be expensive to prove. This is because Ms Baker’s claim effectively puts the entire documentary in issue and the defendants must therefore prove the accuracy of significant portions of the documentary. Mr Nilsson also submits that Ms Baker has denied matters that should not require proof at trial. For example, several of Stuff’s allegations in support of its truth defence refer to content posted by Ms Baker on various online platforms. Although copies of that content has been provided to Ms Baker by way of initial disclosure, Ms Baker claims to have insufficient knowledge of the allegations, and therefore denies them. This means that Stuff will be required to prove that Ms Baker said what she said, and lead evidence on matters such as whether COVID-19 vaccines cause magnetism and whether the pandemic was the result of a government conspiracy.

[41]	Mr Hague disputes that the costs of defending this application and the denial of a security for costs order is oppressive to the defendants. He says that Stuff is a prominent mainstream media entity with significant revenue. And Ms Hannah was speaking in her professional capacity, inferring a degree of commercial interest, and has not presented any evidence that the cost of defending the proceedings would be oppressive to her.

[42]	However, the fact that Stuff may be a prominent mainstream media entity with significant revenue cannot mean that it may not be unfair or oppressive for Stuff to be required to incur significant costs defending defamation proceedings without the checks and protection of security for costs. This is particularly so where the litigation may be over-complicated or protracted because, as discussed above, Ms Baker has put the entire documentary in issue and denied matters that should not require proof at trial.22 It is also relevant to the considerations of fairness and oppression that, as discussed above, Ms Baker may be pursuing the claim with the financial assistance of non-parties against whom the defendants may have no recourse.

22	Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine, above n 10, at [22(e)].

[43]	I consider this is a factor which favours the granting of an order for security for costs in this case.

Ease, convenience and cost of enforcing a judgment in Australia

[44]	Ms Baker is residing in Australia. The ease, convenience and cost of enforcing a judgment in Australia is therefore an important consideration. Mr Hague submits this factor weighs against an order for security because of the Trans-Tasman Agreement between New Zealand and Australia and the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010. The purpose of the Act is to streamline the process for resolving civil proceedings with a trans-Tasman element in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency.23 Mr Hague submits that the agreement and legislation ensures that enforcement would remain convenient for the defendants.

[45]	While there is no doubt that it is easier and more convenient to enforce a costs award in Australia than in remote jurisdictions with fundamentally different political and legal systems, it is still more difficult and more costly than enforcement in    New Zealand. Further, at the end of the day, there is no evidence that Ms Baker would have the financial resources or assets to pay any costs award after the defendants had gone to the trouble of enforcement in Australia. Mr Hague submitted that Ms Baker would want to avoid bankruptcy and that this should be taken into account in exercising my discretion. However, every person who has a judgment debt against them wants to avoid bankruptcy, and this provides little assurance for the defendants that an adverse costs award would ultimately be paid.

[46]	Overall, I see this factor as neutral in terms of security.

Would an order for security prevent Ms Baker advancing her claim?

[47]	In Monnery v Parsons,24 Associate Judge Johnston stated:

A consideration that makes balancing the interests of the parties particularly difficult in this case is that the plaintiffs have elected not to put in any evidence as to their financial positions. In those circumstances, I do not think I can properly infer that the plaintiffs are unable to put up any amount of security

23	Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, s 3(1)(a).
24	Monnery v Parsons [2018] NZHC 3414 at [36].

for costs or that an order would prevent them from pursuing this litigation. Having regard to the material before the Court I do not think I can go any further than concluding that an order for security for costs against the plaintiffs in this case will make it more difficult for them to pursue their claim.

[48]	In considering the appropriate quantum for any order for security, Mr Hague submits that Ms Baker largely accepts the scale costs calculation put forward by Stuff in October 2024 for its costs entitlement if successful at trial in the sum of approximately $65,000. However, he says that Ms Baker takes issue with the allowance for second counsel in the sum of approximately $6,000.

[49]	During the hearing, Mr Hague also obtained instructions that, if Ms Baker was ordered to pay security for costs of approximately two times Stuff’s scale costs calculation, reflecting the estimated costs entitlement for both defendants if successful, this would not prevent her pursuing her claim.

[50]	In the circumstances, I am satisfied that an order for security for costs, even in the order of $130,000, would not have access to justice implications in terms of preventing Ms Baker from pursuing the proceeding.

Conclusion on discretion

[51]	I conclude that, balancing what I see as the legitimate interests of Ms Baker in having access to the Court to pursue her claim, and those of the defendants in obtaining some protection in respect of their costs, an order for security for costs should be made to do justice between the parties.

Quantum and terms of order

[52]	Mr Nilsson submits that Stuff’s scale costs calculation in October 2024 was based on a one-week trial and no significant interlocutory issues. He submits that this is very conservative given the range of issues in dispute and that a trial may well last two to three weeks, unless the issues can be narrowed considerably. He notes that the calculation also excludes disbursements including expert witness fees. Mr Nilsson submits  that  a  more  realistic  estimate  of  costs  would  be  between  $100,000 and
$150,000 per defendant as an appropriate starting point for assessing the quantum  of

security. Mr Nilsson proposes a global order for security for costs in the sum of
$150,000 paid in three stages. Mr Nilsson also proposes that the need for any further payment should be addressed at a pre-trial conference scheduled once the trial date is known.

[53]	Mr Hague submits that the quantum of any order for security for costs should be lower than sought by the defendants. As discussed above, Ms Baker largely accepts the October 2024 scale costs calculation (less the costs for second counsel) in the sum of approximately $60,000 per defendant, as an appropriate starting point.

[54]	In my view, it is important that both Ms Baker and the defendants know where they stand before the proceedings progress. Ms Baker is entitled to know before pursuing the proceedings any further the level of security for costs she will be required to pay, and when she will be required to pay the security. The defendants are entitled to know what measure of protection they will have for their costs.

[55]	Accordingly, as a global award, I fix security for costs at $100,000.

[56]	I agree with Mr Nilsson that the security should be paid in stages between now and any trial. I consider that $20,000 should be paid within 20 working days of this judgment to cover the completion of pleadings, discovery and any further interlocutory applications. A further $40,000 should be paid by the date for serving Ms Baker’s briefs of evidence; and the final $40,000 should be paid two months before the commencement of trial. I identify these dates as being dates immediately prior to periods during which the parties, and in particular the defendants, will be required to commit significant resources to the litigation.

Result

[57]	Accordingly, I make the following orders:

(a)	pursuant to r 5.45 of the High Court Rules, the plaintiff is to provide security for the defendants’ costs in the total sum of $100,000 to the Registrar of the High Court at Wellington as follows:

(i)	$20,000 to be paid within 20 working days of the date of this judgment;

(ii)	$40,000 to be paid within 10 working days of service of the plaintiff’s evidence; and

(iii)	$40,000 to be paid two months prior to the commencement of any trial.

(b)	pursuant to r 5.45(3)(b), if any of these amounts remain unpaid after they have fallen due for payment, the plaintiff’s case will be stayed until such time as they are paid.

Costs

[58]	As to costs, the defendants have been successful and there is no reason why costs should not follow the event on a 2B basis together with reasonable disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.

[59]	Although the defendants initially filed separate applications, there was only one affidavit filed in support of the applications, by Stuff. One synopsis of submissions was filed on behalf of both defendants, and they were jointly represented by Mr Nilsson at the hearing. Accordingly, I award one set of costs in accordance with r 14.15 of the High Court Rules.

Associate Judge Skelton
Solicitors:
Frontline Law, Wellington for Plaintiff
LeeSalmonLong, Auckland for First Defendant McVeaghFleming, Auckland for Second Defendant

NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The solicitors on the record for the parties are to promptly provide a copy of this judgment to their clients (r 5.43).