SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v HGD (No 2) [2025] QSC 153	
PARTIES:	ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(Applicant)
v
HGD
(Respondent)	
FILE NO/S:	1363/2020	
DIVISION:	Trial Division 	
PROCEEDING:	Application pursuant to s 22 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). 	
ORIGINATING COURT:	Supreme Court at Brisbane 	
DELIVERED ON:	26 June 2025	
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane 	
HEARING DATE:	16 June 2025	
JUDGE:	Smith J	
ORDER:	1.	I find on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent contravened a requirement of the Supervision Order made on 15 June 2023.
2.	Pursuant to section 22(7) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) I find that  the Respondent has satisfied the court of the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can despite the contravention of the existing order be ensured by an amended Supervision Order.
3.	I order the respondent be released from prison on the conditions set out in Annexure A.   	
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – GENERALLY – where the respondent breached a supervision order – where the respondent has commence anti-libidinal medication – where this has reduced the risk of reoffending – where there are difficulties finding suitable accommodation – whether the respondent has discharged the onus under section 22(7) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) 
HUMAN RIGHTS – HUMAN RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND NOT TO BE SUBJECTED TO ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION – whether these rights are relevant to the decision to make a supervision or continuing detention order   
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) ss 3, 13, 22
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ss 29, 30, 48  
Attorney-General v Francis [2006] QCA 324; [2007] 1 Qd R 396, applied
Attorney-General v Grant (No 2) [2022] QSC 252; (2022) 12 QR 357 applied
Attorney-General v Guy [2017] QSC 105, considered
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v HGD [2020] QSC 295, considered
Van de Wetering v Attorney-General [2024] QCA 222, cited	
COUNSEL:	B Mumford for the Attorney General
S Hamlyn-Harris for the respondent. 
	
SOLICITORS:	Crown Solicitor for the Attorney General 
Cridland & Hua Lawyers for the respondent. 
	
Introduction 
[1]	The Attorney General applies pursuant to s 22(2)(a) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (“DPSOA”) for an order that the court rescind the supervision order of Cooper J made on 15 June 2023 and order the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment. 
[2]	There is no dispute that the respondent is a “serious danger to the community” in the absence of a Division 3 order. There is also no dispute that the respondent breached the supervision order. He pleaded guilty to the breach in the Magistrates Court on 5 March 2024 and was convicted and fined $650. I find that the contravention has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
[3]	For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied that the respondent has proved on the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention, be ensured by an amended supervision order as set out in Annexure A.  
Background
[4]	The respondent was born on 5 March 1979. He is presently 46 years old. He suffers from an intellectual disability. On 28 September 2020, a guardianship order was made for him. On 8 June 2023, this order was changed to appoint the Public Guardian for his personal matters including accommodation, NDIS and legal matters.  
[5]	The following details his relevant criminal history:
(a)	On 28 November 1997, the respondent was sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment with respect to the offence of rape and three years’ imprisonment with respect to assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed in company, to be served concurrently. Parole eligibility was set after 18 months imprisonment. At the time of the offence, the respondent was 18 years of age. The victim was 15 years old and intellectually impaired. The offending was committed in the presence of an 11-year-old. The offending included the use of a hot cigarette lighter as a form of threat that the victim would not complain. 
(b)	On 28 February 2006, the respondent was sentenced to six years imprisonment with respect to procuring an intellectually impaired person to commit an indecent act and eight years imprisonment in respect of indecent dealing with an intellectually impaired person and incest, to be served concurrently. A presentence custody declaration of 386 days was made with parole eligibility after serving two years and nine months. At this time, the respondent was 25 years old and the intellectually impaired victim was 21.
(c)	On 16 December 2016, the respondent was dealt with for sexual assaults committed on 11 October 2014. He received three years imprisonment with a parole eligibility date as at 27 February 2017. The respondent was 35 years old. He was drunk and went into the adult female victim’s shop pretending to need the toilet. He then exposed himself in front of her. She went to a back room, trying to eat her lunch. The respondent’s fly was still undone. Instead of leaving, the respondent jumped on top of her and straddled her, pushing her face first into the mattress so she couldn’t scream. He groped and squeezed her body and simulated intercourse as he tried to pull down her jeans. She was fighting against him. He was rubbing his fingers between her buttocks and eventually she cried out for help. He pulled out his penis wanting her to take it. She continued screaming and finally the respondent left. The victim thought she was going to be raped and it was very frightening. 
(d)	On 13 July 2017, the respondent pleaded guilty to one charge of indecent treatment of a child under 16 under 12. On 7 November 2015, when the respondent was 36, he was at Southbank parklands. The victim was nine years of age. She was swimming in the Southbank pool. He swam up to her and tickled her on the vagina before swimming away. He was on bail for other sexual assault offences at the time of this offending. Judge Farr commented that the offending was serious, brazen and in public. He noted that he was on bail for sex offences at the time which was an aggravating feature. He noted the respondent suffered from some intellectual problems and had a serious alcohol problem. He received six months imprisonment which was ordered to be served cumulatively with a parole eligibility date set as at 13 July 2017. 
[6]	On 25 September 2020, Williams J ordered the respondent to be the subject of a continuing detention order. This order was affirmed by Kelly J on 30 May 2022. 
[7]	On 12 July 2023, the respondent was released on a supervision order for five years by Cooper J. Requirement 6 of this order provided:
“A corrective services officer will supervise you until the order is finished. This means you must obey any direction that a corrective services officer gives you about: 
(a)	where you are allowed to live; 
(b)	rehabilitation care or treatment programs; and 
(c)	using drugs and alcohol. 
(d)	Who you may and may not have contact with; and 
(e)	anything else, except for instructions that mean you will break the 	rules in this supervision order.”
[8]	On 22 February 2024, Queensland Corrective Services (“QCS”) received information from the Queensland Police Service (“QPS”) that the respondent had been regularly calling a medical centre and making inappropriate remarks to female staff members including “I want to cum on your pussy”. It was thought by the staff member that the respondent was masturbating whilst making this call. 
[9]	On 29 February 2024, the QPS extracted data from the respondent’s mobile phone and discovered he had called the medical centre on 23 separate days between 4 December 2023 and 2 February 2024. He erased his call history from his mobile phone. The respondent later admitted to a psychologist that he made the calls and was masturbating when he made them. 
[10]	As a result of the contravention, on 7 March 2024 the Attorney made an application for an order that the respondent be detained in custody.   On 7 March 2024, Bradley J ordered that the respondent be detained and he has been in custody now for 15 months.
[11]	The matter first came on for final hearing before Freeburn J on 19 August 2024 and was adjourned so that the anti-libidinal medication and accommodation issues could be resolved.
[12]	The matter came back on before this court for hearing on 16 June 2025 and judgment was reserved.        
Psychiatric/psychological evidence 
Dr Arthur
[13]	Dr Ken Arthur has provided a report dated 31 May 2024. It was noted: 
(a)	The respondent minimised his level of sexual interest relating to specific women in the community or the presence of sexual fantasies and engaged in significant externalisation of blame. He under reported the amount of times he called the medical centre and could not explain why he did it.
(b)	He attributed his escalating levels of sexual preoccupation to QCS’ failure in providing him with access to sex workers and accused his NDIS supports of being lazy and inattentive in allowing him to interact with women in the community and not monitoring his phone calls. He attributed his behaviour to boredom.
(c)	He fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for a mild to moderate intellectual disability, Substance Use Disorder in remission and most likely a Paraphilic Disorder not otherwise specified with features of exhibitionism and voyeurism. He also fulfilled the criteria for Anti-social Personality Disorder. 
(d)	He considered the respondent’s unmodified risk of committing a further sexual offence to be high or well above average. Critical factors included high levels of sexual preoccupation and the presence of an intellectual impairment related to an impaired capacity for self-regulation, lack of consequential thinking and impulsivity.
(e)	He remained a relatively young man with an excessive sex drive. He was an unreliable historian as regards his sexual activity. He remained prone to aberrant sexual behaviour in the absence of intoxication.
(f)	There is no clear pattern of a single paraphilic disorder. The doctor believed his offences represented the indiscriminate expression of a pathologically elevated level of sexual preoccupation.
(g)	He would most likely engage in opportunistic and impulsive offending even in the absence of intoxication. It appears this prediction had been borne out. It appears the only factor relevant to his most recent inappropriate behaviour relates to sexual frustration. 
(h)	The respondent continued to have unmet treatment needs in regard to his sexual offending particularly in relation to self-awareness, sexual preoccupation, denial of sexual fantasy life and capacity for self-regulation. 
(i)	Despite a high level of scaffolding and ongoing psychological therapy, he has shown himself incapable of utilising these supports to manage his risk factors. It is possible this reflects both his intellectual disability and his anti-social personality structure. 
(j)	The respondent will continue to struggle with sexual preoccupation if released to the community with a high risk of further sexual acting out. On this basis, the use of anti-libidinal medication should be considered as a matter of urgency. 
(k)	In his opinion the respondent could give informed consent if provided sufficient education and adequate time to process this information. 
(l)	Whilst alternative medication such as SSRI anti-depressants may have some modest effect in reducing libido and treating impulsivity, these agents are no substitute for drugs that lower testosterone. 
(m)	Without medical treatment it is highly likely that the respondent will continue to experience high levels of sexual preoccupation and frustration, leading to acting out behaviours. 
(n)	Should the court see fit to release the respondent to supervision, he should return to supported independent living with 24 hour supports, no unsupervised community access and a stage one curfew. He should continue with psychological therapy with Dr Hatzipetrou.
(o)	His sexual preoccupation needs to be addressed. While it may be beneficial for him to access sex workers, this is a nuanced issue which needs to be discussed in detail with Dr Hatzipetrou.
(p)	At the current time, the respondent’s interactions with women in the community need to be carefully monitored given his propensity to sexualise even casual contacts. 
(q)	Given the indiscriminate nature of his sexual offences, it would be prudent to limit his contact with children and ensure there is no unsupervised access with children under the age of 16 or vulnerable adult females. 
(r)	Whilst strict application of a supervision order would reduce his risk of a further contact sexual offence to moderately low (by the use of stage one curfew and no unsupervised community access), the order is limited in its ability to reduce the risk of non-contact offences. 
(s)	He should abstain from all drugs of abuse. 
[14]	After the matter came on for hearing before Freeburn J on 19 August 2024, anti-libidinal medication treatment has commenced and it is fair to say that the opinion of Dr Arthur was revised.  
[15]	Dr Arthur in his report dated 2 June 2025 noted: 
(a)	It is encouraging the respondent has commenced Zoladex monthly injections. He appears to be tolerating this medication reasonably well with few minor side effects. His testosterone levels are consistent with compliance. He reports a significant reduction in his levels of sexual preoccupation and sexual activity, which is consistent with the effects of this drug. 
(b)	The respondent reports an improvement in his mental state since commencing the medication, although he has not resumed work following a transfer from secure to residential. 
(c)	It appears there are ongoing difficulties finding appropriate accommodation. The main issue appears to be proximity to children. There is also concern about contact with females or female staff in shared housing accommodation. 
(d)	His interactions with women in the community should be carefully monitored.
(e)	Given the nature of his sexual offences, it would be prudent to limit his contact with children and ensure there is no unsupervised access to children under the age of 16 or vulnerable adult females. 
(f)	While it is unlikely he suffers from paedophilia, his sexual offending has been indiscriminate and involved children.
(g)	It is possible that due to (reported) reductions in sexual preoccupation and arousal the risk of further sexual offending has been reduced, although this has yet to be tested in a community setting. 
(h)	If he is released to supported independent living arrangements with 24-hour interpersonal support along with supported access to the community, the risk of a contact offence against children would be low. 
(i)	Although it is still Dr Arthur’s recommendation that the respondent  not be placed in housing with vulnerable females or children in adjoining houses or regular line of sight, refusing accommodation simply because there are children in the general vicinity may no longer be indicated. 
(j)	If the court sees fit to release him to supervision, Dr Arthur believes the conditions of the previous supervision order are sufficient to adequately manage his risk. He should remain on anti-libidinal medication with regular psychiatric reviews and continue with psychiatric/psychological interventions targeting risk factors for sexual recidivism.
[16]	In his evidence before me, Dr Arthur:
(a)	Confirmed that studies show that the use of Zoladex reduces sexual recidivism.
(b)	A closely monitored supervision order in this case would be appropriate.
(c)	He should not live next door to children or be a near a regular path which children use. He needs to continue on the Zoladex.
(d)	He should not reside at the Wacol precinct because of his support needs and the potential access to pornography. 
(e)	His testosterone levels are consistent with a level of castration.
(f)	Anti-libidinal medication does not manage all risk but reduces sexual pre-occupation and arousal. He would need to continue the treatment with Dr Hatzipetrou. 
Dr McVie
[17]	Dr Ness McVie, in her report dated 16 July 2024, provides the following information: 
(a)	The respondent has a full-scale IQ of 59 and meets the criteria for a diagnosis of mild intellectual disability. 
(b)	He is under the care of the public guardian and was, from July 2023 to February 2024, supported in the community by NDIS and living in shared accommodation. 
(c)	He meets the criteria for anti-social personality disorder and substance use disorder (alcohol and cannabis). He does report intermittent use of other drugs including amphetamine, with his last offence in 2015 being attributed to ice or methylamphetamine use. 
(d)	He does not appear to have any major mental illness or mood disorder. He may have a paraphilia, with repeated behaviours consisted with exhibitionism in custody in 2020. The paraphilia, paedophilia, is a further possibility. He does not, however, have a clear pattern of offending behaviour against children as an adult. Other factors lead into his offending including his intellectual disability, his substance use, use of pornography, and a high sex drive. 
(e)	Assessment, actuarial and structured clinical, indicate the respondent presents a high risk of reoffending sexually if released from custody without a supervision order. 
(f)	He has progressed well in therapy with Dr Hatzipetrou. He was managed well in the seven months he was in the community in supported accommodation. The therapy needs to be continued to maintain this improvement. Though he could have potentially been charged with a new non-contact sexual offence, this did not occur. 
(g)	He did appear to increasingly struggle with sexual preoccupation and unmet sexual needs. His treating psychologist identified institutionalisation and difficulties in managing his responses to particularly adult females he came into contact with, in the community. 
(h)	Prior to July 2023, he never had structured supports in place in the community to assist him to develop a prosocial lifestyle. 
(i)	Dr McVie supported his being released again on a supervision order with conditions preventing unsupervised access to children under 16, including:
(i)	Guardianship; 
(ii)	Supported housing with 24-hour NDIS supports;  
(iii)	A NDIS support worker (male, at least initially) to facilitate community access; 
(iv)	Abstinence from alcohol and illicit substances; 
(v)	Weekly or fortnightly therapy with his treating psychologist; and 
(vi)	Restricting his access to pornography. 
(j)	Dr McVie would not support his being placed in accommodation directly next door to where children reside. He does not appear to have any specific identified paedophilic interest and could be accommodated in areas where children visit, pass through or play.
(k)	Dr McVie notes he has asked for increased NDIS supports and the psychologist has identified his need for more prosocial and structured activities. 
(l)	He may benefit from an SSRI type antidepressant medication. Dr McVie strongly recommended he be referred to a psychiatrist for assessment of anti- libidinal therapy. 
(m)	His sessions with his treating psychologist should be resumed weekly or fortnightly. 
(n)	He does have significant intellectual impairment and there needs to be continuity of support, therapy and ongoing reinforcement of positive behaviours and attitudes. 
(o)	Consideration could be given to his attendance at an appropriate brothel, but this would depend on the progress in therapy and guided by the advice of his treating psychologist. 
[18]	Dr McVie, in her addendum report dated 2 June 2025 reports: 
(a)	The respondent has now commenced on anti-libidinal therapy with promising early results. He had previously progressed well in therapy with Dr Hatzipetrou. Though he appeared to progress in the seven months he was managed in the community, it was noted he increasingly struggled with sexual preoccupation and unmet sexual needs. Ultimately, this lead to his contravention and return to custody. 
(b)	The psychologist identified institutionalisation and difficulties in managing his responses to others, particularly adult females.
(c)	Prior to July 2023, he had never previously had structured supports in place in the community to assist him to develop a prosocial lifestyle. 
(d)	Dr McVie would support his again being released again to the supervision order with the conditions: 
•	No unsupervised access to children under 16.
•	Guardianship. 
•	Supported housing with 24-hour NDIS supports. 
•	To reside with males only.
•	A male NDIS support person to facilitate community access.
•	Abstinence from alcohol and illicit substances.
•	To continue in weekly or fortnightly therapy with his treating psychologist Dr Hatzipetrou. 
•	Continuation of his injectable anti-libidinal Zolodex supervised by Dr Lenardon with monitoring of side effects. 
•	Access to pornography should be restricted and monitored. 
(e) 	Finding accommodation has been a limiting factor. Dr McVie considered he should not be placed in accommodation directly next door to where children reside, though he could be accommodated in areas which are near places where children visit, pass through or play.
[19]	In evidence, Dr McVie said:
(a)	He should reside with males only.
(b)	A closely monitored supervision order would reduce the risk of reoffending, provided he continues to take the medication.
(c)	There is no clear evidence he suffers from a paedophilic disorder.
(d)	The offence involving the child occurred when intoxicated.
(e)	There needs to be a no substance use condition.
(f)	The Wacol precinct would not be appropriate for him as he is vulnerable and cannot have NDIS support there. He is better off in NDIS supported accommodation.
(g)	Casually coming across children is not an obstacle to a supervision order.
(h)	He definitely needs to continue treatment with Dr Hatzipetrou.
(i)	A lot of work needs to be done because of his intellectual impairment.  
(j)	A restrictive curfew would be a good idea to start with.
(k)	Dr McVie also said that the supervision order should be amended to add a requirement concerning the respondent receiving therapy.
Dr Hatzipetrou
[20]	Dr Hatzipetrou psychologist in his report dated 28 May 2024 stated: 
(a)	His general impression was the respondent had an intellectual disability with a history of antisocial behaviour and sexually abusive behaviour. 
(b)	Since March 2020, he has engaged in a targeted offence specific interventions and psychological treatment. He has been able to consolidate the learnings from the models which contributed to shifts in attitude and behaviour. Over the course of three years of treatment, he demonstrated improvements in his knowledge of the risk factors related to the offence pathway and his ability to apply this knowledge in the centre environment. 
(c)	Following his release from custody, he was receiving disability supports from a service provider and lived in supported accommodation. He had an appointed public guardian decision maker. He was supervised whilst on the DPSOA order. 
(d)	He demonstrated positive adjustments in his social behaviours and attitudes about offending. He engaged in healthy and prosocial behaviours that were facilitated and supervised by staff. However, his repeated exposure to community settings such as shopping centres did reveal breadth of his distorted attitudes about women and preoccupation with sex. He often misinterpreted the social behaviours of women in public. He was candid about this and sought advice.
(e)	His leisure pursuits were limited, and he was unemployed. Because of his intellectual disability and history, his capacity to initiate and sustain a range of leisure activities is limited. With this in mind, he demonstrated a willingness to align with societal norms and did not seek illicit drugs or alcohol nor display any anti-social behaviours. His behaviour in treatment sessions and engagement with his case manager reflected his level of compliance and motivation.  
(f)	His recent disclosures did represent an increase in risk factors as he engaged in voyeuristic acts with women working at a medical centre. He had been preoccupied with sex and masturbated when he called the female staff. He had increasing difficulties regulating his actions when sexually attracted to women he encountered. 
(g)	The current behaviours are concerning and reflect an alternative pathway of harmful sexual behaviours that have been somewhat covert and distinct from previous behaviours. With this in mind, he has been cooperative in the sessions and willing to comply with advice, yet there have been increasing reports of his overly familiar engagement with women in the community. The respondent does appear to struggle with preoccupation and sexual fantasies yet remains aware he cannot touch women. 
(h)	To manage the emergent behaviours, access to his mobile phone and internet requires closer supervision by support staff. Likewise, his community access should consist of different activities and venues, and focus on skill development and safe social contacts with peers. He is prone to boredom which in turn increases the risk of reoffending. His ongoing management needs to be carefully reviewed with the consideration of positive behaviour support plans and psychiatric reviews being undertaken. 
[21]	In evidence, Dr Hatzipetrou said:
(a)	That his sessions had ceased when the respondent was returned to custody in March 2024.
(b)	He had recently seen the respondent. If he was released on a supervision order, he can do therapeutic sessions with him.
(c)	His treatment continued during the supervision order. The respondent engaged well and understood the purpose of treatment. He made progress.
(d)	He was motivated to prevent relapse. He genuinely wants to rehabilitate.
(e)	It did become overwhelming when he was in the community.
(f)	He did seek advice.
(g)	Dr Hatzipetrou thought curfews could be considered.
(h)	The respondent still needs treatment as to his attitudes and beliefs. The Zoladex appears to have reduced his sexual urges which has reduced the risk of reoffending.
(i)	He made admissions concerning the phone calls to the medical centre.
(j)	Because of his intellectual disability, he frequently needs recalibration.     
Ms Wildermoth
[22]	Emma Wildermoth is the acting manager of the High Risk Offender Management Unit (HROMU) within QCS. She has provided several affidavits sworn 16 August 2024, 1 November 2024, 27 November 2024, 23 May 2025 and 13 June 2025. She has had access to the integrated offender management system (IOMS) regarding the respondent. 
[23]	Ms Wildermoth has provided evidence as to key aspects of a supervision order and the IOMS records. In her affidavit of 27 November 2024, she attaches the report of Dr Lenardon who states the respondent would benefit from anti-libidinal medication. In her affidavit of 23 May 2025, she refers to the challenges in finding suitable accommodation for offenders with a serious sexual offence history. She also refers to the limitations of a supervision order. She attaches reports from Dr Lenardon concerning the anti-libidinal medication. In her affidavit dated 13 June 2025, she provides an updated report from Dr Hatzipetrou.     
[24]	In her affidavits she provides evidence of assessments done on a number of houses and reports as follows: 
(a)	House one was unsuitable because children lived next door, behind and adjacent to the property. 
(b)	House two was unsuitable because of evidence of children living in neighbourhood properties as well as proximity to parkland and a playground. 
(c)	House three was unsuitable because of children living next door on both sides of the property as well as in nearby properties. 
(d)	House four was unsuitable due to the presence of children in the immediate area. 
(e)	House five was unsuitable because there were female staff and residents. 
(f)	House six was unsuitable due to evidence of children living in adjoining properties and within close proximity. 
(g)	Houses seven and eight were unsuitable due to the significant presence of children surrounding the property. 
(h)	Houses nine and ten were unsuitable due to evidence of children living in direct neighbouring properties and in direct line of the sight of the proposed property. 
(i)	House eleven was unsuitable due to the evidence of children residing in close proximity and the respondent being required to pass properties where children reside. 
(j)	House twelve was unsuitable due to children residing in close proximity and in direct neighbouring properties. 
(k)	House thirteen was unsuitable due to evidence of children residing in close proximity and the property having a direct line of sight to a thoroughfare frequented by school aged children. 
(l)	House fourteen was unsuitable due to evidence of children living in direct neighbouring properties as well as close proximity to public parks. 
(m)	House fifteen was unsuitable due to children residing in close proximity and a direct neighbouring property.  
(n)	House sixteen was unsuitable due to evidence of children residing in direct neighbouring properties and being in a direct line of sight of a children’s playground and sporting field. 
(o)	House seventeen was unsuitable due to evidence of children residing in direct neighbouring properties and being in a direct line of sight. 
(p)	House eighteen was unsuitable due to evidence of children residing in direct neighbouring properties. 
(q)	House nineteen was unsuitable due to significant presence of children and child related items in the immediate area and a park with children’s play equipment in direct line of sight. 
(r)	House twenty was unsuitable due to evidence of children residing in direct neighbouring properties and public parks frequented by children in close proximity. 
[25]	Ms Wildermoth gave evidence:
(a)	Explaining that all the houses assessed were in high density areas. She conceded in such a scenario it would be impossible to find a house without children in the vicinity.
(b)	She said the QCS is obliged to carry out such assessments.
(c)	She said that a curfew direction could be given. A stage one was 24 hours. A leave pass could be granted. Also, reasonable directions can occur.
(d)	She further explained that the purpose of supervision is to reintegrate and rehabilitate the person under the order.  This means that HROMU needs to progress the person through the stages of curfew and that to maintain someone on the most stringent curfew, such as a 24-hour curfew, with no end date is incompatible with human rights, rehabilitation and reintegration. 
(e)	She explained how an electronic monitoring device would operate.
(f)	She accepted the assessments were ongoing.    
(g)	She said that almost all the addresses assessed involved proximity to children. This was of concern to QCS. Their primary role is to protect the community.
(h)	She explained how a leave pass could be given for essential activities. It could be progressive.
(i)	It was not possible for the respondent to reside at the Wacol precinct because of his disability. Carers do not go there.
(j)	She accepted that rural areas might be a possibility, provided he could have access to psychological treatment.  
(k)	She said that curfews could be put back in place if someone was non-compliant. 
(l)	She said that house number 4 was still available but there was a children’s bike 5 doors down and children’s play equipment in a yard across the street. It was on a sub-divided block. She accepted the respondent could be under a 24-hour curfew to start with.   
(m)	Although QCS does brief the support workers and requests they report inappropriate or concerning behaviour, they are not appropriately trained to identify such risk factors or concerning behaviours.  The support workers are there to assist the respondent with his disability needs and there is no guarantee they would identify and report breaches to QCS. Ultimately, support workers are not employed by QCS. 
[26]	On 23 June 2025, while this decision was reserved, the applicant emailed a further affidavit of Ms Wildermoth, sworn 20 June 2025. No objection was taken by the respondent to the court receiving this affidavit.
[27]	Ms Wildermoth deposed as to further enquiries made in relation to house number 4.  These enquiries determined house 4 was also unsuitable, largely due to the significant presence of children in the area, including in two directly neighbouring properties.  Further, the fence between house 4 and the main house, both of which are on the sub-divided block, is incomplete and the respondent would have direct access to the backyard of the neighbouring property.  Ms Wildermoth deposes that this was intentional and there is no foreseeable plan to close the fence. 
Submissions by the Attorney General 
[28]	The Attorney concedes that the respondent commenced anti-libidinal medication in December 2024. It relies on the reports of Dr Arthur and Dr McVie. It submits that section 22(7) of the DPSOA places an onus upon the respondent to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can be ensured by a supervision order. It is submitted that the 20 residences put forward are unsuitable because most of them have children as direct neighbours, or there is a direct line of sight to children, or both. 
[29]	It is submitted that the court would be satisfied the respondent has contravened the requirements of the supervision order. Residences put forward have been deemed unsuitable. 
[30]	It is submitted that in all of the circumstances the respondent has not discharged the onus required of him in light of the fact that suitable accommodation cannot be located.
[31]	The Attorney also submitted there is a system of reviews under the DPSOA and if suitable accommodation could be found then the position could be revised.  
Respondent’s submissions 
[32]	The respondent submits that when the matter first came on before Freeburn J on 19 August 2024, there were two unresolved issues, namely the commencement of anti-libidinal medication and whether suitable supported independent living could be found. After further review, it appeared that his suitability for the medication was being investigated but the critical issue of accommodation was unresolved. The issue of suitable accommodation remains unresolved mostly because of the presence of children within the area. 
[33]	In the meantime, however, the respondent commenced the medication in December 2024.  He willingly receives this and there are positive benefits. It is submitted that the material suggests the commencement of the anti-libidinal medication for the respondent has diminished his sexual preoccupation, which has historically been a consistent feature of his sexual offending and his behaviour more generally. This is relevant to risk. It is also relevant to the criteria used when assessing the suitability of potential accommodation. Arrangements have been made to recommence treatment with Dr Hatzipetrou. 
[34]	It is submitted that the court would be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention, be ensured by the supervision order. This would include a condition that he take the prescribed anti-libidinal medication. 
[35]	The respondent relies on the remorse felt in making the phone calls to the centre. It also relies on the diagnoses in this case. 
[36]	As to the accommodation issues, it is submitted on the evidence he can reside in a community where there are children, but not next door to them. It is not possible to say there is no accommodation available. Even though the Wacol precinct is not desirable, if there is no alternative, he should reside there.  The respondent submits that the undesirability stems from the prohibition on support or NDIS workers attending the Wacol precinct.  However, the respondent being accommodated at the precinct would not be an obstacle to him continuing his treatment with Dr Hatzipetrou.   
[37]	Given the exceptional nature of the jurisdiction, a supervision order should be made.   
Discussion 
[38]	In reaching my decision, I have had regard to all of the evidence and the submissions of the parties. 
[39]	Section 22 of the DPSOA provides: 
“22 		Court may make further order 
(1) 	The following subsections apply if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the released prisoner is likely to contravene, is contravening, or has contravened, a requirement of the supervision order or interim supervision order (each the existing order). 
(2) 	Unless the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention or likely contravention of the existing order, be ensured by the existing order as amended under subsection (7), the court must— 
(a) 	if the existing order is a supervision order, rescind it and make a continuing detention order; or
(b) 	if the existing order is an interim supervision order, rescind it and make an order that the released prisoner be detained in custody for the period stated in the order. 
(3) 	For the purpose of deciding whether to make a continuing detention order as mentioned in subsection (2)(a), the court may do any or all of the following— 
(a) 	act on any evidence before it or that was before the court when the existing order was made; 
(b) 	make any order necessary to enable evidence of a kind mentioned in section 13(4) to be brought before it, including, for example, an order— 
(i) 	in the nature of a risk assessment order, subject to the restriction under section 8(2); or 
(ii) 	for the revision of a report about the released prisoner produced under section 8A; 
(c) 	consider any further report or revised report in the nature of a report of a type mentioned in section 8A. 
(4) 	To remove any doubt, it is declared that the court need not make an order in the nature of a risk assessment order if the court is satisfied that the evidence otherwise available under subsection (3) is sufficient to make a decision under subsection (2)(a). 
(5) 	If the court makes an order in the nature of a risk assessment order, the psychiatrist or each psychiatrist examining the released prisoner must prepare a report about the released prisoner and, for that purpose, section 11 applies. 
(6)      For applying section 11 to the preparation of the report— 
(a)     section 11(2) applies with the necessary changes; and 
(b)	section 11(3) only applies to the extent that a report or information mentioned in the subsection has not previously been given to the psychiatrist. 
(7) 	If the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention or likely contravention of the existing order, be ensured by a supervision order or interim supervision order, the court— 
(a) 	must amend the existing order to include all of the requirements under section 16(1) if the order does not already include all of those requirements; and 
(b) 	may otherwise amend the existing order in a way the court considers appropriate— 
(i) 	to ensure adequate protection of the community; or 
(ii) 	for the prisoner’s rehabilitation or care or treatment. 
(8) 	The existing order may not be amended under subsection (7)(b) so as to remove any requirements mentioned in section 16(1).”
[40]	In this particular case, there is no dispute that the respondent contravened requirement six of the supervision order and there is no dispute that the mobile data related to his telephoning females at the medical centre, talking sexually to them and masturbating at the same time. There is no doubt this is of concern. There is also no doubt that it is of concern that this contravention occurred about seven months after being released on the supervision order. 
[41]	But, as against this, the respondent has now commenced the anti-libidinal medication which has shown promising results. The evidence reveals that this reduces sexual urges and arousal and reduces the risk of reoffending. All expert witnesses considered there were promising results. Both psychiatrists support the respondent’s release on supervision.  
[42]	Dr Arthur noted “if the court sees fit to release him to supervision, I believe the conditions from the previous supervision order are sufficient to adequately manage his risk. He should remain on anti-libidinal medication with regular psychiatric reviews and continue with psychological interventions targeting the risk factors for sexual recidivism.”
[43]	In her most recent report, Dr McVie noted that there were promising early results with the anti-libidinal therapy. The respondent had also progressed well in therapy with Dr Hatzipetrou. She again supports his release on a supervision order with various conditions. She states “finding appropriate accommodation has been a limiting factor. I would consider he should not be placed in accommodation directly next door to where children reside though he could be accommodated in areas which are near to places where children visit, pass through or play.”
[44]	There is a difference in view between the evidence of Dr Arthur and Dr McVie. Both support the contention that the respondent should not live directly next door to children. Dr Arthur though considers that places where children might go should not be in a direct line of sight of the respondent. Dr McVie considered that this restriction is not necessary.
[45]	On balance, I prefer the evidence of Dr McVie. I particularly note that the respondent is not diagnosed as a paedophile by either psychiatrist. If he were, I would consider the situation would be different. In light of the fact he is not so diagnosed, I accept her evidence that whilst he should not be housed directly next to children, there does not need to be a restriction to housing him in an area where there may be children in sight.
[46]	But regardless of whether I accepted the evidence of Dr Arthur or Dr McVie,                   the fact is that I need to have regard to the principles expressed in Attorney-General v Francis. In that decision, the Court of Appeal held:
“The Act does not contemplate that arrangements to prevent such a risk must be "watertight"; otherwise orders under s 13(5)(b) would never be made. The question is whether the protection of the community is adequately ensured. If supervision of the prisoner is apt to ensure adequate protection, having regard to the risk to the community posed by the prisoner, then an order for supervised release should, in principle, be preferred to a continuing detention order on the basis that the intrusions of the Act upon the liberty of the subject are exceptional, and the liberty of the subject should be constrained to no greater extent than is warranted by the statute which authorised such constraint.”
[47]	I am satisfied on all the evidence that a strict supervision order on the terms proposed is apt to ensure adequate community protection in this case, particularly bearing in mind the anti-libidinal medication and the proposal that he continue his therapy with Dr Hatzipetrou. I have independently reached this view on all the evidence and not just based on the medical evidence, although that been very relevant to my decision.  
[48]	It may be right that it is difficult to find accommodation for the respondent away from children altogether, or that the Wacol precinct is not suitable for him, but I need to have regard to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA) and conclude that a person should not be deprived of a supervision order simply because it is hard to find that person suitable accommodation. There are two rights relevant as follows:
“29       Right to liberty and security of person
(1)     Every person has the right to liberty and security.
(2)     A person must not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”

“30         Humane treatment when deprived of liberty
(1) 	All persons deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”
[49]	In Attorney-General v Grant (No 2) Applegarth J was concerned with a case where the respondent was a 78-year-old with numerous health conditions. There was evidence that, due to the respondent’s disability and care needs, residing at the Wacol precinct would not be suitable and there was no suitable supported accommodation in the community. Despite this evidence, Applegarth J made a supervision order. His Honour found:
(a)	A continuing detention order would have deprived the respondent of his rights under section 29(1) of the HRA. This is the right to liberty and security and that a person must not be detained arbitrarily. 
(b)	The discretion to make a continuing detention order instead of a supervision order involves the application of the right to liberty under section 29(1) of the HRA and arguably the right not to be subject to arbitrary detention.
(c)	The right in section 29(1) is a right relating to a proceeding in which a court is exercising a discretion.
(d)	Also (in that case) section 30(1) HRA was right and relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion.     
(e)	Both section 29(1) and 30(1) of the HRA were relevant to the exercise of the discretion in that case.
(f)	“… applying established principles in a case in which a supervision order is apt to ensure adequate protection of the community, supervised release should, in principle, be preferred to a continuing detention order. This principle rests upon the basis that the intrusions of the Act upon individual liberty, including the liberty protected by s 29(1) of the HRA, are exceptional and that liberty should be constrained to no greater extent than is warranted by the law that authorises such constraint.”
[50]	Importantly, in light of the HRA considerations, Applegarth J said that the fact the respondent (in that case) could not receive the care he needed if accommodated in the precinct is not a valid basis to continue the detention of a person who is otherwise suitable for supervised release.  His Honour acknowledged the respondent was aware of the lack of care and support available in the precinct but was prepared to take his chances, and that the Court should not prevent him from doing so, even where his health and life expectancy would be better if he were to remain in prison [52].
[51]	Further, his Honour discussed the observations of Holmes CJ in Attorney-General v Guy including:
“It is deeply troubling to think that people who could be managed and rendered relatively risk-free with appropriate support and accommodation, must instead, be imprisoned as the only option.” 
[52]	Applegarth J held that it remains the case that the Court’s discretion under s 13(5) of the DPSOA should not lean in favour of a continuing detention order simply because the respondent may be better off in prison rather than in a Wacol precinct house.  The DPSOA is clear in its objects that the primary considerations are the adequate protection of the community and the facilitation of the prisoner’s rehabilitation.  To achieve rehabilitative aims, it is necessary that the prisoner spend a length of time under supervision in the community. 
[53]	In my opinion, it is unreasonable to suggest that a person whose risk can be mitigated and managed in the community ought to be detained indefinitely, particularly where there is medical evidence supporting supervised release.   
[54]	Ms Wildermoth said in her evidence that the respondent could not remain on a 24-hour curfew for an extended period as the intention is progress, and that “we can’t support human rights, rehabilitation or reintegration if we’re maintaining someone on the most stringent curfew with no-end date.” But the alternative to that is to simply detain them. I do not think that is a correct approach.
[55]	To my mind, a very restrictive curfew condition is far more apt to ensure the respondent’s rehabilitation rather than detention in prison. A restrictive curfew approach would also protect the community. Also, if a person is rehabilitated in that way the community is protected. Integration, even in small steps to start with, starts someone on the road to be a functioning and law abiding member of our society.  
[56]	Both Dr Arthur and Dr McVie state that it is important that the respondent continue regular treatment with Dr Hatzipetrou and that the Wacol precinct is not appropriate for the respondent as he would not have the benefit of his NDIS supports.   However, as in Grant, this option will need to be considered as a starting point. The respondent would still receive the benefit of treatment from Dr Hatzipetrou, presumably through remote sessions. This continuity of treatment is crucial.   
[57]	The important human rights referred to in Grant  strengthen my view that a preference should be given to a supervision order despite any issues with accommodation in this case. Indeed, as section 48(1) of the HRA says, statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.   
Conclusion
[58]	Bearing in mind the psychiatric evidence, the fact that the breach of condition did not involve a contact offence; the fact he is not diagnosed as a paedophile; and the fact that there are promising results with the anti-libidinal medication, and bearing in the principle in Francis and the respondent’s human rights, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has discharged the onus placed on him by section 22(7) of the DPSOA, that is, he has proved on the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention of the existing order, be ensured by the supervision order set out in Annexure A which include the additional proposed conditions.   
[59]	Those additional conditions are:
Additional: anti-libidinal medication
(a)	If prescribed anti-libidinal medication by your treating psychiatrist or doctor, you must take the medication at the dosage and frequency as prescribed to you.
(b)	 You must not change the type, dosage, or frequency of the anti-libidinal medication, unless that is approved by your treating psychiatrist or doctor and advised to a corrective services officer.
(c)	If prescribed anti-libidinal medication by your treating psychiatrist or doctor, you must let your treating psychiatrist or doctor provide information to a corrective services officer about the administration of the anti-libidinal treatment. 
(d)	You must consult with your treating psychiatrist before changing or ceasing your anti-libidinal treatment. 
[60]	I also note that the respondent has now been in custody since March 2024 by reason of this breach. I expect he now appreciates the severe consequences which follow if he breaches the Supervision Order again.
Order
[61]	For the reasons given I make the following orders:   
1.	I find on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent contravened a requirement of the Supervision Order made on 15 June 2023.
2.	Pursuant to section 22(7) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) I find that the Respondent has satisfied the court of the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention of the existing order, be ensured by an amended Supervision Order.
3.	I order the respondent be released from prison on the conditions set out in Annexure A.   

Annexure A

Conditions of supervised release:- 

1.	You are being released from prison but only if obey the rules in this supervision order.

2.	If you break any of the rules in this supervision order, the police or Queensland Corrective Services have the power to arrest you. Then the Court might order that you go back to prison. 

3.	You must obey these rules after you are released from prison until 12 July 2028.

Reporting

4.	On the day you are released from prison, you must report before 4 pm to a corrective services officer at the Community Corrections office closest to where you will live. You must tell the corrective services officer your name and the address where you will live.

5.	A corrective services officer will tell you the times and dates when you must report to them. You must report to them at the times they tell you to report. A corrective services officer might visit you at your home. You must let the corrective services officer come into your house.
To “report” means to visit a corrective services officer and talk to them face to face.

Supervision

6.	A corrective services officer will supervise you until this order is finished. This means you must obey any reasonable direction that a corrective services officer gives you about: 
a)	where you are allowed to live; and
b)	rehabilitation, care or treatment programs; and
c)	using drugs and alcohol; 
d)	who you may and may not have contact with; and
e)	anything else, except for instructions that mean you will break the rules in this supervision order.
A “reasonable direction” is an instruction about what you must do, or what you must not do, that is reasonable in that situation.

If you are not sure about a direction, you can ask a corrective services officer for more information, or talk to your lawyer about it.

7.	You must answer and tell the truth if a corrective services officer asks you about where you are, what you have been doing or what you are planning to do, and who you are spending time with.

8.	If you change your name, where you live or any employment, you must tell a corrective services officer at least two business days before the change will happen. 
A “business day” is a weekday (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday) that is not a public holiday. 

No offences

9.	You must not break the law by committing a sexual offence.

10.	You must not break the law by committing an indictable offence.

Where you must live

11.	You must live at a place approved by a corrective services officer. You must obey any rules that are made about people who live there.

12.	You must not live at another place. If you want to live at another place, you must tell a corrective services officer the address of the place you want to live. The corrective services officer will decide if you are allowed to live at that place. You are allowed to change the place you live only when you get written permission from a corrective services officer to live at another place.
This also means you must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to stay overnight, or for a few days, or for a few weeks, at another place.

13.	You must not leave Queensland. If you want to leave Queensland, you must ask for written permission from a corrective services officer. You are allowed to leave Queensland only after you get written permission from a corrective services officer.

Curfew direction

14.	A corrective services officer has power to tell you to stay at a place (for example, the place you live) at particular times. This is called a curfew direction. You must obey a curfew direction.

Monitoring direction

15.	A corrective services officer has power to tell you to:
(i)	wear a device that tracks your location; and
(ii)	let them install a device or equipment at the place you live. This will monitor if you are there. 
This is called a monitoring direction. You must obey a monitoring direction.

Employment or study

16.	You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to start a job, start studying or start volunteer work.

17.	When you ask for permission, you must tell the corrective services officer these things: 
(I)	what the job is;
(II)	who you will work for;
(III)	what hours you will work each day;
(IV)	the place or places where you will work; and
(V)	(if it is study) where you want to study and what you want to study.

18.	If a corrective services officer tells you to stop working or studying you must obey what they tell you. 

Motor vehicles

19.	You must tell a corrective services officer the details (make, model, colour and registration number) about any vehicle you own, borrow or hire. You must tell the corrective services officer these details immediately (on the same day) you get the vehicle. 
A “vehicle” includes a car, motorbike, ute or truck. 

Mobile phone

20.	You are only allowed to own or have (even if you do not own it) one mobile phone. You must tell a corrective services officer the details (make, model, phone number and service provider) about any mobile phone you own or have within 24 hours of when you get the phone. 

21.	You must give a corrective services officer all passwords and passcodes for any mobile phones you own or have. You must let a corrective services officer look at the phone and everything on the phone.

Computers and internet

22.	You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to use a computer, phone or other device to access the internet.

23.	You must give a corrective services officer any password or other access code you know for the computer, phone or other device. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using the computer, phone or other device. You must let a corrective services officer look at the computer, phone or other device and everything on it. 

24.	You must give a corrective services officer details (including usernames and passwords) about any email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms, or social networking sites that you use. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using any of these things.

No contact with any victim

25.	You must not contact or try to contact any victims of a sexual offence committed by you. You must not ask someone else to do this for you. 
“Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting.
You must not do any of these things in person, by telephone, computer, social media or in any other way.

Rules about alcohol and drugs

26.	You are not allowed to take (for example, swallow, eat, inject, or sniff) any alcohol.  You are also not allowed to have with you or be in control of any alcohol.

27.	You are not allowed to take (for example, swallow, eat, inject, smoke or sniff) any illegal drugs. You are also not allowed to have with you or be in control of any illegal drugs.

28.	A corrective services officer has the power to tell you to take a drug test or alcohol test. You must take the drug test or alcohol test when they tell you to. You must give them some of your breath or pee (urine) when they tell you to do this. 

29.	You are not allowed to go to pubs, clubs, hotels or nightclubs which are licensed to supply or serve alcohol. If you want to go to one of these places, you must first get written permission from a corrective services officer. If you do not get written permission, you are not allowed to go. 

30.	You are not allowed to visit any business that is only licensed to supply alcohol. If you want to go to one of these places, you must first get written permission from a corrective services officer. If you do not get written permission, you are not allowed to go.

Rules about medicine 

31.	You must tell a corrective services officer about any medicine that a doctor prescribes (tells you to buy). You must also tell a corrective services officer about any over the counter medicine that you buy or have with you. You must do this within 24 hours of seeing the doctor or buying the medicine.

32.	You must take prescribed medicine only as directed by a doctor. You must not take any medicine (other than over the counter medicine) which has not been prescribed for you by a doctor.

Rules about rehabilitation and counselling

33.	You must obey any direction a corrective services officer gives you about seeing a doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker or other counsellor. 

34.	You must obey any direction a corrective services officer gives you about participating in any treatment or rehabilitation program.

35.	You must let corrective services officers get information about you from any treatment or from any rehabilitation program.

Speaking to corrective services about what you plan to do

36.	You must talk to a corrective services officer about what you plan to do each week. A corrective services officer will tell you how and when to do this (for example, face to face or in writing).

37.	You must also tell a corrective services officer the names of new persons you have met.
This includes: people who you spend time with, work with, make friends with, see or speak to (including by using social media or the internet) regularly.

38.	You may need to tell new contacts about your supervision order and offending history.  The corrective services officer will instruct you to tell those persons and the corrective services officer may speak to them to make sure you have given them all the information.

Contact with children

39.	You are not allowed to have any contact with children under 16 years of age.  If you want to have supervised or unsupervised contact with a child under 16 years of age you must first get written permission from a corrective services officer.  If you do not get written permission, you are not allowed to have contact with the child.
“Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking with them face to face, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting, using a telephone, computer, social media or in any other way.
“Supervised” means having contact with the child while another person is with you and the child.
“Unsupervised” means having contact with the child while there is no other person with you and the child.

40.	If you have any repeated contact (that is, more than one time) with a parent, guardian or carer of a child under the age of 16, you must:
a)	tell the person(s) about this supervision order; and
b)	tell a corrective services officer the details of the person(s).
You must do this immediately.  This means you have to tell the person, and tell a corrective services officer, on the same day you have contact with the person.

41.	Queensland Corrective Services has power to give information about you, and about this supervision order, to any parent, guardian or caregivers that you have contact with.

42.	Queensland Corrective Services also has power to give information about you, and about this supervision order, to an external agency (such as the Department of Child Safety).

43. You must not:
(a) 	be within 100 metres of any school or childcare centre;
(b) 	be in a place where there is a children’s play area or child minding area;
(c)	go to a public park;
(d) 	go to a shopping centre;
(e)	join any club or organisation in which children are involved; and
(f)	participate in any club or organisation in which children are involved.

If you want to do any of these things, you must first get written permission from a corrective services officer.  If you do not get written permission, you cannot do any of these things.

Offence Specific Conditions

43.	You must not collect photos/ videos/ magazines which have images of children in them without prior approval of a Corrective Services officer.
If you have any you may be asked to get rid of them by a corrective services officer.

44.	You are not to get child exploitation material or images of children on a computer or phone from the internet.

45.	You cannot get or look at pornographic material of any type without written approval from a corrective services officer.  Your treating psychologist may provide advice regarding this approval.
This includes pictures on a computer, photographs, movies, or magazines.

46.	You must develop a management plan with your psychologist or psychiatrist to address any risk of sexual re-offence.  You must talk about this with a corrective services officer when asked.

47.	You must advise your case manager of any personal relationships you have started.

48.	You must obtain the prior written approval of a corrective services officer before possessing any equipment that enables you to take photographs or record moving images. 
“Equipment” means any type of devices, including things like mobile phones, digital or video cameras, computers, laptops, tablets, surveillance cameras including dashboard cameras and drones. 

Additional: Anti-libidinal medication

49.	If prescribed anti-libidinal medication by your treating psychiatrist or doctor, you must take the medication at the dosage and frequency as prescribed to you. 

50.	You must not change the type, dosage, or frequency of the anti-libidinal medication, unless that is approved by your treating psychiatrist or doctor and advised to a corrective services officer.

51.	If prescribed anti-libidinal medication by your treating psychiatrist or doctor, you must let your treating psychiatrist or doctor provide information to a corrective services officer about the administration of the anti-libidinal treatment. 

52.	You must consult with your treating psychiatrist before changing or ceasing your anti-libidinal treatment.