QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND 
                 ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION	Briggs v Lisale & Anor [2025] QCATA 48 	
PARTIES:		Liam Terry Briggs	

(applicant)	

v 	
	JODIE MARIE LISALE
(respondent) 	
	
YERRIE GUY
(respondent)
	
APPLICATION  NO:
ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO:                                                                   	APL287-24
MCDO2842 of 2024  	
MATTER TYPE:	Other minor civil dispute matters	
DELIVERED ON: 	2 May 2025	
HEARING DATE:	24 April 2025	
HEARD AT:	Brisbane	
DECISION OF:	Dr J R Forbes	
ORDERS:	The application for leave to appeal is dismissed	
CATCHWORDS	CONSUMER DISPUTE – application for leave to appeal – contract for services – where ecommerce facility needed to provide access to web – where major fault found in ecommerce facility – where action by consumer to recover monies paid – where respondent denies personal liability and claims that a company is proper respondent – whether respondent acted as servant or agent  of company –  whether applicant made the subject agreement in his personal capacity –  whether action against individual respondent should be dismissed –  whether post-contractual evidence unilaterally alters terms of the agreement or identity of responsible party – where tribunal finds individual  respondent liable – where respondent seeks leave to appeal on issues of identity and due process

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 32, s 142
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v G R Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622
Cameron v Spalding [2012] QCATA 145
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715 
JM v QFG [1998] QCA 228
Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22
Seo v Kent Realty Southport [2018] QCATA 125
Sinclair v Balanian [2024] NSWCA 144
	
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:		This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction 
[1]	In early 2022 the present respondents, Jodie Lisale and Yerri Guy (‘Lisale-Guy’) decided to commence a retail business in ‘e-commerce’ form.
[2]	The term ‘e-commerce’ (an abbreviation of ‘electronic commerce’) refers to the connection of vendors with customers for the exchange of goods or services online.
[3]	The creation of such a business requires the construction online of a special ‘web site’.
[4]	For that purpose, Lisale-Guy, on or about 27 February 2022, entered into an agreement with the present applicant (‘Briggs’) to construct such a website. On 1 March 2022 they paid Briggs $10,000 for that service. 
[5]	Lisale and Guy were persuaded to deal with Briggs by online advertisements such as: ‘$4K per day online business built for you. Full set up. Ad creatives. Ongoing support’; ‘For 5 people only I will find a winning product for you – build a high level online store – give you an automated supplier – make all the ads for you – help you get to $10K to $15K per month PROFIT [sic]’; ‘If you would like to make an extra $10,000-$15,000 per month from your laptop and want the whole business built for you apply via link below and I’ll call you with all the details.’ Several of these invitations were adorned with photographs of Briggs standing proudly beside a helicopter parked on a beach, seemingly about to take to the waters.
Major defect
[6]	It is not necessary now to discuss the terms of the agreement or the quality of Briggs’ performance at length. As will be seen, those matters are not now in issue. Suffice it to note that about one month after the agreement, Lisale-Guy were voicing dissatisfaction:
Since taking ownership of our store what we have experienced is store ready disappointing. …We were promised that our store would be handed over polished and ready. This has not happened. We advised you that there were many inconsistencies and grammatical errors which you advised would be amended…. Again it was not done. …We paid $10,000 for a fully polished store ready to go on day one (as advertised) and this [is] not what we received.
[7]	Absent a reply, Lisale addressed Briggs again on 22 April 2022:
In short, the product we have paid for has not been delivered. We seek a full refund of the $10,000… within 5 working days…
[8]	Only then did Briggs reply to Lisale’s email of 3 April. He did not challenge the substance of it:
Jodie, I thought I’d send a reply to your email. … In this case, like, the original store that we delivered like wasn’t like reviewed and checked  properly and stuff like that, so I do apologise like and I do agree with you it’s like was not to the standard that we obviously wanna be like presenting  …. We want you to be happy and we want you to get [A] little lapse communication  … but yeah we’ve completely remade it and it’s like to a super high standard now …
[9]	That promise was not fulfilled; by June 2022 Lisale-Guy had reported Briggs to ‘Scamwatch’, the police and the Tax Office. About the same time there was an expose on the ABC’s 7.30 Report.
Action commenced
[10]	Eventually Lisale-Guy filed an originating application against ‘Liam Teddy Briggs’ and as a precaution, added his company as second respondent, claiming, inter alia, $10,000 and costs.
[11]	So far as Lisale and Guy were concerned, the allegation of corporate, not personal liability, was first ventilated on 18 August 2023 – well over one year after the subject agreement was made.
[12]	That was done when Briggs, in a Response signed ‘Mr Liam Briggs’, filed on 18 August 2023, evoked, albeit unconsciously, the ghost of Saloman v Saloman & Co alleging:
I am named personally name [sic] as a Respondent. I deny any claim the Applicants make against me. The Applicants entered into a contract with the entity Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd trading as Ecom Connect. I am a director of Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd. The Applicants did not at any time enter into a contract with me in my personal capacity.
[13]	On 19 August 2024 the Tribunal upheld Lisale and Guy’s claim and ordered Briggs himself to pay them $10,000 and $379.50 in costs.
[14]	No part of that award has been paid.
[15]	On 13 September 2024 Briggs applied for leave to appeal. 
[16]	In the light of the Response and the Application for Leave the issues on appeal are refined to two: (i) Is the subject agreement one between Lisale-Guy and Briggs in his personal capacity; and (ii) Was Briggs accorded due process in the primary hearing?
[17]	According to Briggs the only proper respondent in these proceedings is a now insolvent company, Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd.
[18]	Briggs has asserted this defence on several occasions since August 2023. It is unnecessary to quote every such assertion, but the following are typical:
I am named personally name [sic] as a Respondent. I deny any claim the Applicants make against me. The Applicants entered into a contract with the entity Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd. The Applicants did not, at any time, enter into a contract with me in my personal capacity.
The original decision maker erred in fact when she made a ruling that I was acting in my personal capacity and not as a director of a company.
Through most of 2023 I usually referred to Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd as ‘Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd trading As Ecom Connect’ which I did on my Form 40 application… Teddy Briggs Co  Pty Ltd has often been referred to in trade as ‘Teddy Briggs Co’ and ‘Teddy Briggs’.  …I am the Director of Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd. Teddy Briggs Co Pty Ltd has employed me to act on its behalf in business.
[19]	The crucial time, however, is when the contract was made, on or about 27 February 2022. Identity of the parties is a fundamental aspect of contract formation. It is to be determined in the circumstances at the time of agreement – here, in the context of what Lisale and Guy may reasonably be expected to have known and understood at that time. Much of the material that Briggs now seeks to make decisive is what the French call  l’esprit de l'escalier – more or less effective repartee after the debate is over.
[20]	It is not surprising that even before trial the tribunal dismissed Briggs’ application that his personal joinder in the proceedings be struck out.
[21]	On trial the Adjudicator questioned Briggs carefully about the circumstances of the February 2022 agreement:
ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   So – but don’t you refer to yourself as Teddy Briggs?
			
MR BRIGGS:   I mean, I go by Liam Briggs, but – yeah.  Like, I guess Teddy Briggs is the company name.

ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   Right.

MR BRIGGS:   Some people also know me by that as well.

ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   So can you just tell me, then, how on earth were 
these girls to know that they were contracting with a company?  That’s really what I want to know.

MR BRIGGS:   Yeah.  So when they, like, sent the payment, it was to the company account. All the business dealings were with the company ‑ ‑ ‑ 
ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   But, sorry, doesn’t – isn’t the company account just Teddy Briggs Co?  … [I]t doesn’t have a Pty Ltd, does it?
MR BRIGGS:   It doesn’t have it written on there.
ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   No.  So can I ask you where it is that you ever informed them that you were signing this agreement as a director of a company?
MR BRIGGS:   So it was discussed on our phone call, but it’s not in documentation.  But – yeah.  I mean, to be honest, I mean, it was always known that you don’t purchase something from a human.  Like, it was – it’s a business service.  Like, it would be … .  I mean, that was obviously just poor business practice on our end to not have the ABN.   …
ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   Well, no, because there was some evidence that Liam Teddy Briggs was a sole trader in some businesses.  So it can’t be assumed – because what we have to look at is what was the nature of your agreement, and in – unlike in some other agreements that I’ve seen, there’s no reference to the company this time.
MR BRIGGS:   Yep.  Yep.
	And later to Lisale-Guy:

ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   Right.  So can I just ask you once again:  when you entered into this agreement, who did you think you were contracting with?
MS GUY:   Teddy Briggs.
MS LISALE:   Teddy Briggs.
ADJUDICATOR WALSH:   Right.  And at no time did anyone tell you [that] you weren’t contracting with him till after it all went south?
MS GUY:   No.	
MS LISALE:   No.
MS GUY:   That’s correct.  And we found that information ourselves.  That was never volunteered to us. 	

[22]	Post-contract, Lisale addressed numerous letters simply to ‘Teddy’ and received answers similarly signed. A Briggs advertisement invited inquiries to ‘Teddy Briggs’.
[23]	On the evidence, particularly Briggs’ lame and evasive replies to the Adjudicator’s questions, it is not surprising that she rejected Briggs’ argument that the company, and not he, was the only proper respondent.
[24]	A trial judge’s findings of fact are seldom disturbed, unless they are ‘glaringly improbable’. That certainly cannot be said here. The Adjudicator did not err in her eminently reasonable finding that Lisale and Guy contracted with Briggs in person.
Due process
[25]	Briggs’ other foreshadowed ground of appeal is that the Adjudicator ‘erred in law when she failed to provide me with procedural fairness at the QCAT hearing’. The suggestion is that Briggs was not permitted to refer to certain evidence at the trial. If that were so it would of course have been a denial of natural justice. 
[26]	However, it appears that the material referred to was assembled long after the agreement was made, and was quite unknown to Lisale or Guy at that crucial time in February 2022. Contractual terms, and particularly the identity of parties, cannot be inserted or altered unilaterally by post-agreement discovery. See [16] above.
[27]	Besides, Briggs made no reference to these afterthoughts at the hearing when responding to the Adjudicator’s questions. See [18] above. The transcript records not the slightest objection by Briggs to the exclusion or dismissal of information assembled for present purposes after the making of the agreement, quite unknown to Lisale-Guy at that crucial time.
[28]	There is no substance in Briggs’ complaint of natural justice denied.
[29]	An application for leave to appeal is not an occasion for a retrial. It is confined to inquiring whether the proceedings at first instance reveal an error of law that may reasonably said to have seriously affected the result.
[30]	I discern no such error in this case. Leave to appeal must be refused.