IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA
AT Melbourne
COMMON LAW DIVISION	Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication	
Appeals and Post Sentence Applications List

Case No. AP-24-1463

LENA ANDERSON	Applicant	
		
v		
		
KARINA WALKER	Respondent	

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JUDGE:	HER HONOUR JUDGE MANOVA	
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne	
DATE OF HEARING:	31 March 2025	
DATE OF RULING:	3 April 2025	
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Anderson v Walker (Ruling No 3)	
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VCC 371		

RULING
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Subject:	PERSONAL SAFETY INTERVENTION ORDER APPEAL – EXTENSION OF FINAL PERSONAL SAFETY INTERVENTION ORDER FOR FIVE YEARS
Catchwords: 	Whether ongoing threat to respondent’s safety, publication of derogatory comments and identifying details on publicly available Facebook Group
Legislation Cited:	Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic), Magistrates Court (Personal Safety Intervention Orders) Rules 2021
Cases Cited:	Anderson v Walker (Ruling) [2024] VCC 1606, Anderson v Walker (Ruling No. 2) [2025] VCC 265; Berlyn v Brouskos (2002) 134 A Crim R 111; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, AAA v County Court of Victoria & Ors [2023] VSC 13
Ruling:	Order of the Magistrate varied, additional order made requiring Ms Anderson to de-identify Ms Walker and her business name from her online posts.  Order made for five years.
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APPEARANCES:
	Counsel	Solicitors	
For the Applicant	The Applicant appeared in person		
			
For the Respondent	The Respondent appeared in person		

HER HONOUR:

1	This is an appeal by Ms Anderson from a decision by Magistrate Casey on 22 October 2024, to grant Ms Walker an extension of a final personal safety intervention order (“FPSIO”). 
2	On 22 October 2024, Magistrate Casey extended the FPSIO.  At the time of the extension, Ms Anderson was not present in court and no formal hearing was held.  The magistrate relied on an order for substituted service made on 24 September 2024.  
3	Ms Anderson has been successful in making out error by the Magistrates’ Court in the making of the Orders for Substituted Service.  As a consequence, the jurisdiction of the Court has been enlivened and the Court proceeded to hearing Ms Anderson’s substantive appeal.
4	At all times, both parties were self-represented before me.  Sadly, the proceedings have taken a severe emotional toll on each of them.
5	Prior to the hearing, I referred both parties to the statutory provisions which I considered relevant to this appeal.  These, together with relevant legal principles, have been reproduced below.
6	After the hearing, Ms Anderson sent two emails to the Court clarifying some matters raised in her submissions.  Relevant portions of the emails, together with the legislative provisions, are also reproduced in this judgment.
Background
7	Ms Walker runs a business.  In 2022, she briefly employed Ms Anderson.  At the end of her employment, Ms Anderson raised a complaint about her entitlements with the Fair Work Commission.  That complaint was finally determined in September 2022, but the determination was not before me.  
8	Ms Anderson was dissatisfied with the outcome of the Fair Work Commission hearing and formed the view that the result had been obtained using false evidence.
9	Having formed that view, Ms Anderson engaged in certain conduct, including but not limited to making a derogatory public post about Ms Walker on Ms Anderson’s Facebook group and sending emails calling Ms Walker “liar”.  Ms Walker considered that conduct placed her in fear for her safety and/or in fear for her reputation or both.  
10	Ms Walker then applied for, and was granted a FPSIO, under the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic) (“the Act”)
11	After a full hearing, the FPSIO was made by Judicial Registrar Wilson (“JR Wilson”) at the Magistrates’ Court Benalla on 5 September 2023.
12	At that hearing, evidence was given by Ms Walker and cross-examination was carried out by Ms Anderson.  At the conclusion of Ms Walker’s evidence, Ms Anderson also gave evidence and was cross-examined by Ms Walker. 
13	During the hearing, Ms Anderson made submissions that Ms Walker’s evidence was unsupported by copies of the documents allegedly sent to her by Ms Anderson (emails for instance), and ought not be accepted.  Ms Anderson strongly argued that Ms Walker had told lies in court to obtain the Intervention Order.
14	JR Wilson considered the evidence of both parties and Ms Anderson’s submissions, and accepted Ms Walker’s evidence.  The FPSIO was made for a period of one year, to expire at midnight on 4 September 2024.  
15	Ms Anderson again formed the view that the Order had been obtained by false evidence or lies, and in the absence of crucial documentary evidence.  
16	Ms Anderson sought review of JR Wilson’s order.  That review was carried out by a magistrate who confirmed the Order of JR Wilson.  The magistrate’s findings were subject to a separate appeal before me.  
17	On 4 September 2024, Ms Walker applied for an extension of the FPSIO.  Her application contained the following outline of “reasons/grounds”:
“THE DISPUTE HAS BEEN ONGOING. THE MATTER WAS APPEALED TO THE COUNTY COURT FOR HEARING ON 4/9/24, THAT MATTER IS STOOD DOWN PENDING JURISDICTIONAL CONCERN. THE RESPONDENT MADE REFERENCE TO ME BEING DERANGED AND A COMPULSIVE LIAR, WILL GET WHAT SHE DESERVES AND INDICATED THAT THE RESPONDENT WISHES TO CONTINUE LEGAL ACTION AND I STILL FEEL THAT THERE IS AN ONGOING THREAT TO MY SAFETY”
18	On the same day, an interim PSIO was made by the Magistrates’ Court at Benalla.  The Interim PSIO included the following prohibition:
“THE COURT ORDERS THAT THE RESPONDENT MUST NOT: 
 …
 Publish on the Internet, by email or other electronic communication any material about the protected person(s).
19	It was not possible to serve Ms Anderson personally with the application for extension and the interim PSIO, because Ms Anderson was no longer living at her known address.  Orders were then made for substituted service on Ms Anderson’s email address.
20	On 5 September 2024, Ms Anderson published on her publicly-available Facebook group called “Anderson v Westpac” a number of publications.  These included:
(a)	a commentary by Ms Anderson about the PSIO proceedings and her views about the motives of police and the Magistrates’ Court; and
(b)	an email which she had sent to a [regulatory body], naming Ms Walker and her business.  Ms Anderson also apparently published the link to the Court Book in the first appeal from the FPSIO; and
(c)	the following comment:
“the only evidence provided to the Magistrates’ Court were posts from this page which the Court and Victoria Police were clearly trying to shut down….they don’t like their conduct being exposed. It didn’t work. I did not remove one single post as I object to States (sic) increasing coercive control over us and our freedoms. It’s not hard to see we’re slowly becoming a police state run by fear, control and retribution and being slowly conditioned to accept police officers acting as a para-military force.”
21	On 24 September 2024, the Magistrates’ Court made orders for substituted service of the Interim PSIO and the application for extension.
22	I found that errors had been made in the making of those orders, because the certificates of inability to serve upon which they were based failed to comply with the legislative requirements.
23	In the preliminary hearing before me, Ms Anderson said she did not receive the documents ordered to be served by substituted service, despite being in frequent contact with both the court and with police using the same email address.  Therefore, she did not receive notice of the proposed dates for hearing of Ms Walker’s application for extension and did not attend court on 22 October 2024.
24	On 22 October 2024, the application for extension was granted in Ms Anderson’s absence, as the Magistrate considered Ms Anderson had elected not to come despite being served.  The Order was made for a period of five years.
Relevant legislative provisions
25	Section 1 of the Act provides:
The main purposes of this Act are— 
(a) to protect the safety of victims of assault, sexual assault, harassment, property damage or interference with property, stalking and serious threats; and 
(b) to promote and assist in the resolution of disputes through mediation where appropriate.  (emphasis added)
26	Section 96 of the Act (relevantly) provides:
“Conduct of appeal 
 (1) 	The appeal is by way of a rehearing by the County Court or the Supreme Court. 
Note 
…
(2) 	On the appeal, the County Court or Supreme Court may— 
(a) 	confirm the relevant decision; or 
(b) 	set aside the relevant decision; or 
(c) 	vary the relevant decision and make any other order the Magistrates' Court or Children's Court could have made and exercise any other powers that the Magistrates' Court or Children's Court may have exercised; or 
(d) 	…
(e) 	…. .”
27	Section 83 provides:
“Power of court to extend final order 
 (1) 	The court may order the extension of a final order on an application under this Division. 
 (2) 	The court may order the extension of a final order if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that if the order is not extended the respondent is likely to commit prohibited behaviour or stalking against the protected person.
 (3) 	Subsection (2) applies whether or not the respondent has— 
(a) 	committed prohibited behaviour or stalking against the protected person while the final order was in force; or 
(b) 	complied with the order while it has been in force.
28	Section 4 provides relevant definitions:
“mental harm means grief, anxiety, distress or trauma;
 …
 prohibited behaviour has the meaning given in section 5;
…
 stalking has the meaning given in section 10;”
29	Section 5 provides:
“Meaning of prohibited behaviour 
 For the purposes of this Act, prohibited behaviour is—
 (a) 	assault; or 
 (b) 	sexual assault; or 
 (c) 	harassment; or 
 (d) 	property damage or interference; or 
 (e) 	making a serious threat.”
30	Section 10 (relevantly) provides:
“Meaning of stalking 
 (1) 	A person (the first person) stalks another person (the second person) if the first person engages in a course of conduct— 
(a) 	with the intention of causing physical or mental harm to the second person, including self-harm, or of arousing apprehension or fear in the second person for his or her own safety or that of any other person; and 
(b) 	that includes any of the following— 
(i) 	… 
(ii)	…
(iii) 	publishing on the Internet or by an email or other electronic communication to any person a statement or other material—
(A) 	relating to the second person or any other person; or 
(B) 	purporting to relate to, or to originate from, the second person or any other person; 
(iv)	 …
(v) 	…
(vi) 	…
(vii) 	… 
(viia) 	 making threats to the second person; 
(viib) 	…
(viic)	…
(viid) 	 …
(viii)	…
(ix) 	…
(x) 	acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected— 
(A) to cause physical or mental harm to the second person, including self-harm; or 
(B) 	to arouse apprehension or fear in the second person for his or her own safety or that of any other person. 
 (2) 	For the purposes of this Act, the first person has the intention to cause physical or mental harm to the second person, including self-harm, or to arouse apprehension or fear in the second person for his or her own safety or that of any other person if— 
(a) 	the first person knows that engaging in a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause such harm or arouse such apprehension or fear; or 
(b) 	the first person in all the particular circumstances ought to have understood that engaging in a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause such harm or arouse such apprehension or fear and it actually did have that result. 
 (3)	 In this section— 
mental harm includes— 
(a) 	psychological harm; and 
(b) 	suicidal thoughts.”
Relevant legal principles 
Additional evidence on the appeal 
31	Ordinarily, appeals of this kind are limited to the evidence on the record.  In this case, that evidence consists of the following documents, which would have been on the court file and available to the Magistrate:
(a)	the application for extension, together with the affidavit of the applicant sworn/affirmed on 4 September 2024 and swearing/affirming that the contents of the application are true and correct;
(b)	the original application for the Intervention Order, together with the Orders of the court making the FPSIO, following a fully-contested hearing.
32	The transcript of the hearing before the Magistrate on 22 October 2024 also forms part of the record. 
33	However, in some cases, additional evidence can be received on the appeal.
34	In AAA v County Court of Victoria & Ors, John Dixon J said:
“Broad appeals may be further categorised into rehearings on existing evidence and rehearings allowing for new evidence:
 (a) 	Limited to evidence on the record: The appellate court considers for itself the issues the trial judge had to determine and the effect of the evidence appearing on the record but applying the law as it is when the appeal is heard, not when the trial is heard. This has been described as an appeal where the court ‘makes its own decision on the evidence before the court below’.
 (b) 	New evidence: The powers of the appellate court are exercisable where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error. The appellate court is not confined to the record of evidence led at the original hearing and may hear new evidence and applies the law as it applies when the appeal is heard. The appellate court can substitute its own decision based on the facts and the law as they then stand. Its powers are not restricted to making the decision that should have been made at first instance. However, a rehearing is not a retrial and the court’s power to receive further or fresh evidence is limited to that provided by the statute creating the right of appeal. This has been described as ‘an appeal by way of rehearing based upon the evidence given in the court of first instance supplemented by further evidence’.”
(Emphasis added.) 
(Footnotes omitted.)
Discretionary error
35	In House v The King the High Court said: 
“… The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. Unlike courts of criminal appeal, this court has not been given a special or particular power to review sentences imposed upon convicted persons. Its authority to do so belongs to it only in virtue of its general appellate power. But even with respect to the particular jurisdiction conferred on courts of criminal appeal, limitations upon the manner in which it will be exercised have been formulated. Lord Alverstone L.C.J. said that it must appear that the judge imposing the sentence had proceeded upon wrong principles or given undue weight to some of the facts (R. v. Sidlow…). Lord Reading L.C.J. said the court will not interfere because its members would have given a less sentence, but only if the sentence appealed from is manifestly wrong (R. v. Wolff…). Lord Hewart L.C.J. has said that the court only interferes on matters of principle and on the ground of substantial miscarriage of justice (R. v. Dunbar …). See, further, Skinner v. The King and Whittaker … v. The King … .” 
(Emphasis added.) 
(Footnotes omitted.)
Course of conduct
36	There is no definition of “course of conduct” in the PSIO Act.  However, the expression has been considered in the context of the offence of stalking under s21A of the Crimes Act 1958, the text of which was in very similar terms to s10 of the Act.
37	In Berlyn v Brouskos, Nettle J said:
“…The essence of stalking under the American model, and thus I think an essential element of stalking as defined by s 21A of the Crimes Act, is a course of conduct of the kind prescribed in the California Penal Code. And for the reasons already given that means that there must be a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose … It is readily conceivable that conduct on two separate occasions may not always constitute a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose and it is unlikely that conduct on only one occasion could constitute a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose, unless the conduct were protracted. In order to constitute a pattern of conduct there must be something more, and I think with respect that McDonald J was correct when his Honour said in Gunes, in effect, that the something more is that the conduct must be engaged in on more than one occasion, or it must be protracted.
That is not to suggest that proscribed conduct which is engaged in on more than one occasion or which is protracted will necessarily constitute a course of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose. It may not, and I do not take McDonald J to have suggested otherwise. Something additional about the conduct or the surrounding circumstances will need to be shown before it can be said of the conduct that it amounts to a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose. But I think that for all intents and purposes, it will not be open to say of conduct that it amounts to a course of conduct unless it is engaged in on more than one occasion or unless it is protracted; whatever else may need to be shown.”
(Emphasis added.)
(Footnote omitted.)
Additional evidence tendered on the appeal
38	I consider the remarks in AAA about the availability of new evidence on the appeal, apply equally to appellants and respondents.  
39	In this case, therefore, if Ms Walker can demonstrate that having regard to the additional evidence, the Orders of the Magistrate ought to be upheld or varied, this court “is not confined to the record of evidence led at the hearing” and “can substitute its own decision based on the facts and the law as they then stand”.
40	Ms Walker relied on screenshots of the contents of the Facebook group posted or published on 5 September 2024, together with a “Copy of Full text of  above Facebook post on 05/09/2024”, an email to a [regulatory body] from Ms Anderson, also posted on the Facebook group on the same day, together with reference to a link to the Court Book of the appeal sent to the [regulatory body], and posts on the Facebook Group made on 20 February 2025 and 17 March 2025.
41	Ms Anderson did not dispute having made the posts, but provided an explanation that she was engaging in freedom of speech and political commentary which she believed was her right and entitlement at law.
Submissions of the parties
42	Ms Anderson relied on two written outlines of submissions and oral submissions.
43	In summary, Ms Anderson asked for the Order made on 22 October 2024 to be set aside and in support submitted, as follows:
1. 	The allegation made by Ms Walker in her application for extension of the FPSIO, makes a false allegation of “fear of ongoing threat to [her] safety”.  It is false because Ms Walker accepted, during her evidence in the hearing for the FVIO, that she did not fear for her physical safety, she only feared for her reputation;
2. 	Ms Walker gave false and contradictory evidence in the hearing for the FVIO before JR Wilson – there were contradictions between her evidence that Ms Anderson had been “firing off a lot of emails” and her evidence that Ms Anderson sent her a number of emails with just one word “liar”; 
3. 	There was no documentary or other supporting evidence to support Ms Walker’s original application for a FVIO.  The registrar should never have accepted Ms Walker’s application and Ms Walker would not have obtained a FVIO on the basis of the documentary evidence she had, which was one business review in which Ms Anderson referred to Ms Walker as “dishonest and incompetent”.
4.	There was no documentary or other physical evidence to support the application made by Ms Walker on 28 September 2022.
5.	There is no documentary or other physical evidence in support of the application for extension.  Further, the evidence given by Ms Walker on 5 September 2023 contradicts the contents of the application for extension, because on 5 September 2023, Ms Walker said in evidence that she did not fear for her physical safety, only her reputation.
6.	Section 61(4)(c) of the Act provides an exemption to publishing material on the internet if the conduct is engaged in without malice “for the purpose of engaging in political activities or discussion or communicating with respect to public affairs”.  The Facebook page has been in existence since 2018, its purpose is to promote Ms Anderson’s forthcoming book in which she will detail her attempts to obtain justice in the courts for the last twelve years.  While it is publicly available, Ms Anderson does not send it to anyone.  Posting material about Ms Walker and her business was for the purpose of engaging in political activities or discussion.  This, it was said, includes discussion about Ms Anderson’s experience with the justice system, the injustice of the Intervention Orders made against her and her quest to convince the Federal Government to establish a Judicial Integrity Commission;
7.	Any publication on the internet and complaints about Ms Walker to agencies such as the [regulatory body] did not constitute prohibited behaviour because the contents were not threatening and were not sent to Ms Walker.  If Ms Walker obtained them, she did so by directing others to Ms Anderson’s Facebook group:
“Writing is not prohibited behaviour, it might be defamatory but only if it were not true.  If the contents were true, then the writing or publication was not defamatory and not prohibited”;
8.	The period of five years was a unilateral decision by the magistrate for which there was no application (Ms Walker had sought two years only) and in respect of which no reasons were given.
44	Ms Walker relied on written submissions and oral submissions made in response to Ms Anderson’s arguments.
45	Ms Walker asked for orders varying the Orders made on 22 October 2024 to include orders requiring Ms Anderson to de-identify her and her business from Ms Anderson’s Facebook Group.  In support, Ms Walker submitted as follows:  
1.	Her application to the magistrate and in this court relies on s10(1)(b)(iii) of the Act, stalking by publishing material on the internet relating to Ms Walker and her business and s10(1)(b)(x), acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected to cause mental harm by calling her “deranged” and “a liar” and threatening that “she will get what she deserves”.  Ms Walker said she has suffered mental harm in the context of Ms Anderson’s indications that she would never stop publishing material and was under constant fear that it would never end.  She submitted this fear existed at the time she sought the extension, because she believed Ms Anderson had not accepted that her behaviour was wrong.
2.	The Bench Book provides that, when determining whether to extend a PSIO, the magistrate is required to consider the history of the relationship and any interaction between the parties and may also consider the allegations contained in the original application, even if the order was made by consent without admissions.  When the magistrate said, in the transcript, that she would review the file, she was taking such prior interactions and information under consideration.  In an uncontested hearing, there is no requirement for the magistrate to provide reasons for extending the order and pursuant to r10.03(1)(d) of the Magistrates Court (Personal Safety Intervention Orders) Rules 2021 (the Rules”), the magistrate was clearly empowered to make any order which the court considered appropriate, in the absence of any party.
3.	The magistrate need only receive an application and be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent is likely to commit prohibited behaviour or stalking in the future.  Pursuant to the reasoning in House, it is not enough for an appellate court to form the view that it might have made a different decision, it has to be satisfied that a glaring wrong or substantial error has been made.
4.	At all times she has maintained that Ms Anderson’s conduct in posting about her on the internet was causing her mental harm.  It caused her stress and anxiety to be called a liar and a fraud and a person who breaches employment law.
5.	She stands by her evidence that, in the Magistrates’ Court in September 2023, she told the truth in court and in her application for extension of the FPSIO, she does have a moral compass and her submissions were true and accurate.
6.	Ms Anderson’s online publications about her and reports to the [regulatory body] that she is unfit are accompanied by malice.  Ms Anderson wants people to believe that Ms Walker is an unfit person and a liar and has said as much, in her submissions to the Court.
7.	If Ms Anderson feels there is a problem with the legal system, then she is free to comment on her Facebook Group.  However, Ms Walker is a private citizen and not seeking to be in the public sphere.  Therefore, if Ms Anderson wants to make public comments about the legal system, she is entitled to do that, but she is not entitled to name Ms Walker or her business.  Further, Ms Anderson was not engaging in public commentary or making political statements, what she was doing was making disparaging remarks about Ms Walker and her character.
8.	When Ms Anderson believed the Intervention Order had expired, she immediately began posting online, identifying Ms Walker and her business by name and posting the Court Book of the appeal containing Ms Walker’s personal information.
Ms Walker said she found the post intimidating because, in it, Ms Anderson included a complaint email about Ms Walker sent to a [regulatory body] and made reference to her intent not to remove any posts.
9.	Ms Anderson’s posts cause her mental harm because they describe her as having a pathological disorder and being a fraud.
10.	Ms Anderson’s complaint to the [regulatory body] is also causative of mental harm to Ms Walker, because her reputation is tarnished on a public forum and before her peers.  All this, Ms Walker said, was evidence by Ms Anderson’s own hand that she appeared not to understand her behaviour was causative of harm.
11. Ms Walker asked for orders requiring Ms Anderson to de-identify her and her business from the existing Facebook group.
46	In response, Ms Anderson said that:
(a)	Ms Walker was open to criticism and reviews on a public forum because she was an employer and if she was engaging in improper conduct, then criticism in a public forum is appropriate and not prohibited;
(b)	the Magistrates’ Court made orders against her in reprisal to her having made a complaint to the Judicial Complaints Commission;
(c)	that she was going to keep posting on her Facebook group, which helps a lot of people who have similar experience with the courts.  Her page has many of her own cases on it and that is what makes it so compelling.  Her page is all about how fraud is dealt with in Victoria and she will keep running the page until there is a Judicial Integrity Commission.  The page provides an update about what she is going through at the hands of Victoria Police.
47	Following the hearing, Ms Anderson sent an email to the Court, which sought to clarify some of the matters put in her submissions.  The email included the following:
“I refer to yesterday’s hearing in which I referenced a similar case from 2011 (Grierson v Cox) where Tim North SC was successful in protecting his client’s freedom of expression on his personal Facebook page….
 my Facebook page, Anderson v Westpac, is designed to comment on matters of public interest and advance the rights of self-represented litigants in a court system currently hostile to those who cannot afford legal representation. (Refer judicial College Victoria bench book 4.2.1.4 (c)).
 As explained, this case is reported on in the context of those objectives as Ms Walker is an employer who runs a business wholly funded by [a named agency] which is wholly funded by Australian tax-payers.
 I note for the purposes of the PSIO Act that the posts Ms Walker relies on are not easily found and she gave evidence that they were “sent to her” by a friend and not provided by me with malice. She did not provide any evidence of them having affected her or her business.
 I further note that the Magistrate Casey did not have this, or any evidence apart from Ms Walker’s affidavit, before her when making the final orders. As the transcript we both rely on shows, Ms Walker is not a reliable witness.
 As a consequence of the above I formally cite the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act (Vic) 2006, sections 15 and 7(2) (“the Charter”).”
48	Ms Anderson reproduced, in her email, the following two provisions which relate to freedom of expression:
49	Section 7(2) of the Charter, which provides:
“Human rights—what they are and when they may be limited 
(1) 	This Part sets out the human rights that Parliament specifically seeks to protect and promote. 
(2) 	A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors including— 
(a) 	the nature of the right; and 
(b) 	the importance of the purpose of the limitation; and 
(c) 	the nature and extent of the limitation; and 
(d) 	the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) 	any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve. 
(3)	Nothing in this Charter gives a person, entity or public authority a right to limit (to a greater extent than is provided for in this Charter) or destroy the human rights of any person.”
50	Section 15 of the Charter, which provides:
“Freedom of expression 
 (1) 	Every person has the right to hold an opinion without interference. 
 (2) 	Every person has the right to freedom of expression which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, whether within or outside Victoria and whether— 
(a) 	orally; or 
(b) 	in writing; or 
(c)	in print; or 
(d) 	by way of art; or 
(e) 	in another medium chosen by that person. 
(3) 	Special duties and responsibilities are attached to the right of freedom of expression and the right may be subject to lawful restrictions reasonably necessary— 
(a) 	to respect the rights and reputation of other persons; or 
(b) 	for the protection of national security, public order, public health or public morality.”
51	The following day, Ms Anderson sent another email providing online reports of the results of the “Grierson v Cox” case, from the Age Newspaper and Crikey.com. 
52	In that email, Ms Anderson again reiterated her position that it would be an error of law to confirm the final order of the Magistrate, because there had been “no evidentiary basis for making the order”.  Ms Anderson referred the court to Momcilovic v The Queen as authority for the proposition that there was no legal basis for interfering with her right to freedom of expression  
Ms Anderson’s response to Ms Walker’s submissions
53	In response to Ms Walker’s request for orders requiring Ms Anderson to de-identify her and her business from the existing Facebook Group, Ms Anderson submitted that:
(a)	she should not be made subject to such orders, because the post was made at a time when there was no Magistrates’ Court proceeding, as she had not been served with the documents;
(b)	her Facebook Group page supports the writing of her book and contains an interesting commentary to enable her to have her voice heard publicly.  The landscape currently in the internet space is such that her page gives people confidence to fight for their own rights;
(c)	her Facebook Group has had a lot of visitors because there is a significant amount of interest in the community about the way the courts operate and how they apply the law.
Analysis
54	Ms Anderson’s submissions numbered 1-4 can be dealt with expeditiously.  They each relate to matters which are not properly before me and can have no bearing on this appeal, save by way of background.  Suffice it to say that the registrar of the Magistrates’ Court did accept Ms Walker’s application for a PSIO, JR Wilson did accept Ms Walker’s evidence and granted the application, and this court accepts Ms Anderson is extremely dissatisfied with those outcomes.
55	This appeal deals only with the Order extending the FPSIO made on 22 October 2024. 
56	That brings me to Ms Anderson’s sixth submission, which focuses on s61(4)(c) of the Act.  In essence, Ms Anderson submitted that this provision authorises the publications about Ms Walker and her business name on the Facebook Group because it is conduct engaged in by Ms Anderson without malice and for the purposes of political discussion.
57	I reject that submission.
58	Section 61 applies to the making of a final order under the Act.  It does not relate to extending an order.  The relevant power to extend an order is found in s83. 
59	Section 61 (relevantly) provides:
“Power of court to make final order
 (1) 	The court may make a final order if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities. that—
(a) 	the respondent has— 
(i) 	committed prohibited behaviour against the affected person and— 
(A) 	is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and 
(B) 	the respondent's prohibited behaviour would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety; or 
(ii) 	stalked the affected person and is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and 
(b) 	the respondent and the affected person are not family members; and 
(c) 	it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to make a final order.
 …
 (4) 	Despite subsection (1), the court must not make a final order if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent engaged in the prohibited behaviour or stalking without malice— 
(a) 	in the normal course of a lawful business, trade, profession or enterprise (including that of any body or person whose business, or whose principal business, is the publication, or arranging for the publication, of news or current affairs material); or 
(b) 	for the purpose of an industrial dispute; or 
(c) 	for the purpose of engaging in political activities or discussion or communicating with respect to public affairs. 
 … .” 
 (Emphasis added.)
60	If I am wrong about that, I consider that Ms Anderson engaged in the “stalking” by publication online, with malice.  This is because I accept Ms Walker’s submission on this point.  
61	The email to the [regulatory body] published by Ms Anderson on her Facebook Group, appears to be a response to a letter from the Acting Commissioner of that body following [her] complaint about Ms Walker and her business.
62	On the face of the document, it appears that Ms Anderson has made at least one other complaint about Ms Walker and this email responds to a letter from the Acting Commissioner about that complaint.
63	It provides a link to the court book, the intervention order documents and transcript, which it appears, any reader of the Facebook Group can access.
64	The email is focussed on the intervention order proceedings between the two women and Ms Anderson’s perception of the harm these proceedings have done to her, and of the harm Victoria Police have done to her.  
65	The email purports to diagnose Ms Walker with some kind of pathological disorder, the alleged consequences of which are focussed on Ms Anderson.  In conclusion, the email suggests that Ms Walker is an unfit person because of what she has allegedly done to Ms Anderson. For instance, by applying for intervention orders and giving evidence in support of her application, which Ms Anderson considered was false.
Submissions relevant to the disposition of this appeal
66	Ms Anderson made only three submissions about the Magistrate’s decision to extend the FPSIO, (5, 7 and 8).  I will address each of these in turn:
Submission 5
67	Ms Anderson submitted that:
“There is no documentary or other physical evidence in support of the application for extension.  Further, the evidence given by Ms Walker on 5 September 2023 contradicts the contents of the application for extension because on 5 September 2023, Ms Walker said in evidence to the Magistrate that she did not fear for her physical safety, only her reputation.”
68	I reject Ms Anderson’s submission that there was no evidentiary basis for making the order.
69	As outlined above, the “evidence” the Magistrate had before her, was the application for extension, together with the affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the contents of that application, the previous applications for an intervention order and the court records demonstrating that an order had been made following a fully-contested hearing.  
70	Even if it could be said the evidence given by Ms Walker on 5 September 2023 was inconsistent with the contents of the application for extension (which I am far from persuaded about), that is of no significance to the magistrate’s task under s83. 
71	There are two reasons for that:
(a)	I consider the Magistrate was bound to apply s83 of the Act, not to consider evidence given (and accepted) in a previous hearing, and determine whether it was or was not consistent with the contents of the application for extension;
(b)	physical safety was not the focus of the application.  On a fair reading, it is clear the application was made because Ms Walker is concerned about Ms Anderson’s statements that Ms Walker was “deranged” and “a compulsive liar” and that she will “get what she deserves”;
72	In the hearing before the Magistrate on 22 October 2024, Ms Walker also told the Magistrate that: 
“… I wanna keep the intervention order in place because even when she thought that it had lapsed because they hadn’t re-served her the extension, she immediately went back to posting online, so I’m kind of - anyway – yeah, I’m sort of torn as to what the best course of action is”.
73	I accept this is strictly not evidence, as Ms Walker had not taken the oath.  However, I consider, there was no reason for the magistrate not to accept what Ms Walker told her.
74	Ms Anderson does not dispute posting the 5 September 2024 posts which include derogatory commentary about Ms Walker.  She explained to the Court that she did it because the Order had expired and she was engaging in political commentary.
75	Taking into account the contents of the Facebook Group posted on 5 September 2024, and Ms Anderson’s admission that she made the post because there was no order in place, it is clear Ms Walker was telling the truth, even if she had not given an oath to do so.
76	For the above reasons, I reject Submission 5.
Submission 7
77	Ms Anderson orally submitted that “any publication on the Internet and complaints about Ms Walker to [a regulatory body] did not constitute prohibited behaviour because the contents were not threatening and were not sent to Ms Walker.  If Ms Walker obtained them, she did so by directing others to Ms Anderson’s Facebook group:
“writing is not prohibited behaviour, it might be defamatory but only if it were not true. If the contents were true, then the writing or publication was not defamatory and not prohibited.”
78	I accept the publications did not fall within the definition of prohibited behaviour under s5 of the Act, which concerns matters such as assault, sexual assault, property damage and making serious threats.
79	I accept also that Ms Anderson steadfastly believes her posts contained true content and she is entitled to make them.
80	However, I consider the posts fell within the definition of “stalking” under s10 of the Act and the Magistrate had the power to make the Order extending the FPSIO. 
81	Focusing the enquiry on the evidence (including previous applications and court orders) which was before the Magistrate, I consider a combination of a number of matters demonstrate a course of conduct and a continuity of purpose and meet the requirements of the following provisions:
(a)	of “publishing on the internet by an email” a statement or other material relating to Ms Walker; 
(b)	Section10(b)(viia) of the Act, “making threats”; and 
(c)	Section 10(b)(x), “acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected” to cause mental harm and arouse fear and apprehension in (Ms Walker) for her safety.
82	Those matters are as follows:
(a)	in the application made on 28 September 2022 by Ms Walker, there was reference to the following publications by email and online, threats and derogatory comments:
“… AFTER 5:03 PM AND CONTINUING FOR AROUND TWO HOURS THE RESP SENT A SERIES OF EMAILS THREATENING ME. WHILE THE FIRST COUPLE OF MESSAGES FOCUSED ON JUST THREATENING MY REPUTATION THEY ESCALATED INTO WHAT I FELT WERE PERSONAL THREATS INCLUDING “YOU’LL GET YOURS”, “YOU’LL GET WHAT’S COMING TO YOU”. CONCURRENTLY SHE STARTED POSTING ONLINE REVIEWS CALLING ME A LIAR, INCOMPETENT, A FRAUD, A DANGER TO CHILDREN. AT THE SAME TIME SHE ALSO SENT SEVERAL MESSAGES TO MY PERSONAL AND BUSINESS FACEBOOK ACCOUNTS THREATENING THE SAME THINGS. I WAS INITIALLY JUST UPSET SHE WAS TRYING TO RUIN MY REPUTATION BUT THEN I BECAME SCARED DUE TO THE INCREASING LEVEL OF THREATS AND FEARED THAT MY PERSONAL SAFETY MAY BE AT RISK.
 … .
 THE RESP BECAME FIXATED ON “BRINGING ME DOWN”. SHE THEN STARTED LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME. BEGAN TO APPROACH ME AND OTHER MEMBERS OF STAFF CLAIMING I WAS A LIAR. SHE MADE CLAIMS THAT I HAD MADE CHILDREN UNSAFE AND THAT IT WAS HER JOB TO PROTECT THE CHILDREN. SHE BEGAN SENDING MESSAGES ALONG THE LINES OF “THE COURT WILL SORT THIS OUT YOU WILL GET WHAT’S COMING TO YOU… .”;
(b)	the contents of the application for extension include references by Ms Walker to Ms Anderson having made comments that Ms Walker was “deranged and a compulsive liar and will get what she deserves”;
(c)	the contents of the submission by Ms Walker to the magistrate which outlined that when Ms Anderson believed no order was in place, she immediately began posting derogatory comments about Ms Walker on her Facebook Group.
83	I accept the submission by Ms Walker that when the Magistrate said she was going to look at the file, she would have had access to all of the relevant applications and court orders (some of which are outlined above).  This would have clearly highlighted the above matters to the Magistrate.  It would have provided context to the relationship and demonstrated a continuity of purpose and course of conduct by Ms Anderson over a number of years, which included online derogatory posts, and threats that Ms Walker would get what was coming to her. This conduct was continuing at the time of the application for extension.
84	Ms Walker also submitted she had been suffering mental harm as a result of the posts and comments made by Ms Anderson.  In particular, she is a moral and principled person and suffered greatly when called a liar and a fraud.  
85	I consider that an inference can be drawn from the contents of the application for extension that Ms Walker felt apprehension and fear and that when she stated “I still feel there is an ongoing threat to my safety”, she was referring to her emotional safety and wellbeing which, was likely to be impacted by damage to her reputation.
86	The Magistrate was entitled to accept Ms Walker suffered mental harm, based on the contents of the application for extension.  I also accept she did so, and continues, to suffer mental harm as a result of the publications.
87	For all the above reasons, I reject Submission 7.
Submission 8
88	Ms Anderson submitted that the period of five years was a unilateral decision by the Magistrate for which there was no application (Ms Walker had sought two years only) and in respect of which no reasons were given.
89	Ms Walker submitted that the magistrate had power under r10.03(1)(d) of the Rules to make the Order in Ms Anderson’s absence, and in an uncontested hearing, and there was no obligation to provide reasons.
90	I accept that submission.  The documents before the Magistrate, together with Ms Walker’s submissions about Ms Anderson posting online when she thought there was no order in place, enabled the Magistrate to be satisfied in accordance with s83, on the balance of probabilities, that if the Order was not extended, Ms Anderson is likely to commit stalking against Ms Walker.
91	The Magistrate also said:
“…. what I’m proposing to do today, subject to anything you might say, is to grant your application to extend, and make a five-year order effective today.
…
 … No doubt given the other proceedings there will be some flow-on action, but at least this stops you needing to come back here every week or every month.”
92	I consider that this, although brief, is a statement of reasons by the Magistrate.  
93	From it, it is possible to conclude that the Magistrate took into account the appeal proceedings relevant to the Intervention Orders between the parties, and the likelihood of  further hearings (and further opportunity for interaction).  It is clear the Magistrate intended her order to be of such duration as to ensure that Ms Walker did not need to return frequently to the court for protection from ongoing conduct by Ms Anderson. 
94	This ground also fails.
95	Ms Anderson has not made out any of her grounds of appeal. 
96	I now turn to consider Ms Walker’s submissions about the orders that I ought to make.
The additional evidence
97	Based on my understanding of Ms Walker’s submissions, the additional evidence serves two purposes. 
(a)	the first is to demonstrate that what Ms Walker told the Magistrate during the hearing was in fact true; 
(b)	the second is to support Ms Walker’s submission that the Court ought to vary the Order of the Magistrate to require Ms Anderson to de-identify her and her business name from the Facebook Group posts.
98	Ms Anderson does not dispute posting on her Facebook group on 5 September 2024, on 20 February 2025 and on 17 March 2025 the contents of which posts were in evidence before me.  However, Ms Anderson submitted she was entitled to do so because she was engaging in genuine political commentary or because, on 5 September 2024, she had not been served with any interim order or application for extension, and on the other two days she had not identified Ms Walker by name.
99	Ms Walker submitted the posts about her are personal and identify her and her business by name.  Alternatively, it is possible to identify her from other posts  even if Ms Walker’s name is not mentioned. The reason for this is, those two posts contain reference to the Intervention Order proceeding, details of which are posted on the Facebook group, including a link to the Court Books which contain personal details about Ms Walker. Therefore, it was submitted any reader who reads the two posts is able to refer back to other posts and find Ms Walker’s identity and such other personal details as may be found in the court documents.
100	I accept Ms Anderson’s submission that she does not, herself, send copies of the post to anyone, including Ms Walker.  However, by Ms Anderson’s own admission, the post is publicly available, it has many visitors and its purpose is to enable Ms Anderson to have a voice and be heard publicly.  Ms Anderson said “it gives people confidence to fight for their own rights”.
101	As I understand the position, the page can be, and is, accessed by members of the public on Facebook.  
102	I accept Ms Anderson has a right to freedom of expression in writing and online under the Charter.  However, this right is not unfettered. 
103	There are special duties and responsibilities attached to that right as provided by s15 of the Charter to which Ms Anderson helpfully referred the Court.  Pursuant to ss3 of that provision: 
“Special duties and responsibilities are attached to the right of freedom of expression and the right may be subject to lawful restrictions reasonably necessary— 
(a)	to respect the rights and reputations of other persons … .”
Such other persons include Ms Walker and her business.  Ms Anderson’s right to freedom of speech and to political commentary therefore must be exercised in such a way as respects the rights and reputations of Ms Walker and her business. 
104	I reject the submission that, because Ms Walker is an employer, that somehow makes her liable to public derogatory reviews and commentary.  Ms Anderson did not rely on any authority in support of this proposition and I know of no such authority.
105	I consider the tone and content of the posts are such that Ms Anderson ought to have understood that engaging in a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause harm or arouse apprehension and fear in Ms Walker for her reputation and that of her business. 
106	I am satisfied that, when Ms Anderson considered no order was in place, she posted derogatory comments online identifying Ms Walker.  This supports my finding that if no order is made, Ms Anderson is likely to continue posting similar content online.
107	I consider that any “defence” or “exception” for political activities or commentary under s61 does not apply, as the Order sought by Ms Walker was an extension to a final order. However, even if it did apply, I consider Ms Anderson was motivated by malice and was not engaging in political commentary when she posted about Ms Walker and her business.
108	Regrettably, Ms Anderson has developed a fixation with Ms Walker and what she perceived were injustices (such as making allegations in intervention order proceedings or reporting breaches of orders to police) committed against her by Ms Walker.  During the hearing before me, Ms Anderson made numerous references to Ms Walker as a liar and re-stated her intention to continue with her quest to bring her perceptions of Ms Walker to the attention of the public and a [regulatory body].  
109	I consider, therefore, that the Orders I am about to pronounce are necessary for the protection of Ms Walker from stalking under s10 of the PSIO Act.
110	Pursuant to s96(2)(c) of the Act, I vary the decision of the Magistrate as follows:
(a)	I will make the same orders as orders 1 to 9 of the Orders made on 22 October 2024 and I further order that: 
(b)	By midnight on 7 April 2025, Ms Anderson must de-identify Ms Walker and her business from any and all online posts over which she has control, which posts contain direct or indirect commentary about Ms Walker or her business, and/or about the intervention order proceedings between Ms Anderson and Ms Walker and/or the Fair Work Proceedings between Ms Anderson and Ms Walker;
(c)	By midnight on 7 April 2025, Ms Anderson must remove from any and all online posts over which she has control, any links publishing court books, certified extracts, applications and summons for an intervention order, intervention orders, transcripts, appeal documents, or any other documents which identify Ms Walker or her business; 
(d)	Ms Anderson must not publish on Facebook or any other social media platform, any material about the protected person; and
(e)	these Orders will last for five years from the date of this order (3 April 2030).
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