Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)

Dajani & Dajani (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 749  
File number(s):	SYC 3672 of 2020	
		
Judgment of:	ALTOBELLI J	
		
Date of judgment:	8 November 2024	
		
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW –  STAY APPLICATION – Where the husband seeks to stay final orders for the sale of the former matrimonial home pending his appeal – Where the wife opposes the stay – Where the wife proposes alternative orders that would preserve the subject matter of the appeal – Discussion of the extent of the Court’s power to make orders by way of conditions of a stay – Where the Court declines to grant a stay of orders for the sale of the former matrimonial home – Orders made for the former matrimonial home to be sold as per the final orders with the sum in contention at appeal to be deposited into a controlled monies account pending determination of the appeal.   	
		
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79	
		
Cases cited:	Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106
Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1985) 2 NSWLR 685
Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621; [1953] HCA 25
Dajani & Dajani [2024] FedCFamC1F 605
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Newett & Newett (No 6) [2021] FamCA 436
Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (In Liq) (Court of Appeal, 15 December 1976, unreported)
White & White [2014] FamCAFC 213	
		
Division:	Division 1 First Instance	
		
Number of paragraphs:	40	
		
Date of hearing:	4 November 2024 	
		
Place:	Sydney	
		
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr O’Brien	
		
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Russell Kennedy Lawyers	
		
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Gerace SC	
		
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Santone Lawyers	

ORDERS
	SYC 3672 of 2020	
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)	
BETWEEN:	MR DAJANI
Applicant
	
AND:	MS DAJANI
Respondent

order made by:	ALTOBELLI J	
DATE OF ORDER:	8 November 2024	

THE COURT ORDERS PENDING FURTHER ORDER THAT:

1.	Pending the determination of the appeal with the file number NAA263/2024, the property at C Street, Suburb D NSW (“the Suburb D property”) be sold in accordance with Orders 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the final orders made 12 September 2024 (“the final orders”), save that upon settlement of the sale, Order 4(f) of the final orders be varied such that:
(a)	The Respondent wife (“the wife”) receives such sum to result in her receiving 40 per cent of the net asset pool;
(b)	Such amount that constitutes 22.5 per cent of the net asset pool is deposited into a Controlled Monies Account invested by Santone Lawyers; and
(c)	The Applicant husband receives the balance. 
2.	These orders act as full authority for the wife to forthwith accept the offer of $3,850,000 for the sale of the Suburb D property and in the event that purchaser is no longer available, to continue to act as sole trustee to effect the sale of the Suburb D property. 
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.	For the purpose of these orders, the “net asset pool” is defined as the assets, addbacks, liabilities, superannuation and financial resources as set out at [191] of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli dated 12 September 2024 (Dajani & Dajani [2024] FedCFamC1F 605), but taking into account any variation in the value of the Suburb D property, such value being determined by the sale price, together with the actual sales costs and expenses incurred in preparing the Suburb D property for sale. 

Note:	The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dajani & Dajani has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
Introduction 
1	These reasons for judgment explain the orders the Court has made pending an appeal in the substantive matter to the Full Court. 
Background
2	The final hearing of this matter was listed for four days commencing 22 April 2024 in relation to alteration of property interests. The husband was the respondent in the substantive proceedings, but the applicant in the current proceedings (“the husband”). The wife was the applicant in the substantive proceedings, but the respondent in the current proceedings (“the wife”). The husband was, and still is, incarcerated after being found guilty of offences in relation to the sexual assault of the parties’ daughter. The primary asset in dispute in both the substantive and current proceedings is the former matrimonial home at C Street, Suburb D NSW (“the Suburb D property”).
3	On 12 September 2024, final orders were made (“the final orders”) and reasons for judgment delivered: Dajani & Dajani [2024] FedCFamC1F 605 (“my reasons for judgment”). The husband filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 October 2024 (“the appeal”).
4	By way of an Application in a Proceeding filed 14 October 2024, the husband seeks to stay Orders 1–5, 9–11, 18–20 and 22 of the final orders, pending the determination of the appeal.  These orders primarily relate to the sale of the Suburb D property and the distribution of funds from the parties’ joint accounts. During submissions, counsel for the husband conceded that he could no longer press the stay of Orders 18–20, as these orders had already been implemented. He also seeks that the parties continue to engage a real estate agent to lease the Suburb D property for a period of not greater than 12 months, with the net rental income to be paid to the wife, and that the wife be restrained from dealing with his personal property that remains on the Suburb D property.
5	The wife seeks for the husband’s application to be dismissed. However, she offers two alternative orders, the first of which would see her receive 40 per cent of the net asset pool through the sale of the Suburb D property, with the remaining amount she would otherwise be entitled to pursuant to the final orders being kept in a controlled monies account pending the determination of the appeal. The second alternative order would see her receive 40 per cent of the net asset pool through funds otherwise available from the husband, and the Suburb D property would be leased with her receiving 100 per cent of the net rental income. 
The final orders and reasons for judgment
6	The final orders provided for the Suburb D property to be sold, with the wife appointed as trustee for herself and the husband in relation to the sale. There is no challenge on appeal to this order. The net proceeds of sale were to be distributed as to 62.5 per cent to the wife and 37.5 per cent to the husband, with the husband to pay the wife a cash adjustment if the amount remaining was insufficient to achieve the distribution of the net matrimonial asset pool in the aforementioned percentages. They were to otherwise retain any property in their sole names. The parties were ordered to pay to their two adult children (“the children”) $30,000 each, and two vehicles were to be held on trust and transferred into their names. Several incidental orders were made. 
7	In my reasons for judgment, findings were made in relation to the impact of the husband’s family violence perpetrated towards the wife and the children, both during the marriage and post-separation. The Court found that there was ample evidence to establish that the husband perpetrated family violence and that this made the wife’s pre- and post-separation contributions, particularly as homemaker and parent, significantly more arduous (see [164] and [167]). The Court holistically assessed contribution, both direct and indirect, financial and non‑financial as 60:40 in favour of the wife (see [173]) and made a two and a half per cent adjustment under s 75(2) (see [185]). Relevantly, the parties agreed that the value of the Suburb D property was $4 million.
The Notice of Appeal
8	The husband filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 October 2024 in relation to the final orders and my reasons for judgment. His grounds of appeal are reproduced as follows:
1. 	His Honour erred in his exercise of discretion by failing to:
a. 	Properly consider the actual (1,000,000 [Country J currency]) rather than purchase (200,000 [Country J currency]) value of the Appellant’s shares (bought by the Appellant’s family business) at the start of the marriage; and 
b. 	Attribute appropriate weight to this financial contribution providing a ‘springboard’ for the parties’ later financial investment success.
2. 	In respect of the Appellant’s Sentencing Remarks from his criminal trial, His Honour:
a. 	Misapplied s.91 of the Evidence Act Cth (1995) and erroneously admitted such document into evidence; and 
b. 	Misapplied s.135 of the Evidence Act Cth (1995) by failing to exclude such document on the basis it was unfairly prejudicial to the Appellant.
3. 	When assessing the contributions of the parties, His Honour:
a. 	Drew an inference in support of the Respondent’s argument based upon inadmissible evidence (Sentencing Remarks);
b. 	Considered the Kennon argument independently from the other contributions of the parties; and 
c. 	Gave inadequate reasons as to the basis upon which the Appellant’s conduct had a significant adverse effect upon the Respondent’s contributions.
4. 	His Honour erred by failing to afford the Appellant procedural fairness by allowing the Final Hearing (22 – 24, 26 April 2024) to proceed in circumstances where the Appellant had been transferred from one correctional facility to another without being able to properly confer with his legal representatives, give instructions or prepare the required Court documents until, and within the time period of only 18 – 19 April 2024. 
9	The grounds of appeal will be referred to where relevant.
The evidence 
10	In support of his case, the husband relies upon the following material:
(1)	Outline of Case Document filed 1 November 2024;
(2)	Application in a Proceeding filed 14 October 2024;
(3)	His affidavit filed 14 October 2024; and
(4)	Documents tendered during the proceedings and marked as Exhibits A1–A4.
11	In support of her case, the wife relies upon the following material:
(1)	Outline of Case Document filed 1 November 2024;
(2)	Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 25 October 2024;
(3)	Her affidavit filed 25 October 2024;
(4)	Affidavits of Mr CC filed 25 October 2024 and 1 November 2024; and
(5)	Documents tendered during the proceedings and marked as Exhibits R1–R4.
The applicable law
12	The principles relevant to the present stay application were referred to by both parties and are conveniently set out by the Full Court in Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106 (“Aldridge & Keaton”) at [18]:
The principles to be applied in determining an application for a stay of orders both in the general law and in respect of parenting proceedings are also well known. The authorities stress the discretionary nature of the application which should be determined on its merits. Principles relevant to this matter include the following:
•	the onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay. However it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate any “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;
•	a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;
•	a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;
•	the mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay;
•	the bona fides of the applicant;
•	a stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties - this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;
•	a weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant a stay;
•	some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal – whether the appellant has an arguable case;
•	the desirability of limiting the frequency of any change in a child’s living arrangements;
•	the period of time in which the appeal can be heard and whether existing satisfactory arrangements may support the granting of the stay for a short period of time; and
•	the best interests of the child the subject of the proceedings are a significant consideration.
(Citations omitted)
13	For the purposes of the present application, the Court will focus on the principles which it considers to be most relevant, and which were referred to in the wife’s Outline of Case Document filed 1 November 2024, namely:
(1)	A person who has obtained a judgement is entitled to presume the judgement is correct;
(2)	The mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to ground a stay;
(3)	A stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties and this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and competing rights of the parties;
(4)	The bona fides of the applicant; 
(5)	Some preliminary assessment of the strength of the appeal; and
(6)	Weighing the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory should a stay not be granted. 
The submissions summarised
14	The husband’s primary submission is that the appeal will be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted. A stay is necessary to preserve the subject matter of the litigation, being the Suburb D property (which is the largest asset in the asset pool), because if a stay is not granted the Suburb D property will be sold. The husband also submitted that, as the appeal is likely to be finalised within 12 months, the duration of the stay will not be onerous, and the wife will not be prejudiced by a delay in the sale of the Suburb D property as she has ample funds to support herself. He further submitted that the Suburb D property is unlikely to depreciate in value during the course of the stay (and may even increase), and there have been no offers to buy the Suburb D property above the estimated value of $4 million such that not selling now would result in a significant missed opportunity if the stay were to be granted. Finally, the husband submitted that he has an arguable case on appeal and there are bona fide reasons for the appeal.
15	The wife submitted that there will be detriment, and she will be prejudiced, if a stay is granted. She has received an offer for the Suburb D property from a purchaser of $3.85 million and asserted that there is no reliable evidence that a better offer will be obtained in the immediate future. She contended that if there is further delay, she will lose the present offer and future sales efforts will be impeded by the property remaining empty for a long period. She explained that previous attempts at leasing the Suburb D property were unsuccessful, and are likely to continue to be difficult, and even if tenants were to be obtained it would not be a sound investment. She further expressed concern about the bona fides of the appeal and submitted that it lacks strength. She submitted that the appeal will not be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted, as the husband has no entitlement to the Suburb D property in specie, and there is no evidence to suggest that she will not be able to pay whatever sum is ordered if the appeal is successful. Finally, the wife submitted that the balance of convenience favours her, especially in circumstances where she experiences ongoing financial, psychological and emotional detriment consequent upon retaining the Suburb D property. Further, there is no evidence that the husband will appeal his criminal conviction, he will in all likelihood be deported to New Zealand upon his release (see [180] of my reasons for judgment), and it is a better financial course for the Suburb D property to be sold. 
Discussion 
A person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct
16	This principle was accepted by both parties, although the husband submitted that this principle must be weighed against other factors. 
17	In Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627, the High Court stated that:
…the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable, but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. 
18	In the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 the Court at 694 cited with approval the decision of Mahoney JA in Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (In Liq) (Court of Appeal, 15 December 1976, unreported):
… Prima facie, a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained by him and is entitled to commence with the presumption that the judgment is correct. These are not matters of rigid principle and a court asked to grant a stay will consider each case upon its merits, but where an applicant for a stay has not demonstrated an appropriate case but has left the situation in the state of speculation or of mere argument, weight must be given to the fact that the judgment below has been in favour of the other party. 
19	While the Court does not take issue with the bona fides of the appeal, and acknowledges the husband’s arguable grounds of appeal, it finds that the husband has left the situation in the present stay application in the state of “mere argument”. He has not demonstrated an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of discretion in his favour, and weight must be given to the fact that my reasons for judgment were in favour of the wife. 
20	The wife, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained by her and is entitled to commence with the presumption that the judgment is correct. At the very least, the wife was entitled to forthwith act on the final orders, as she has in fact done, and to continue to do so until specifically restrained by the Court. Indeed, the final orders have already been partly implemented in relation to preparing the Suburb D property for sale, causing to be paid $30,000 to each of the children, and transferring the legal title of two vehicles held on trust for the children into their names. This factor weighs in the wife’s favour.
The mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay
21	This principle is self-evident, was accepted by both parties and is not a determinative issue in this case. 
A stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties, and this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and competing rights of the parties
22	Both parties contemplated that a stay might be granted on terms and conditions which would be fair to all parties. The Court is permitted to make a stay order on conditions (Newett & Newett (No 6) [2021] FamCA 436 at [35]).
23	As stated above at [4]–[5], the husband proposes that the Suburb D property be leased for a period of not greater than 12 months, with the whole of the net rental income after expenses being paid to the wife. The wife proposes (in the alternative) that the Suburb D property be leased for a period of six months, with her receiving 100 per cent of the rental income after expenses, and with the husband paying her a sum such that she receives 40 per cent of the net asset pool plus the costs borne by her in readying the Suburb D property for sale.
24	There is a notable difference between the wife’s proposal and that of the husband. The wife’s proposal concedes, in the alternative, that a stay be granted in relation to the distribution of that part of the sale proceeds which represents the value of the distribution of the net asset pool put in contention by the husband (22.5 per cent), but no further. It was conceded that this was an orthodox condition on the granting of a stay. 
25	There is a clear nexus between the conditions proposed by the wife, and the orders sought to be impugned on appeal. By contrast, the proposal by the husband to lease the Suburb D property pending the outcome of the appeal is a new issue and there is, seemingly, no nexus between the condition sought to be imposed, and the orders sought to be impugned in the appeal.
26	The Court’s powers to grant conditions when granting a stay cannot be a power at large. It must be limited by reference to the power exercised when the orders were made in respect of which a stay is now sought, namely s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Moreover, if the exercise of the said power is exhausted, as the Court believes was the case when the orders were made on 12 September 2024, there is no power to make any further order by way of conditions on a stay outside of the parameters of that order (White & White [2014] FamCAFC 213 at [9]–[11]).
27	The Court thus doubts whether it has the power to order that the Suburb D property be leased if the conclusion is reached that the Court’s powers are not at large when granting a stay, and the Court can only make orders that are causally connected or proportionate to the order relevant to the granting of the stay. 
28	In any event, the Court must consider the appropriateness of the conditions proposed by the parties. The husband is not experiencing, and will not experience, financial hardship if a stay is not granted. On the wife’s proposal, he will receive interest from the investment of his share of the sale proceeds of the Suburb D property when it is sold. Given earlier findings about previous attempts to lease the property, which findings are adverse against the husband (see [91] of my reasons for judgment), and which findings are not challenged on appeal, the proposal to lease the property is rejected. 
29	The balance of convenience and competing rights is a central issue, the focus being on the Suburb D property. The Suburb D property has been vacant since September 2021 and attempts at leasing it in the past have been unsuccessful, including after interim orders were made on 6 October 2021 for the Suburb D property to be rented for a period of six months (the wife’s affidavit filed 25 October 2024, paragraph 25). The wife correctly submitted that the husband did not put forward any evidence as to whether the applicants who applied to rent the Suburb D property between August and September 2024 (the husband’s affidavit filed 14 October 2024, paragraph 19) are still available and willing to do so. She further submitted that leasing the Suburb D property may impact upon achieving a favourable sale price in the future as inspections are restricted and tenanted properties do not generally present as well (affidavit of Mr CC filed 25 October 2024, paragraph 17), and that leasing the Suburb D property does not represent a sound investment.
30	Further, the wife neither wishes to retain, nor occupy the property, as the ongoing joint ownership of the property is causing her “immense distress” and has exacerbated her mental health issues (the wife’s affidavit filed 25 October 2024, paragraph 26). Given the Court’s findings about the psychological and physiological impact on the wife of the continued joint ownership of the Suburb D property in my reasons for judgment at [72], [89] and [156], and the ongoing impact this is having on the wife, the Court considers these to be reasonable concerns and accepts them. The wife’s mental and physical health is another factor tipping the balance of convenience in her favour as regards the stay. 
31	The Court rejects the husband’s contention that he will one day personally occupy the property (the husband’s affidavit filed 1 November 2024, paragraph 18). There is no appeal against the finding made about this in my reasons for judgment (at [181]). It is common ground he will be deported to New Zealand upon his release from prison (my reasons for judgment at [180]). He maintains that he should nonetheless be able to retain the Suburb D property, and that he has the capacity to do so (the husband’s affidavit filed 14 October 2024, paragraph 16). This may be so, but the balance of convenience does not favour him in this regard. It is notable that he did not propose a stay on any condition that would enable the wife to be paid out of her share in the Suburb D property. He could have done so. He is well represented. The Court infers that he chose not to seek a condition to this effect. In circumstances where the Court accepts the wife’s evidence about neither wishing to retain, nor occupy the property, and the need for her to re-accommodate herself, and in circumstances where she is entitled to the fruits of the final orders, the balance of convenience falls in favour of her being able to sell the Suburb D property in accordance with the final orders.
32	Given that the wife has partially implemented the orders (see [20] above), as she was entitled to do, this too is a factor going to the balance of convenience in the wife’s favour.
The bona fides of the applicant
33	The Court accepts that the appeal is brought by the husband in good faith and that the grounds of appeal are arguable, and not fanciful.
Some preliminary assessment of the strength of the appeal
34	As indicated above, the grounds of appeal are arguable. The husband faces the usual challenges in seeking to impugn an exercise of discretion (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–505). Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal filed 10 October 2024, contending that the Court erred by failing to afford the husband procedural fairness, lacks strength given the absence of any complaint by or on behalf of the husband at the hearing itself. Indeed, the Court explicitly found that it was satisfied the husband’s legal representatives were able to prepare his case to a very high standard and he was not prejudiced by the fact he is incarcerated (my reasons for judgment at [9]).
Weighing the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory should a stay not be granted
35	Having rejected the husband’s contention that the Suburb D property should not be sold, and accepting, in principle, the wife’s proposal that the contentious amount of the net sale proceeds should be held in a controlled monies account for the parties, it is difficult to see how the husband’s appeal would be rendered nugatory if the stay were not granted. As submitted by senior counsel for the wife, the husband is not entitled to the Suburb D property in specie, and the Court may make such order as it considers appropriate with respect to the property of the parties altering the interests of the parties in the property (s 79(1) of the Act).
Other factors relevant to the exercise of discretion
36	The Court accepts that the effect of declining the stay of the final orders in terms of those sought by the husband is likely to lead to the sale of the Suburb D property, possibly at a value slightly lower than the agreed value on the balance sheet at [104] of my reasons for judgment. The evidence of the real estate agent (affidavit of Mr CC filed 25 October 2024), and the wife (including Exhibits R1–R2), suggests that genuine efforts have been made to market and sell the Suburb D property, and that the market value for the Suburb D property is that offered by the current purchaser ($3.85 million). The husband contends that the Suburb D property is worth more than the offer and is to be valued at either $4–4.2 million or in the mid to high range of $4 million (Exhibits A3–A4). As there is no ground of appeal relating to findings about the value of the Suburb D property, he cannot now contend for a higher value. In any event, the opinions offered by the real estate agents relied on by the husband (Exhibits A3–A4) are given little weight. For example, neither appraisal appears to explicitly indicate that the real estate agents have been inside the Suburb D property. Their opinions (described in the husband’s submissions as “kerbside valuations”) as to value are plainly inconsistent with the offers received to date. The submission made at paragraph 11 of the husband’s Outline of Case Document filed 1 November 2024 that the property is “is unlikely to significantly depreciate during the course of the stay” is purely speculative and is inconsistent with the wife’s reliable evidence (affidavit of Mr CC filed 25 October 2024, paragraphs 15–18).
37	Another discretionary factor operating in the wife’s favour is that her proposal provides for the undisputed sum which the parties are entitled to pursuant to the final orders to be released to both of the parties, with only the controversial amount held in a controlled monies account for them.
Orders 
38	The Court declines to grant the husband’s stay application. However, the final orders will be varied to the extent necessary to preserve the subject matter of the appeal.
39	Orders will be made in similar terms to those set out in Orders 3–6 of the wife’s Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 25 October 2024. The Suburb D property will be sold in accordance with the final orders and the wife has full authority to accept the offer of $3.85 million for the sale of the Suburb D property. In the event that purchaser is no longer available, the wife shall continue to act as sole trustee to effect the sale of the Suburb D property. 
40	Order 4(f) of the final orders will be varied, pending the determination of the appeal, with the net proceeds of sale of the Suburb D property to be distributed such that the wife receives 40 per cent of the net asset pool (as set out at [191] of my reasons for judgment) but taking into account any variation in the value of the Suburb D Property, such value being determined by the sale price, together with the actual sales costs and expenses incurred in preparing the Suburb D Property for sale, with the additional 22.5 per cent she would otherwise be entitled to receive pursuant to the final orders being deposited into a controlled monies account invested by her solicitors, and the husband receiving the balance. 

I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli.	

Associate: 

Dated:	8 November 2024