Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)

Julien & Perrin (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 50 
File number(s):	SYC 8105 of 2022	
		
Judgment of:	HARPER J	
		
Date of judgment:	6 February 2025	
		
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where the wife’s Application in a Proceeding seeks wide-ranging orders, primarily about disclosure – Extensive disclosure provided by the husband – Consideration of the overarching purpose and requirements of efficiency, timeliness, cost and proportionality confining the scope of arguments about disclosure – Rules about and obligations of disclosure generally not intended to place one party in a position to undertake an unreasonable, overly detailed, unnecessarily fastidious or obsessive audit of another party’s expenditure, dealings and transactions over many years – Where the evidence did not establish the husband’s existing disclosure was oppressive to the wife – Where some disclosure sought by the wife was not relevant to issues in the proceeding – Where the wife sought to discharge earlier court orders on the basis of non-compliance by the husband – Where the husband provided acceptable explanation for non-compliance – Husband granted an extension of time for compliance with orders – Application dismissed – All questions of costs reserved.   	
		
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VIIIAB, ss 4AA, 75, 79, 90SF, 90SM, 95, 96
Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) Sch 5
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 67, 68
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Ch 6, Pt 6.2, Div 6.2.4, rr 6.01, 6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.06, 6.09, 6.18  	
		
Cases cited:	Hicks & Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Hicks (2021) FLC 94-006; [2021] FamCAFC 19  
Julien & Perrin [2024] FedCFamC1F 265
Nagel & Clay (2020) 60 Fam LR 550; [2020] FamCA 326
Needham & Trustees of the Bankrupt Estate of Needham (2017) FLC 93–777; [2017] FamCAFC 94
Stopford Malloy & Malloy [2021] FedCFamC1F 123
Wei v Xia (No 5) (2023) 67 Fam LR 421; [2023] FedCFamC1F 679  	
		
Division:	Division 1 First Instance	
		
Number of paragraphs:	41	
		
Date of hearing:	30 January 2025 	
		
Place:	Sydney 	
		
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Worth	
		
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Milevski Family Lawyers	
		
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr Kearney SC and Ms Reid	
		
Solicitor for the Respondent:	York Family Law Specialists	

ORDERS
	SYC 8105 of 2022	
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)	
BETWEEN:	MS JULIEN
Applicant
	
AND:	MR PERRIN
Respondent

order made by:	HARPER J	
DATE OF ORDER:	6 FEBRUARY 2025	

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.	The Application in a Proceeding filed on 13 August 2024 be dismissed, apart from questions of costs.
2.	The time for compliance by the Respondent De Facto Husband (“husband”) with Order 1 made on 17 April 2024 be extended up to and including 2 September 2024.
3.	With respect to Order 1 made on 17 April 2024:
(a)	Within 72 hours of the making of these orders the Applicant De Facto Wife (“wife”) shall select in writing one of the proposed experts nominated by the husband on 2 September 2024 to be appointed as the single expert and in the event the wife does not make a selection within that time, the husband shall select one of the persons nominated;
(b)	Upon the selection of an expert in accordance with Order 3(a) the person selected shall be the single expert for the purpose of Order 1 made on 17 April 2024 and Ch 7 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). 
(c)	Each party is otherwise to comply, subject to these orders, with the requirements of Order 1 made on 17 April 2024.
4.	By no later than 12 noon on Friday, 14 February 2025, the wife's lawyers shall either:
(a)	Counter-sign the letter of instruction addressed to the single expert and return to the husband's lawyers, whereupon the husband's lawyers shall provide the letter of instruction to the single expert within 48 hours of receipt; or
(b)	Amend and return the letter of instruction to the husband's lawyers.
5.	The parties are to submit a draft joint balance sheet to the Chambers of Justice Harper by no later than 4.00 pm on 30 March 2025.
6.	Within 14 days of the wife providing the husband a response to the particulars requested by the husband on 24 January 2025, the husband file and serve:
(a)	An Amended Response to Initiating Application, in response to the wife’s Second Further Amended Initiating Application filed 11 November 2024; and
(b)	Particulars in Response to the wife’s Particulars of Claim filed 13 November 2024.
7.	Within 21 days of service of the documents referred to in Order 6, the wife be at liberty to file and serve a Reply to the husband’s Particulars in Response.
8.	If the wife refuses or neglects to execute any deed or instrument necessary to give effect to these orders then the Registrar of the Court be appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to execute such deed or instrument in the name of the wife and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed or instrument.
9.	The proceedings are listed for further mention only at 10.00 am on 31 March 2025.
10.	All questions of costs of the applications the subject of this judgment be reserved.
11.	On condition that the parties arrange a private mediation of their dispute to take place no later than 31 May 2025, the provisional final hearing dates commencing on 11 August 2025 with an estimate of 5 days are confirmed.
The Court Notes that:
A.	The parties are advised that any default in compliance with the orders of the Court will result in the dismissal of the Application or Response of the defaulting party, as the case may be.

Note:	The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Julien & Perrin has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HARPER J:
1	These are property adjustment proceedings between the applicant de facto wife, Ms Julien (“wife”) and the respondent de facto husband, Mr Perrin (“husband”) under Pt VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
2	The parties were never married but there is no dispute they were in a de facto relationship, as defined in s 4AA of the Act, but the duration of the relationship is disputed. The wife claims the relationship lasted for a period of about four years between September 2018 and August 2022, while the husband claims it lasted for just over two years including periods of separation. On either case this Court’s jurisdiction under Pt VIIIAB of the Act is attracted to adjust the property interests of the parties.
3	The value of the property pool is in dispute, but somewhere between $20,000,000 and $50,000,000 according to a draft joint balance sheet sent to my Chambers on 14 October 2024. There is no dispute the husband brought enormous wealth to the relationship in the form of extensive property and business interests. The wife claims adjustment on the basis of her non‑financial and homemaker contributions, which she claims reversed a decline in the value of the husband’s wealth by reason of his alcoholism and mental health problems, and in fact brought about an increase of about $20,000,000. The husband argues it would not be just and equitable to make any property adjustment. 
4	The proceedings are provisionally listed for final hearing on 11 August 2025 with an estimate of five days.
5	On 12 March 2024 the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding concerning claims about privilege attaching to documents located on a grey laptop computer, owned by the husband, but in the possession of the wife. A judicial registrar made an order by consent on 5 April 2024 requiring the husband to destroy hardcopies of documents the subject of his application. I delivered a judgment on 17 April 2024 which made certain orders requiring the husband to nominate three names and the wife to select a particular expert as part of a process to isolate the documents which would be the subject of any claim for privilege, and stood over the balance of the application: Julien & Perrin [2024] FedCFamC1F 265. I will return to this below because it is the background to one of the orders sought by the wife.
6	On 13 August 2024 the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking a range of orders, primarily orders about disclosure, but several other orders which are discussed below. The husband filed a Response on 13 December 2024.
7	In summary, as set out in her amended proposed Minute of Interim Orders (Exhibit A), the wife seeks orders categorised as follows:
(a)	Disclosure – orders 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 (orders 15, 16 and 17 were not pressed by the wife);
(b)	An affidavit by the husband verifying disclosure – order 22;
(c)	Discharge of orders made on 5 and 17 April 2024 concerning the claim for privilege – orders 24, 25 and 26; and
(d)	Procedural orders for the filing of an Amended Response – orders 29 and 30.
8	The wife relied on the following material as set out in her Case Outline filed 28 January 2025:
(a)	Affidavit of the wife filed 15 April 2024;
(b)	Affidavit of the wife sealed 21 January 2025; and
(c)	Affidavit of the wife filed 13 August 2024.
9	The husband relied on the following material as set out in his Case Outline filed 28 January 2025:
(a)	Affidavit of the husband filed 13 December 2024;
(b)	Affidavit of Ms E filed 13 December 2024; and
(c)	Affidavit of the husband filed 26 March 2024.
10	The documents tendered and received into evidence at the interim hearing on 30 January 2025 are set out in Schedule 1 to these reasons. 
Disclosure
11	Allegations about non-disclosure are routinely encountered in this Court. Some are well founded, others exaggerated and time wasting. It has become commonplace for one party to argue that the other party has failed to make adequate disclosure, and therefore the asset pool should be inflated by adding back notional property and the non-defaulting party should get a higher percentage of the known pool. 
12	The application by the wife requires some detailed consideration of the relevant rules and principles. 
13	Chapter 6 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“Rules”) makes detailed provision for disclosure. These rules came into effect on 1 September 2021, replacing rules to similar effect, and applied at the time of the interim hearing. Rule 6.06 stipulates parties to financial proceedings have a duty to make full and frank disclosure of “all information relevant to the proceeding, in a timely manner” (r 6.01). Rule 6.02 provides for undertakings by parties that “to the best of the party’s knowledge and ability”, they have “complied with, and will continue to comply with, the duty of disclosure”. Other rules provide specifically for the provision of documents and their use in financial proceedings (rr 6.03, 6.04 and 6.06). Part 6.2 of the Rules sets out detailed procedures for disclosure including production and inspection of documents, and the provision of a list of documents. Division 6.2.4 deals with orders for disclosure, and specifically provides for orders, for example, that a party disclose specific documents, provide an affidavit of documents or be relieved from the duty of disclosure either partly or fully (see r 6.18).
14	I have had occasion to comment before that the duty of disclosure “is not some hollow guideline to which perfunctory lip service can be paid” (Nagel & Clay (2020) 60 Fam LR 550 at [76]). I also venture to repeat some of the statements of principle I set out in Wei v Xia (No 5) (2023) 67 Fam LR 421 (“Wei v Xia (No 5)”):
168. 	The duty of disclosure enforces a high normative standard, always understood as fundamental to the integrity of this Court’s processes in financial cases under Pt VIII of the Act (In the Marriage of P A and R T Briese (1985) 10 Fam LR 642 (1986) FLC 91-713In the Marriage of R A Black and J Kellner (1992) 15 Fam LR 343 (1992) FLC 92-287)....
169. 	…
170. 	… 
171.	On the other hand, despite being described as absolute, the duty of disclosure does not embody a counsel of perfection and is not unconfined. The obligation is, and has always been, limited by relevance. This has usually been understood as relevance to an issue in the proceedings (Carmel-Fevia v Fevia (2010) 43 Fam LR 405; [2010] FamCA 502 at [55]; Moore and Moore (2014) FLC 93-595; [2014] FamCAFC 113 at [223])... 
172. 	… in any proceeding the ambit of relevance can narrow or expand, or alter in other ways, as the proceeding evolves. In this Court, where these proceedings have continued for many years, the ambit of relevance and hence the scope of the duty of disclosure may have shifted from time to time. This reality will often have some significance when the Court is faced with allegations of non-disclosure and arguments about the consequences of non-disclosure.
173.	In relation to documents, r 6.03(a) and r 6.03(b) (previously r 13.01 of the 2004 Rules) also narrows the scope of the duty to each document “in the possession custody and control” of a disclosing party and which is relevant. However, the expression “possession custody and control” does not mean the duty requires a party to garner documents by any means. It introduces to some degree the reality of practical considerations into the duty to disclose. The Full Court in Masoud v Masoud (2016) 54 Fam LR 245 (2016) FLC 93-689; [2016] FamCAFC 24 said:
20. 	The meaning of “possession and control” has been considered extensively. For a document to be within the power of a party, the party must be in actual possession of it or must have an immediate indefeasible right at the time of discovery to demand possession from the person who has physical possession of it: see Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 1) [1980] 1 WLR 627. In Schweitzer & Schweitzer [2012] FamCA 445, O’Reilly J held at [45] that “possession” as contemplated by r 13.07 “means not mere physical possession (custody) but “possession” within the accepted meaning being “the legal right to possession”: see in B v B, per Dunn J at 805; 807”. Further, her Honour stated at [50] that a beneficiary of a discretionary trust “has no interest in the corpus, but only the right to require due administration of the trusts, and…is entitled to access to the financial documents of the trustees only for the purpose of ascertaining that there is due administration.” In the present case, therefore, the husband has no access to the financial documents of the trustees beyond that required to ascertain there is due administration. It cannot be said that he has the requisite “control” of the trust deed that would warrant its disclosure.
21. 	With respect to his Honour, he elevated the duty of disclosure to an absolute obligation on a party to garner documents by any means.
…
24. 	It needs to be observed too that it is well recognised that there is a difference between circumstances where there is inadequate disclosure which suggests the existence of undisclosed assets and where it does not (see HDM & MM and Anor [2006] FamCA 47).
15	Although the duty of disclosure has been called “absolute”, in addition to limits imposed by relevance, the authorities have recognised other limitations grounded in concepts of reasonableness in the particular circumstances and proportionality (Needham & Trustees of the Bankrupt Estate of Needham (2017) FLC 93–777 at [38]–[45]). It can be said therefore that meaningful inadequacy in disclosure is not clearly established merely because there appear to be gaps or incompleteness in the material disclosed (Wei v Xia (No 5) at [356]).
16	It is well known that the possible consequences of a failure to disclose can include a finding that hidden assets exist, or taking account of the likely existence of other assets under s 90SM(4)(e) (s 79(4)(e)) of the Act (s 90SF(3)(r) (s 75(2)(o)) of the Act), or an order beyond the ascertained property, to achieve substantial justice relative to the non-disclosure or an order that all known assets be awarded to the innocent party (Wei v Xia (No 5) at [175]). The question is ultimately one of demonstrating injustice to a vulnerable party in need of the protection of the duty to disclose (Stopford Malloy & Malloy [2021] FedCFamC1F 123 at [22]–[24]). However, as the Full Court pointed out at [87] in Hicks & Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Hicks (2021) FLC 94-006 the achievement of justice must be relative to the subject non‑disclosure.
17	When assessing disputes about disclosure, this Court is bound to take account of the overarching purpose imposed by statute. Between 1 September 2021 and 5 May 2024, s 67 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (“FCFCOA Act”) applied the overarching purpose to proceedings in this Court. Since the commencement of Sch 5 of the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) on 6 May 2024, s 67 no longer applied, but s 95 of the Act, which is in almost identical terms, applies the overarching purpose to proceedings under the Act. Section 95(2) provides:
(2) 	…the overarching purpose includes the following objectives in relation to proceedings under this Act:
(a) 	the just determination of all such proceedings;
(b) 	the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;
(c) 	the efficient disposal of the overall caseload of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;
(d) 	the disposal of all such proceedings in a timely manner;
(e) 	the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute
18	The rules dealing with disclosure are family law practice and procedure provisions (s 95(4)). Section 95(3) provides: 
(3) 	The family law practice and procedure provisions must be interpreted and applied, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them (including the power to make applicable Rules of Court) must be exercised or carried out, in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose.
19	Section 96(1), like s 68(1) of the FCFCOA Act, imposes a duty on litigants in this Court to conduct their litigation consistently with the overarching purpose:
(1) 	The parties to proceedings under this Act must conduct the proceedings … in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions.
20	Clearly if a party is conducting proceedings consistently with the overarching purpose they must be assiduous and careful providing disclosure. But equally they must formulate any complaints about another party’s disclosure by reference to general dictates of efficiency, timeliness, cost and proportionality. To this extent the statutory overarching purpose embodies an articulation, and even extends, pragmatic concepts identified in existing caselaw. The requirements of efficiency, timeliness, cost and proportionality may serve to limit the scope of arguments about disclosure by obliging a party to assess rationally and carefully not only the materiality and legitimacy of claims about disclosure but their true importance in the overall litigation.
21	This discussion makes it equally obvious that while the obligations and purpose of disclosure require real proactive and frank conduct by a disclosing party, they are generally not intended to place one party in a position to undertake an unreasonable, overly detailed, unnecessarily fastidious or obsessive audit of another party’s expenditure, dealings and transactions over many years, including the period of a given relationship, be it short or long. Similarly, fidelity to the overarching purpose does not warrant the Court entertaining serial applications for orders for specific disclosure, beyond the point where such applications have become futile. 
22	The orders for disclosure sought by the wife are extremely wide-ranging. I do not consider it necessary to discuss them in detail. The evidence from both parties showed that they have, in the course of the proceedings, exchanged multiple requests and responses about disclosure. The wife conceded that the husband has given substantial disclosure of documents, comprising thousands of pages.
23	Rather the complaint which emerged from the wife’s submissions was in truth not too little but too much disclosure, for a variety of reasons. The husband’s disclosure was said to be oppressive because it has been voluminous, disorganised and chaotic, not arranged chronologically, lacking a sufficient means of identification, contained duplicates, and therefore imposed a burden on the wife personally in sifting through the material because it has already taken, and would continue to take, a significant amount of time. Her counsel claimed in submissions that the wife did not have the resources to pay for her lawyers to undertake this work. 
24	The husband denied the disclosure was either disorganised or chaotic. He pointed to evidence which plainly permitted the wife to identify and understand material disclosed electronically by reference to the categories set out in her own requests for disclosure. I agree with the husband’s submission. 
25	Part of the wife’s argument was that the husband provided a list of documents in compliance with r 6.09 on 19 April 2023 and he should be ordered to provide another such list to make it easier for the wife to understand the material that has been disclosed. For example, the wife claimed that she could not be satisfied categories the subject of her requests for disclosure had been properly addressed without a further list prepared by the husband. But I do not accept this submission. The proposed order for a further list of documents pursuant to r 6.09 is unnecessary in my view because, as the husband pointed out, several of his responses to the wife’s requests for disclosure constitute precisely such lists, and his affidavit affirmed on 13 December 2024 verifies much of his disclosure. Rule 6.09 does not stipulate a complying list must take any particular form.
26	The husband further argued that much of the material sought by the wife was not relevant to the issues in the proceedings. He tendered a list of issues agreed between the parties in September 2024 (Exhibit B) and pointed out that the wife’s application for detailed disclosure orders did not adequately engage with questions of relevance, particularly in light of the short relationship. 
27	I agree with this submission. Several examples suffice to demonstrate the point. 
28	Orders 2 and 3 seek disclosure of documents relating to the husband’s property settlement with his first wife in 2010. The wife argued these are relevant to establishing how her non-financial contributions during the relationship improved the value of the husband’s assets and business interests during the relationship, which commenced eight years later in 2018. In my view this is entirely unconvincing and the proposed disclosure sought could have no relevance to the issues identified by the parties in Exhibit B. 
29	Order 14 seeks disclosure about the source of the superannuation interest of the husband’s mother in the Super Fund 1, “from inception of that interest to date”. The wife argued his mother’s interest in this fund could have been used to “dispose of funds” by making contributions in her name. Exhibit E shows that the mother joined the fund on 13 April 2011. Her accumulation interest as at 1 July 2017 was valued at $504,326. The husband’s disclosure showed that this value had risen to $2,688,201 by 30 June 2022, which was about 20 per cent of the fund’s total value. In my view, the wife’s assertions about this fund are no more than speculation and fail to demonstrate any relevance for the scope of the documents sought in order 14. 
30	In short and in summary, the wife’s arguments for her proposed disclosure orders are unpersuasive. Shorn of unnecessary verbiage, they appeared to be no more than that the husband’s disclosure was inadequate because he did not present it in a manner which she found convenient. This is not a ground of inadequacy, nor a persuasive ground of complaint, and the evidence did not demonstrate the husband’s manner of disclosure was oppressive in any relevant sense.
31	In addition, the scope of her application makes it hard to reconcile the wife’s complaint about the volume of disclosure with the present application for further disclosure, which if granted could only result in a further enormous volume of documentation being provided to her. 
32	I do not accept the wife has demonstrated failures in the husband’s disclosure which warrant the orders which she seeks. I am satisfied that in truth those orders are designed to place her in a position to undertake an unreasonable, overly detailed, unnecessarily fastidious or obsessive audit of the husband’s expenditure, dealings and transactions over many years both before, during and after a short relationship, often seeking to stray into irrelevant areas. 
33	It is an unfortunate feature of litigation in this Court that parties frequently sink into an unproductive and ultimately pointless round of applications about disclosure, which delay an orderly progression to final hearing at a proportionate cost, when the rules about disclosure and the substantive adverse consequences which can flow to a defaulting party from non-disclosure are well known. This reality, the overarching purpose and the existing restrictions on interlocutory applications in the Rules and Practice Directions should not only discourage but compel parties to cease ill-conceived and time-wasting applications about disclosure. Too often inadequate attention is given to the purpose and formulation of applications about disclosure.
34	I decline to make orders 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 22.
35	In relation to orders 8 and 9, the husband claimed that he had already disclosed the documents sought by those orders, but would, consistently with the ongoing obligation for disclosure, provide any remaining documents. The wife in her Case Outline accepted that the husband had already given disclosure of documents falling within orders 8 and 9. In those circumstances I am not persuaded it is necessary to make orders 8 and 9.
Orders of 17 April 2024
36	Orders 24, 25 and 26 seek discharge of the orders of 5 and 17 April 2024, on the basis the husband failed to comply with the nomination of three expert names by the specified date. The husband did not dispute this default, but an explanation was given by his solicitor who accepted blame for this outcome. Nonetheless, the husband did nominate three expert names in correspondence dated 2 September 2024 from his solicitors to the wife’s solicitors. However, the wife did not respond. Consequently, the husband in his response to the wife’s application seeks an extension of time for compliance with the orders of 17 April 2024, pointing out that until the process envisaged by the 17 April 2024 orders is complete, the Court cannot be in a position to adjudicate the parties’ claims of privilege.
37	In my view, the discharge orders proposed by the wife do not help progress the proceedings to final hearing and are not consistent with the overarching purpose. The dispute about privilege must be determined if the parties are to be in a position to rely at trial upon any documents located on the grey laptop computer. The husband’s failure to comply with the first order to nominate three expert names was unacceptable, but I accept the explanation that the responsibility does not primarily lie at his feet. In any event, in my view the wife’s failure to respond to the correspondence dated 2 September 2024 without applying for the matter to be relisted, was similarly unhelpful.
38	I decline to make the wife’s proposed orders and will extend the time for compliance as sought by the husband. Otherwise, the privilege question will be no closer to resolution.
Procedural Orders
39	The wife sought procedural orders (orders 29 and 30) for the husband to file particulars and an Amended Response to her Second Further Amended Initiating Application filed 11 November 2024 and her Particulars of Claim filed 13 November 2024. The husband said he had sought further and better particulars from the wife on 24 January 2025 and would provide a Response within 14 days of receiving an answer to the balance of the request. I will make orders accordingly.
40	The husband also sought procedural orders for the creation of a draft joint balance sheet. These orders should be made in my view, as necessary to progress the matter for hearing.
41	The parties agreed the question of costs of the wife’s application should be determined at a later date. Those costs will be reserved.

I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Harper.	

Associate: 

Dated:	6 February 2025

schedule 1 – material tendered and relied upon by the parties
Exhibit Label	Document	Tendered by	
A	Proposed Minute of Interim Orders. Note: paragraphs 27 and 28 are not sought as part of the application listed on 30 January 2025	AW	
B	Joint list of issues dated 5 September 2024	RH	
C	Extract from disclosure	RH	
D	Email that sets out three-page document	RH	
E	The Super Fund 1 consolidated member benefit totals for year ended 30 June 2018 for Ms F	RH	
F	Wife’s Application in a Proceeding filed 13 August 2024	RH