Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)

Haque [2025] FedCFamC2G 341   
File number(s):	SYG 632 of 2025	
		
Judgment of:	JUDGE D HUMPHREYS	
		
Date of judgment:	12 March 2025	
		
Catchwords:	PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to institute fresh proceedings following vexatious litigant orders-application dismissed   	
		
Legislation:	Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 88Q(2)(b)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 243
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.10(b), 13.10(c)    
Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW)	
		
Cases cited:	Haque [2024] FedFCFamC2G 1139
Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 228
Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 92
Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd and Anor [2016] FCCA 147   
Haque v Tessoriero [2017] FCA 86
In the application for leave to institute proceedings by Applicant X [2020] FCCA 2322   	
		
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law	
		
Number of paragraphs:	13	
		
Place:	Parramatta	
		
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Self-represented litigant	

ORDERS
	SYG 632 of 2025	
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)	
BETWEEN:	AKM HAQUE AZMERUL 
Applicant

order made by:	JUDGE D HUMPHREYS	
DATE OF ORDER:	12 MARCH 2025	

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.	Leave is not granted for the applicant to institute fresh proceedings. 
2.	Pursuant to s 243 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 ( Cth), the proposed proceedings are dismissed. 

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
1	This matter has a long and complicated history. In 2014, the applicant instituted proceedings in the (then) Federal Circuit Court alleging that his former employer, Jabella Group Pty Ltd, had breached a number of sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) and the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth).
2	In a judgment of 4 February 2016, Judge Nicholls dismissed the application pursuant to r 13.10(b) and (c) of the (then) Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules): Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd and Anor [2016] FCCA 147. His Honour found the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.
3	The applicant sought to appeal that decision. On 18 August 2016, Bromwich J of the Federal Court dismissed an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal: Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 92. In a further judgment of 9 February 2017, Bromwich J affirmed a Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept a further application for leave to appeal and a supporting affidavit: Haque v Tessoriero [2017] FCA 86.
4	In July 2018, orders were made prohibiting the applicant from instituting proceedings under s 88Q(2)(b) of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) without leave of a Judge of the Court. The applicant sought leave; however, this application was dismissed by Judge Street in In the application for leave to institute proceedings by Applicant X [2020] FCCA 2322 (Applicant X).
5	A further application for leave to institute proceedings was considered and dismissed by Judge Manousaridis in Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd (Haque)) [2023] FedCFamC2G 228.
6	In later 2024, the applicant again sought to institute proceedings in the Court. Leave was refused by me in Haque [2024] FedFCFamC2G 1139.
THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS
7	The applicant now seeks leave yet again to institute proceedings that relate to the original cause of action that was considered by Judge Nicholls. The applicant alleges there is further new evidence evidencing fraud and misconduct of the part of the respondents to the original proceedings. In support of his Application, the applicant has filed an Affidavit sworn 1 March 2025.
8	That Affidavit lists some 33 documents that have been rejected for filing by the Court Registry, covering the period July 2018 to December 2024. In his Affidavit, which is admittedly difficult to follow, the applicant lists new authorities upon which he seeks to rely as well as claiming he only discovered the respondent’s alleged fraud after completing an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. These are all matters that have been raised multiple times before. They do not raise any new information.
9	In Applicant X, Street J had the following to say at [9] – [10]:
[9] 	The applicant has provided a further proposed affidavit that annexes a purported process and makes submissions concerning a judgement made on 4 February 2016. That judgement was the subject of an unsuccessful appellant challenge by the applicant for leave.
[10]	The applicant’s affidavit makes bare assertions of the judgement made on 4 February 2016 having been obtained by fraud. There is reference to communications that took place between the parties prior to the orders made on 4 February 2016. The applicant alleges that a particular email that was sent in April 2015 is false. The assertions in the affidavit make reference to the state of mind of the applicant and do not properly identify any basis for the assertion of falsity nor does the affidavit identify how this is new evidence that was not known at the time of the dismissal of the proceedings before the court.
             The affidavit otherwise seeks to agitate alleged errors in the decision of the trial judge. The assertions that the judgement was obtained by fraud or perjury appear baseless.
10	As noted by Judge Manousaridis at [15] in Haque as to the requirements for proving fraud (citations omitted): 
             Finally, it is necessary to refer to the nature of the ground on which the proposed with proceeding seeks to set aside the judges order; the ground alleges fraud. It is a fundamental a long established principle that, in all cases based on fraud, “particulars of the fraud claimed must be exactly given and the allegations must be established by the strict proof which such charge requires”; and “if the case of fraud is to be mounted, it should be pleaded specifically and with particularity”. The “mere labelling of an allegation has fraud amounts to little”, because “nobody can be expected to meet a case… Upon the allegations of fraud without any definite character being given to those charges by stating the facts upon which they rest”. If the applicant were permitted to commence the proposed proceeding, it would not meet these requirements for alleging fraud, and the proposed proceeding would be liable to be summarily dismissed for that reason.
11	I am not satisfied that there is any new material to support the contention that the judgment was procured by fraud. I am satisfied that the allegation raised in support of the application is nothing more than a mere restatement of the material that was previously relied upon and rejected by both Judge Street and Judge Manousaridis, for the reasons they gave, in refusing the applicant’s application for leave to commence the proposed proceeding.
12	The applicant seems unable to grasp that simply lodging a further application with no real additional evidence to support his assertions will simply produce the same result in leave to institute the proceedings being refused.
13	Accordingly, I consider and find the proposed proceedings are vexatious proceedings within the meaning of Part 8 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (the Act). I dismiss the proposed proceedings pursuant to s 243 of the Act.

I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.	

Associate:

Dated:	12 March 2025