QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:	Vasilj v Queensland Law Society [2024] QCAT 517	
PARTIES:	CHANEL VASILJ	

(applicant)	

	v	
	QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY	

(respondent)	

APPLICATION NO/S:	OCR119-24	
MATTER TYPE:	Occupational regulation matters	
DELIVERED ON:	11 December 2024	
HEARING DATE:	9 October 2024	
HEARD AT:	Brisbane	
DECISION OF:	Justice Williams	
ORDERS:
	1.	Williams J be recused from further hearing and determining the Review Application.
2.	The Review Application be adjourned and listed before the President of QCAT for:
(a)	allocation to another judicial member for re-hearing;
(b)	further directions for the re-hearing; and 
(c)	directions as to the appropriate procedure as to the costs of the Recusal Application.	
CATCHWORDS:	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where at the beginning of the substantive hearing the Tribunal member disclosed previous association with the Respondent – where the Tribunal member disclosed an honorary life membership of the Respondent – where the Applicant did not object to those disclosures – where the Respondent published articles in relation to the substantive hearing after it was heard – where the articles identified the Applicant –  whether the articles constituted extraneous information – whether the Tribunal member should be recused on the basis of apprehended bias as a result of the alleged extraneous information

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2012 (Qld), r 28.1
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 51(4), s 51(9), s 598
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 18, s 19, s 20, s 21(1), s 21(2), s 23, s 24(1), s 28(1), s 28(3), s 138
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), r 92, r 93

AAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 114; (2020) 277 FCR 393, cited
Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111, considered
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289, considered
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76, cited
Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner Ross Barnett [2010] QCAT 690, cited
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, applied
GetSwift Ltd v Webb [2021] FCAFC 26; (2021) 388 ALR 75, considered
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135, considered
Leeson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889) 43 Ch D 366, cited
Legal Practitioner v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2018] ACTSC 351, cited
Legal Services Commissioner v Orchard [2012] QCAT 583, cited
MG v R [2007] NSWCCA 57; (2007) 69 NSWLR 20, cited
Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427, cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136; (2017) 254 FCR 534, considered
O’Sullivan v Medical Tribunal of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 374, considered
Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd (No 8) [2018] QSC 213, applied
R v McInroy (1915) 26 DLR 615, cited
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342, cited
Smits v Roach [2006] HCA 36; (2006) 227 CLR 423, cited
Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135, cited
Swalling v Councillor Conduct Tribunal [2022] QCAT 204, cited
Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41, applied	

COUNSEL:	G Radcliff for the Applicant
A Low for the Respondent	
SOLICITORS:	Radcliffs for the Applicant
Queensland Law Society Incorporated for the Respondent	

REASONS FOR DECISION
[1]	The Applicant applies for an order that I recuse myself from further hearing and/or determining the review application (Recusal Application).  
[2]	The Applicant applied to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) seeking review of the decision made by the Respondent on 16 April 2024 refusing a principal’s practising certificate (Review Application).  The Review Application was heard on 18 July 2024 by the Tribunal and the decision was reserved.
[3]	On 7 August 2024 the Recusal Application was filed, together with a supporting affidavit of Mr Corey Radcliff.  On 8 August 2024, the Applicant filed submissions and on 22 August 2024, the Respondent filed written submissions and an affidavit of Renee Hunt. A further affidavit of Ms Hunt was filed on 23 August 2024 exhibiting the transcript from the hearing of the Review Application.  On or about 29 August 2024 the Applicant filed submissions in reply together with a statutory declaration of the Applicant.
[4]	The Recusal Application was heard on 9 October 2024.
[5]	The issue to be determined is whether the Applicant has established a basis for me to recuse myself in respect of the Review Application on the ground of apprehended bias.
Relevant Facts
[6]	On 22 July 2024, the Respondent published in Proctor an article entitled “Challenge to refusal of principal certificate” which referred to the Applicant by name (Original Article).  
[7]	On 26 July 2024, the Respondent revised the Original Article and de-identified it to remove references to the Applicant by name (Redacted Version 1 Article).  A further version of the article was prepared removing references to “KOL Legal” (Redacted Version 2 Article).
[8]	On and from 12.29 pm on 26 July 2024, the Original Article was no longer accessible by recipients of, or online visitors of, Proctor, and instead only the Redacted Version 2 Article was accessible.
[9]	The Original Article, the Redacted Version 1 Article and the Redacted Version 2 Article are together referred to as the Articles.
Disclosures
[10]	At the commencement of the hearing of the Review Application on 18 July 2024, I made the following disclosures:
“I think it is appropriate that I put on the record that, previously having been a practising solicitor, I was a member of the Law Society for over 25 years.  I was involved in various committees, including the Litigation Rules Committee during that time.
Upon my appointment, I’ve obviously ceased in those roles, but it was at 2020 or 2021, sometime during the early Covid years, I was granted an honorary membership of the Law Society given my involvement over a period of time.  But other than an occasional function, I have not been actively involved in the Queensland Law Society since that time.”
[11]	Counsel on behalf of the Applicant stated, “I have no difficulty with that at all, your Honour. No.”
[12]	At a review on 31 July 2024 Counsel for the Applicant indicated that an application would be brought seeking that I recuse myself on the basis of apprehended bias.
[13]	Following the filing of the Recusal Application, supporting affidavits and submissions from both parties, a further review was held on 2 September 2024 to list the Recusal Application for hearing.
[14]	Having reviewed the submissions, I made additional disclosures to the following effect:
(a)	I did not receive any email from the Respondent with any of the Articles. 
(b)	If an email was sent to me as a consequence of my honorary membership of the Respondent, it was sent to my Associate.
(c)	My Associate did not forward any email to me, nor was an email copied, printed or given to me with any of the Articles.
(d)	Given these circumstances, I had not asked my then Acting Associate to search the emails to see if an email was received or not.  
[15]	Further, during the hearing of the Recusal Application I further disclosed that I attended the annual dinner held by the Respondent in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 together with other judges, including heads of jurisdiction or judges who manage court lists.
[16]	I also disclosed that I was generally aware that articles had been written about some of the matters allocated to me and listed in the QCAT sittings in the week commencing 15 July 2024, which included three disciplinary matters involving the Legal Services Commissioner and the Review Application involving the current parties.  However, I was not aware of the details of any of the Articles prior to the affidavits being filed in relation to the Recusal Application.
Applicant’s submissions
[17]	The Applicant’s submissions refer to a deficiency in the evidence in respect of a copy of the Practising Certificate of the Applicant for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024.  A copy of this document was omitted from the Hearing Book.  This was rectified by a copy of the Practising Certificate being tendered by agreement at the review hearing on 2 September 2024.
[18]	The Applicant contends that during the period when there was communication between the Applicant and the Respondent in respect of the procedure for tendering a copy of the Practising Certificate, on Monday 22 July 2024 the Respondent published the Original Article. It is submitted that the Original Article was available by a link on the Respondent’s website.
[19]	On 26 July 2024, the Applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Respondent demanding that the First Article be withdrawn and that the matter be re-listed.
[20]	Later that day the Original Article was deleted and the Redacted Version 1 Article and then the Redacted Version 2 Article were published.
[21]	The Applicant submits that the author of the Original Article, the Redacted Version 1 Article and the Redacted Version 2 Article was a solicitor with an employee Practising Certificate and a ‘servant or agent’ of the Respondent.
[22]	It is contended that there are errors and exaggerations in the Original Article, and the subsequent Redacted Version 1 Article and Redacted Version 2 Article, which “exacerbate the impropriety of each of the publications”.
[23]	Further, it is contended that the Articles contained certain information which could only have been sourced from the written submissions of the Applicant and the Respondent and would not usually be available to a journalist.
[24]	The Applicant submits that as a result of the publication of the Articles, the Applicant is faced with having to make the Recusal Application and this includes considerations of justice as it would be improper for the Applicant not to make the application.
[25]	The Applicant recognises that this is not a re-hearing within section 138 of QCAT Act or r 92 and r 93 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Rules).  Nor is it a reconsideration pursuant to s 23 of the QCAT Act.
[26]	Rather, the Applicant relies upon s 28 of the QCAT Act as giving the Tribunal power to deal with the Recusal Application.
[27]	The Applicant relies upon s 28(1) of the QCAT Act that the hearing procedure is at the discretion of the Tribunal, subject to the provisions of the QCAT Act and QCAT Rules. Further, s 28(3) amplifies and explains the underlying basis of conduct in matters before the Tribunal.  That is, it provides directions as to the observance of natural justice rules and the Tribunal is not bound by practices or procedures applying to Courts of record.  In particular, the Applicant relies upon s 28(3)(c) of the QCAT Act that the Tribunal may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate.
[28]	The Applicant submits that the Recusal Application does not arise out of the hearing in respect of the Review Application but results from the “publications and conduct of the [Respondent] since 18 July 2024.”
[29]	The Applicant acknowledges that the Respondent is the decision-maker at first instance and contends that the Respondent’s position is analogous to a District Court judge whose decision is being tested in the Court of Appeal.  That is, that comments about appellant or review proceedings are never made.  
[30]	The Applicant relies on various matters including:
(a)	The decision of the High Court in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL. 
(b)	Rule 28.1 of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2012 which provides:
“A solicitor must not publish or take steps towards the publication of any material concerning current proceedings which may prejudice a fair trial or the administration of justice”.
(c)	The decision of Legal Services Commissioner v Orchard which involved material that was sent to the employer to the party of a proceeding.  The Tribunal said that the rule did not, on its face, reveal an intention only to prohibit media activity.  Rather, its apparent intent was to ensure a fair trial of proceedings, and to maintain the proper administration of justice.  Further, the use of the word publication was not limited to only general or widespread publication.
(d)	The decision in MG v R which concerned media statements of counsel.
(e)	The Respondent’s Guidance Statement 32 “Solicitors commenting to the media”.  The Guidance Statement at [4] states the seriousness of such publication and that the author of such a statement should “consider whether any such statements would diminish the trust and confidence in or bring the profession or the judicial system into disrepute”.
(f)	The textbook “Lawyers Professional Responsibility” by GE Dal Pont, in particular the discussion in respect of balancing the various interests including the “interest of the public and opposing parties in ensuring that the process of adjudication is not distorted by statements carried in the media”.
(g)	The statement in the “Concise Australian Legal Dictionary” as follows:
“Contempt by publication” is defined to be “publishing material that has a real tendency to interfere with or is intended to interfere with pending criminal or civil proceedings”.
(h)	The statement of Stewart J in R v McInroy in respect of the issue of whether or not judges are susceptible to what they see in the media as follows:
“The mere resolve to be uninfluenced by (a publication) might throw the balance of impartiality in the other direction”.
[31]	The Recusal Application proceeds on the basis of apprehended bias.   The Applicant relies on the test for apprehended bias as stated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, namely whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that a judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided.
[32]	Further, the Applicant relies upon the comments of Justice Gageler (as the Chief Justice then was) in Isbester v Knox City Council, that there are three steps in determining whether there is an appearance of disqualifying bias in an administrative context.  Namely:
(a)	identification of the matter which underpins the apprehension that a decision-maker might decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits;
(b)	articulation of the logical connection between that matter and a feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits; and
(c)	consideration of the reasonableness of the apprehension of that deviation being caused by that factor in that way.
[33]	The Applicant recognises that there are four categories of apprehended bias, being:
(a)	Interest: such as where a decision-maker has a direct or indirect interest in the proceedings, whether pecuniary or otherwise, which creates a reasonable apprehension of prejudice, partiality or pre-judgment.
(b)	Conduct: including publishing statements and excessive intervention in questioning made within or outside a formal proceeding.
(c)	Association: such as where an apprehension of pre-judgment or other bias results from a direct or indirect relationship, experience or contact with the person involved in the relevant proceeding, including a party and a witness.
(d)	Extraneous information: such as where knowledge of a prejudicial and inadmissible fact gives rise to an apprehension of bias.
[34]	The ground of extraneous information was considered in the decision of Webb v The Queen.
[35]	The Applicant also relies upon the High Court decision in Charisteas v Charisteas.
[36]	In respect of the disclosure made on 18 July 2024, the Applicant submits that on the facts that were known to that point, the Applicant took no objection to me hearing and determining the Review Application. It is submitted that no one could contemplate the subsequent publication of the Articles.
[37]	Further, it is submitted that a party may waive the right to object where such waiver is fully informed and clear. In this regard, the Applicant refers to the following decisions:
(a)	Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls; and
(b)	Smits v Roach.
[38]	The Applicant also submits that the Tribunal needs to consider the Respondent’s role as the initial decision-maker and abuse of process.
[39]	Following the disclosure on 18 July 2024, the Applicant contends that it was not contemplated that the Respondent would conduct itself in the manner which it has done by publishing the Articles. Further, the Articles were published at a time when the decision of the Tribunal was reserved.
[40]	The Applicant goes as far as submitting that the publication was done in circumstances where the Respondent “has attempted to steal a march in unresolved proceedings”.  Further, it is submitted that the Respondent cannot say that it did not know that the Articles would be drawn to the Tribunal’s attention or probably seen by its life members.
[41]	Ultimately, the Applicant contends that following publication of the Articles, the Tribunal must ask what effect, if any, the publication has upon justice and the fairness of the proceeding. 
[42]	Consideration must be given to the effects on the parties and the Tribunal itself. It is submitted that “the attitude of the reasonable man sitting in the back of the courtroom needs to be considered.  He may come to doubt the integrity of the judicial process.”
[43]	The position taken by the Applicant at the commencement of the Review Hearing was on the assumption that the Respondent would conduct itself as the model litigant and the Applicant could not contemplate that before the decision had been made by the Tribunal the Respondent would:
“publish to more than 10,000 practitioners and members of the public the then unproven facts directly attributable to [the Applicant] and others…. somehow retract or withdraw the offending article and re-publish it in an anonymised form”.  
[44]	Ultimately it is contended that even if the Tribunal considers that it can ignore the Articles, it does not overcome the impact of the events which have arisen since the hearing.
[45]	It is in these circumstances, that the Applicant submits that the Tribunal must ask, would the reasonable  person have trust and confidence that the decision has not been infected by the conduct of the Respondent.
[46]	It is submitted that the Tribunal should be “seriously concerned” about the publication of the Articles by the Respondent and the hearing must occur again before another judicial member of QCAT.
Respondent’s submissions
[47]	The Respondent’s ultimate submission is that the Recusal Application should be refused.
[48]	The Respondent agrees that the relevant test is that set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy and recently confirmed by the High Court in Charisteas v Charisteas.
[49]	That is, the test as to whether a judge should be disqualified for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the decision-maker is required to decide.
[50]	The Respondent submits that a vague sense of unease or disquiet in a reasonable bystander is not enough to satisfy the test.
[51]	In particular, the Respondent submits:
(a)	The test is objective.
(b)	The objective facts must be considered in the legal, statutory and factual context in which the decision is made.
(c)	It is an objective test of possibility (real and not remote) and not probability.
[52]	The Respondent recognises that the Tribunal is an administrative decision-maker and submits that the test for reasonable apprehension of bias is the same for both administrative and judicial decision-makers. It is recognised, however, that the broader context in which the decisions are made may, but not always, be different depending upon the extent of divergence from the judicial paradigm.
[53]	In the current case, the Respondent submits that the divergence was negligible. That is, both parties were legally represented, the Review Application was held in open court and followed a judicial format.
[54]	In respect of the application of the test, the Respondent submits that there are two steps:
(a)	The first step: identification of the factor which it is postulated might have led the decision-maker to decide the review otherwise then on an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits.
(b)	The second step: articulation of how that factor might lead the decision-maker to decide the matter otherwise than on an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits.
[55]	Another aspect of the test that needs to be considered is the understanding and knowledge of the fair-minded lay observer. Consistent with the authorities, the Respondent contends that the following applies in respect of the application of the test:
(a)	The fair-minded lay observer does not have attributed to him or her a detailed knowledge of the law, but the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice, taking into account the exigencies of modern litigation.
(b)	The fair-minded lay observer has attributed to him or her awareness of and a fair understanding of the nature of the decision, the context in which it was made, and the circumstances leading up to the decision.
(c)	The fair-minded lay observer has attributed to him or her knowledge that the judge is a professional lawyer, whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial, with the result that a conclusion that there is a reasonable apprehension that the judge might be biased should not be drawn lightly.
[56]	It is also contended that the onus is upon the Applicant to demonstrate the apprehension of bias and the apprehension of bias must be firmly established.
[57]	The Respondent addresses the four bases for disqualification for apprehended bias raised by the Applicant:
(a)	Extraneous information: The Applicant’s complaint can be understood to be that the Tribunal member has read or been affected by the Articles which allegedly contained errors and exaggerations and unproven facts.  
(b)	Association: The Applicant’s complaint can be understood to be the Tribunal member’s association or historical association with the Respondent in the circumstances of (a) above.
(c)	Interest: The Applicant’s complaint appears to concern the Respondent (being a party to the proceeding) having published the Articles while judgment was reserved and where the Respondent has an interest in the outcome.
(d)	Conduct: The Applicant’s complaint appears to concern the Respondent’s conduct in having published the Articles in circumstances where the Respondent was the decision-maker of the decision under review and the Respondent to the proceeding.
[58]	The extraneous information basis arises where a decision-maker has knowledge of some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance that prevents them from bringing an impartial mind to the decision as discussed in Webb v The Queen.
[59]	Here, the Applicant contends that the Articles contained alleged “errors and exaggeration” and “unproved facts”.  The Respondent submits that the parts of the Articles which give rise to the Applicant’s concerns have not been precisely identified.
[60]	Correspondence provided after the Applicant’s written submissions identifies that the Applicant contends that:
(a)	the errors and exaggerations include “the assertion that the facts alleged in each of the [A]rticles constitute proven facts;” and
(b)	the “then unproven facts” are “the entirety of the [A]rticles”.
[61]	The Respondent submits that an ordinary reading of the Articles does not make out the Applicant’s assertion.  That is, on a plain reading of the text there is no assertion that the facts have been proved.
[62]	The Respondent’s primary position is that the Articles do not contain any relevant errors, or exaggerations and contain information that was before the Tribunal at the hearing of the Review Application.
[63]	In any event, in respect of the Applicant’s contention that the Articles assert that the facts have been proved, the Respondent submits that the Applicant has not identified how that might lead the decision-maker to decide the matter otherwise than on an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits.
[64]	Further, the Respondent contends that in the application of the principles identified above, a fair-minded observer with knowledge of the objective context, would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question I am required to decide in respect of the Review Application.
[65]	The second potential basis identified is association.  The Applicant contends that an association arises as a result of:
(a)	a previous association with the Respondent as a former solicitor; and 
(b)	having been given honorary life membership with the Respondent,
despite the disclosure and no objection being taken.
[66]	The Respondent submits that it now appears that the Applicant submits that the declared association with the Respondent has become a basis for disqualification post publication of the Articles.
[67]	In this regard, the Respondent submits that the Applicant conflates two distinct matters: my declared association with the Respondent and the Respondent’s conduct.
[68]	Relevantly, the Respondent notes:
(a)	That my association with the Respondent has not changed since the commencement of the Review Application.
(b)	That it is not contended by the Applicant that my declared association, absent the more recent conduct by the Respondent in publishing the Articles, is a basis for disqualification on the basis of apprehended bias.
[69]	Accordingly, consideration of waiver and whether waiver was fully informed and clear, would only be relevant where the circumstances of my association with the Respondent met the test for apprehended bias.
[70]	The Respondent contends that the mere fact that a Tribunal member is a member of a body which is a party to a proceeding may not necessarily give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. In this regard, reliance is placed on the authority of Leeson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration.
[71]	In particular, the comments in Legal Practitioner v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory are relied on:
“…[T]he fact that, in an earlier or later life, a judge may have been or may become a member of a large, leading professional organisation is incapable of giving rise to reasonable apprehension of partiality.”
[72]	Further, the Respondent submits that if the Applicant is contending that the relevant factor is my association with the Respondent, absent the Respondent’s conduct in publishing the articles, then the Applicant has not identified how that factor might lead the decision-maker to decide the matter otherwise than on an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits.
[73]	Further, a fair-minded observer with knowledge of the objective context including the contents of the Articles, would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question I am required to decide.
[74]	The third and fourth bases can only be understood to be the Respondent’s interest and conduct. There is no allegation that I have a direct or indirect interest in the proceeding or that I have engaged in any particular disqualifying conduct.
[75]	Rather, it appears that the Applicant contends that the relevant interest or concern is that of the Respondent and also the relevant conduct or concern is that of the Respondent. That is:
(a)	The relevant interest is publishing the Articles while the decision was reserved where the Respondent is a party to the proceeding and thus interested in the outcome.  
(b)	The relevant conduct is publishing the Articles while the decision was reserved, in circumstances where the Respondent was the decision-maker of the decision under review in the Review Application and a party to the proceeding.
[76]	It is contended that:
(a)	The matters identified in relation to the Respondent’s interest and conduct are not reasons for disqualification.
(b)	The Applicant has not identified how each, or either, of the Respondent’s interest or conduct might lead me to decide the matter otherwise than on an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits.  
(c)	Further, a fair-minded lay observer with knowledge of the objective context, including the matters in relation to the Articles, would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question I am required to decide.
Consideration
[77]	At the outset it is important to understand what the Recusal Application is not. While the Applicant alleges certain conduct by or on behalf of the Respondent and makes some serious allegations, no relief is sought in respect of the Respondent.  Accordingly, it is not appropriate to comment on the Respondent’s conduct other than to the extent it is relevant to, and necessary for, the Recusal Application.
[78]	Other than the relevant facts outlined above, I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to make any further factual findings in respect of the publication of the Articles by the Respondent.
[79]	The Applicant does not contend that there is any interest held by me or conduct by me relevant to the Recusal Application.  Further, the Applicant does not contend that the declared historical association with the Respondent is a basis for me to recuse myself.
[80]	The Applicant relies on:
(a)	the extraneous information constituted by the Articles (Extraneous Information Ground); and/or
(b)	a combination of the declared honorary life membership of the Respondent and the extraneous information (Combination Ground).
[81]	In respect of the Combination Ground:
(a)	The Applicant does not seek to challenge the declaration made that I did not receive a copy or a link to the Articles by an email from the Respondent as a result of the honorary life membership.
(b)	Proceeds on the basis that the Articles were published on the Respondent’s website.
[82]	The Extraneous Information Ground logically must proceed on the same basis: that is the Articles were published on the Respondent’s website.
[83]	Dealing with the Extraneous Information Ground and the Combination Ground in turn.
Extraneous Information Ground
[84]	The ground of extraneous information is one of the four categories of cases identified by Deane J in Webb v The Queen in which a reasonable apprehension of bias may arise. While it is uncontroversial that there are four categories, the categories of interest, association, conduct and extraneous information may sometimes overlap.
[85]	Deane J recognised that these categories reflect the four types of situations that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of “prejudice, partiality and prejudgment”.
[86]	Extraneous information arises when a judge or decision-maker has knowledge of “some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance that prevents them from bringing an impartial mind to the decision.”
[87]	The ALRC in the Final Report helpfully identifies some recent examples concerning extraneous material:
(a)	GetSwift Ltd v Webb: The Full Federal Court found that a reasonable apprehension of bias arose on the facts in that case involving two separate proceedings where there was some common evidence but also some evidence that may be admissible in one but not the other. The Full Federal Court also recognised that the “fair-minded lay observer” may not have complete faith in the ability of judges to put aside prejudicial and irrelevant information.  The reasons of the Court stated as follows:
“…[T]he hypothetical observer would recognise that judges are human, not a ‘passionless thinking machine’ (CNY17 at [28] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J) quoting Re J P Linahan Inc (1943) 138 F 2d 650 at 653) or robot just assessing information. … The hypothetical observer looking at the reality of the process might apprehend that it might be difficult for any person, even a professional judge, confronted with different and potentially conflicting evidence and submissions in different proceedings … to decide ... without the contamination of the extraneous information.  As a result the hypothetical observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might be influenced subconsciously…”.
(b)	CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection: The High Court considered circumstances where irrelevant and prejudicial information about the applicant was given to the administrative decision-maker as part of a review process concerning his protection visa application. The majority of the High Court held that a fair-minded lay observer might apprehend a lack of impartiality and consider that there was a realistic possibility that knowledge of the material would play on the subconscious of the decision-maker.
[88]	The facts of these cases will be considered further below.
[89]	The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in O’Sullivan v Medical Tribunal of New South Wales is of some assistance in considering the issues in the current case.  In that case:
(a)	The issue of extraneous information arose before the Medical Tribunal of New South Wales.
(b)	A bundle of documents was prepared to be tendered at the hearing by the Tribunal.  
(c)	The bundle included two documents which were objected to and the objection was accepted.
(d)	The two documents were to be removed from the copies of the bundle.
(e)	Inadvertently, the bundle of documents of one the Tribunal members still had a copy of the two documents in it.
(f)	It was apparent that one or more of the Tribunal members had looked at the two documents.
[90]	The practitioner applied for the Tribunal to disqualify itself on the basis that the Tribunal’s impartiality had been compromised by having access to the prejudicial material.
[91]	The Tribunal refused the application, removed the copy of the two documents from the bundles and indicated that the Tribunal would not take the material into account.
[92]	Relevantly, the Court’s reasoning included:
(a)	“Many of the rules of evidence are designed to limit the material which can be relied upon before a tribunal and, in particular, to exclude material which may be irrelevant or prejudicial. The non-application of the rules of evidence indicates a degree of faith in the Tribunal, under the guidance of a District Court judge, being able to distinguish and disregard the irrelevant and prejudicial”.
(b)	The nature and composition of the Tribunal was the Chairperson (or Deputy Chair) and three other members, two being registered medical practitioners and one not a registered medical practitioner.  The Chairperson or Deputy Chair was a judge of the District Court or a person having the status of a judge of the Supreme Court.  Any questions of law or procedure arising during the hearing were to be determined by the presiding Chairperson or Deputy Chair.
(c)	“Although … the rules of evidence did not apply, it was inappropriate for material to be placed before any Tribunal member, even inadvertently, in contravention of the agreement between the parties as to what would be tendered.”
(d)	“[I]t is at least arguable that the fair-minded (but not legally trained) observer will have a degree of scepticism about any judicial pretensions to a monopoly over the capacity to exclude from consideration, material that has been rejected or withdrawn.  Given the underlying policy (namely the need to protect the appearance of impartial justice) arguably such healthy scepticism should be acknowledged and accepted by the Court”.
(e)	“[T]he Tribunal does not undertake its fact-finding exercise in isolation from the judicial member.  It is therefore not merely a matter of faith that the non-legal members of the Tribunal will follow the directions of the judicial member with respect to questions of law and procedure.  This, too, is a factor which the fair-minded observer would take into account”.
(f)	“[A]lmost inevitably, administrative decision-makers operate without reference to the rules of evidence.  Again, almost inevitably, they will be required to consider and, where appropriate, exclude from influence prejudicial material which may be destructive of the credit or credibility of an applicant.  Access to such material cannot vitiate a decision… The manner in which administrative law deals with such difficulties is to require that such prejudicial material be disclosed to the person affected so that he or she may have an appropriate opportunity to address it”.
(g)	One of the identified difficulties in such an application was recognised to be the applicant identifying the nature of the prejudice which he feared he might suffer and which might be inconsistent with the appearances of impartiality on the part of the Tribunal.
(h)	The fair-minded lay observer must be taken to understand the general nature of the proceedings, the composition of the Tribunal and the statutory controls over the procedures.
(i)	Ultimately, “the fair-minded observer should also be understood to know that judicial officers rule on the admissibility of evidence on a daily basis, and are assumed to be able to put out of their minds irrelevant or prejudicial material which is excluded”.
(j)	Further, “[t]here is no reason to suppose that the fair-minded observer would not accept the principle that responsible Tribunal members would seek to follow the direction of the judicial member as to the proper manner of dealing with material which they had seen, but not retained”.
[93]	Several other decisions are also of assistance.
[94]	In Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission the Full Court of the Federal Court (Kenny, Tracey and Middleton JJ) dismissed an appeal from a decision of the primary judge refusing to disqualify himself on the ground of apprehended bias.    
[95]	The issue arose in Federal Court proceedings concerning alleged contraventions of s 45 and s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The primary judge had dealt with a matter in the Australian Competition Tribunal where an individual had been a moving party to a review.  The same individual was to be a witness in the Federal Court matter. It was contended that there was a significant overlap between the material facts in the Tribunal matter and the Federal Court matter.
[96]	The Full Court acknowledged that there was some factual overlap between the two matters.  However, the Full Court concluded that the fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might “harbour any … irrevocable commitment” to the factual findings in the Tribunal over 4 years previously, where the findings were largely on the basis of undisputed evidence.
[97]	The nature of the Federal Court proceedings would result in the evidence being tested under cross-examination and would require an assessment of the weight to be given to the conflicting factual assertions. In these circumstances, the appeal was dismissed.
[98]	Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 and Others concerned a challenge to a decision of the Minister under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The material before the Minister included a departmental communication that the first respondent had been charged with certain offences. The decision was challenged on the basis that the Minister’s decision was affected by apprehended bias arising from the provision of the departmental communication.
[99]	At first instance, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia held that the decision was so affected. The Minister appealed to the Full Federal Court. The Full Federal Court (Dowsett, Griffiths and Charlesworth JJ) dismissed the appeal.
[100]	Dowsett J stated:
“[3]	… I do not accept that the information in question … was, by itself, necessarily so prejudicial as to bring the matter within the fourth category of apprehended bias identified by Deane J in Webb v The Queen … A lay jury is quite a different creature from a professional decision-maker in a specialized area … I do not accept that a fully informed, fair-minded, lay observer might apprehend bias, merely because he or she was aware that the first respondent had been charged with a serious offence …
[4]	However, in the present case, there is rather more than knowledge of irrelevant and prejudicial information.  Such information had been communicated to the [Immigration Assessment Authority] as material considered, by the Secretary, to be relevant to the review. In those circumstances the fair-minded observer might well apprehend bias where the decision-maker has not expressly identified such information as irrelevant, and has not said that he or she has excluded it from consideration in the decision-making process.”
[101]	Griffiths J observed that the principles relating to apprehended bias in an administrative decision-making context are well settled and are not applied in a vacuum.  Further, these principles:
“… reflect an underlying and fundamental value to preserve and promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of administrative decision-making and the judicial review process which attaches to it”.
[102]	The High Court in CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another considered the circumstance where the review material included material that was irrelevant to the review task and was prejudicial to the applicant. The statement of reasons stated that regard had been had to the material but did not make any reference to the irrelevant and prejudicial material.  The majority held that a hypothetical fair-minded lay observer with knowledge of the material objective facts might reasonably have apprehended that the decision-maker might not have brought an impartial mind to the resolution of the review by reasons of the irrelevant and prejudicial information which the decision-maker was mandated to consider.
[103]	In AAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs and another the Full Court of the Federal Court considered a challenge to a decision under the Migration Act as a result of the provision of information due to an administrative error. In that case, there was no appearance of bias as the same information was also volunteered by the appellant and he submitted the information was irrelevant. In the particular circumstances of that case, the appeal was dismissed.
[104]	GetSwift Ltd and Another v Webb is an example of the Full Federal Court allowing an appeal from a decision of the primary judge refusing to recuse himself. The Full Federal Court (Middleton, McKerracher and Jagot JJ) held that the primary judge failed to appreciate or consider that a fair-minded lay observer would view human frailty and the subconscious effect of extraneous material to be material, despite the ability of a judge to disregard irrelevant information.
[105]	That case concerned two related proceedings: civil penalty proceedings and a class action. There was considerable overlap in the evidence and issues between the two proceedings but also some differences. The argument was that the primary judge, consciously or subconsciously, might be influenced by extraneous information from the civil penalty proceeding.
[106]	The Court in a joint judgment stated:
“In our view, the hypothetical observer would recognise that judges are human, not a “passionless thinking machine” … or robot just assessing information.  In the circumstances before the primary judge, there is a real difficulty of disregarding the extraneous information. The primary judge is not being asked to disregard the evidence of one witness, on a discrete topic, heard at a remote point in time. This case is removed from the “everyday duty of a judge at first instance to sift inadmissible from admissible material … In contrast to the present case, when a judge rules evidence inadmissible, he or she is generally not required to return to it again.
…
The test does not focus on the particular characteristics of the judge. The hypothetical observer looking at the reality of the process might apprehend that it might be difficult for any person, even a professional judge, confronted with different and potentially conflicting evidence and submissions in different proceedings (albeit proceedings directed to the same underlying transactions and issues) to decide the Webb proceeding without the contamination of the extraneous information.  As a result the hypothetical observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might be influenced subconsciously by the extraneous information in deciding the issues in the Webb proceeding.”
[107]	In the current case:
(a)	It is relevant to have regard to the nature of the material and the way that it is extraneous. 
(i)	The Articles are a summary of the evidence and what happened at the hearing of the Review Application and do state that the decision is reserved.
(ii)	There is no overlap of facts or competing proceedings.  There is just the original statutory task for deciding the Review Application on the admissible evidence.
(iii)	The Articles could arguably be put aside and do not need to be considered further. To this extent, there are similarities to a ruling that certain evidence is inadmissible.
(b)	It is also relevant to consider the nature of the Tribunal.  Pursuant to the QCAT Act and the LP Act, the review jurisdiction is exercised by a judicial member.  A Supreme Court judge sitting as a supplementary member relevantly constitutes the Tribunal for the Review Application.
(c)	There is no act, comment or conduct on my part which is relied upon or could be found to be an apprehension of partiality.
[108]	However, there are some additional factors that need to be considered.
[109]	In respect of the nature of the proceeding and the nature of the Respondent’s role in the proceeding:
(a)	The decision being reviewed is that of the Executive Committee of the Respondent on 21 March 2024 that the Executive Committee was not satisfied that the Applicant was a fit and proper person for the grant of a principal practising certificate and, in accordance with s 51(4) of the LP Act, refused to grant the principal practising certificate.
(b)	The Review Application was made under s 51(9) of the LP Act to QCAT.
(c)	Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the QCAT Act govern the review jurisdiction including:
(i)	s 19(a) provides that the Tribunal must decide the review in accordance with the QCAT Act and the enabling Act (here, the LP Act).
(ii)	s 19(b) provides that the Tribunal may perform the functions conferred on the Tribunal under the QCAT Act or the enabling Act.
(iii)	s 19(c) provides that the Tribunal has all the functions of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision being reviewed (here, the Respondent).
(iv)	s 20 provides:
“(1)	The purpose of the review of a reviewable decision is to produce the correct and preferable decision.
 (2)	The tribunal must hear and decide a review of a reviewable decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.”
(v)	s 21 provides:
“(1)	In a proceeding for the review of a reviewable decision, the decision-maker for the reviewable decision must use his or her best endeavours to help the tribunal so that it can make its decision on the review.”
(vi)	s 21(2) provides that the decision-maker must provide a written statement of reasons for the decision and also “any document or thing in the decision-maker’s possession or control that may be relevant to the tribunal’s review of the decision.”
(vii)	s 23(1) provides that at any stage of a proceeding for the review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal may invite the decision-maker for the decision to reconsider the decision. If the decision-maker confirms the decision, then the review proceeding must continue (s 23(3)). If the decision is amended then that becomes the reviewable decision (s 23(4)).
(viii)	s 24(1) sets out the functions of the Tribunal:
“… the tribunal may:
(a)	confirm or amend the decision; or
(b)	set aside the decision and substitute its own decision; or
(c)	set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision-maker for the decision, with the directions the tribunal considers appropriate.”
(ix)	s 24(2) provides that subject to any contrary order of the Tribunal, the Tribunal’s decision has effect from when the reviewable decision takes or took effect.
(d)	The Tribunal is to decide the Review Application “on the merits” by reaching its own view on the matters it has to consider and on the basis of the materials placed before it.
(e)	The Tribunal for the Review Application must be constituted by a judicial member who is a Supreme Court judge or who is a former Supreme Court judge.
(f)	Pursuant to s 28(3) of the QCAT Act in conducting a proceeding, the Tribunal:
“
(a)	 must observe the rules of natural justice; and
(b)	is not bound by the rules of evidence, or any practices or procedures applying to courts of record, other than to the extent the tribunal adopts the rules, practices or procedures; and
(c)	may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate; and
(d)	must act with as little formality and technicality and with as much speed as the requirements of [the QCAT] Act, an enabling Act or the rules and a proper consideration of the matters before the tribunal permit; and
(e)	must ensure, so far as is practicable, that all relevant material is disclosed to the tribunal to enable it to decide the proceeding with all the relevant facts.”
(g)	Ultimately, in the Review Application the Tribunal needs to be satisfied that the Applicant is, as at the date of the hearing, a fit and proper person to hold a principal practising certificate.
(h)	In making that decision, the Tribunal can take into account evidence that was not before the original decision-maker, the Executive Committee of the Respondent.
[110]	It is necessary to consider s 21 of the QCAT Act in more detail.
(a)	The Explanatory Notes provide that: 
“Clause 21 sets out the duties of a decision-maker in relation to a review of a decision made by the decision-maker. Subsection (1) requires the decision-maker to use his or her best endeavours to assist the tribunal in performing its review function. It is not the role of the decision-maker to act like a party in an adversary system. This provision reflects the purpose of the review which is to ensure the correct and preferable decision is made and reinforces the non-adversarial nature of review proceedings.”
(b)	QCAT Practice Direction No 3 of 2013 deals with matters heard in the review jurisdiction and addresses the role of a “decision-maker” in that context as follows:
(i)	“The government or agency official (the decision-maker) which made the decision is required to use their best endeavours to assist the Tribunal so that it can make its decision on the review: that is, the decision maker must assist the Tribunal to make the correct and preferable decision. Therefore, the decision-maker’s role is not adversarial. However, in discharging its obligations the decision-maker must properly test the evidence relied upon by the applicant (and the evidence of any other party intervening in or joined as a party to the proceeding), to perform its function of assisting the Tribunal.” (emphasis added)
(ii)	The purpose is to help the Tribunal produce the correct and preferable decision.
(c)	In Swalling v Councillor Conduct Tribunal an issue arose as to the “appropriate respondent”, the Councillor Conduct Tribunal or the Independent Assessor.  Considering s 21 of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal held:
“[29] 	These are not adversarial proceedings, but the administrative review of a decision of the CCT. The CCT will furnish this Tribunal with all of the evidence upon which it made its decision, and the Tribunal has the benefit of the decision of the CCT which sets out the basis upon which the decision is made. Pursuant to the Practice Direction, the decision maker will properly test the evidence relied upon by the applicant, outline the issues to be decided, the statutory framework, and any relevant policy considerations, and will make relevant submissions to perform its function of assisting the Tribunal.
[37] 	The decision maker need not, in these proceedings, take an adversarial role. The CCT holds the information upon which it made its decision, and is able to make that information available to the Tribunal. It is not a question of “defending” its decision, but rather a requirement to use its best endeavours to help the Tribunal reach the correct and preferable decision on review. It is able to do so by providing the Tribunal with all of the relevant information and evidence to assist the Tribunal to make the correct and preferable decision.” (emphasis added)
(d)	The Tribunal in Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission had to consider whether the Queensland Building and Construction Commission had not used its best efforts to help the Tribunal.  In respect of s 21 of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal held:
“[26]	...The obligation to assist in section 21(1) of the QCAT Act is expressly not limited to the matters in section 21(2), being the provision of a written statement of reasons and any document or thing in the decision-maker’s possession.
[29]	The purpose of review proceedings is to produce the correct and preferable decision. In review proceedings before the Tribunal it is not necessary to demonstrate errors such as denial of natural justice, as the Tribunal reconsiders the matter afresh and there is no presumption that the decision maker’s decision is correct.”
(e)	In Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner Ross Barnett consideration was given to the operation of s 21 where there were two respondents: the decision-maker and a policeman who had been found guilty of misconduct and who both had responded in an adversarial way to an application brought by the Crime and Misconduct Commission to adduce further evidence.  It was held that:
“[10] 	It is undesirable that an adjudicating officer be put in the position of having to defend his or her decision in adversarial mode when the reasons for the decision have already been given. It is preferable that the decision be defended by the party who wants to uphold it. It should be noted that the position of the decision-maker on a review differs from that of a fully adversarial party and is expressed in section 21 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 as a requirement to "use his or her best endeavours to help the tribunal so that it can make its decision on the review”.
[11] 	In these circumstances the normal response from the decision-maker should be to supply QCAT with the same material as upon an ordinary review, and to intimate in accordance with the Hardiman principle that he or she will not take any further part in these proceedings and will abide the order of the Tribunal, reserving the right to appear if any costs are claimed against them. In certain cases where the protection of a police policy that might not be properly understood or ventilated by the other parties, it would be appropriate for the decision-maker to make a limited intervention. In my view it would eliminate considerable duplication, expense and effort if the Hardiman principle were generally followed. This point may deserve further consideration after full argument, and I shall say no more about it in the present matter.”
[111]	Here, there was no other party to take a role in the Review Application.  The Respondent participated in the Review Application, including cross-examining the Applicant at length and making submissions as to whether there was a sufficient basis on the evidence at the hearing of the Review Application for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the Applicant was a fit and proper person to hold a principal practising certificate.
[112]	The participation of the Respondent in the hearing can be understood to be consistent with the role of properly testing the evidence relied upon by the Applicant, outlining the issues to be decided, the statutory framework and any relevant policy considerations, and relevant submissions to assist the Tribunal.
[113]	An issue arises, however, as to the role of the Respondent in publishing the Articles outside of the hearing, about matters the subject of the hearing.
[114]	Whilst the Articles may arguably have been published for an educative purpose, they in effect were a public statement by the Respondent who was the original decision-maker and a party in the Review Application, where that party had a particular role.  The role included:
(a)	Pursuant to s 21(1) of the QCAT Act, the decision-maker who must “use his or her best endeavours to help” the Tribunal make its decision on the review, being the “correct and preferable decision”.
(b)	Pursuant to s 23(1) of the QCAT Act, the decision-maker who may be invited by the Tribunal to reconsider the decision.
(c)	Pursuant to s 24 (1)(c) of the QCAT Act, the decision-maker who may have to reconsider the decision on a remitter from the Tribunal.
[115]	As part of the Extraneous Information Ground, these factors need to be considered together with the nature of the Articles themselves.
[116]	Wider concerns also potentially arise, namely whether the public perceptions and confidence in the proper administration of justice are affected.
[117]	As Bond J (as his Honour then was) recognised in Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd (No 8):
“[32]	What is required for justice to be seen to be done is that it must be apparent to the fair-minded lay observer that the judge will bring to the resolution of the issues an impartial and unprejudiced mind which will decide the issues according to their factual and legal merits. If such an observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not do that, then a case of apprehended bias is established.  But if the possibility of such a reasonable apprehension does not exist, it will not suffice that there might be a reasonable apprehension that the judge will decide an issue or issues adversely to one party.”
[118]	Bond J further stated:
“[34]	The judge’s ordinary duty to sit unless convinced otherwise was also discussed in the earlier decision of Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [19] to [21]: 
[19] Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case. 
[20] This is not to say that it is improper for a judge to decline to sit unless the judge has affirmatively concluded that he or she is disqualified. In a case of real doubt, it will often be prudent for a judge to decide not to sit in order to avoid the inconvenience that could result if an appellate court were to take a different view on the matter of disqualification. However, if the mere making of an insubstantial objection were sufficient to lead a judge to decline to hear or decide a case, the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable. 
[21] It is not possible to state in a categorical form the circumstances in which a judge, although personally convinced that he or she is not disqualified, may properly decline to sit. Circumstances vary, and may include such factors as the stage at which an objection is raised, the practical possibility of arranging for another judge to hear the case, and the public or constitutional role of the court before which the proceedings are being conducted. These problems usually arise in a context in which a judge has no particular personal desire to hear a case. If a judge were anxious to sit in a particular case, and took pains to arrange that he or she would do so, questions of actual bias may arise.”
[119]	In respect of whether there is any “residual discretion”, Bond J concluded:
“[37]	The remarks in Ebner were considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 177 per Whelan and McLeish JJA and Cameron AJA at [79] to [85]. There the Court of Appeal dealt with an argument that in Ebner the High Court sought to describe some form of “residual discretion” not to continue to sit, which should be exercised whenever the judge had real doubt as to whether the judge should recuse himself or herself. The Court of Appeal rejected that proposition as amounting to an unwarranted modification of the test for recusal. The Court concluded that “a judge’s decision not to sit, after rejecting a recusal application, would involve an exceptional departure from the ordinary duty of a judge to sit on a case to which the judge had been assigned”. If the exercise of such a decision were to be reviewable on appeal, the Court concluded that it would be necessary to establish that the discretion to make the decision miscarried by reference to the usual House v The King calculus, having regard to the proposition that the circumstances must be exceptional in order to displace the judge’s ordinary duty to sit.”
[120]	Accordingly, applying these principles, the issue is whether I am persuaded that I should recuse myself on the basis of apprehended bias as a result of the extraneous information, being the Articles. 
[121]	Further:
(a)	My own views as to my ability to decide the Review Application on the factual and legal merits are irrelevant.
(b)	The appearance and not the “actuality” of bias is the issue.
(c)	The ultimate question is whether the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not be able to bring the appropriate mindset to an issue.
[122]	I have considered the nature of the Review Application, the nature of the Respondent’s role in the Review Application and the nature and content of the Articles.
[123]	Any one of these factors on their own may not be sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. However, it is the combination of these factors that gives rise to the current concerns.  
[124]	A critical aspect of the Recusal Application is that the Respondent published the Articles after the decision had been reserved, where the Respondent:
(a)	has a particular role to use its best endeavours to help the Tribunal reach the correct and preferable decision on review; and
(b)	may have an on-going role in respect of the decision being reviewed.
[125]	 Taking into account the relevant factors and in all of the circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that:
(a)	The fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might give additional weight to the views of the Respondent expressed outside of the hearing in the Articles, given the combination of the particular role of the Respondent to assist the Tribunal and the potential on-going role in respect of the decision being reviewed of the Respondent.
(b)	In these circumstances, the fair-minded observer lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not be able to put aside the subconscious effect of the Articles in reaching a decision in respect of the Review Application.
[126]	I reach this decision mindful that the conclusion of apprehended bias is not to be reached lightly.
Combination Ground
[127]	In light of the above finding, it is not strictly necessary to go on to consider the Combination Ground, being a combination of the factors identified in the Extraneous Information Ground, together with the fact that I have an honorary membership of the Respondent.
[128]	It is not contended that the honorary membership alone is a sufficient basis to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. In accordance with the authorities, that is the correct position.
[129]	However, in light of the reasoning and findings in respect of the Extraneous Information Ground, the additional factor of the honorary membership of the Respondent together with the Combination Ground is likely to heighten the matters identified at [125] above.
Orders
[130]	Given this conclusion, the appropriate order is as follows:
1. 	Williams J be recused from further hearing and determining the Review Application.
2.	The Review Application be adjourned and listed before the President of QCAT for:
(a)	allocation to another judicial member for re-hearing;
(b)	further directions for the re-hearing; and
(c) 	directions as to the appropriate procedure as to costs of the Recusal Application.