IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA	Not Restricted	
AT MELBOURNE
Criminal Division
S ECR 2023 0127; S ECR 2023 0130
Between:	
		
THE KING		
		
-and-		
		
ZAKARIA HAGI ALI	First Accused	
		
-and-		
		
GM	Second Accused	

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JUDGE:	Croucher J	
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne	
DATE OF HEARING:	11 October 2024	
DATE OF SENTENCE:	29 October 2024	
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Hagi Ali & GM	
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2024] VSC 654
[First revision: 1 November 2024]	

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CRIMINAL LAW — Sentencing — Kidnapping — Assist offender (re manslaughter) — Several young males (aged 16 to 19) formed group after AA (aged 17), KM (aged 25) and others bearing weapons went to home of one in group — HA (aged 19) and GM (aged 17) part of group — Some in group found AA, kidnapped him, put him in boot of AA’s white car, assaulted him, had him call KM to locate him — In white car (with AA still in boot) and red car, group drove to KM’s location — White car ran down KM and crashed into yard of home unit — Red car arrived shortly after — Some from car or cars seriously assaulted KM, including at least one with weapons — KM killed by stab wound — Group of seven fled in red car, leaving crashed white car behind — Some in group disposed of clothing in nearby creek — Seven in group (including HA and GM) initially charged with kidnapping and murder — Following sentence indications before another judge, four (“principals”) pleaded guilty to manslaughter and sentenced: AS to four years’ gaol with non‑parole period of 33 months; YA and MB to three years’ youth justice centre (“YJC”) detention; and MI to two years’ YJC detention — Following sentence indications, HA and GM pleaded guilty to kidnapping and assisting principals after manslaughter — HA and GM complicit in kidnapping of AA, but not assaults — GM assisted principals by driving them away from scene of manslaughter — HA assisted principals discard clothing at creek nearby, and by failing to inform police — Both GM (now 19) and HA (now 21) pleaded guilty relatively early; are remorseful; have no prior or subsequent convictions; have done well on bail, including working and/or studying; have work or study to resume; have strong family support; have excellent prospects of rehabilitation; had murder charge hanging over head for long period — Delay deprived HA of possibility of YJC order — Parsimony — Parity — DPP concedes manslaughter more serious than kidnapping and assist offender combined — After HA and GM’s sentence indications, but before sentence, co‑accused AF sentenced by other judge on kidnapping to 402 days’ imprisonment (time served) — Whether GM to be sentenced as a child, pursuant to Children’s Court sentencing powers — General deterrence inapplicable purpose in sentencing GM as child offender — Unnecessary and potentially counter‑productive to return HA and GM to custody — HA sentenced to 203 days’ imprisonment (time served) on kidnapping,  community correction order on assist offender —  GM sentenced to 132 days’ detention in YJC (time served) on kidnapping, youth supervision order on assist offender — Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 320 & 325; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), ss 207–209; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), ss 5, 6AAA, 7, 18, 32 & 35; Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), Part 5.3, Divisions 1, 7 & 10, & ss 516 & 586; DPP v Ali & Ors [2024] VSC 601; DPP v Farah [2024] VSC 551.

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APPEARANCES:
	Counsel	Solicitors	
For the Director of Public Prosecutions	Mr G. Hayward	Abbey Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions	
			
For Zakaria Hag Ali	Mr R. Edney with
Ms K. Foote	Stary Norton Halphen	
			
For GM	Mr G. Casement with
Ms L. Andrews	Balmer & Associates	

HIS HONOUR:
Overview
1	Following sentence indications I gave on 8 August this year, Zakaria Hagi Ali and GM each pleaded guilty to charges of kidnapping (at common law) of AA and assisting an offender responsible for the manslaughter of Khalid Mahat (“assist offender”).  At the time of the offending, which occurred about two years ago, Mr Hagi Ali was aged 19, GM and AA were 17, and Mr Mahat was 25.
2	Just over two weeks ago, I heard pleas in mitigation and further submissions on some matters of law.  Balancing all relevant considerations as best I can, I have determined to sentence each accused consistently with the sentences I indicated in August.
3	In particular, on kidnapping, Mr Hagi Ali will be convicted and imprisoned for 203 days.  The 203 days he spent in prison before being granted bail will be declared as time served under that sentence.  On assist offender, he will be convicted and released on a community correction order (“CCO”) for 12 months.
4	As for GM, on kidnapping, he will be convicted and detained in a youth justice centre (“YJC”) for 132 days.  The 132 days he spent in detention in a YJC before being bailed will be declared as time served under that sentence.  On assist offender, he will be convicted and released on a youth supervision order (“YSO”) for 12 months.
5	In addition to the core conditions, the CCO imposed on Mr Hagi Ali and the YSO imposed on GM will contain special conditions I shall detail later.
6	My reasons for imposing those sentences follow.
History of proceedings
7	Before summarizing the facts, it is helpful to say something about the history of these proceedings to date.
8	Initially, seven young males were jointly indicted in this Court on charges of kidnapping AA and of murdering Mr Mahat.  As well as Mr Hagi Ali and GM, they were Abdisamad Farah (who was aged 19 at the time of the alleged offending), Yuusuf Ali (aged 19), MI (aged 17), MB (aged 17), and AS (aged 16).  An eighth, RS (aged 18), was charged jointly on the same indictment but only with the kidnapping of AA.
9	Following discussions between the relevant parties, the Director of Public Prosecutions agreed to support sentence indications on manslaughter for AS, MB, MI and Mr Yuusuf.  Subsequently, Incerti J heard applications for sentence indications on two separate occasions:
a)	On 31 May 2024, her Honour indicated that, if AS pleaded guilty manslaughter, she would impose a sentence not exceeding four years’ imprisonment.
b)	On 20 June 2024, her Honour indicated that, if they pleaded guilty to manslaughter, she would sentence Mr Yuusuf to no more than four years’ imprisonment, MB to no more than four years’ imprisonment, and MI to no more than three years’ imprisonment.
10	Incerti J added that, in MI’s case, she would be satisfied of the exceptional circumstances necessary for the purposes of fixing a term of detention in a YJC.  As for AS and MB, her Honour indicated that she could not say at that stage whether she would find the necessary exceptional circumstances, but she did not rule that finding out either, should the material on any plea support such a finding.  Her Honour did not indicate the non‑parole period she might fix on Mr Yuusuf’s sentence of imprisonment.  All four accused subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter, and their plea hearings were adjourned to later dates.
11	At some stage in the proceedings, Mr Farah offered to plead guilty to kidnapping in satisfaction of the indictment, which the Director accepted.
12	By that stage, three accused — Mr Hagi Ali, GM, and RS — were still headed for trial.  On Friday 26 July 2024, having heard submissions on the Tuesday that week, I made preliminary rulings in the trials of those three accused, including ordering that RS’s trial on kidnapping be heard separately from the trials of his remaining two co‑accused.  The matter was then adjourned to allow the parties to consider their positions.
13	On 8 August 2024, Mr Hagi Ali and GM brought applications for sentence indications on kidnapping and assist offender, which the Director supported.  In Mr Hagi Ali’s case, I indicated that, if he pleaded guilty to both charges, I would impose a sentence of no more than 203 days’ imprisonment on kidnapping, and a CCO on assist offender.  In GM’s case, I indicated that, if he pleaded guilty to both charges, I would impose a sentence of no more than 132 days’ detention in a YJC on kidnapping, and either a CCO or a YSO on assist offender.
14	On 13 August 2024, the Director filed a notice of discontinuance against RS on the kidnapping, which concluded his proceedings.
15	On 11 September 2024, Incerti J sentenced Mr Farah to 402 days’ imprisonment on the kidnapping, which was the period he had served in custody to that point.  While Mr Farah had been bailed much earlier, he was returned to custody for breaching his bail, and was only released from custody again when sentenced by her Honour.  Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), Incerti J declared that, but for Mr Farah’s plea of guilty, she would have sentenced him to two‑and‑a‑half years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of one‑and‑a‑half years.
16	On 26 September 2024, Incerti J sentenced the four accused who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter to the following sentences:
a)	Mr Yuusuf was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of two years and nine months, with a declaration of 635 days of pre‑sentence detention.  Her Honour declared that, but for the plea of guilty, she would have imposed a sentence of six years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of four‑and‑a‑half years.
b)	AS was sentenced to three years’ detention in a YJC, with a declaration of 492 days of pre‑sentence detention.  Her Honour declared that, but for the plea of guilty, she would have sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of three‑and‑a‑half years.
c)	MB was sentenced to three years’ detention in a YJC, with a declaration of 429 days of pre‑sentence detention.  Her Honour declared that, but for his plea of guilty, she would have sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of three‑and‑a‑half years.
d)	MI was sentenced to two (not three) years’ detention in a YJC, with a declaration of 141 days of pre‑sentence detention.  Her Honour declared that, but for his plea of guilty, she would have sentenced him to four years’ detention in a YJC.
Summary of offending and surrounding circumstances
Agreed summary
17	I turn now to a summary of the offending and the surrounding facts.  In the main, this summary is taken from the Director’s summary of prosecution opening filed at the sentence indication hearing, which doubled as the opening on the pleas, and was agreed between the parties.
Lead‑up events
18	I shall commence with some of the lead‑up events.
19	On 13 October 2022, a white Toyota Corolla was rented from GoGet Rentals.
20	In the very early hours of 16 October 2022, CCTV recorded AA and Mr Mahat at a service station in the same white Corolla.
21	A little later, at around 1:24 a.m. that morning, the same car travelled to Webb Court in Bellfield, and parked out the front of the family home of MI.  A CCTV recording showed several persons get out of the car and walk towards MI’s home.
22	MI’s sister became aware of a car out the front, and looked outside to see the white Corolla.  She saw people she described as African males armed with machetes around the car.  Two of them came towards her home.  She rang triple‑zero.
23	At 1:31 a.m., the white Corolla drove away.
24	At 1:34 a.m., another of his sisters made MI aware of this incident.  Immediately afterwards, a red Toyota Corolla entered Webb Court, travelled to the end of the court, turned around, and left the court without stopping.  The red Corolla was registered to a sister of Mr Yuusuf.
25	Very shortly after this, police saw the red Corolla driving fast on Liberty Parade, Heidelberg West, close to where they had just seen the white Corolla.  Police followed the red car until it pulled into the driveway of a house in Oriel Road.  This was the home of Mr Yuusuf’s family.  In the car were GM, who was the driver, and passengers Mr Hagi Ali and Mr Farah.  A moment later, a black Kia Cerrato arrived, with five males on board.  The driver was Musa Elmi (who was not charged), and Mr Yuusuf, MI, AS, and RS were passengers.
26	MI told police that he was from Webb Court and that his friends were helping him.  He said there had been “guys with weapons” at his house, and that his sister and his mum had called the police.  He said he had to jump his back fence because he was scared, and they were chasing him.
27	After speaking to police, Mr Yuusuf, Mr Hagi Ali, Mr Farah, GM and AS left in the red Corolla.  Mr Elmi, MI and RS left in the black Kia.
28	Later that day, at 12:40 p.m., Mr Yuusuf and RS went to the Heidelberg Police Station to collect the keys to the red Corolla.  The keys had been found by Mr Yuusuf’s neighbour, who saw young males jumping the back fence.  Mr Yuusuf, who was one of the males seen by his neighbour, told police that he had to enter his premises via the back fence because people were out to get him, and his life was in danger.
Kidnapping of AA
29	I turn now to the kidnapping of AA.
30	At 1:05 p.m., AA was captured on CCTV in the white Corolla driving towards his home in Reservoir.
31	At about 1:44 p.m., the red Corolla parked about 60 metres from AA’s home.  Mr Yuusuf, Mr Hagi Ali and Mr Farah exited the car.  They placed their hoods over their heads and walked down the footpath.  Meanwhile, RS got into the driver’s seat of the red car, and GM got into the passenger seat, and the car slowly followed the other three as they walked along.  The car stopped, and GM joined the other three on the footpath.
32	AA, who was outside his house, was approached by the group.  One of them demanded that AA hand over the key to the white Corolla, and threatened to stab him in the neck.  Another held a knife to his back.  AA handed over the key.  He was forced to walk to the white car and sit in the rear passenger seat.
33	At about 2:00 p.m., RS then drove the red Corolla away, with GM in the front passenger seat.  A minute later, the other three from the group, with AA in the back seat, drove away in the white Corolla.
34	Both cars went to the home of MI’s sister, in Kerang Avenue, Reservoir.  MB and MI joined the red Corolla there.
35	At about 2:23 p.m., the two cars then travelled to Bundoora Park, Bundoora.  After being asked to step out of the white car, which he did, AA was then assaulted by some in the group.  Some had knives.  He was struck with a hammer.  After about five minutes, AA was told to get into the boot of the white Corolla, which he did.
36	RS drove the red car to a spot near his grandmother’s house, and parked.  He left, and his brother AS took his place in the car.  GM moved into the driver’s seat, with AS, MI and MB as his passengers.
37	Both cars ended up at Yulong Park in Bundoora, where AA was removed from the boot and assaulted again.
38	At about 2:58 p.m., AA rang Mr Mahat.  The call lasted for a minute or so.
39	At some point, AA was returned to the boot of the white Corolla.
40	At 3:33 p.m., both the white and red Corollas were seen on CCTV about 150 metres from 1 North Crescent in Heidelberg West, which is the place where Mr Mahat would be killed.
Killing of Mr Mahat
41	This brings me to the manslaughter of Mr Mahat, which is an element of proof in the charge of assist offender.
42	Nine minutes earlier, Mr Mahat had made a brief call (lasting only 15 seconds) to Farhiya Ahmed, who lived at Unit 2, 1 North Crescent.
43	Ms Ahmed was at home when Mr Mahat arrived.  They had a short conversation, which was interrupted when she overheard the beep of a car horn at the front of her premises.  Mr Mahat went outside.
44	CCTV footage from a nearby home shows Mr Mahat walking along the footpath in front of Ms Ahmed’s unit.  Next, the CCTV shows the white Corolla crashing into Mr Mahat while he is on the footpath, before ploughing through the front fence and onto the lawn.  The car came to rest against the wall of the unit.  This occurred at 3:35 p.m.
45	The CCTV also shows that, about 15 seconds later, two figures ran from the street towards the front of the unit.  A second or two later, a red Corolla arrives and is parked in the street in front of the unit.  As this is occurring, a third figure can be seen behind the red car moving from the street towards the unit.  A second or so later, a person exits the driver’s side of the red car, although it is not clear whether the exit was from the rear or the front door.  As that person moves towards the footpath, several others emerge from the front lawn of the unit and head towards the red car.  While it is not clear how many there were, several persons then got into the red car before it drove out of view.  The white car was left (crashed) at the front of the residence.
46	AA was still in the boot of the white Corolla when it crashed.  Before the impact, AA noticed the car began to slow down.  He overheard someone in the car say words to the effect of, “That’s him,” or “We need to go get him.”  AA said the car then sped up and turned sharply to the left before “it got really bumpy”, and then it “crashed”.  While still in the boot, AA looked through the back window of the car and saw people kicking something on the ground.
47	From Ms Ahmed’s perspective, from her front window, she saw a white car racing towards the house before hearing a loud bang.  She went out to the front of her residence and saw masked people coming towards her from a red car.  She saw Mr Mahat against the brick wall of the front of her home and AA in the boot of the white Corolla, which had crashed into the north‑eastern corner of the unit. 
48	At 3:37 p.m., a call was made to triple‑zero.  AA remained at the scene until police arrived.  Paramedics arrived at 3:45 p.m., but, sadly, Mr Mahat could not be saved.  He was declared deceased at the scene.
49	An autopsy revealed that he had suffered at least four separate applications of blunt force trauma to the forehead and skull, at least four separate applications of blunt force trauma to his face, two non‑penetrating stab injuries to the chest, ten stab injuries to the upper limbs and legs, abrasions to the arms and legs, and a stab injury to the left upper chest, which was likely to be the principal cause of death.
50	Mr Hayward, who appeared for the Director, explained that it could not be said who assaulted or stabbed Mr Mahat.  The charge of manslaughter was put against AS, MB, MI and Mr Yuusuf on the basis that each entered into an agreement to assault Mr Mahat, and was aware it was probable that, in the course of carrying out the agreed assault, another or others would commit an act that was unlawful and dangerous.  More specifically, each accused entered his plea of guilty on an agreed basis that:
a)	he was aware that others were in possession of knives;
b)	he held a reasonable belief or foresight of the possible use of the knives by the principal in the course of the assault;
c)	he accepts that using a knife in the course of an assault is an unlawful and dangerous act that a reasonable person would have realized exposed Mr Mahat to an appreciable risk of serious injury; and
d)	he accepts that, in the course of the assault, the principal or principals caused the injury that resulted in Mr Mahat’s death.
Assist offender
51	Next, I turn to the offence of assist offender.
52	GM, believing some in his group had committed manslaughter, drove at least six of them away from the scene in the red Corolla, and ultimately to a carpark in Boyne Street, Coburg North, near the intersection with Ballard Avenue.  At that point, GM, Mr Yuusuf, MI, MB, AS, Mr Farah and Mr Hagi Ali all exited the car.  They walked about 200 metres across Jackson Reserve to Edgars Creek.  Some of the clothing worn by members of the group was discarded in the creek.  Believing some had committed manslaughter, Mr Hagi Ali assisted them in that endeavour.
53	Between 21 and 22 October 2022, with the assistance of the SES, police searched Edgars Creek and the surrounding area.  In the creek, they found clothing and/or shoes worn by Mr Yuusuf, MI, GM and Mr Hagi Ali, and a kitchen knife.
Arrest
54	On 26 October 2022, GM was arrested while passing through Customs at Tullamarine Airport.  He was charged, and remained in custody in a YJC until he was bailed on 7 March 2023 (i.e., 132 days later).
55	On 2 December 2022, Mr Hagi Ali was arrested at Tullamarine Airport upon his return from Mogadishu in Somalia.  He was charged, and remained in adult custody until he was bailed on 23 June 2023 (i.e., 203 days later).
The cases against Mr Hagi Ali and GM
56	The Director puts the kidnapping against Mr Hagi Ali and GM on the basis that they entered an agreement, arrangement or understanding with others that AA would be kidnapped.  It is not alleged that they made the demand of AA when he was first confronted, or that they had weapons, or that they committed or were complicit in any of the various assaults on him.  They were, however, complicit in forcing him into the boot of the car.
57	As for assist offender, the Director puts the case against GM on the basis that he drove those who had committed manslaughter away from the scene with the purpose of impeding their apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment.  The Director puts assist offender against Mr Hagi Ali on the bases that he assisted those who committed manslaughter to discard their clothing at Edgars Creek, and that he failed to report the matter to police, with the purpose of impeding their apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment.
58	Mr Hagi Ali and GM entered their pleas of guilty to the two charges on the bases put by the Director.
Victim impact statements
59	I turn now to the victim impact statements by Mr Mahat’s parents and his three sisters.  Those same statements were before Incerti J when sentencing the four co‑accused on manslaughter.  After summarizing their contents, her Honour went on to say that she did so in order properly to acknowledge and appreciate the enormity and enduring impact of the serious crime the four accused before her had committed.  I endorse those remarks.  It must be a terrible thing for Mr Mahat’s family.
60	However, while GM and Mr Hagi Ali, by their pleas of guilty to assist offender, accept that Mr Mahat was killed in circumstances amounting to manslaughter, and that they believed this had occurred when they engaged in their acts of assistance, they are not to be punished for his manslaughter or for its effect on his loved ones.  Rather, their offences concern their actions, respectively, in driving the killers away from the scene of the crime and helping them discard their clothing, and the purposes for which those actions were performed. 
61	It follows that, while there are some mental gymnastics involved, I must confine my assessment of the impact upon Mr Mahat’s loved ones to that which flows from their offences of assisting those principal offenders, not from his manslaughter.  That is what I have sought to do.
62	Thus, while it is difficult to isolate the grief Mr Mahat’s family may have experienced in learning of GM and Mr Hagi Ali’s assistance to his killers after the fact, I think I can reasonably infer that such behaviour would have only added to their suffering.
63	As for AA, he did not provide a victim impact statement.  However, it can reasonably be inferred, and I do infer, that the kidnapping was a terrifying experience for him.
Nature and gravity of offending
Kidnapping
64	I turn now to an assessment of the nature and gravity of the offences in general and in this case, commencing with kidnapping.
65	Kidnapping at common law is committed when, by force or fraud, a person is taken or carried away and deprived of liberty without consent and absent any lawful justification or excuse.  It can be a very serious offence.  This is reflected in its maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment.  But, like many offences, its gravity can vary markedly.
66	The genesis for the offence appears to be the display of violence that occurred at MI’s residence in the early hours of 16 October 2022.  But there was no evidence of any direct motive for either GM or Mr Hagi Ali to be involved in the kidnapping.  In that sense, whatever grievance was held by another or others in the group, it was not Mr Hagi Ali or GM’s, and their involvement appears to have been designed to assist others in their group.
67	In this case, it is not alleged that either GM or Mr Hagi Ali was the driver of the white car in which AA was held.  Nor is it alleged that either GM or Mr Hagi Ali made the initial demand of AA, was in possession of a knife, or was involved in any of the assaults of, or threats made to, him.
68	That said, they were part of the agreement that AA be forced into the car, taken away and forced into the boot.  There were several in the group, whereas AA was alone, and hopelessly outnumbered.  Further, this was not a momentary or even a short‑lived kidnapping, but a continuing offence that endured for over one‑and‑a‑half hours.
69	Thus, notwithstanding their involvement is not aggravated in the ways identified, I think the objective nature and gravity of their participation in the kidnapping is still significant and makes each a serious example of the offence.
Assist offender
70	Assisting an offender is a statutory offence modelled on what at common law is known as being an accessory after the fact.  The offence is committed when a person (“the principal offender”) has committed a serious indictable offence (“the principal offence”), and any other person who, knowing or believing the principal offender to be guilty of the principal offence or some other serious indictable offence, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, does any act with the purpose of impeding the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of the principal offender.
71	Assist offender can also be a serious offence, although its gravity can vary markedly.  When committed in relation to manslaughter, as here, the maximum penalty is five years’ imprisonment, whereas it carries a 20‑year maximum where the related offence is murder.
72	GM and Mr Hagi Ali’s offences of assisting an offender had some serious elements.  For example, it was morally blameworthy to seek, without reasonable excuse, to assist those responsible for the manslaughter of Mr Mahat to avoid detection, whether by spiriting them away from the scene (in GM’s case) or by helping them discard potentially incriminating clothing (in Mr Hagi Ali’s case).
73	However, while their offending may have created some difficulties for the police in the early stages of the investigation, it does not appear that the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of those who committed manslaughter was compromised in any significant way by that behaviour.  Further, it can be inferred that part of the motivation for their offending was to avoid being wrongly implicated in the killing of Mr Mahat.  Given the number of people involved in the manslaughter, and that all were part of the same group of young persons, I accept that it is likely that GM and Mr Hagi Ali felt under pressure to assist them.
74	The offence tends to be more serious when the offending conduct involves disposing of, burying or destroying a body.  This is because such behaviour often limits or removes the ability to determine the cause or circumstances of death, usually adds substantially to the suffering of the deceased’s loved ones, and almost invariably involves greater moral culpability.
75	Overall, while the assist offender offences committed by GM and Mr Hagi Ali have a degree of gravity, they lack some of the aggravating features often associated with more serious examples of the offence.  In my view, they are also less serious offences than their offences of kidnapping.
Mitigating factors: Mr Hagi Ali
Personal circumstances
76	I turn now to the mitigating factors urged on behalf of Mr Hagi Ali.  I shall introduce those matters by saying something about his personal circumstances.
77	Zakaria Hagi Ali was born in Victoria in April 2003, and raised in South Morang.  His parents are Somalian.  He has five siblings: a brother aged 25, and four sisters aged 24, 22, 18 and 15.  He resides with his family in South Morang.  They are very supportive of him.  None in his family has a criminal record.
78	Mr Hagi Ali went to primary school at The Lakes South Morang College, and to secondary school at Mill Park Secondary College.  He graduated from VCE in 2021.
79	After finishing school, Mr Hagi Ali travelled overseas for six months.  Upon his return, he enrolled in a Certificate II in Carpentry.  When he completed this course, it was the time of the offences, which put his employment and education at a standstill.  After his period of incarceration, he enrolled in a Certificate II in Electrical, and began studying his Certificate III, but ceased because he thought he might be incarcerated again.  He was also working as a mechanic in Essendon, but felt he had to leave this job too because of the belief he might be returned to custody.  One of his goals for the future is to undertake a mechanical apprenticeship.
80	Mr Hagi Ali attends his local mosque each Friday.  He participates in his five daily prayers and reads the Quran often.  He told the Community Corrections officer who interviewed him for the purposes of a pre‑sentence report that, while in custody, turning to his faith was helpful to keep his mind level.  He said that people would attend the Melbourne Custody Centre and pass out the Quran, which he enjoyed.
Pleas of guilty and remorse
81	Mr Edney, who appeared with Ms Foote for Mr Hagi Ali, urged several factors in mitigation, commencing with his pleas of guilty and remorse.
82	Mr Edney explained that the plea of guilty to assist offender had only been possible following my rulings on pre‑trial issues late in July.  He submitted that, on this basis, the pleas can be considered early pleas.  Mr Hagi Ali, he submitted, is entitled to a significant moderation of sentence to recognise the utilitarian value of the pleas and to take account of them as an expression of remorse.
83	While the guilty pleas were not entered at the earliest opportunity, in context, they are relatively early pleas.  In particular, they were entered immediately following the sentence indication, which was soon after the Director indicated that a plea to assist offender, rather than a homicide, would be accepted.
84	Further, I accept that his guilty pleas amount to an acceptance of responsibility and are evidence of remorse.  That Mr Hagi Ali is remorseful is supported by the observations made in the pre‑sentence report by the Community Corrections officer assessing him for suitability for a CCO, which include the following:
Mr Hagi Ali advised that he has had significant time to reflect on these offences and often envisions different scenarios, such as leaving earlier, not spending the night with his friends and how differently it could have played out if he made different choices.  During his time in custody, Mr Hagi Ali stated that he used this time to reflect on these decisions and what could have been.  He acknowledged the remorse he feels for the victim’s family as well as the remorse for his own actions and the impacts on his family.  He states he thinks of the incident often and it replays in his mind, he is still impacted mentally by these events, and states he may be for some time.
No prior or subsequent convictions; good character
85	Next, Mr Edney relied on the fact that Mr Hagi Ali has no prior convictions, and that he is otherwise of prior good character.  Further, there have been no subsequent matters before the courts, and there is nothing pending.
86	I also received two references from members of the local Somali community attesting to Mr Hagi Ali’s positive character traits, including his volunteer work with children and the elderly.
87	I accept that Mr Hagi Ali is otherwise of good character, and consider that this is a significant matter in exercising the sentencing discretion.
Relative youth
88	Third, Mr Edney emphasised that Mr Hagi Ali was only 19 at the time of the offending, and is now aged only 21.  In his submission, given his relative youth, rehabilitation should be given considerable weight in the sentencing synthesis.  I agree.
Salutary experience of remand in adult custody
89	Fourth, Mr Edney explained that, as a 19‑year‑old person, he found the 203 days he spent on remand in adult custody to be frightening.  He submitted that that was a salutary experience, and that it has served the ends of just punishment and specific deterrence.  I accept that submission.
90	This conclusion is also supported by the opinion expressed in the pre‑sentence report, which was that, according to the Level of Service/Risk, Need, Responsivity Assessment Tool (“LS‑RNR”), Mr Hagi Ali was assessed as having a low risk of reoffending.
Impact of delay
91	Fifth, Mr Edney pointed out that there has been a delay of about two years between the offending and the plea hearing.  This, he submitted, was a significant period over which Mr Hagi Ali had the anxiety and stress of a murder charge hanging over his head.  The delay also had the effect of precluding detention in a YJC as a sentencing option, which opportunity passed when he turned 21 in April this year.  I accept these submissions.
Excellent prospects of rehabilitation
92	Sixth, Mr Edney submitted that I should accept that Mr Hagi Ali’s prospects of rehabilitation are very strong in light of the following factors:
a)	his pleas of guilty and remorse;
b)	his lack of criminal history or any pending matters, and his positively good character;
c)	his relative youth;
d)	his strong family support;
e)	his employment history following his period on remand, and his goals for the future; and
f)	he no longer has any association, let alone contact, with any of his co‑accused.
93	In addition, he was assessed as suitable for a CCO.
94	For these reasons, I accept that Mr Hagi Ali has excellent prospects of rehabilitation.
Mitigating factors: GM
Personal circumstances
95	I turn now to the mitigating factors urged on behalf of GM.  Here too I shall preface those matters by saying something about GM’s personal circumstances.
96	GM was born in Australia in April 2005.  His parents migrated here from Somalia.  He has four siblings.  He grew up in Reservoir with his family, with whom he continues to have a close relationship.  He has continued to reside with his family since his release on youth supervised bail in March 2023.
97	He attended a local secondary school.  At the time of his remand, he was enrolled in the VCAL programme at that school.
98	After his release on bail, GM worked at his cousin’s barber shop.  He has also worked in a factory and in warehousing, at the local markets, and with his brother, who is an electrician.
99	Throughout 2023, GM expressed to his Youth Justice workers a desire to undertake a course in cyber security.  He commenced that course early in 2024, and has focused on his education and the court proceedings since that time.  Another of his goals is to secure an apprenticeship as an electrician, like his brother.
Pleas of guilty and remorse
100	Mr Casement, who appeared with Ms Andrews for GM, urged several factors in mitigation, commencing with his pleas of guilty and remorse.
101	Mr Casement submitted that, while the pleas of guilty were entered following a sentence indication soon before the trial listing, this occurred within a short time of the resolution of the matters of four co‑accused to manslaughter and one co‑accused to kidnapping, and the pre‑trial rulings made on 26 July 2024.
102	Counsel also submitted that GM’s pleas of guilty demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility, speak to his prospects of rehabilitation, have significant utilitarian benefit in obviating the need for a trial, and spare the witnesses from giving evidence, particularly AA.
103	In the opinion of the Youth Justice case manager who interviewed GM to determine his suitability for a YJC order, he “articulated a level of insight and victim empathy”.  He described “feeling a multitude of emotions about what had occurred, and the impact on victims, ranging from guilt to acceptance”.
104	As in Mr Hagi Ali’s case, so too in GM’s, while the guilty pleas were not entered at the earliest opportunity, they are, in context, relatively early pleas.  Further, I accept that they demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility and, when coupled with the observations of the Youth Justice case manager, are indicative of remorse. 
No prior or subsequent convictions
105	Second, Mr Casement relied on the fact that GM has no prior or subsequent convictions.
106	Mr Casement also disclosed, however, that, since being bailed, GM has been charged with driving offences arising from two separate motor vehicle collisions — in July and August 2023.  Those matters had not been finalised at the time of the plea hearing.
107	Further, the Youth Justice pre‑sentence report records that, when in custody, GM was involved in some incidents considered noteworthy.  One involved a fight with another young detainee, after which, pleasingly, they shook hands.  Another incident involved GM as the victim of a what appeared to be a random slap to the face.  Other incidents appear to concern relatively minor breaches of internal disciplinary rules.
108	Balanced against these matters is the fact that no further offending is alleged against GM in the 14 months since the driving charges in August 2023.  Further, Youth Justice found him suitable to continue on their supervised bail programme despite those charges.  Moreover, while he has missed some of his appointments, the author of the pre‑sentence report considers that GM has “engaged well with Youth Justice, and is respectful, polite and receptive to Youth Justice supports”.  In addition, GM’s family have raised no concerns with Youth Justice regarding his bail compliance or behaviour within the family home.
109	I accept that GM is to be treated as a first offender who is, in the main, otherwise of good character.
Relative youth
110	Third, Mr Casement relied on GM’s youth as a significant factor in mitigation.
111	At 17, he was only a child at the time of the offending, and is still only 19 now.  In addition to the considerations applicable to child offenders under s 362 of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), (“CYF Act”), to which I shall return later, Mr Casement submitted that the usual principles applicable to sentencing young offenders apply squarely to GM’s case.  Thus, both of his offences resulted from rash, ill‑considered decisions to assist others in his group of a similar age.  Further, he was negatively influenced and unsettled by his peers while on remand, even though he was held in a YJC, not a prison.
112	In those circumstances, submitted Mr Casement, given his age then and now, and given he has no criminal history, rehabilitation must be a primary purpose in sentencing one so young, notwithstanding the seriousness of his offending.  I agree.
Excellent prospects of rehabilitation
113	Fourth, Mr Casement submitted that, in light of the following matters, I should find that GM has excellent prospects of rehabilitation:
a)	his pleas of guilty and remorse;
b)	his lack of criminal history;
c)	his relative youth;
d)	his study and work history, and his goals for the future;
e)	his completion of psycho‑social programmes while in custody;
f)	his strong family support; and
g)	his continuing positive engagement with Youth Justice while on bail.
114	In addition, the Youth Justice case manager also reported the following:
[GM] advised he has largely referred to his Muslim faith to reconcile what occurred.  [He] stated for him to move forward in his life, he has had to focus on learning from the offending and accepting what occurred.  [He] spoke of the importance of working with Youth Justice whilst on Supervised Bail which has “kept me on the right track”.
115	Finally, GM was assessed by Youth Justice as having “reasonable prospects for rehabilitation” and as suitable for detention in a YJC.  Further, he was also assessed by Community Corrections as suitable for a CCO.
116	Given these matters, I accept that GM has excellent prospects of rehabilitation.
Sentencing purposes: Mr Hagi Ali
117	I turn now to the purposes of sentencing.  Section 5(1) of the Sentencing Act provides that the only purposes for which sentence may be imposed are, to use the shorthand, general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation, protection of the community, just punishment, and rehabilitation.
118	In my opinion, general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are important sentencing purposes in Mr Hagi Ali’s case.  The sentences imposed must serve to deter others from offending in a like manner; must reflect the Court’s denunciation of his crimes; and must amount to just punishment.
119	Given Mr Hagi Ali’s young age, his previous good character, his pleas of guilty and remorse, the salutary experience he had on remand, and his excellent prospects of rehabilitation, I consider that personal deterrence and protection of the community are of substantially less weight than they might be otherwise.  I doubt that Mr Hagi Ali will offend in any similar way again.
120	Rehabilitation is an important purpose in sentencing Mr Hagi Ali.  This is because he has such strong prosects of rehabilitation and because he is relatively young.  Further, it is also in the community’s interests that he be sentenced in a way that allows for the other sentencing purposes while maximising his prospects of rehabilitation.
121	Section 5(3) of the Sentencing Act provides that a court must not impose a sentence that is more severe than that which is necessary to achieve the purpose or purposes for which the sentence is imposed.  This provision reflects the fundamental common law principle of parsimony. I have applied this principle in arriving at the sentences to be imposed.
Sentencing purposes: GM
122	Were GM to be sentenced as an adult offender, the same remarks I have just made would apply to him, but, in light of his even younger age, with an even greater emphasis on rehabilitation as a sentencing purpose.
123	However, given that GM was 17 at the time of the offending and under 19 when the proceedings were commenced, he is a child for the purposes of the CYF Act.  The charges to which has pleaded guilty could have been heard in the Children’s Court.  Those charges are in this Court only because murder was charged initially, because the Children’s Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine murder, and because only this Court has that jurisdiction.
124	However, now that the kidnapping and assist offender charges are here, s 586 of the CYF Act provides that the powers this Court may exercise in sentencing a child for those indicatable offences include the power to impose any sentence which the Children’s Court may impose under the CYF Act, but that an order that the child be detained in a YJC must be made in accordance with Subdivision (4) of Division 2 of Part 3 of the Sentencing Act.
125	Mr Hayward submitted that it is not appropriate and necessary to apply the CYF Act regime in sentencing GM.  This is because, in his submission, the offending was objectively grave, and his moral culpability is high.  Further, he was aged 17‑and‑a‑half (i.e., nearly 18) at the time of the offending.
126	Mr Casement submitted that it is necessary and appropriate to apply the CYF Act regime in sentencing GM.  This case, he submitted, is not materially distinguishable from CNK v The Queen.  In his trial before this Court, the applicant in CNK was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of aggravated burglary, kidnapping, recklessly causing serious injury, and reckless conduct endangering serious injury.  He was just 15 at the time of the offending.  The trial judge (Kaye J) accepted that the CYF Act regime should apply to his sentencing, but rejected his counsel’s submission that general deterrence was irrelevant to the sentencing exercise.  His Honour imposed a total effective sentence of three years’ detention in a YJC.
127	On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that, on the proper construction of the CYF Act, general deterrence was excluded from consideration in the sentencing of children.  In resentencing the applicant, their Honours considered it both appropriate and necessary that the CYF Act regime apply.  The Court re‑sentenced the applicant to time served in YJC for the first three offences (which was about six‑and‑a‑half months) and released him on a YSO for the fourth offence.
128	In my opinion, it is necessary and appropriate that GM be sentenced under the CYF Act regime.  While his offending is serious, it is not so serious that the Children’s Court could not have dealt with the current charges.  Far more serious offending is commonly dealt with in that court.  Had he not been charged with homicide, it would not have been inappropriate to hear the matter in the Children’s Court, notwithstanding that the co‑accused’s manslaughter charges had to be heard in this Court.
129	Thus, GM will be sentenced under the CYF Act regime.  This means that, in accordance with CNK, I must exclude general deterrence from the mix of purposes in sentencing him.  But I must — and have sought to — apply the dictates of s 362(1) of the CYF Act, which provides that, in determining which sentence to impose on a child, the Court must, as far as practicable, have regard to the following matters:
a)	the need to strengthen and preserve the relationship between the child and the child’s family; and
b)	the desirability of allowing the child to live at home; and
c)	the desirability of allowing the education, training or employment of the child to continue without interruption or disturbance; and
d)	the need to minimise the stigma to the child resulting from a court determination; and
e)	the suitability of the sentence to the child; and
f)	if appropriate, the need to ensure that the child is aware that he or she must bear a responsibility for any action by him or her against the law; and
g)	the need to protect the community, or any person, from the violent or other wrongful acts of the child—
(i)	in all cases where the sentence is for a Category A serious youth offence or a Category B serious youth offence; or
(ii)	in any other case—if it is appropriate to do so; and
h)	if appropriate, the need to deter the child from committing offences in remand centres, youth residential centres or youth justice centres.
130	In particular, I have had regard to the factors listed in paragraphs (a) to (f) and (g)(ii) of s 362(1), to a greater or lesser degree, in considering the sentencing of GM.
Current sentencing practices
Introduction
131	A new topic.  In so far as I can determine them, I have had regard to current sentencing practices for kidnapping and assist offender.  Such practices are but one factor in sentencing, and certainly not a controlling one at that, but they are nevertheless important in the sentencing synthesis.
Sentencing statistics
132	Sentencing statistics are one way of gauging current sentencing practices.
133	Statistics collected by the Sentencing Advisory Council show that, in the higher courts, 58 offences of kidnapping were the subject of sentence in the five years to 30 June 2023.  The most common sentence was imprisonment (86 percent, or 50 of 58 offences).  The shortest prison sentence was less than one month, the longest was seven years, and the median was two‑and‑a‑half years.
134	In the higher courts, 18 offences of “accessory to serious indictable offence (not further defined)” (which is another name for assist offender in relation to offences other than murder) were the subject of sentence in the five years to 30 June 2023.  The most common sentence was imprisonment (61 percent, or 11 of 18 offences).  The shortest prison sentence was three months, the longest was 18 months, and the median was between 14 and 15 months.
135	I recognise, however, that such statistics are of limited utility.  This is mainly because they do not distinguish cases according to their most important sentencing considerations, such as the gravity of the offence, the age or maturity of the offender, or whether there was a plea of guilty or not guilty, remorse, a relevant criminal history, and so on.
Case comparisons
136	Sometimes, case comparison can assist in gauging current sentencing practices.
137	With this in mind, Mr Casement and Ms Andrews annexed to their written submissions a table of two non‑custodial sentences imposed on young offenders for kidnapping (and related offences) in the County Court in 2016 and 2017.
138	In contrast, Mr Hayward referred to Mwamba & Ors v The Queen, where in 2015 the Court of Appeal said that, “[ordinarily], in the absence of substantial mitigating factors, a conviction for [kidnapping] attracts a sentence of imprisonment measured in years”.
139	Mr Edney and Ms Foote annexed to their submissions a table of eight sentences imposed in this Court for assist offender, six relating to manslaughter, two relating to murder.
Conclusions
140	None of the cases in the tables struck me as meaningfully similar to the present cases on either kidnapping or assist offender.  But that is not uncommon.  Indeed, in the area of sentencing, it is almost always difficult usefully to compare cases.  And, in any event, sentences are not precedents to be applied or distinguished.
141	Further, I did not consider any statistics or case comparisons in respect of Children’s Court sentences for these offences.
142	In the end, as is the situation even where there are helpful statistics or more useful case comparisons, I have been driven to rely principally on the circumstances of this case, such as they are known, and sentencing principles to arrive at the appropriate sentences for these offences.
Parity considerations
Manslaughter by MI, MB, AS and Mr Yuusuf
143	I turn now to considerations of parity of sentence among co‑offenders, commencing with those who have been sentenced on manslaughter.
144	Mr Hayward submitted that, strictly speaking, there was no issue of parity to consider vis‑à‑vis those who had been sentenced for manslaughter, because that offence is quite different from the offences to which Mr Hagi Ali and GM pleaded guilty.
145	However, at the sentence indication hearing, Mr Hayward accepted — very fairly, in my view — that the kidnapping and the assist offender offence combined, while serious, were in each accused’s case less serious than the manslaughter committed by any of the four principal offenders, and deserving of lesser custodial sentences than those indicated in their cases.
146	Further, given the sentence indicated for MI on manslaughter, Mr Hayward accepted that it followed that a sentence of less than three years’ imprisonment should be imposed on Mr Hagi Ali for the kidnapping and assist offender, and a sentence of less than three years’ detention in a YJC should be imposed on GM for the same offences.
147	In circumstances where Incerti J ended up sentencing MI to two (not three) years’ detention in a YJC and that, at the plea hearing, Mr Hayward adopted his submissions from the sentencing indication, I took his concession to be adapted to that lesser sentence on MI, so that, in his submission, the two‑year YJC sentence might be regarded as a ceiling for the custodial sentences to be imposed on Mr Hagi Ali and GM.
148	Whether or not I have correctly understood Mr Hayward’s position, I consider that MI’s manslaughter is far more serious an offence than is the combined gravity of either Mr Hagi Ali or GM’s offences of kidnapping and assist offender.  Further, they have substantially more compelling mitigating factors than MI did.  In the result, I think the sentences I have indicated, and which I am now compelled not to exceed in severity anyway, sit comfortably with MI’s sentence for manslaughter — and, for that matter, with the other manslaughter sentences imposed on AS, MB, and Mr Yuusuf.
Kidnapping by Mr Farah
149	However, I think it is necessary to mention a potential complication or two that arise from the sentence of Mr Farah for kidnapping, which was imposed after my sentence indications were given to Mr Hagi Ali and GM.
150	In sentencing Mr Farah, Incerti J referred in some detail to those sentence indications, and to the fact that they were followed by pleas of guilty.  Her Honour then said this:
It is evident that [Mr Farah’s] offending is necessarily less serious than that of GM and Mr Hagi Ali and that [he is] equally less morally culpable.  If I am to give appropriate regard to the principle of parity, I must give consideration to the sentence indications that have been accepted by GM and Mr Hagi Ali.  However, I am at pains to stress that, without the strong call to respect the principle of parity, I would have imposed a more severe sentence on [Mr Farah].
151	It is plain, from the paragraphs in Incerti J’s reasons preceding the paragraph just extracted, that her Honour’s view — that Mr Farah’s offending is “necessarily less serious than that of GM and Mr Hagi Ali and that [he is] equally less morally culpable” — stems from the fact that those two accused had pleaded guilty to assist offender in addition to kidnapping, whereas Mr Farah was being dealt with only on kidnapping.  Otherwise, her Honour appears to have considered all three offenders’ criminality in the kidnapping as more or less equal — which, with respect, seems about right to me.
152	Some of the difficulties, then, are these.  Had Incerti J sentenced Mr Farah before I gave my sentence indications to Mr Hagi Ali and GM, it seems that, unconstrained by parity considerations, her Honour may well have imposed a heavier sentence on him.  And had I heard the sentence indication applications after her Honour sentenced Mr Farah (whether to the sentence actually imposed or to a heavier sentence), I may well have been influenced to impose heavier sentences on Mr Hagi Ali and GM.  I say this notwithstanding that I do not consider that the parity principle compels an increase of a sentence otherwise thought to be appropriate.  Rather, so to say is just to recognise that the exercise of the sentencing discretion tends to be affected — perhaps even unconsciously at times — by numerous things, including knowledge of the sentences imposed on co‑offenders for the same offence.
153	In the end, having considered them again, I am satisfied that the sentences I indicated to Mr Hagi Ali and GM on the kidnapping are appropriate, notwithstanding the potential incongruity with Mr Farah’s sentence for the same offence.  As I mentioned earlier, a key difference between Mr Hagi Ali and GM on the one hand, and Mr Farah on the other, is that, after Mr Farah was released on bail on the murder and kidnapping charges, he breached his bail and was returned to custody.  That is why he was still in custody when he was sentenced by Incerti J.  It is also likely that, had he spent less time on remand and had he been on bail when sentenced, her Honour would have fixed a non‑parole period on whatever head sentence of imprisonment she imposed, assuming that head sentence was still in excess of 12 months.
154	In any event, I am constrained, as a matter of law, not to impose any sentences that are more severe than those I indicated at the sentence indication hearing.  This is because s 209(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides that, if the Court gives a sentence indication under s 207, and the accused pleads guilty to any charge to which the sentence indication relates at the first available opportunity (as both accused did here), this Court, when sentencing the accused for the offence, “must not impose a more severe sentence than the sentence type or maximum total effective sentence indicated”.
Submissions on disposition
The Director
155	Finally, I turn briefly to counsel’s submissions on disposition, commencing with those made on behalf of the Director.
156	Mr Hayward submitted that “time served”, whether as detention in a YJC for GM or imprisonment for Mr Hagi Ali, would not be a sufficient sentence for the kidnapping.  In his submission, each offender’s offence was too serious to warrant such a short custodial sentence.  In other words, an appropriate sentence on the kidnapping would see each accused returned to custody.
157	He conceded, however, that it was open to impose a CCO on Mr Hagi Ali and a YSO on GM for assist offender.
Mr Hagi Ali
158	Mr Edney submitted that Mr Hagi Ali should be sentenced to “time served” by way of imprisonment on kidnapping, and to a CCO on assist offender.
159	Mr Edney accepted that, as a young person, Mr Hagi Ali has had his first foray into the criminal justice system at a very serious level by being involved in offending of this type.  But, in his submission, Mr Hagi Ali’s antecedents, and his conduct since his release, demonstrate that this offending is truly an aberration, and that the prospect of his further involvement in the criminal justice system is remote.
160	In Mr Edney’s submission, the punishment Mr Hagi Ali has undergone — by way of nearly seven months’ imprisonment — is significant.  To the extent that further punishment is required, he submitted that the ends of justice can amply be achieved by a CCO on assist offender.
161	As for the Director’s submission that Mr Hagi Ali should be returned to prison, Mr Edney referred to Ashley JA’s remarks in R v Tran: that “it is well to reflect upon how much is done by most people in one day, one week, or one month of their lives, let alone how much in one year”.
GM
162	Mr Casement submitted that GM should be sentenced to “time served” by way of detention in a YJC on kidnapping, and to a YSO on assist offender.
163	He submitted that, given GM’s tender age, his lack of prior convictions, his pleas of guilty and remorse, his positive engagement with Youth Justice while on bail, his excellent prospects of rehabilitation, and the matters listed in s 362(1) of the CYF Act, it is well open to sentence in the manner he urged.
164	In his submission, the ultimate aim of the criminal law — protection of the community — is best served by GM’s rehabilitation through his continued education, future employment and maintaining strong relationships with his family.  Returning him to custody at this point would only risk thwarting his continuing rehabilitation.
Consideration
165	In my opinion, Mr Edney and Mr Casement’s submissions should be preferred.  Neither Mr Hagi Ali nor GM’s impressive progress on bail should be interrupted by a sentence that results in a return to custody.  It is not only in their interest, but also in the community’s interest, that they be allowed to continue on their path to rehabilitation in the community.  That outcome, I think, is best achieved by the combination of sentences urged by their counsel.  Moreover, I am satisfied that all of the necessary purposes of sentencing will be achieved by those dispositions, and that those dispositions accord with parsimony.
Sentence: Mr Hagi Ali
166	I turn now to impose those sentences.  Mr Hagi Ali, would you stand, please?
167	For the kidnapping of AA, Mr Hagi Ali is convicted and sentenced to 203 days’ imprisonment.
168	Pursuant to s 18 of the Sentencing Act, I declare that 203 days be reckoned as a period of imprisonment already served under this sentence.
169	For the offence of assisting an offender in relation to manslaughter, Mr Hagi Ali is convicted and released on a CCO for 12 months.
170	In addition to the core conditions, the CCO contains the four special conditions recommended by Community Corrections in their pre‑sentence report, which are as follows:
a)	Mr Hagi Ali is to perform 200 hours of unpaid community work.
b)	Mr Hagi Ali is to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in relation to his mental health.
c)	Mr Hagi Ali is to be supervised by the Secretary.
d)	Mr Hagi Ali is not to contact or associate with his former co‑accused in this matter.
171	Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act, I declare that, had Mr Hagi Ali not pleaded guilty but instead had been found guilty of these offences after a trial, I would have imposed a total effective sentence in the order of two years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 12 months.
Sentence: GM
172	GM, would you stand, please?
173	For the kidnapping of AA, I consider that a sentence of confinement of GM is justified.  Further, on all the evidence, including the views expressed in the Youth Justice report, I am satisfied that there are at least reasonable prospects for GM’s rehabilitation — indeed, as I have said, I think those prospects are excellent — and I believe that he is particularly impressionable and likely to be subject to undesirable influences in an adult prison.  I have also had regard to GM’s age, character and past history, and the nature of the offence, in considering whether to impose a YJC order.
174	Accordingly, for the kidnapping of AA, GM is convicted and sentenced to be detained in a YJC for 132 days.
175	Pursuant to s 35 of the CYF Act, I declare that 132 days be reckoned as a period of detention already served under this sentence.
176	For the offence of assisting an offender in relation to manslaughter, GM is convicted and released on a YSO for 12 months.
177	In addition to the core conditions, the YSO contains the following special conditions:
a)	GM is not to contact or associate with his former co‑accused in this matter.
b)	GM is to abstain from the use of illegal drugs.
178	Pursuant to s 381(3) of the CYF Act, I indicate that my reason for imposing the first special condition is to prevent GM from getting into trouble again by mixing with those with whom he committed the offences of which he now stands convicted.
179	As for the second special condition, I note that GM disclosed to Youth Justice that he was smoking cannabis regularly with peers up until the offending.  He also reported being exposed regularly to other illicit substances by his peers, but claimed he did not progress past cannabis use.  Thus, my reason for imposing the second special condition is to ensure that GM does not use illicit drugs, for fear that such behaviour might lead to something much worse.
180	Finally, pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act, I declare that, had GM not pleaded guilty but instead been found guilty of these offences after a trial, I would have imposed a total effective sentence in the order of 18 months’ detention in a YJC.
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