DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	The Body Corporate for The Anchorage One v Huang (No 2) [2024] QDC 95	
PARTIES:	THE BODY CORPORATE FOR THE ANCHORAGE ONE – COMMUNITY TITLE SCHEME 35311
Plaintiff	
	v	
	YUE HUANG
Defendant	
FILE NO/S:	TD213/2020	
DIVISION:	Civil	
DELIVERED ON:	18 June 2024	
DELIVERED AT:	Townsville by videolink from Brisbane	
HEARING DATE:	24 - 26 July, 4 September, 27 - 29 September 2023,
31 January 2024, submissions on costs and interest 11
June 2024	
JUDGE:	Barlow KC, DCJ	
Orders:	1	Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $9,872.92.
2	The plaintiff bear its own costs of:
(a)	the second and third days of the trial; and
(b)	preparation and delivery of the five volume trial bundle handed to the court on the first day of the trial; and
(c)	its claim for debt recovery costs.
3	Otherwise, the defendant pay:
(a)	half of the plaintiff’s costs of the claim; and
(b)	one quarter of the plaintiff’s costs of the counterclaim.
3	The plaintiff pay three quarters of the defendant’s costs of the counterclaim.	
CATCHWORDS:	PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL RULE: COSTS FOLLOW EVENT – GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION –
whether plaintiff should be entitled to costs due to a failure of the defendant to accept a formal offer made by the plaintiff – whether the offer made was clear to the
defendant where the costs incurred to the date of the offer	

	were not specified – whether the plaintiff should have the costs of the claim and counterclaim where the counter claim was lost – whether the judgement should be for the balance by setting off the amount or should be provided separately – whether the defendant should have to pay costs where she won the counterclaim but lost the claim – whether the defendant should have to pay costs where only part of the counterclaim was successful – whether the plaintiff should be able to claim costs where they cased unreasonable delay and resulted in unjustifiable costs for a portion of the trial
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 58
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 184

Built Qld Pty Ltd v Pro-Investment Australian Hospitality Opportunity (ST) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] QCA 140, cited Chapel of Angels v Hennessy Builder Pty Ltd [2018] QDC 248, cited
Hanak v Green [1958[ 2 QB 9, distinguished
Imbree v McNeilly (No 2) (2008) 236 CLR 576, cited
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, discussed
Yara Nipro Pty Ltd v Interfet Australia Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 19, distinguished	
COUNSEL:	J Hastie for the plaintiff
Yue Huang, self-represented defendant	
SOLICITORS:	SLF Lawyers for the Body Corporate
Yue Huang, self-represented defendant	

Contents
Summary	1
Interest	1
Costs	1
Offer to settle	2
Misconduct of the proceeding by the Body Corporate?	4
Judgment for balance or on each claim?	6
Calculation of interest	7
Conclusions	8

Summary
[1]	On 17 May 2024, I published my reasons for judgment on the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s counterclaim.1 Terms used in those reasons are adopted in these reasons.
[2]	I held that the Body Corporate is entitled to judgment on its claim for $54,620.05 plus interest at 2.5% per month on the amount outstanding from time to time to the date of judgment. I also held that Ms Huang is entitled to judgment on her counterclaim for
$13,404.63 plus interest under s 58 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 from 15 April 2019 to the date of judgment. I raised for consideration whether I should give judgment for each party on its claim and her counterclaim, or just a single judgment for the balance, under rule 184 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.
[3]	I directed that the parties file submissions on the appropriate form of judgment, interest and costs. Having received those submissions (and supporting affidavits), these are my reasons for orders on those issues.
Interest
[4]	The Body Corporate provided a calculation of the interest to which it says it is entitled on outstanding contribution levies, under the 2008 Regulation and the 2020 Regulation, taking into account a moratorium period for the accrual of interest that was imposed under what became Part 3 of Chapter 7 of the BCCM Act. On its calculation, interest as at 1 June 2024 was $52,050.38, accruing thereafter at $45.52 per day.
[5]	The Body Corporate also calculated interest on the damages awarded to Ms Huang, basing its calculations on default judgment interest rates under Practice Direction 6 of 2013. On that basis, interest on her damages to 1 June 2024 was $3,750.37, accruing thereafter at $3.07 per day.
[6]	Thus, as at 1 June 2024, on the Body Corporate’s claim it was entitled to judgment for $106,670.43 and on Ms Huang’s counterclaim she was entitled to judgment for
$17,155.00.
[7]	Ms Huang does not take any particular issue with those calculations, although she asked the court to do its own calculation of interest amounts. I have discerned no error in the calculations and therefore I base my judgment on those sums.
Costs
[8]	The Body Corporate submits that Ms Huang should be ordered to pay its costs of the claim and the counterclaim because:
(a)	in net terms (taking into account the amounts awarded on the claim and the counterclaim respectively), the Body Corporate has succeeded in the proceeding;
(b)	Ms Huang did not accept an offer made by the Body Corporate in June 2023 to settle both the claim and the counterclaim; and

1	The Body Corporate for The Anchorage One v Huang [2024] QDC 60 (RJ).

(c)	Ms Huang’s success in the counterclaim was modest, with the court rejecting the bulk of the damages that she claimed.
[9]	Alternatively, if the court decides to make separate judgments and orders for costs:
(a)	Ms Huang should pay the Body Corporate’s costs of the claim and the counterclaim since date of the offer on the indemnity basis;
(b)	Ms Huang should pay the Body Corporate’s costs of the claim before the date of the offer on the standard basis; and
(c)	Ms Huang should pay 50% of the Body Corporate’s costs of the counterclaim before the date of the offer.
[10]	As to the overall result and the modest amount of damages awarded to Ms Huang, it is true that, as a result of the court’s findings in each of the claim and the counterclaim, the amount of a judgment on the claim will considerably exceed the amount of a judgment on the counterclaim, with the result that Ms Huang will be liable to the Body Corporate for considerably more than the Body Corporate will be liable to Ms Huang. However, that is not the only consideration.
[11]	Ms Huang’s counterclaim resulted from ongoing disregard by the Body Corporate of its duties as a body corporate and its obligations to repair the paved area and to provide adequate drainage along the wall. As I found in my reasons,2 the Body Corporate failed in 2018 and then refused, in 2019, to engage tradespersons to repair the paved area; then, despite resolving in October 2020 to carry out repairs, it did not do so until October 2022; and it did not install drainage along the wall until after May 2021. In doing so, it acted unreasonably and it treated Ms Huang and her complaints with disdain.
[12]	It was the Body Corporate’s conduct that led to the counterclaim being made. Although both experts who gave evidence disagreed with most of the opinions expressed in the first NCE report, I accepted as correct many of the observations made by the author of that report. The Body Corporate vociferously opposed Ms Huang’s counterclaim, similarly to its refusal to acknowledge and correct its failure to maintain the pavers and to install drainage. In the circumstances, Ms Huang was entitled to pursue her counterclaim. Although the damages she recovered were not high, the issues were not uncomplicated and a substantial amount of evidence was called and tendered, both in support and in opposition to it.
[13]	Subject to my decisions on the ultimate form of the judgment and on the effect of the Body Corporate’s offer to settle, I see no reason why costs should not, prima facie, follow the event in both the claim and the counterclaim.
Offer to settle
[14]	By an order made on 27 January 2023, the court set the proceeding down for a three day trial to begin on 24 July 2023. At the same time, it gave directions for the preparation of a trial bundle of agreed documents. The plaintiff was to have carriage of preparation of the bundle and was to provide a final copy to Ms Huang by 12 July 2023 and two copies to the court at the commencement of the trial. In the meantime,

2	RJ [231].

the parties were to exchange outlines of non-expert witnesses’ evidence and the previously appointed experts were to confer and produce a joint report.
[15]	On 23 June 2023, the Body Corporate’s solicitors wrote to Ms Huang in a letter expressed to be without prejudice save as to costs and to have been written in accordance with the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank3 and Imbree v McNeilly (No 2).4 The Body Corporate offered to settle the entire proceeding on one of two bases that Ms Huang could choose. They were that, in full settlement of the proceeding, Ms Huang pay the Body Corporate (within time frames set out in the offer):
(a)	$75,000 plus its costs assessed on the standard basis; or
(b)	$68,000 plus its costs fixed at $80,000.
The references to the Body Corporate’s costs appear to mean its costs of both the claim and the counterclaim. The offer was left open for 14 days.
[16]	In the letter, the Body Corporate’s solicitors noted that the joint experts’ report had been delivered and contended that it “heavily supports our client’s position and places the Plaintiff in a strong position moving forward with the trial.”
[17]	Ms Huang did not accept either offer. The Body Corporate submits that she was imprudent in doing so and that the Body Corporate has obtained a substantially better outcome at the trial than it would have under either offer. The offer involved a substantial compromise and contained sufficient information to enable Ms Huang to make an informed decision. Ms Huang lost her defence of the claim and recovered only a modest sum on her counterclaim. Therefore, Ms Huang should be ordered to pay the Body Corporate’s costs of both the claim and the counterclaim.
[18]	Alternatively, the Body Corporate submits, the usual consequences of not accepting a Calderbank offer should follow and Ms Huang should pay the Body Corporate its costs of the claim and 50% of its costs of the counterclaim5 before the date of the offer on the standard basis and its costs of both the claim and the counterclaim thereafter on the indemnity basis.
[19]	Ms Huang submits, as I understand her submission, that the court cannot be satisfied that either alternative offer would have resulted in a better outcome for the Body Corporate than the ultimate result. The first involved her agreeing to an unknown liability for costs of both the claim and the counterclaim, which is not possible to compare with the parties’ existing positions. The second, although allowing for a fixed amount of costs, did not provide enough information for her to make an informed judgment in comparing that amount with ordinarily recoverable costs.
[20]	A comparison of the results of the claim and the counterclaim with the principal amounts that the Body Corporate offered to accept in settlement shows that the offers constituted a real compromise by the Body Corporate: outstanding contributions of
$54,620.05 plus interest, which the Body Corporate calculates as at 1 June 2024 to amount to $52,050.38, a total of $106,670.43, as against damages on the counterclaim of $13,404.63 plus interest of $3,750.37, totalling $17,155.00. However, the Body

3	[1975] 3 All ER 333.
4	(2008) 236 CLR 576.
5	The basis for selecting 50% is not articulated in the plaintiff’s submissions.

Corporate clearly intended to recover a substantial contribution to its costs of defending the counterclaim as well as its costs of the claim. Whether the result for Ms Huang is worse than the offer then made to her will depend on the Court’s decision on who should pay some or all of the costs of the claim and the counterclaim respectively.
[21]	In this respect, Ms Huang deposes, in an affidavit sworn by her on 11 June 2024, that, having received the offer, she informed the body corporate manager that she wished to pay the levies and asked for an assessor to evaluate the Body Corporate’s legal fees for its debt recovery, disassociated from its cost of defending the counterclaim. She never received a response, but on the information she had she considered that it was seeking excessive costs from her.
[22]	In the absence, at the time, of clarity as to the likely recoverable costs of the claim and the counterclaim respectively, I do not consider that the offers were so clear as to make it unreasonable for Ms Huang not to have accepted them. Therefore, I do not consider that I should take those offers into account in determining who should be liable for the costs of the proceeding.
Misconduct of the proceeding by the Body Corporate?
[23]	Ms Huang submits that the Body Corporate’s conduct of the proceeding was such as to have increased inordinately the length and cost of the proceeding, so that the usual order that costs follow the event – either of the claim or of the proceeding as a whole – ought not apply. She relies, in this respect, on remarks of McHugh J (dissenting) in Oshlack v Richmond River Council6 and the decision to which his Honour referred,7 in which Devlin J said:
No doubt, the ordinary rule is that, where a plaintiff has been successful, he ought not to be deprived of his costs, or, at any rate, made to pay the costs of the other side, unless he has been guilty of some sort of misconduct.
“Misconduct” in this context means misconduct relating to the litigation, or the circumstances leading up to the litigation. Thus, the court may properly depart from the usual order as to costs when the successful party by its lax conduct effectively invites the litigation; unnecessarily protracts the proceedings; succeeds on a point not argued before a lower court; prosecutes the matter solely for the purpose of increasing the costs recoverable; or obtains relief which the unsuccessful party had already offered in settlement of the dispute.
[24]	I would add reference to McHugh J’s remarks at [70], in which he said:
Apart from anomalous examples in the equity jurisdiction, there are very few, if any, exceptions to the usual order as to costs outside the area of disentitling conduct. The Court may award costs in favour of a defendant where the plaintiff has obtained only nominal damages. However, this practice can be justified on the basis that, in reality, the successful party lost the litigation and the unsuccessful party won.
[25]	Ms Huang submits that the Body Corporate’s conduct leading to and during this proceeding amounted to misconduct that ought deprive it of any costs order in its favour. It refused to repair the pavers or to install drainage, despite her complaints.

6	(1998) 193 CLR 72, [67]-[69].
7	Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] A All ER 873, 874 (footnotes omitted).

It then agreed to do some works but delayed them unnecessarily. It sought, as part of its costs, the costs of the conciliation and adjudication of Ms Huang’s complaints to the CBCCM, its Chair refused to meet with her to resolve matters and its conduct of the litigation unreasonably extended the litigation and resulted in the Body Corporate incurring much higher costs than were justified.
[26]	In my original reasons, I criticised the Body Corporate’s conduct toward Ms Huang and characterised it as unreasonable.8 In my view, at least some of its conduct in the conduct of the proceeding was also unreasonable and resulted in unjustifiable costs. In particular, the trial directions included orders for the preparation, service and tender of an agreed trial bundle. Contrary to my directions, the Body Corporate’s solicitors prepared and purported to tender, on the first day of the trial, a five volume trial bundle that contained most the documents on which either party wished to rely at trial, even though almost all of them were not agreed. Furthermore, it became apparent early on the first day of the trial that its solicitors had not even given a hard copy of the bundle to Ms Huang (although they did, apparently, send her an electronic version of it). She did not get a hard copy until around 6.00pm that day. It also became apparent, on the second day of the trial, that the Body Corporate had not complied with the time within which it was to serve a list of the documents it wanted to include in a trial bundle, which seems to have contributed to the delay in preparation of the final bundle. Eventually that bundle was abandoned and returned to the Body Corporate’s solicitors. Each party produced its own bundle of documents on which it or she relied, some of which had not been included in the five volume bundle.
[27]	The Body Corporate’s counsel tendered one volume, which he said contained the documents on which the Body Corporate in fact proposed to rely. That bundle had not been provided to Ms Huang before the trial commenced either. She was given it during the course of the morning. The Body Corporate then called its only witness on its claim. Furthermore, as became obvious on the fifth day of the trial, the documents within that bundle included invoices from the Body Corporate’s solicitors, relied on in support of its claim to recover its debt recovery costs, that had not previously been disclosed. The court was not informed of that fact until the fifth day of the trial.9
[28]	In the course of discussion, on the second day of the trial, about how the trial should proceed, I commented that it seemed to me that the plaintiff had – inadvertently or not – attempted to run the case in a manner that was extremely prejudicial to a self- represented defendant having a fair trial, so the trial could not proceed, even to consider objections to documents.10 I concluded that the court could not proceed with the trial at all, in fairness to the defendant, who had not had a decent opportunity to check the trial bundle, nor to check the plaintiff’s documents tendered the previous day, which the Body Corporate’s counsel conceded.11 The trial was adjourned that morning to the third listed day for consideration of objections, but on the third day it became clear that Ms Huang was not able fairly to proceed. A day was then allocated for objections to be determined in early September, following which the trial continued in late September 2023.

8	See [11] above.
9	Indeed, I was told by counsel who originally appeared for the Body Corporate that they had been disclosed - T1-52:5, although I accept that counsel believed that to be the case and did not intend to mislead the court.
10	T2-16:36-39.
11	T2-22:14-18.

[29]	Objections were heard and determined on 4 September 2023 (with new counsel appearing for the Body Corporate) and the trial proper resumed on 27 September. On that day, counsel for the Body Corporate sought leave to reopen the Body Corporate’s case in an attempt to prove the service of contribution notices on Ms Huang by calling another witness. I granted that leave and the trial then proceeded over three days.
[30]	In my view, having regard to the Body Corporate’s conduct of the proceeding in the lead up to the trial and in the first tranche of the trial, two of the first three days were effectively wasted. Whatever my decision on the costs of the proceeding otherwise, the Body Corporate should bear its own costs of preparation of the original trial bundle and of the second and third days of the trial.
[31]	As for its conduct concerning the repairs to the pavers and the drainage, that did not materially increase the costs of the trial itself, so I do not consider it relevant to the determination of who should bear any of the costs of the counterclaim.
[32]	Finally, Ms Huang’s evidence of her attempts to settle the proceeding in discussion with the Body Corporate is mostly vague and imprecise. I do not consider it to be sufficiently clear to be reflected in the costs order.
[33]	As an aside, I understand Ms Huang to submit that the Body Corporate should not be entitled to levy her for any proportion of its costs, or at least its costs of defending the counterclaim or of any of the other steps (such as conciliation) taken in respect of her dispute with the Body Corporate about the pavers and drainage. To date, it seems, the Body Corporate has levied her for an aliquot share of all its costs related to this litigation, in accordance with her lot entitlement under the community title scheme. There may well be an argument that she should not have to bear such a proportion of those costs by way of levy, but that is not a matter over which this court has jurisdiction. As with her other challenges to the calculation of levies, only an adjudicator under the BCCM Act could determine such an issue.12 I need not, therefore, be further concerned with this issue.
Judgment for balance or on each claim?
[34]	In my original reasons, I raised whether separate judgments should be given on each of the claim and the counterclaim, or I should simply give one judgment for the balance of the two offsetting amounts: see UCPR rule 184.
[35]	The Body Corporate contends that I should give judgment in its favour for the balance rather than two separate judgments. It submits that to do so would be consistent with decisions in other courts in which the party that had the net result in its favour obtained judgment for the net amount due to it and an order for its costs of both the claim and the counterclaim.
[36]	Counsel submitted that the starting point is the decision in Hanak v Green,13 which was applied by the Supreme Court in Yara Nipro Pty Ltd v Interfet Australia Pty Ltd.14 He acknowledged that the rule is discretionary and there is little guidance as to the circumstances in which the discretion will be exercised, but other courts have established that:

12	See The Body Corporate for the Anchorage One v Huang [2022] QDC 119.
13	[1958] 2 QB 9.
14	[2010] QSC 19, [7], [8].

(a)	it is not necessary to establish an entitlement to set-off between the claim and the counterclaim before making an order under r 184;15 and
(b)	the effect of making such an order is that there is a single judgment in favour of one party and not separate judgments on both the claim and the counterclaim.16
[37]	The Body Corporate submitted that the evident purpose of the rule is to avoid a multiplicity of judgments for the payment of money and a situation where one party satisfies a judgment against it but the other party does not satisfy the judgment against it, leading to the necessity for the first party to take steps to enforce its judgment. It contends that these purposes inform the exercise of this court’s discretion and one judgment would avoid the potential for further disputes between the parties.
[38]	Neither Hanak v Green nor Yara Nipro is really relevant to this issue, as there was no dispute in those cases that judgment should be given for the balance of the claim and the counterclaim. The question in each case was the costs consequences of such a judgment. Here, there is a dispute as to both the form of judgment and the appropriate treatment of costs.
[39]	The claim and the counterclaim in this proceeding raised different issues and, in that sense, could be seen to be separate proceedings. That is not a reason not to make one order on both claims, taking into account the parties’ respective success and, in effect, setting off one award against the other and giving judgment only for the balance. It does not follow that costs should follow that consequence and, for the reasons stated below, I do not consider that appropriate in this case.
[40]	Even if the court were not to do that, in equity the Body Corporate could set off its liability to Ms Huang against her liability to it.
[41]	I therefore consider it appropriate to give judgment in favour of the Body Corporate for the balance.
Calculation of interest
[42]	The Body Corporate provided calculations of the interest that accrued on its claim, pursuant to its entitlement under the Regulations, and interest under the Civil Proceedings Act on the damages awarded to Ms Huang.
[43]	Ms Huang did not concede that those calculations are correct and asked the court to undertake its own calculation. She also submitted that the court should revoke its order for the payment of interest on the contributions up to 28 July 2023. She gave evidence and contended that, on that day, she offered to pay the entire amount owing, subject to an assessment of the Body Corporate’s debt recovery costs. She received no response to that offer.
[44]	That offer is not a basis for reversing the court’s findings and decision on the interest due to the Body Corporate on the outstanding contributions. The entitlement to interest arises under the Regulations. Ms Huang chose not to pay the contributions pending her challenge to the basis for their calculation and ultimately pending the determination of this proceeding. There is no reason why she should not be held liable

15	Chapel of Angels v Hennessy Builder Pty Ltd [2018] QDC 248, [6].
16	Built Qld Pty Ltd v Pro-Investment Australian Hospitality Opportunity (ST) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] QCA 140, [6].

for that interest, as I have done. There is certainly no reason for the court not to give judgment for the interest for which it has held she is liable.
[45]	I have checked the Body Corporate’s calculations of interest, both on the outstanding contributions and on the damages to which Ms Huang is entitled. So far as I can ascertain, they are correct. As Ms Huang has not identified any particular error, I shall adopt those calculations.
[46]	However, Ms Huang deposes that she paid $80,000.00 to the Body Corporate (by transfer into its bank account) on Sunday 9 June 2024. My associate has been informed by the Body Corporate’s solicitors that that sum was received into its account on 11 June 2024. The result is that all of the outstanding contributions and most of the statutory interest on those contributions have been paid. That being so, the court should not award ongoing interest on the contributions past 10 June 2024. Therefore, the total amount of interest due by Ms Huang to the Body Corporate is
$52,460.06 ($52,050.38 as at 1 June 2024, plus nine days at $45.52).
[47]	Interest on Ms Huang’s damages continues until judgment, comprising $3,750.37 as at 1 June 2024, plus $3.07 per day until judgment.
Conclusions
[48]	There should be a single judgment in favour of the Body Corporate for the balance between the respective amounts (including interest) awarded to the parties.
[49]	Notwithstanding that there should be a single judgment in favour of the Body Corporate, in my view the costs orders need not simply reflect the Body Corporate’s success in obtaining such a judgment.
[50]	The bulk of the evidence and the time utilised at trial and in the pre-trial conduct of the proceeding concerned the counterclaim. The Body Corporate lost the counterclaim, even though Ms Huang ultimately recovered only a small sum by way of damages. However, in that respect, much of the evidence about the counterclaim concerned the extent of loss that she claimed to have suffered, much of which I rejected in determining the amount of her loss.
[51]	The Body Corporate was not wholly successful in its claim, because it failed to prove the largest proportion of that claim, namely the debt recovery costs that it sought under the Regulations. It would not be just, in my view, for it to recover its costs related to that part of its claim. Those costs might be comparatively small, but nevertheless they should not be allowed.
[52]	Similarly, I consider that overall justice would not be served by ordering the Body Corporate to pay all of Ms Huang’s costs of the counterclaim. Some allowance should be made for its successful defence of the bulk of the damages sought by Ms Huang.
[53]	It would be unnecessarily costly, time consuming and wasteful of resources to make orders for costs by reference to the separate issues, involving, as it would, further disputes between the parties and extensive consideration by a costs assessor. Rather, the court should take a broad brush approach in determining the ultimate costs orders.
[54]	Taking such an approach, I consider that, to do justice between the parties (subject to my views, expressed above, as to the costs of the five volume trial bundle, the claim
[1]	
for recovery costs and two days of the trial), Ms Huang should pay half of the Body Corporate’s costs of the claim and one quarter of the Body Corporate’s costs of the counterclaim and the Body Corporate should pay three quarters of Ms Huang’s costs (if any) of the counterclaim.
[55]	Interest will be awarded to the Body Corporate up to 10 June 2024 and to Ms Huang up to the date of judgment.
[56]	To be clear, in determining the amount of the judgment for the Body Corporate, the amount to be awarded in favour of the Body Corporate would be $107,080.11 ($54,620.05 plus interest of $52,460.06).  Offset against that is the amount of
$17,207.19 ($13,404.63 plus interest of $3,750.37 to 1 June 2024 plus $52.19 comprising $3.07 per day for 17 days from 2 June to the date of judgment). The balance, therefore, is $89,872.92. However, as Ms Huang paid the Body Corporate
$80,000.00 on 11 June 2024, the balance owing by her is $9,872.92.
[57]	I shall give judgment accordingly.