IN THE Court of appeal OF new Zealand

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA	
 CA168/2024
 [2024] NZCA 184

	
BETWEEN	
KYLE JAMES CRAIG
Appellant	
	
AND	
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Respondent	

Court:	
Collins, Churchman and Osborne JJ	

Counsel:	
Appellant in person
W S Taffs for Respondent	

Judgment:
(On the papers)	
28 May 2024 at 2.30 pm 	

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A	The application for an extension of time to appeal is granted.
B	The appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Collins J)
Introduction
[1]	Mr Craig appeals a decision of Radich J declining Mr Craig’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.
[2]	Mr Craig’s appeal was filed 8 days out of time.  As the delay was short and explained, we grant an extension of time.
[3]	On 19 January 2024, Mr Craig was sentenced in the Invercargill District Court to 16 months’ imprisonment for three breaches of a protection order, one month’s imprisonment for possession of cannabis and one month’s imprisonment for failing to assist with a computer search by providing a pin code.  All sentences were imposed concurrently.  
[4]	Mr Craig raises a number of points on appeal.  His grounds of appeal can be conveniently distilled to two broad grounds:  
(a)	He challenges the legitimacy of the convictions for which he has been imprisoned.  He also says that a term of imprisonment lacks merit in his case because he has autism.
(b)	He is also concerned that he is required to share his cell with another inmate.  He says this arrangement hinders his ability to prepare for a Family Court case with which he is involved.  
The challenge to the legitimacy of the convictions
[5]	Mr Craig pleaded guilty to the offences which resulted in the sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment.  Nevertheless, he challenges the legitimacy of the convictions and sentences imposed.  
[6]	There is no doubt Mr Craig is detained for the purposes of s 6 of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001.  The onus therefore rests with the respondent to demonstrate that the detention is lawful.
[7]	The respondent produced in the High Court the warrants committing Mr Craig to terms of imprisonment.
[8]	This Court explained in Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison:
… In practice, once a prison superintendent or other official named as respondent produces a committal warrant or other authorisation … it would then be necessary for an applicant for habeas corpus to demonstrate that the documentation did not in fact provide a lawful justification in the particular circumstances.  …
[9]	In any event, the Habeas Corpus Act specifically prohibits a Court to call into question a conviction of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction.  Section 14(2)(a) of the Habeas Corpus Act states:
14	Determination of applications
…
(2)	A Judge dealing with an application must enquire into the matters of fact and law claimed to justify the detention and is not confined in that enquiry to the correction of jurisdictional errors; but this subsection does not entitle a Judge to call into question—
	(a)	a conviction of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court Martial of New Zealand established under section 8 of the Court Martial Act 2007, or a disciplinary officer acting under Part 5 of the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971; or
…
[10]	Faced with the effect of s 14(2)(a) of the Habeas Corpus Act, Mr Craig argues the District Court is not a court of competent jurisdiction.  That argument is misconceived.  Parliament created the District Court and its predecessor legislation, the latest iteration of which is the District Court Act 2016.  Section 7(3) of that Act specifically confers civil and criminal jurisdiction on the District Court and provides that it is a court of record.  It is therefore a court of competent jurisdiction, which had the authority to consider the charges against Mr Craig, accept his guilty pleas, and sentence him appropriately. 
[11]	If Mr Craig wishes to challenge the sentence imposed, then he may apply to the High Court for leave to appeal out of time the sentences he takes issue with.  
[12]	Mr Craig also attempts to challenge the integrity of the protection orders on the basis that the summary of facts that he pleaded guilty to referred to there being a final protection order whereas the protection order was temporary.  
[13]	That however does not advance Mr Craig’s case.  What is beyond dispute is that there was a protection order in place, he breached that order on three occasions and he pleaded guilty when charged with those breaches.
[14]	Mr Craig’s autism was specifically considered by the Judge who sentenced Mr Craig, but nevertheless decided a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate. 
[15]	Mr Craig’s attempts to challenge the legitimacy of his conviction fails by a very wide margin.  
Challenges to the way the sentences are being administered
[16]	A writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate mechanism for challenging the way a lawful sentence of imprisonment is administered.  In particular, habeas corpus can not provide relief where a prisoner is unhappy with cell arrangements.  This part of Mr Craig’s appeal fails because of the clear text and purpose of s 14(1A)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act which relevantly provides:
(1A)	… the High Court may refuse an application for the issue of the writ, without requiring the defendant to establish that the detention of the detained person is lawful, if the court is satisfied that—
	…
	(b)	an application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by the applicant.
Result
[17]	The application for an extension of time to appeal is granted.
[18]	The appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors: 
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch for Respondent