IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE	
CIV-2019-485-000620
[2019] NZHC 2910	

UNDER	the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016	
BETWEEN	BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON
Applicant	
AND	ATTORNEY GENERAL (CROWN)
First Respondent

REGISTRY (FINES)
Second Respondent	

On the Papers		
Judgment:	7 November 2019	

JUDGMENT OF DOOGUE J

Introduction

[1]	Mr Easton considers himself to have been self-appointed “under potential authority within a jurisdiction of section 1 of the Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand”.1

[2]	This judgment concerns an application for:

(a)	judicial review of the respondents, claiming that they are both in breach of an order made by Judge B A Morris on 7 August 2018 requiring the Collections Registry arm of the Ministry of Justice to instruct legal counsel and appear before the Court in the event that the Registrar sought to prosecute Mr Easton in relation to his fines; and

1	The Applicant’s Statement of Claim for issuance of Writ of Mandamus, dated 21 October 2019, at [1].
BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON v ATTORNEY GENERAL (CROWN) [2019] NZHC 2910 [7 November 2019]

(b)	a writ of mandamus requiring the Crown and the other respective authorities to remedy allegations of corruption.

[3]	Mr Easton seeks the following remedy from the Court:

That these matters are brought by the Crown to the attention of the British Monarch with urgency; and

(a)	with comprehension that the Applicant will travel to Maori Parliament as to be convened on 28 October 2019 – where the application for this writ is presented; and

(b)	that a reply will be requested from Maori Parliament on the importance of the procedure to Maori; and

(i)	whether the matter ought to be pursued to any remedial condition as may be qualified by Maori either in consultation with the Crown or otherwise by indigenous discretion; and

(c)	with or without – standing paragraph (b)(i) accepting in purpose that the British Monarchy shall engage the matters of controversy directly with Maori under the jurisdiction and proper authority of the Declaration of Independence 1835.

Should the proceedings be struck out?

[4]	The proceedings have been referred to me under r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules).

[5]	Rule 5.35A provides:

5.35A Registrar may refer plainly abusive proceeding to Judge before service

(1)	This rule applies if a Registrar believes that, on the face of a proceeding tendered for filing, the proceeding is plainly an abuse of the process of the court.

(2)	The Registrar must accept the proceeding for filing if it meets the formal requirements for documents set out in rules 5.3 to 5.16.

(3)	However, the Registrar may,—

(a)	as soon as practicable after accepting the proceeding for filing, refer it to a Judge for consideration under rule 5.35B; and

(b)	until a Judge has considered the proceeding under that rule, decline to sign and release the notice of proceeding and

attached memorandum for the plaintiff or the applicant (as appropriate) to serve the proceeding.

[6]	The High Court may strike out a proceeding  on  a  number  of  grounds.  Rule 15.1 of the Rules provides:
15.1	Dismissing or staying all or part of proceeding
(1)	The court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it—
(a)	discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(b)	is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or
(c)	is frivolous or vexatious; or
(d)	is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2)	If the court strikes out a statement of claim or a counterclaim under subclause (1), it may by the same or a subsequent order dismiss the proceeding or the counterclaim.
(3)	Instead of striking out all or part of a pleading under subclause (1), the court may stay all or part of the proceeding on such conditions as are considered just.
(4)	This rule does not affect the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The relevant principles

[7]	The principles relevant to a strike-out application are settled:

(a)	Except for pleaded allegations which are entirely speculative and without foundation, pleaded facts, whether or not admitted, are assumed to be true.2
(b)	The causes of action must be so clearly untenable they cannot succeed.3
(c)	The jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in a clear case.4 The Court will not strike out a claim if the defect can be cured by amending the pleadings.5

[8]	The principles applicable in judicial review proceedings are no different.6

2	Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267, endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45 at [33] per Elias CJ and Anderson J.
3	Attorney-General v Prince, above n 2, at 267.
4	At 267.
5	Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR 679 at [89].
6	New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA) at 167.

[9]	There is a question about the standing relied upon by Mr Easton, deriving as it does from his self-conferment of the Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand, but for present purposes I will set that to one side and consider whether or not to strike out the proceedings.

[10]	I shall approach the matter on the basis that Mr Easton is a party who has a personal interest at stake, or whose personal rights and interests are affected. That justifies standing according to the relevant authorities.

[11]	The documents filed in their present form disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action.

[12]	The statement of claim does not particularise any event(s) subsequent to Judge Morris’ minute whereby the Registrar of Fines has taken any action against  Mr Easton and where the Registrar of Fines was required to instruct counsel to appear before the Court in respect of such action. Thus, there appears to be no decision of the relevant decision makers to actually review.

[13]	The second application for writ of mandamus relates to the Letters Patent, signed 28 October 1983 by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. Mr Easton claims the patent is unauthorised in law.

[14]	Mr Easton’s claim is that the patent is unlawful because it was issued without the agreement of Māori Parliament in session at Waitangi in the appropriate year of 1983.

[15]	His claim is that the Crown and “Fines” have acted by failing to discharge their responsibilities:7

… failing to process and remedy allegations made of corruption with those still to be made so to be heard, those to identify serious and significant failure in administration.

7	The Applicant’s Statement of Claim, above n 1, at [6(a)].

[16]	Mr Easton’s best attempts at specifying the particular acts can be found at [7] of his statement of claim where he claims as a remedy “these matters are brought by the Crown to the attention of the British Monarch with urgency” and that:

(c)	with or without – standing paragraph (b)(i) accepting in purpose that the British Monarchy shall engage the matters of controversy directly with Maori under the jurisdiction and proper authority of the Declaration of Independence 1835.

[17]	The difficulty with this claim is that is does not properly identify what persons shall be directed to perform their official duties or correct an abuse of their discretion. Nor does it specify the particular act, the performance or omission of which is required by the law as an obligation.

Conclusion

[18]	These proceedings are struck out as neither of them disclose any reasonably arguable cause of action.

Doogue J

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Wellington