IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE	
CRI-2019-485-18
[2019] NZHC 1784	

BETWEEN	DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Applicant	
AND	KENNETH ROBERT O’REILLY
Respondent	

Hearing:	26 July 2019	
Appearances:	A W M Britton for the Applicant J M Robertson for Respondent	
Judgment:	26 July 2019	

JUDGMENT OF COOKE J

[1]	On 17 December 2015 the Court of Appeal sentenced Mr O’Reilly to six years, six months’ imprisonment on one representative charge of sodomy and three charges of indecent assault, reducing the High Court’s higher sentence.1 His sentence expiry and statutory release date is 22 August 2019.

[2]	The applicant, the Department of Corrections, has applied for an extended supervision order (ESO) to be imposed on Mr O’Reilly pursuant to s 107F of the Parole Act 2002 (the Act). Corrections seek an order for a period of 10 years.

Relevant law

[3]	The Chief Executive of Corrections may apply for an ESO pursuant to s 107F of the Act and the High Court may make the order pursuant to s 107I. The purpose of an extended supervision order is to protect members of the community from those

1	O’Reilly v R [2015] NZCA 604.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v O’REILLY [2019] NZHC 1784 [26 July 2019]

who, following receipt of a determinate sentence, pose a real and ongoing risk of committing serious sexual or violent offences.2 The maximum term of an ESO is 10 years.3 The term of the order must be the minimum period required to achieve the purpose given factors set out in that subsection.4

[4]	Ms Robertson for Mr O’Reilly initially indicated an intention to fully oppose the application, but on receipt of the advice from Mr Lascelles indicated that the opposition is confined to the period of the order.

[5]	The Court of Appeal in Department of Corrections v Alinizi outlined the process for imposing an ESO:5

[13]	In its original form s 107F of the Parole Act simply required, in order to impose an ESO, that the Court be satisfied that the offender was “likely” to commit a relevant offence on ceasing to be subject to a sentence of imprisonment. Under the new framework once it is established that an offender is an “eligible offender” the Court is required to engage in a three- step process:

(i)	the Court must determine whether the offender has, or has had, a pervasive pattern of serious sexual or violent offending;

(ii)	the Court must make specific findings as to whether the offender meets the qualifying criteria set out in s 107IAA; and

(iii)	if those criteria are met the Court must make a determination about the risk of the offender committing a relevant sexual or violent offence.

[6]	It is not in dispute that Mr O’Reilly is an “eligible offender” under s 107F.

Does the respondent have/has had a pervasive pattern of sexual offending?

[7]	A pervasive pattern of sexual is apparent from Mr O’Reilly’s conviction history. He has an extensive history of sexual offending dating back to 1962.

2	Parole Act 2002, s 107I(1).
3	Section 107I(4).
4	Section 107I(5).
5	Department of Corrections v Alinizi [2016] NZCA 468.

Convictions

[8]	Mr O’Reilly was first convicted in 1985 for two charges of sodomy. He was sentenced to eight months’ periodic detention. He was 39 years old at the time of the offending. The victim was a nine year old boy.

[9]	In 2011 Mr Riley was convicted of indecent assault of a female under 12 years of age. The offending occurred between 1982 and 1986, when Mr O’Reilly was 37– 41 years old. The victim was the daughter of a family friend. The first instance of indecent assault occurred when the victim was six years old. The second incident occurred when the victim was 10 years old. Mr O’Reilly was acquitted of seven other similar charges against the same victim and a second victim, her sister.

[10]	In October 2015 Mr O’Reilly was convicted of three charges of indecently assaulting an adult male.  The offending occurred between 2006  and 2008 when   Mr O’Reilly was 62–64 years old. The victim was aged between 19 and 20 years old and had  been  diagnosed  with  Asperger’s  syndrome.  The  victim  worked  with Mr O’Reilly. A number of incidents occurred in the workplace and at Mr O’Reilly’s house.

[11]	In October 2015 Mr O’Reilly was convicted of sodomy with a male child. The offending occurred between 1 January 1962 and 5 April 1966, when Mr O’Reilly was between 17 and 21 years old. The victim aged between seven and eleven years old. Mr O’Reilly would visit from time to time. The abuse ended when the boy and his family moved away.

History not resulting in a conviction

[12]	In assessing the pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending the court may have regard to the health assessor’s report. The health assessor’s report may contain references to conduct that did not result in a conviction.6

6	Section 107F(3); and Clark v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZCA 119 at [22]; Holland v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZCA 504 at [42].

[13]	In 1997 Mr O’Reilly was convicted for sexual offending against a minor. The offending occurred between 1972 and 1983, when Mr O’Reilly was between 28–39 years old. The victim was aged between eight and sixteen at the time. The offending would occur two to three times per week. Mr O’Reilly was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment but was acquitted of all charges after an appeal on the grounds of inconsistent verdicts from the Court.

Timeline of offending

[14]	In assessing all of the above offending it can be seen to have continuously occurred over a number of years from 1962 through to 2008 (46 years). The chronology of the offending is as follows:

•	1962–1966: sodomy offending against a male child aged between 7–11 years.
•	1972–1983: alleged range of sexual offending against a person aged between 8–16.
•	1982–1986: indecent assault against female child aged 6–10 years.
•	1985: sodomy offending against a nine year old male child.
•	2006–2008: indecent assault charges against vulnerable adult

[15]	I am satisfied that this demonstrates a pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending.

Qualifying criteria under s 107IAA

[16]	Section 107IAA provides four mandatory factors of which the Court must be satisfied before it can find there is a high risk of reoffending:

107IAA	Matters court must be satisfied of when assessing risk

(1)	A court may determine that there is a high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant sexual offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—

(a)	displays an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence; and

(b)	has a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending; and

(c)	has limited self-regulatory capacity; and

(d)	displays either or both of the following:

(i)	a lack of acceptance of responsibility or remorse for past offending:

(ii)	an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

Does Mr O’Reilly display an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence?

[17]	In order to display an intense drive, desire or urge does not require for the respondent to externally manifest those traits at the time of the application. Rather, the relevant traits and behavioural characteristics must be currently possessed by the offender.7

[18]	While Mr O’Reilly evidently displayed a strong drive to sexually offend in the past, the health assessor’s report from Mr Lascelles provided by the respondent notes there is a lack of recent evidence of a drive to sexually offend. The last recorded incident displaying a drive to sexually offend was in 2008, 11 years ago. He has, of course, been in prison over that time. Mr Lascelles also notes that the lack of evidence does not preclude the possibility that the drive has persisted over time. He describes the research relating to the effect of age in the following way:

51. Research of age and sexual recidivism risk is hampered by the absence of longitudinal studies, which would measure risk of offending for a group of men followed across their lifespans. Consequently, all the current research reflects summaries of data for groups of people across different ages, and does not represent the effect of aging except by conceptual extrapolation.

…

53.	A challenge in Mr O’Reilly’s case is how much weight should be given to his age, and how to incorporate the associated research on older offenders into the overall risk assessment. Two factors specific to Mr O’Reilly’s case are particularly pertinent, age at index offence, and his health status. Mr O’Reilly’s most recent detected offending was in 2006 at the age of 62 years. As Table 2 indicates, sexual recidivism in this age group is expected to be low and Mr O’Reilly is in the small percentage who has reoffended. Mr O’Reilly reports several significant health problems, and some loss of sexual functioning since the time of the previous offending. It is possible that this may serve as a protective factor if his self-report of this impairment is accurate.

54.	Given that an ESO can be imposed for a period of up to ten years, it is possible if not likely that Mr O’Reilly’s health status will alter over that

7	Department of Corrections v Martin [2016] NZHC 1060 at [17].

period. This would mean that the research in regard to age and recidivism may become increasingly relevant to his case…

[19]	In interviews conducted by both health assessors, Mr O’Reilly was adamant he had no current urges or desire to sexually offend. He reports several significant health problems (gout, high blood pressure, some loss of hearing and diabetes) and a loss of sexual functioning since the time of the previous offending. The health assessors both also suggest the drive to sexually offend may lessen with age. Mr O’Reilly is now 75 years old. But this is a generalisation and may depend on individual factors such as physical health, libido, impulsivity and emotional maturity.

[20]	Mr O’Reilly has also not participated in any rehabilitation or counselling programmes since 2008. He has not attempted to address the root causes of his underlying offending — in fact he denies most of his offending and says his victims’ claims are all fabricated.

[21]	The last factor seems to me to be of particular significance. In the absence of Mr O’Reilly taking any active steps to recognise his offending, and engage in rehabilitation or counselling programmes, it cannot simply be assumed that his age means that the external manifestation of his drive, desire or urge to commit the relevant sexual offences is no longer present. He has a long history over time of engaging in offending amounting to a manifestation of such urges, including offending when he was older when this is not common amongst that age group. In the absence of taking any steps to rehabilitate himself, it seems to me that the manifestation is still present.

Does Mr O’Reilly have a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending?

[22]	A “proclivity” for serious sexual offending has been interpreted to encompass the concept of a pattern.8 A ‘predilection’ is something like preference or particular liking, ‘proclivity’ is something more like “an inclination toward something considered morally wrong, such as sexual offending.”9

[23]	Mr O’Reilly’s criminal history reveals he has demonstrated a long-standing predilection and proclivity for serious sexual offending over a period of 46 years.

8	Holland v Department of Corrections [2016] NZCA 504 at [41].
9	Department of Corrections v Wrigley [2015] NZHC 1712 at [44].

Does Mr O’Reilly have a limited self-regulatory capacity?

[24]	Mr O’Reilly displays an ability to self-regulate in other facets of his life — with a history of stable employment, no history of drug or alcohol abuse and a stable relationship (Mr O’Reilly has been married to his wife since 1962). But there is no evidence of an ability to manage his behaviour in relation to sexual offending. Ordinarily this factor is assessed by reference to successes or failures in treatment programmes. But Mr O’Reilly denies his offending and as such, is not eligible for several treatment programmes. Mr O’Reilly reported that he had been offered a placement at the Kia Marama programme for sexual offenders but had declined. He said that attending would be “admitting guilt”.10 Mr Britton also reports that he has not been eligible for a  “deniers” programme as he has admitted some offending.   Mr Britton accepted that, at least to some extent, he was between a rock and a hard place in this respect.

[25]	Again the failure to engage in rehabilitation is decisive. The recidivist nature of Mr O’Reilly’s offending demonstrates his inability to self-regulate, in spite of sanctions and advanced age. I consider he has a limited self-regulatory capacity.

Has Mr O’Reilly accepted responsibility or display remorse for past offending?

[26]	Mr O’Reilly denies almost all his offending and refuses to accept responsibility for the impact on his victims. Mr O’Reilly only acknowledges the offending in 1985 but in interviews minimised the nature of the offending.11 The regret he did express in interviews was more directed to the consequences he has experienced such as imprisonment and removal from home life. In the face of such denials it is plain that Mr O’Reilly has not accepted responsibility.

Does Mr O’Reilly understand or show concern about the impact of his sexual offending on actual or potential victims?

[27]	Mr O’Reilly denies the majority of his offending and has not demonstrated any concern in respect of those victims. Instead he maintains their claims are fabricated. He suggested the allegations of offending by the person aged between eight and

10	Lascelles report at [28].
11	Lascelles report at [32].

sixteen were false in order to gain a financial incentive, and his other victims were possibly motivated by the same factor.

[28]	I am not satisfied Mr O’Reilly demonstrates any understanding or concern about the impact on his victims.

Other factors: assessment tool results

[29]	Both health assessors analysed Mr O’Reilly’s risk of reoffending using a number of different psychiatric assessment tools:

(a)	The Automated Sexual Recidivism Scale – Revised (ASRS-R). ASRS- R is a brief actuarial static risk screening instrument designed to estimate the likelihood of sexual offenders receiving further convictions for sexual offending. The scale only uses data from the offender’s official criminal record. Both health assessors  assessed  Mr O’Reilly at a low risk of reoffending using  this  method.  Both  Ms Brown and Mr Lascelles record that it is possible the scale is under predicting Mr O’Reilly’s risk of reoffending as age is heavily weighted in the measurement process. Mr O’Reilly’s criminal history, however, suggests that age is not a protective factor for him.

(b)	The Violence Risk Scale – Sexual Offender Version (VRS-SO) aims to assess sexual recidivism up to five years following release. The tool incorporates ratings from factors amenable to change (sexual deviancy, criminality and treatment responsivity) and static items (such as criminal history). Both health assessors assessed Mr O’Reilly at a high risk of reoffending.

(c)	Ms Brown also assessed Mr O’Reilly pursuant to the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) and the Release Proposal Feasibility Assessment – Revised (RPFA-R). Mr O’Reilly’s score was assessed as above average for New Zealand offenders.

Is there a high risk that the respondent will commit a relevant sexual offence in the future?

[30]	Previous cases have generally concluded that the respondent is at high risk of committing a relevant sexual offence upon satisfaction of the s 107IAA criteria.12 Broader considerations are then taken into account in the discretion to make an extended order under s 107I(2). Given the clear satisfaction of all the s 107IAA criteria and the actuarial tool results I am satisfied there is a significant risk the respondent will commit a relevant sexual offence in the future.

Overall discretion

[31]	Overall I am satisfied it is appropriate to make an order. Mr O’Reilly has continued to offend despite external stabilising factors such as consistent employment, a stable intimate relationship with an adult female and a lack of mental and physical health problems. He has a significant history of serious sexual offending over a 46 year period. He has continued to reoffend despite court-imposed sanctions and reportedly receiving treatment.13 Most significantly is Mr O’Reilly’s refusal to accept responsibility for his actions and refusal to undertake treatment programmes.14

Length of ESO

[32]	As indicated, the matter in dispute is the length of the order. In determining the length of an ESO order, the court must consider the factors under s 107I(5):

107I	Sentencing court may make extended supervision order

…

(4)	Every extended supervision order must state the term of the order, which may not exceed 10 years.

(5)	The term of the order must be the minimum period required for the purposes of the safety of the community in light of—

(a)	the level of risk posed by the offender; and

12	See, for example, Department of Corrections v Nepia [2014] NZHC 1448; Department of Corrections v Wrigley, above n 9.
13	Lascelles report at [28] notes Mr O’Reilly said he had undertaken private treatment for 12 sessions after his 1984 conviction but could not recall the content of those sessions.
14	At [29] Mr O’Reilly said he had been offered a placement at the Kia Marama programme but had declined. He said that attending would be “admitting guilt”.

(b)	the seriousness of the harm that might be caused to victims; and

(c)	the likely duration of the risk.

[33]	The focus of the length of time assessment must be on the safety of the community, rather than the facilitation of treatment. Proportionality, however, is a factor in deciding the length of an ESO — the length of the order must be proportionate to the level of risk.15 The applicant seeks the maximum 10 year term for the ESO. The respondent submits a five year term is appropriate.

[34]	Both health assessors assessed Mr O’Reilly at a high risk of reoffending. He has continued to offend, with no apparent decrease in severity, over a 46 year period. He has not participated in treatment or rehabilitation efforts. Although Mr O’Reilly is now aged 75, he has continued to reoffend even when reaching an older age bracket, indicating age is not necessarily a protective factor.

[35]	The seriousness of the harm that might be caused to the victims is significant. Mr O’Reilly’s criminal history demonstrates a capacity for sexual offending at highest levels of seriousness in terms of the sexual acts he has engaged in, and the age of his victims. Victims were exposed to abuse over a period of years. While Mr O’Reilly reports a lack of sexual functioning and health problems, I do not consider this diminishes his ability to cause his victims serious harm.

[36]	Both health assessors noted the difficulty of assessing the risk of reoffending when predicting over a period as long as 10 years due to the multitude of factors and circumstances that may arise over such a lengthy period and the inherent uncertainty of human behaviour.16 Overall he was assessed at a high risk of reoffending over the next five years in the absence of close supervision. The extent to which this risk will persist is uncertain given his age and possibility of declining health.

[37]	The respondent submits that the order should be imposed for a five year period, taking into account Mr Lascelles comment that Mr O’Reilly is assessed as being at a high risk of further sexual offending over the next five years.  I do not understand  Mr Lascelles to be providing a recommendation as to the length of time, however.

15	R v Peta [2007] NZCA 28, [2007] 2 NZLR 627, at [11].
16	Lascelles report at [70].

Rather he was simply identifying the difficulty of a risk assessment for a period of longer than five years.

[38]	Ms Robertson notes Mr O’Reilly is 75 years old and his risk profile may reduce with age. She cites two recent High Court decisions where the length of the ESO was shortened to take into account the fact that, over the lifetime of the order, the offender will move into an age cohort with a lower static risk.17 The determination of the length of order, however, is intensely fact-specific. The health assessors note the age cohort of above 60 is assessed at a lower risk, but Mr O’Reilly was 62 when engaging in his last offending.

[39]	While Mr O’Reilly has displayed a capacity to offend at an advanced age, after five years Mr O’Reilly will be 80 years of age. After 10 years he will be 85. At that point it is possible that health issues will serve as a protective factor but there is no way to be sure. Ms Robertson also points to the reduction of risk in light of the Child Sex Offender Register. In Department of Corrections v Miller Dobson J noted the purpose of the Register is to mitigate the risk posed by monitoring the offender and acts to reduce the level of his risk irrespective of his denial and irrespective of whether the risk decreases with age.18 I accept that the Register may decrease the risk of his offending to a degree.

[40]	The overall position is summarised in the following way by the two health assessors. Ms Brown says:

42 … As Mr O’Reilly maintains his innocence with regards to the majority of his sexual offending, he is not considered suitable to attend the Departmental intensive group-based treatment for child sexual offenders. He has also reoffended despite the presence of an age appropriate intimate relationship, suggesting that this relationship was not a protective factor for him. Mr O’Reilly also sexually offended at an older age indicating that age is not a protective factor for him. In addition, Mr O’Reilly has reoffended despite receiving official sanctions for his sexual offending behaviours. He presents with a high number of dynamic risk factors that reflect his level of risk, and that if remain unaddressed, suggest that this risk will remain at a high level over the longer term. Mr O’Reilly has not demonstrated that he is willing or able to actively manage his own risk and there is little

17	Department of Corrections v W [2016] NZHC 1082; and Department of Corrections v Skudder
[2016] NZHC 1717.
18	Department of Corrections v Miller [2017] NZHC 2527 at [59]

prospect of him being able to meaningfully engage in treatment. Therefore risk reduction is likely to be more successful when supported by external monitoring and management of Mr O'Reilly’s behaviour.

[41]	Mr Lascelles says:

71.	… it is my opinion that Mr O’Reilly is at high risk of sexual offending over the next five years in the absence of close supervision. The extent to which his risk will persist beyond this period is uncertain, given his age and the possibility of a significant change in his health status during the next 10 years. Mr O’Reilly's risk could potentially be reduced through the completion of sexual offence specific treatment to address his demonstrated risk factors.

72.	If the Court decided to impose an extended supervision order, it is difficult to provide evidence based advice regarding the appropriate duration for Mr O’Reilly. This is due to the inability of any assessor to forecast when an individual's risk might decline below the required threshold. It is for the Court to decide whether to consider a shorter order is appropriate, and rely on the Crown to apply for an extension if his risk remained high, or set a lengthier order and place the onus on Mr O’Reilly to apply for review if stable positive change had occurred.

[42]	Mr Lascelles was called to give evidence before me, and he confirmed that the real issue was that it was simply not possible to make an assessment beyond the five year timeframe.

[43]	I must only impose an order for the minimum period required to achieve its objectives given the factors set out in s 107I(5). This requirement should not be given only lip service. An ESO performs no punitive function, but it is penal in effect.19 It involves a significant restriction on the rights of the person subject to the order, which is imposed after their sentence. The restrictions involved must clearly be justified.

[44]	In Department of Corrections v Alinizi, the Court of Appeal noted that it would be open to a Court to direct an ESO of the full ten year period where an offender categorically denies previous offending and is unwilling to undertake treatment.20 In Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Paniora Jagose J summarised the position in the following way:21

19	See Belcher v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2007] 1 NZLR 507 (CA); Department of Corrections v Thorpe [2017] NZHC 2559 at [12].
20	Department of Corrections v Alinizi, above n 5, at [38].
21	Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Paniora [2018] NZHC 1505.

[42] In Department of Corrections v Nepia, Kós J observed “[c]ases where an ESO of ten years have been ordered typically involve a recurring pattern of sexual offending”.22 Lesser terms are justified by offenders’ advancing age,23 but also by their acceptance of responsibility, positive response to treatment, and access to support.24 An organising principle for the imposition of a minimum term at the maximum period available may be the pathological nature of such offending, habitually denied by offenders, and therefore an absence of treatment. Comparatively, serious violent offending appears more frequently environmental, less open to denial, and for which treatment and support are more accepted.

[45]	There are effectively two techniques to address a situation where there is uncertainty about the necessary length of the order. In Department of Corrections v Miller Dobson J reduced the period to eight years on the basis that he was not prepared to accept on the evidence before him that Mr Miller would “maintain the currently assessed level of risk indefinitely” (at [60]).25 He noted that the Department could later make a further application to extend the period. Similarly in Department of Corrections v Alinizi the Court of Appeal held:26
[40] … In our view a period of six years should provide an adequate opportunity for the development of a safety plan with protective factors which would safeguard the community as well as providing a sufficient time for Mr Alinizi’s behaviour in the community to be monitored and assessed. It would be open to the Chief Executive to apply to extend the order towards the end of that period in the event that the present circumstances, including Mr Alinizi’s categorical denial of his sexual offending, pertain.

[46]	On the other hand it is also open for Mr O’Reilly himself to make an application to vary or discharge an order under s 107M if the Court made an order for a longer period.27 The ultimate issue is, therefore, what the presumption should be, and who it is that should make any further application.

[47]	It seems to me on the present evidence I can only be satisfied that the qualifying risk is likely to remain for five years in accordance with s 107I(5). It is possible that the risk will remain after that time, but there is no evidential foundation for me to reach that conclusion before me now. I am obliged to impose the minimum period given the

22	Department of Corrections v Nepia [2014] NZHC 1448 at [41].
23	Eg, Wardle v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZCA 298; Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v van der Plaat [2016] NZHC 3186.
24	Eg, Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v H (CA359/05) CA359/05, 1 May 2006 (five years); Chief Executive Department of Corrections v Clark [2017] NZHC 771 (two years).
25	Department of Corrections v Miller, above n 18.
26	Department of Corrections v Alinizi, above n 5.
27	See Woodhouse v Department of Corrections [2011] NZCA 333 at [11]–[12].

likely duration of the risk, and the other considerations. If after five years the evidence is that the qualifying risk still exists, the Department of Corrections can make application for a further ESO order. But I am not satisfied it is appropriate for me to make a longer order against only a possibility that such risk might still exist. I must base the assessment on the evidence I presently have.

[48]	Accordingly I grant the application for an Extended Supervision Order for the period of five years. This is expressly on the basis that the Department is later able to make further application if it is justified given the evidence gained from the period of operation of the ESO. This gives Mr O’Reilly the chance to demonstrate that an ESO is no longer required. It is also granted with the following interim special conditions under s 107IA (given that there is not sufficient time for a Parole Board hearing) that Mr O’Reilly is:

(a)	To reside at an address approved by a Probation Officer and not to move from that, or any other approved address, without the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.

(b)	Not to enter the Masterton District as defined by a map provided by a Probation Officer, without the prior written approval of your Probation Officer.

(c)	Not to enter or loiter near any school, early childhood education centre, park, library, swimming pool, other recreational facility, church, or other area specified in writing by a Probation Officer, unless you have the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.

(d)	To submit to electronic monitoring as directed by a Probation Officer in order to monitor your compliance with any conditions relating to your whereabouts.

(e)	To comply with the requirements of electronic monitoring and provide unimpeded access to your approved residence by a Probation Officer and/or representatives of the monitoring company for the purpose of

maintaining the electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a Probation Officer.

(f)	To obtain written permission from your Probation Officer prior to starting, or changing your position and/or place of employment (including voluntary and unpaid work).

(g)	Not to contact, directly or indirectly, or otherwise associate with any victim of your offending, directly or indirectly, unless you have the prior written consent of your Probation Officer.

(h)	Not to have contact or otherwise associate, with a person under the age of 16 years, directly or indirectly unless you have the prior written approval of a Probation Officer and are under the supervision and in the presence of an adult, over the age of 20 years who has been approved in writing by a Probation Officer.

(i)	Not to join any social or music clubs without the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.

(j)	To disclose to a Probation Officer, at the earliest opportunity, details of any intimate relationship which commences, resumes, or terminates.

Cooke J

Solicitors:
Luke Cunningham Clere, Wellington for Applicant Quay Legal, Wellington for Respondent