IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE	
CIV-2019-404-2457
[2020] NZHC 416	

BETWEEN	STEPHEN LOFTUS
Applicant	
AND	AUCKLAND COUNCIL
Respondent	

Hearing:	5 March 2020	
Appearances:	Applicant in person
C G McDiarmid for the respondent	
Judgment:	6 March 2020	

JUDGMENT OF PALMER J

This judgment was delivered by me on 6 March 2020 at 11.00am.
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Party/Solicitors:
Applicant in person
Meredith Connell, Auckland

LOFTUS v AUCKLAND COUNCIL [2020] NZHC 416 [6 March 2020]

What happened?

[1]	Mr Stephen Loftus does not acknowledge that is his name, though he understands that is how New Zealand’s legal system identifies him. He prefers to be known as “Stephen: loftus”. Neither does he acknowledge that he is the person charged under that name with owning a dog, “Ringo”, who attacked an eight year old boy contrary to s 57(2) of the Dog Control Act 1996. He insists the charging notice was not valid because it did not have a proper court seal on it.

[2]	His arguments about this, and associated arguments, were carefully dealt with by Judge A M Wharepouri in the Manukau District Court who convicted and sentenced him.1 Unsurprisingly, “Stephen: loftus” did not succeed in his arguments. He also says the sentencing decision was invalid because the Judge referred to him as “you” and he is not “you”.

Application for judicial review

[3]	Now “Stephen: loftus” seeks judicial review of the Judge’s decision. He says the legal process used was a not a lawful process. His statement of claim is a mish- mash of pseudo-legal phrases that have no meaning in New Zealand law. Some of those phrases correspond to labels of grounds of judicial review. But there are no details of them.

[4]	The statement of claim closely resembles, in format and lack of substance, another statement of claim I struck out recently for abuse of process.2 There are also similarities to what one Canadian Judge has called “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” (OPCA).3 Ellis J recently considered the issue of OPCA litigants, and noted:4
At a general level, it seems to me that it will inevitably be an abuse of process for a litigant to attempt to employ OPCA concepts in seeking to avoid or defeat any state, regulatory, contract, family or other obligations recognised by law.

1	Auckland Council v Loftus [2019] NZDC 2063 aty [27]–[35].
2	MC v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki, Ministry for Children [2020] NZHC 296.
3	Meads v Meads (2012) ABQB 571.
4	Niwa v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 853 at [16].

[5]	As “Stephen: loftus” acknowledged today in the call of the matter in the Judicial Review List, he considers the law of the land is “totally different” to the legal process being used in the New Zealand courts. He also acknowledged my suggestion that he would accordingly be unsurprised if I do not accept his arguments.

[6]	The proceeding was served on the Auckland Council, which has filed a detailed affidavit in response and submits the proceeding should be dismissed.

Should the application be struck out?

[7]	I consider that the statement of claim discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, hearing it is likely to cause prejudice and delay to the respondent and the court system and it is an abuse of the process of the court. I strike out the statement of claim accordingly, under the common law of New Zealand, the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, r 15.1 and/or r 5.35B of the High Court Rules 2016.

Palmer J