IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE	
CIV-2019-404-2720
[2020] NZHC 1292	

BETWEEN	LIANSEN MAO
First Plaintiff

GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITED
Second Plaintiff	
AND	JIALING MAO
First Defendant

GUOPING NIU
Second Defendant	

Hearing:	9 June 2020	
Appearances:	GM Illingworth QC & D Liu for Green Land Investment Limited No appearance for Defendants or First Plaintiff	
Judgment:	10 June 2020	

JUDGMENT NO.3 OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SMITH

This judgment was delivered by me on 10 June 2020 at 4.45pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:
D Liu, Heritage Law, Auckland

Copy to:
Liansen Mao Jialing Mao Guoping Niu

Mao v Mao (No.3) [2020] NZHC 1292 [10 June 2020]

[1]	On 9 April 2020 I made certain orders for specific performance on an application filed by the second plaintiff (Green Land) on its own behalf, and as attorney for the first plaintiff, for summary judgment.1 I ordered the defendants to discharge certain mortgages they had registered on the title to a property at 387 Ormiston Road, Flat Bush, Auckland (the property).The first plaintiff (Mr Mao), who is the registered proprietor of the property, opposed the summary judgment application.

[2]	I ordered the defendants to discharge their respective mortgages within 10 working days of the date of my judgment.

[3]	The defendants and Mr Mao applied to set aside the judgment. They produced certain further evidence, and Green Land provided an affidavit in opposition which appeared to show that its case for summary judgment was weaker than that which had been advanced at the summary judgment hearing. On 2 June 2020, I made an order setting aside the summary judgment. My reasons for that order were given on 3 June 2020.2 For convenience, I will refer to the summary judgment given on 9 April 2020 as “the Judgment”, and the setting aside judgment, and the subsequent reasons for it, as “Judgment No.2”.

[4]	On 4 June 2020, Green Land filed an interlocutory application (the application) for orders directing Westpac Banking Corporation, ASB Bank, Bank of New Zealand and ANZ Bank New Zealand Limited (collectively, “the banks”) to disclose details of certain bank cheques, copies of which Mr Mao had referred to in his affidavit in support of the application to set aside the Judgment.

[5]	On 5 June 2020 I gave directions for the filing of any documents in opposition, and directed that the application would be heard on 9 June 2020 at 4pm. The defendants and Mr Mao filed a document which I will treat as a notice of opposition, and each filed written submissions, within the time directed by the Court. The defendants and Mr Mao were advised of their entitlement to participate in the hearing by use of the Virtual Meeting Room facility, but none of them elected to do so. Each

1	Mao & Green Land Investment Ltd v Mao [2020] NZHC 738.
2	Mao & Green Land Investment Ltd v Mao [2020] NZHC 1216.

of them advised by email that they were content for the application to be dealt with on the papers.

[6]	The application was served on each of the banks, and each advised that it would abide the decision of the Court.

[7]	I now give judgment on the application.

Background

[8]	I do not propose to set out the full background, which is set out in detail in the Judgment and in Judgment No.2.

[9]	For present purposes, it is enough to say that Green Land is the owner of certain land adjoining the property, on which it has successfully completed Stage 1 of a large subdivision. Stage 2 of the subdivision required that part of the property be vested in Auckland Council for driveway purposes, and Green Land entered into certain agreements with Mr Mao for that to occur (the agreements are summarised in the Judgment, and it is not necessary to refer to them in detail here).

[10]	The transfer of the (relatively small) part of the property for driveway purposes required the consent of mortgagees holding mortgages over the property. When the relevant agreements between Green Land and Mr Mao were made, a first mortgage over the property was held by Westpac.

[11]	The Westpac loan fell due for repayment shortly after the last of the relevant agreements was entered into between Green Land and Mr Mao, and on or about 30 June 2017 funds were provided to Mr Mao’s solicitors, Lucy Chu Lawyers, to discharge the Westpac mortgage. At or about that time, separate mortgages were registered on the title to the property by the first and second defendants, who are close relatives of Mr Mao. It appears that Green Land was unaware of the mortgages to the first and second defendants until late in 2019, when its Stage 2 subdivision works were nearing completion and it needed mortgagee consent from the defendants to the vesting of the driveway land, before it could deposit the Stage 2 subdivision plan and new titles could be issued for individual sections in Stage 2. A fairly substantial

number of sections in the Stage 2 subdivision had been pre-sold, and further delays in getting the Stage 2 plan deposited and new titles issued would pose a substantial and growing risk for Green Land that many of the pre-purchasers would cancel their purchase contracts.

[12]	In the meantime, serious disputes had arisen between Mr Mao and Green Land, and Mr Mao had issued a proceeding in this Court under CIV-2016-404-1241 (the 1241 proceeding). Green Land has filed a counterclaim in the 1241 proceeding, and I understand that a trial of the proceeding is scheduled for October 2020. The relevant agreements between Mr Mao and Green Land required Green Land to carry out certain works on the property, and Mr Mao contends in the 1241 proceeding (and in this proceeding) that Green Land has been guilty of substantial breaches, primarily by way of delaying the work on the property. He says that the delays have caused him to lose a purchaser for the property, with substantial resulting loss.

[13]	The defendants say that they originally did give consent to the transfer of part of the property for vesting in Auckland Council for driveway purposes, but their consents were tied to particular dates by which they say Green Land was obliged to complete the work for Mr Mao on the property. When the work was not completed by those dates, they say that they withdrew their consents.

[14]	When it found out about the defendants’ mortgages, Green Land formed the view that they were effectively shams, put on the title to the property to obstruct the Stage 2 subdivision and give Mr Mao leverage in the case he is running in the 1241 proceeding. Green Land has referred to a particular sale transaction entered into by Mr Mao at or about the time of the repayment of the Westpac mortgage, which should have produced a substantial cash sum for Mr Mao. It contends that there would have been no need for him to borrow money from the defendants and it denies that he ever did so. Late in 2019, it asked the defendants to discharge their two mortgages, on the basis that nothing was owing under them, and no obligations remained to be performed by Mr Mao under the mortgages. In making that request, and in subsequently issuing this proceeding, Green Land was acting under an irrevocable power of attorney given to it by Mr Mao in March 2017. In the Judgment, I held that Green Land was entitled to use that power of attorney in issuing this proceeding.

[15]	The defendants made it clear in a response given through their New Zealand solicitors, Lucy Chu Lawyers, that they would not discharge their mortgages. Green Land then issued this proceeding.

Green Land’s statement of claim

[16]	Green Land’s statement of claim dated 11 December 2019 contains the following:
8.	The first and second defendants’ mortgages are subject to an implied statutory covenant that the first and second defendants as mortgagees will on payment by [Mr Mao] as mortgagor of all amounts and the performance of all other obligations secured by the mortgage:
(a)	return to [Mr Mao] as mortgagor the mortgage instruments; and
(b)	give to [Mr Mao] as mortgagor mortgage discharge instruments executed in compliance with s 83 of the Property Law Act 2007; and
(c)	do all things that are reasonably necessary to allow the mortgage discharge instruments to be registered; and
(d)	give to [Mr Mao] as mortgagor all certificates or instruments of title and other documents deposited with the first and second defendants as mortgagees on account of the mortgages (if any).
9.	No funds have been advanced by the first and second defendants to [Mr Mao] pursuant to the mortgages … or otherwise.
10.	There are no outstanding sums or unperformed obligations under the first and second defendants’ mortgages.
11.	The discharges of the first and second defendants’ mortgages are necessary for [the proposed driveway land] to be transferred to [Green Land] and to vest in Auckland Council as road.

[17]	Green Land relied on the following covenant implied in the defendants’ mortgages by s 95 and cl.18 of Part 1 of the 2nd Schedule to the Property Law Act 2007 (the PLA):
18 Discharge of mortgage
The mortgagee will, on payment by the mortgagor of all amounts and the performance of all other obligations secured by the mortgage,—
(a)	return to the mortgagor the mortgage instrument; and
(b)	give to the mortgagor a mortgage discharge instrument executed in compliance with section 83 of the Property Law Act 2007; and
(c)	if the mortgage is registered, do all things that are reasonably necessary to allow a mortgage discharge instrument to be registered; and
(d)	give to the mortgagor all certificates or instruments of title and other documents deposited with the mortgagee on account of the mortgage (if any).

Mr Mao’s evidence in the setting aside application

[18]	Mr Mao provided an affidavit in support of the application by the defendants and himself to set aside the Judgment. I summarised the relevant part of his evidence in Judgment No.2, as follows:

24.	Mr Mao produced a number of documents designed to show that the defendants did advance funds to Mr Mao at or about the time the Westpac mortgage was discharged. He produced copies of separate term loan agreements between himself and each of the defendants, both dated 3 July 2017. The term loan agreements were said to have been entered into by Mr Mao as trustee of the Trillion Billion & Others Family Trust (the Trust). The amount said to have been advanced by the first defendant was $1,001,730, and the loan expiry date was 30 June 2018. Interest was payable at the lower, non-default, rate of 8 per cent per annum. The term loan agreement relating to the second defendant showed a principal sum of $1,300,000, with a due date of 30 June 2018. The interest rate was the same as that set out in the term loan agreement signed by the first defendant.

25.	The next document produced by Mr Mao was an extension of loan document dated 8 May 2018. The parties were Mr Mao (said to be acting as trustee for Trust), and the defendants. The document recorded Mr Mao’s request on behalf of the Trust to extend the term loan between the parties to 31 August 2018, with interest at the higher rate of 12 per cent from 30 June 2018. The document went on to record that if Green Land could not complete the subdivision works by 31 August 2018, and the settlement by the buyer of the land (DongFeng Lin) was not completed by 31 August 2018, the penalty rate would rise to 20 per cent per annum until the work was completed. The term of the loan would be extended to the date that the property was refinanced to a third party, or another proper arrangement was made. Ms Jiawen Mao agreed to be added as an additional guarantor to the term loan documents, and she also signed the extension agreement.

26.	Mr Mao provided copies of four bank cheques made out in favour of the firm of solicitors who acted for him in the settlement of the Westpac mortgage, Lucy Chu Lawyers. The first bank cheque was for the sum of $1,001,730, issued by the Greenwoods Corner branch of the ASB Bank. The other three bank cheques, which together totalled
$1,300,000 (the amount said to have been advanced by way of term loan by the second defendant) were issued by three separate banks on 30 June 2017. The first cheque was issued by Westpac Bank, Ti Rakau Drive branch. It was for $300,000. The second cheque was for
$700,000, issued by the Bank of New Zealand, Willis Street branch Wellington. The third cheque was for $300,000. It was issued by the Botany Downs branch of the ANZ Bank.

…

27.	… [Mr Mao] said that his mortgage with Westpac was due for repayment on 30 June 2017, and no other parties were willing to refinance the property due to the non-performance of Green Land’s work during the period. He referred to his change of circumstances following his retirement from business, saying that he was unable to provide proof of income. As a result, he said that he asked for help from his family members, the first and second defendants –

… to refinance the property by their other equity as guarantors to other term loan agreement in order to obtain loan from third party for the funding to repay Westpac in full by 30.6.2017 and not purposely to obstruct [Green Land’s] subdivision as per clause 4 of the Deed of Settlement dated 28.3.2017.

Green Land’s interlocutory application

[19]	Green Land asks for orders from each of the banks, that they disclose forthwith to it the following information concerning the bank cheques issued by them:

(a)	The account name and number of the bank account from which the funds for the bank cheque were drawn; and

(b)	The full name and address of the owner of the source account.

[20]	Green Land says in the application that the bank cheques were relied upon by the defendants to verify their alleged contributions to their mortgages, but the defendants have not disclosed the bank account details or bank statements from which the bank cheques were funded, and they have not otherwise verified the true source of the funds. Green Land says that the true source of the funds is an issue of crucial importance in the proceeding.

[21]	The application is made under s 75 of the Evidence Act 2006, and r 8.21 of the High Court Rules 2016.

The opposition by the defendants and Mr Mao

[22]	The defendants and Mr Mao filed a document headed “Interlocutory application to strike-out/set aside [Green Land’s] interlocutory application for bank account disclosure orders”. I will treat the document as a notice of opposition under r
7.24 of the High Court Rules.

[23]	The defendants and Mr Mao ask for the following:

(1)	An order striking out the application; or

(2)	An order deferring the application pending determination of the issues in the 1241 proceeding; or

(3)	An order striking out the application and replacing it with orders requiring the banks to confirm (i) that the bank cheques were valid and cleared funds that were transferred to Lucy Chu Lawyers’ trust account; and (ii) that the bank account holders were not either Mr Mao or (his daughter) Ms Jiawen Mao.

[24]	The opposition then set out various details of Green Land’s alleged breaches of the agreements entered into by it and Mr Mao, including the contention that the relevant agreements have now been cancelled. I do not consider those claims and contentions are relevant for the purposes of this judgment, which is only concerned with a much narrower aspect of the wider disputes between the parties.

[25]	The opposition also included what appears to be an attempt at bargaining with Green Land, on at least a partial resolution of the dispute. Again, that is not something I can be concerned with in determining the application.

[26]	Relevant to the present application, the defendants and Mr Mao said:

33. The account owners are the lenders/funders of [the defendants] that provided the bank cheques after [the defendants]/family members of [the defendants] provided their worldwide security to the lenders/funders and not third party in this proceeding, strictly they are the third party of third party in this matter.

[27]	In a joint submission, the defendants confirmed that the relevant account owners are the lenders/funders of the defendants that provided the bank cheques after the defendants/family members “provided their worldwide securities to the lenders/funders and not third party in this proceeding, strictly they are the third party of third party in this matter”.

[28]	The defendants said that these lenders/funders had sent unfriendly messages to them since April 2019, due to substantial delays [with the subdivision works, including the work Green Land was required to perform on the property]. The defendants expressed concern that Green Land might threaten legal action against these lenders/funders, as the defendants themselves have experienced (in this proceeding). They also submitted that, under pressure from Green Land, their lenders/funders might provide all information about properties/equity owned by them and their partners/children, who are also guarantors of the loans, and that will cause further damage to [the defendants] and the family members.

Discussion and conclusions

Legal position

[29]	Section 75 of the Evidence Act 2006 materially provides:

75 Bank officer not compellable to produce banking records
(1)	In any proceedings to which a bank is not a party, no officer of the bank is compellable—
(a)	to produce any banking record of the bank, the contents of which can be proved under section 19; or
(b)	to appear as a witness to prove the matters, transactions, and amounts recorded in those records.
(2)	Subsection (1) is subject to any contrary order of a Judge made for a special reason.
…

[30]	Rule 8.21 of the High Court Rules materially provides:

8.21 Order for particular discovery against non-party after proceeding commenced
(1)	This rule applies if it appears to a Judge that a person who is not a party to a proceeding may be or may have been in the control of 1 or more documents or a group of documents that the person would have had to discover if the person were a party to the proceeding.
(2)	The Judge may, on application, order the person—
…
(c)	… to make those documents available for inspection, in accordance with rule 8.27, to the party or parties specified in the order.
(3)	An application for an order under subclause (2) must be made on notice to the person and to every other party who has filed an address for service.

[31]	Mr Illingworth referred to the decision of Master Thomson in Yan v Post Office Bank Limited, which concerned an application for discovery against a non-party, Westpac Banking Corporation.3 The application was made under s 7 of the Banking Act 1983 (now repealed), and alternatively under High Court Rule 301 (the forerunner to r 8.21 of the High Court Rules 2016). The evidence showed that the bank would not give the applicant (the defendant) access to the documents sought from Westpac without an order of the court. The Master considered that the defendant should not be prevented from obtaining what might prove to be relevant information supporting its case. He approved an order that Westpac file an affidavit of documents in its possession relating to certain specific matters, but he elected not to make the order under the Banking Act provision. The order was made under r 301 of the High Court Rules.

[32]	Rule 8.21 was considered by Kós J in Vector Gas Contracts Ltd v Contact Energy Ltd (Vector Gas).4 His Honour identified the following principles:

(1)	Under r 8.21 the Court’s role is to determine whether the material would be discoverable by the non-party if they were in fact the party to the proceeding. The test is simply the relevant discovery test applicable to a party, based primarily on the adverse documents regime. Excursions on trains of enquiry should be rare where non-parties are being compelled to embark.5

(2)	The approach taken by the Court should be broadly consistent with that taken to the issue of subpoenas to produce documents at trial.6

(3)	A non-party discovery order will only be made if it is necessary, in that other sources of evidence are unlikely to be sufficient because they are materially incomplete or unreliable and also that the documents sought may make a real difference and are not merely marginal.7

3	Yan v Post Office Bank Ltd CP 114/92 HC Wellington, 13 December 1994.
4	Vector Gas Contracts Ltd v Contact Energy Ltd (Vector Gas) [2014] NZHC 3171; [2015] 2 NZLR 670.
5	At [58].
6	At [58].
7	At [59].

[33]	Finally, I note under this heading the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wallis Brothers Ltd v Canterbury Bye Products Ltd, where the Court considered the inter- relationship between s 7 of the Banking Act and general orders for discovery.8 The Court considered that an order under the Banking Act would be made only where necessary, and that an order should not be made until the results of the discovery between the parties was known.9

Analysis

[34]	At the hearing, I enquired of Mr Illingworth what the purpose of the application was, filed as it was within a matter of days after the Judgment had been set aside.

[35]	Mr Illingworth told me that Green Land’s purpose was to progress the proceeding in the ordinary list, but with early knowledge of the correct position on the crucial issue of whether funds were advanced by the defendants (and whether any funds remain owing), or whether any obligations remain to be performed by Mr Mao under the defendants’ mortgages. Mr Illingworth acknowledged that the disclosure sought from the banks will not provide Green Land with the whole story on those issues, but it is likely to shed light on a substantial part of them, and the rest of the story can be obtained from the discovery Green Land will seek in due course from the defendants. Also, Mr Illingworth told me that it was highly likely that Green Land would apply for an urgent fixture for the hearing of the substantive action.

[36]	This is not, then, an attempt to obtain additional evidence with a view to attempting to “re-open the re-opening” of the Judgment (in my view, non-party discovery or orders under s 75 of the Evidence Act would not normally be granted for that purpose).

[37]	Approaching the matter on that basis, I accept first that the information sought from the banks is relevant. There is a clear issue between Green Land and the defendants and Mr Mao as to whether the defendants (i) ever advanced any money to Mr Mao, or (ii) whether he entered into any obligations to them that remain

8	Wallis Brothers Ltd v Canterbury Bye Products Ltd (1985) 5 PRNZ 590.
9	At 592.

unperformed, that are secured by the defendants’ mortgages. The term loan agreements produced by Mr Mao in his evidence on the setting aside application appear to show that the defendants did advance $2.3 million to Mr Mao, but the defendants’ submissions in opposition to the application suggest that all they may have done is make properties owned by them in various parts of the world available as security for funds advanced by third parties (possibly including other family members). In due course, the defendants will be required to provide discovery of any securities they have given for third party funding of that sort (if such security was given), and if the $2.3 million in funding did not pass directly through their hands they will presumably disclose any direction from them to the third party funders that the funds be provided direct to Mr Mao (or to any other party to whom third party funding secured over the defendants’ property may have been paid). If the $2.3 million was in fact provided by third party funds, secured against properties owned by the defendants, it appears that the ultimate questions under the PLA will be (a) whether any part of the third party funding remains unpaid, and (if so) (b) whether the defendants’ mortgages secure any indemnity Mr Mao may have given the defendants in consideration of them putting up security for the third party funding.

[38]	In the meantime, the existence of any such third party funding is denied by Green Land. In an affidavit sworn by Mr Lu on 12 May 2020, there is evidence that Mr Mao transferred a property at 405 Ormiston Road to Big Fresh Orchid Flowers Vegetable (NZ) Limited (Big Fresh). Mr Lu said that this property had a rating valuation of $720,000, and was unencumbered by any mortgage at the time of sale. He said that Mr Mao should have received at least $700,000 from the sale.

[39]	I accept that Green Land’s pleading that the defendants never advanced any funds to Mr Mao, read with the term loan agreements that appear to suggest that they did, immediately makes relevant the question of who funded the bank cheques. In terms of the requirement of r 8.21 that the documents sought be relevant documents that the banks themselves would have to discover if they were parties to the proceeding, the answer is therefore “yes” – the documents are relevant, and the banks would have had to discover them.

[40]	I also accept that disclosure from the banks is necessary. In view of the defendants’ ongoing refusal to properly explain the funding arrangements, in such a way as to make it clear whether any monies remain owing by Mr Mao under their mortgages, or any obligations remain to be discharged by him under the mortgages, I accept that it is necessary for Green Land to seek such (partial) verification as it can obtain on those questions from reliable third party sources. As it appears from most the recent affidavit of Mr Mao and the defendants’ submissions on the application that details of the bank accounts used to fund the bank cheques will not be in the control of the defendants or Mr Mao, non-party discovery from the banks is necessary to provide at least some (reliable and neutral) verification on what is clearly an important issue.

[41]	In the particular circumstances of this case, I am also satisfied that the documents sought may make a real difference, and are unlikely to be merely marginal.

[42]	The next question is “why now?”. In the ordinary course, discovery between parties would not take place until after statements of defence have been filed, and the Court has made an order for standard or tailored discovery. Non-party discovery would normally be considered after that. Mr Illingworth’s answer was, in effect, “why wait?” The information sought from the banks will, on the defendants’ version of events, not be available from the defendants or Mr Mao’s own discovery lists, and the arguments about the application of cl.18 of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the PLA are clear and obvious on the documents filed to date. Rule 1.2 of the High Court Rules provides that the objective of the rules is to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of any proceeding or interlocutory application, and Mr Illingworth submitted that advancing the non-party discovery sought from the banks as a priority matter would be entirely consistent with r 1.2.

[43]	I accept Mr Illingworth’s submission on this point. I am not aware of any rule or principle that would preclude the Court from making a non-party discovery order at any point after a proceeding has commenced, especially where the issue on which the discovery is sought goes to the very heart of the proceeding, and the documents sought do not appear to be in the control of the other party. In this case, we have the unusual situation where the statement of claim appears to raise only one substantial

issue – does cl.18 of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the PLA apply or doesn’t it? On the face of it, the defendants would appear to have a complete defence to the claim if cl.18 does not apply. But they are refusing to produce documents (which must exist if what they say is true), and they appear to have been drip-feeding other documents which, if they are genuine, clearly do not reveal the full story. I also accept that if, for example, the bank records sought by Green Land were to show that the funds used to pay for at least some of the bank cheques could be linked to the Big Fresh transaction, that could be relevant evidence on any application Green Land might make for an urgent fixture for the substantive proceeding.

[44]	If third party funding documents are eventually produced by the defendants when they provide their own discovery, the bank information now sought can be matched with the names appearing on the claimed third party funding and security documents, and in the particular circumstances of this case I am satisfied that verification of that sort is both necessary and appropriate.

[45]	I do not accept the submissions made by the defendants that the funders or lenders to whom they have referred might be at risk of some sort of harassment from Green Land if their names and details were now to be known. On the defendants’ own account, they have given security to the so-far-unnamed lenders or funders over their own property, and they will have to disclose the relevant security documents when they provide their own discovery in any event. Nor is it clear to me why Green Land would have any reason to “harass” the lenders or funders: it is the defendants who hold the mortgages over the property, not the lenders/funders.

Finally, I should record that Mr Illingworth relied primarily on s 75 of the Evidence Act. He submitted that the section was intended to replace the now repealed provisions of the Banking Act, which were designed to protect bank officers from being compelled to produce banking records for court proceedings in the absence of special reason. It seems to me that the right answer in the present situation, where the parties are in the early stages of the proceeding and what is really sought is discovery of documents from non-parties, is to make the orders under r 8.21, but (as the non-parties are banks) with appropriate regard to the requirements of s 75 of the Evidence Act. Approaching the matter in that way, I am satisfied that there are special reasons in this

case to require the banks to provide the information sought. The special reasons lie in what I am satisfied is a special need, in the particular circumstances of this case (where the term loan agreements suggest that the defendants advanced the $2.3 million to Mr Mao, while their submissions say that some other parties advanced the money), for independent verification from the banks of the identities of those who were the immediate funders of the bank cheques. Those identities can then be matched (or not) with the names of the funders/lenders when the defendants provide their discovery.

[46]	For all of those reasons, I am satisfied that the orders sought should be made. Draft orders were submitted by Mr Illingworth shortly before the hearing on 9 June 2020, and a copy of the draft orders is annexed to this judgment. I am satisfied that the draft orders are appropriate, except that “9 June 2020” in paragraph 1 should read “10 June 2020”. With that amendment, I make orders in terms of the draft submitted.

Costs

[47]	Leave is reserved to Green Land to file and serve a memorandum seeking costs on the application, within 15 working days after the non-party discovery has been provided by all of the banks. The defendants and Mr Mao may file and serve a memorandum in reply on costs within 10 working days after their receipt of Green Land’s costs memorandum. Any costs memorandum by Green Land may be served by email, at the same email addresses used for service of the other orders made on the application.

Associate Judge Smith