IN THE Court of appeal OF new Zealand
	
CA139/2015
[2015] NZCA 386

BETWEEN	
KORORIA MATIA
Applicant	

AND	
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Respondent	

Hearing:	
11 August 2015	

Court:	
Cooper, Simon France and Asher JJ	

Counsel:	
N W Woods and S G Rhind for Applicant
S K Barr and J N Burns for Respondent	

Judgment:	
24 August 2015 at 10.30 am	

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A	The time for applying for leave to appeal is extended.
B	The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Cooper J)
[1]	Following a judge-alone hearing before Judge Field in the District Court at Manukau, the applicant was convicted on the following charges:
(a)	one charge of obtaining by deception (s 240 of the Crimes Act 1961) during the period 1 October 2003 to August 2012;
(b)	four charges of fraudulently using a document to obtain a pecuniary advantage (s 229A of the Crimes Act);
(c)	seven charges of dishonesty and without claim of right using a document to obtain a pecuniary advantage (s 228(b) of the Crimes Act).
[2]	The context of these charges was an allegation that during the period between 8 February 2000 and August 2012, the applicant had claimed that she was not married or living in a relationship in the nature of marriage in order to obtain a domestic purposes benefit and other supplementary benefits to which she would not have been entitled if she had declared her relationship with Mr Monty Poa.  In the District Court the Judge found that at the relevant times the applicant and Mr Poa lived in a relationship in the nature of marriage.  He stated that the evidence showed that the relevant characteristics of such a relationship were present to a “high degree”.
[3]	The applicant appealed against her conviction but on 6 November 2014 Venning J dismissed her appeal.  Subsequently, Venning J declined the applicant’s application for leave to appeal to this Court on a question of law.  The applicant now seeks special leave pursuant to s 144(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 to appeal on two questions of law.  The questions are:
(a)	Does the admissibility of Jean Te Kani’s hearsay statement pursuant to the Evidence Act 2006 take the exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay beyond any reasonable breaking point?
(b)	Are the Court’s reasons to convict sufficient for the occasion?  Do courts on appeal fail to clearly identify evidence attributable to each of the charges?  Are the defence’s challenges to the admissibility of key evidence; and the period of alleged offending, such that this was an occasion in which greater clarity of reasoning was desirable?
[4]	The application for special leave was filed out of time.  However, the applicant applied to extend the time for making it and the Crown did not oppose an extension.  Consequently, the application to extend the time for applying is granted.
[5]	As Venning J observed in the judgment declining leave, this Court confirmed the elements necessary for a grant of leave to appeal in R v Slater.  The appeal must involve a question of law, the question must be one which by reason of its general and public importance or for any other reason ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal and the Court must be of the opinion that it ought to be so submitted.  The Court observed:
Section 144 was not intended to provide a second tier of appeals from decisions of the District Court in proceedings under the Summary Proceedings Act.  Parliament intended such proceedings to be brought to finality with the defendant having an appeal to the High Court other than when the conditions that are specified in subsections (2) and (3) are met and leave to appeal is granted.  Neither the determination of what comprises a question of law nor the question whether the point of law raises a question of general or public importance, are to be diluted.
First proposed question
[6]	The first proposed question concerns the admission of hearsay evidence from a deceased witness Ms Jean Te Kani.  Ms Te Kani had died some months after providing the respondent with a recorded interview.  Essentially, the applicant complains that such was the importance of this evidence for the prosecution case that the Judge should have given greater weight to the prejudice suffered by the defence in being unable to cross-examine the witness for the purpose of offering an effective defence.  The applicant claims the Judge should have decided that the probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by the risk that it would have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding.  
[7]	The same issue was raised in the High Court, and rejected by Venning J.  In declining leave to appeal, the Judge found that the point was not of such general and public importance as to warrant a second appeal and that it did not warrant the attention of this Court.
[8]	We agree.  The proposed question is not a question of law, still less a question of law of public and general importance.  It is simply an attempt to advance a second appeal in relation to the Judge’s fact-specific determination that the evidence in question should be admitted.  
[9]	In characterising the question in that way we do not overlook Mr Woods’ submission that the Judge had omitted to carry out the balancing exercise required by s 8(1)(a) of the Evidence Act, and consider the probative value as against the prejudicial effect of the evidence.  A similar argument was advanced in the High Court and rejected.  
[10]	Venning J noted that the District Court Judge had conducted a voir dire before ruling the evidence in question admissible.  In the ruling he had addressed the issue of potential prejudice, recording Mr Woods’ submission about the risk of prejudice arising from the inability to cross-examine, referring to ss 7 and 8 of the Evidence Act, quoting s 8(2) and expressing his conclusion that although there would be some prejudice admitting the evidence could not be said to be unfair or contrary to the provisions of s 8.  
[11]	While he did not directly state that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the risk it would have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceedings, we agree with Venning J’s conclusion that this was implicit in the Judge’s reasoning and conclusions.  We also consider Venning J was right to hold that, having dealt with the admissibility issue in the ruling, it was not necessary for the District Court Judge to revisit it in his judgment setting out the reasons for convicting the applicant.
[12]	This is not an issue appropriate for a second appeal under s 144(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act.
Second proposed question
[13]	As can be seen, the second question has several parts.  In his submissions in this Court, Mr Woods addressed the issues under two subject headings namely wrongful reliance by the District Court Judge upon certain financial documentation and an alleged failure to state sufficient reasons for the decisions to convict.
[14]	In relation to the first, the complaint is that the District Court Judge wrongly relied on financial statements produced by an accounting firm to draw inferences that the applicant had received funds from a partnership.  The applicant also claimed the Judge had been wrong to infer that the applicant had provided instructions to the accountants about the apportionment of profits from the business partnership.  These are again fact-based issues that do not give rise to any question of law, let alone one of general or public importance.
[15]	The second issue concerning sufficiency of the reasons for conviction is also unsuitable for a grant of special leave to appeal.  In essence, the applicant asserts that the District Court Judge did not provide reasons for convicting her that were specific to the individual charges she faced.  It was said that this hindered the ability to argue an appeal, and of the first appellate court to consider the appeal, while unfairly failing to inform the applicant of the grounds on which she was convicted.  Mr Woods claimed the facts that the convictions rested on hearsay evidence, and the offending took place over a period of 12 years added to the desirability of setting out the precise evidential basis for conviction on each charge.
[16]	Venning J dealt with the applicant’s contention at [31] to [33] of his substantive decision.  In summary, Judge Field had specifically acknowledged his obligation to consider each obligation separately and not adopt a global approach, noting that the informations in each case referred to a relevant date.  Then, he found that the applicant and Mr Poa had lived in a relationship in the nature of marriage at the relevant times and that on each occasion she signed relevant forms the applicant was in that relationship and knew it.  He then addressed the different categories of offending finding in each case, and in relation to each offence, that it had been made out. 
[17]	In the circumstances the applicant’s allegation that the District Court Judge gave insufficient reasons for convicting her cannot be sustained.  No question of law arises, let alone one worthy of a second appeal.
Result
[18]	The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors: 
Rice Craig, Auckland for Applicant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent